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Case Laws
Showing 21 to 40 of 81 Records
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1965 (11) TMI 141 - PUNJAB HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... nacting tax laws, so long as they are within the constitutional competence of the Legislature. The court is only concerned with the plain language of the law. It is well to remember that there is no equity in a taxing statute, which the courts are empowered to enforce, and also, that revenue is the very life-blood of a democratic welfare State of our pattern. The question of ensuring fair distribution of the burden of taxation is the patriotic privilege and sacred duty of the elected representatives of the nation, who are entrusted with this solemn obligation to be discharged faithfully and conscientiously and who are answerable to the people for their acts of commission and omission. The courts cannot intrude into this sphere except to enforce the constitutional mandates and to keep every one, including the State itself, within the bounds of law. For the foregoing reasons, this petition fails and is hereby dismissed but without costs. CAPOOR, J.-I agree. Petition dismissed.
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1965 (11) TMI 140 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... be fulfilled by supplying motor spirit from the stocks of the company from any place. The choice was left to the company as to the place from which it could transport the motor spirit. It is immaterial to the State Transport Department wherefrom the stocks came. It should also be remembered that it is only on the direction issued by the appellants that the spirit was brought in the appellants lorries as their own property and pumped into their storage tanks. It may be mentioned here that the bills were issued by the Madras office and passed for payment by the Accounts Officer of the Transport Department at Madras. In these circumstances, it is difficult to accede to the proposition that these intra-State sales will be converted into inter-State sales for the reasons adduced by the appellants. We are therefore unable to disagree with our learned brother in his decision. In the above circumstances, the appeal is dismissed with costs. Advocate s fees Rs. 250. Appeal dismissed.
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1965 (11) TMI 139 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... not a mode of service falling within the provisions of rule 77, it is not necessary to consider these submissions. I am, therefore, of the view that the petitioner was not served with a copy of the notice under section 21 before 1st April, 1965, and that consequently the assessment proceedings under section 21 are barred by limitation and, therefore, without jurisdiction. As regards the other relief claimed by the petitioner, namely, the return of the books and documents which are said to have been seized from the petitioner s custody by the Sales Tax Authorities, Mr. Shukla on behalf of the respondents has stated that the respondents are prepared to return those books and documents. In the circumstances it is not necessary to grant any relief in that behalf. The petition is allowed. The proceedings under section 21 of the U.P. Sales Tax Act for the assessment year 1960-61 directed against the petitioner are quashed. The petitioner is entitled to his costs. Petition allowed.
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1965 (11) TMI 138 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... te his duties such as were cast upon him under section 11(4B). In my reading section 11(4B) also contains a power and there is an element of duty that is only an adjunct to the exercise of the powers. In the view that I take, I find inspiration from a decision of the Supreme Court in Messrs. Daluram Pannalal Modi v. Assistant Commissioner of Sales Tax 1963 14 S.T.C. 675 1964 2 S.C.R. 289-290. Mr. Dutta also invited my attention to two other decisions of this Court, namely, Shree Shew Sakti Oil Mills v. Member, Board of Revenue, West BengalI.L.R. (1949) 2 Cal. 347., and Balihari Colliery Co., Ltd. v. Commercial Tax Officer 1957 8 S.T.C. 194 A.I.R. 1957 Cal. 160. It is not necessary for me to consider those decisions further because there is nothing contained in those two decisions which is contrary to the view which I have expressed hereinbefore. For the reasons stated above, this Rule is discharged with costs, hearing fee being assessed at three gold mohurs. Rule discharged.
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1965 (11) TMI 137 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... support of Ram Chandra v. Laxman Das 1961 12 S.T.C. 367. It is true that clause (iv) of sub-section (2) is to the effect that subsection (1) will not apply to disclosure of the particulars to a civil court in a suit to which the Government are party provided that it relates to a matter arising out of any proceeding under the Act. But sub-section (2) cannot be read as in any way enlarging the scope of subsection (1) which has to be decided on the language employed by it. As there is no prohibition in sub-section (1) of section 57 against courts calling for records of the type mentioned in the sub-section, there should be no objection to marking in evidence such documents as the Court may think fit. It may be that section 57(1) is intended to protect assessees by treating the particulars contained in a specified document as confidential. But this privilege appears to be only a qualified one and is not absolute. On that view the petition is allowed with costs. Petition allowed.
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1965 (11) TMI 136 - SUPREME COURT
Whether in view of the decision of the High Court of Orissa in S.J.C. No. 2 of 1965 dated 29th September, 1958, it is open to the Sales Tax Tribunal, Orissa, to hold that any part of the contract for tunnel-holing by Messrs John Mowlem & Co. Ltd., with the Government of Madras (now Andhra Pradesh) is liable for sales tax?
Whether the contract entered into with Messrs John Mowlem & Co. Ltd., by the Government of Madras (now Andhra Pradesh) for tunnel-holing is in the nature of a contract of agency where the goods are Government property from the inception, and there is no passing of title in them, at any time, from the company to the Government?
Whether the contract for tunnel-holing between Messrs John Mowlem & Co., Ltd. and the Government of Madras (now Andhra Pradesh) is not composite and indivisible, but contains a separate and distinct contract for the supply of material, viz., plant as such, and the value of the plant being liable for the sales tax?
Held that:- Appeal allowed. Unable to agree with the learned Judges of the High Court. A covenant in the contract whereby the appellants undertook to deliver goods purchased by them on behalf of the State at the site where they were required by the latter is not inconsistent with the relation between them being of agent and principal, and a stipulation that the appellants "will remain responsible for transportation and insurance as far as the site" also does not detract from the overwhelming indications furnished by the other terms of the contract. The stipulation that goods purchased will be insured in the joint names of the Government of the State of Madras and the appellants is susceptible of no positive inference in favour of either case, and the learned Chief justice was right in observing that the term about the contractors' liability to pay customs duty, if any, was inconclusive.
It is not possible to raise an inference from the clause "the final accounting for the plant, and its passing into the hands of the purchaser will take place" in paragraph 8 of the contract, that till it was delivered at the site of the Machkund Dam, the appellants were the owners of the plant. The clause deals merely with the obligations undertaken by the appellants for "transportation and insurance" of the plant, and not with the passing of property in the plant from the appellants to the State of Madras.
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1965 (11) TMI 127 - SUPREME COURT
Certificate of registration - Held that:- Appeal dismissed. The High Court was right in holding that these two items, namely, spare parts of motor vehicles including tyres and tubes, and motor trucks cannot be included in the registration certificate of the appellant.
As far as furniture and sanitary fittings are concerned, these are covered by the ratio of the decision of this Court in the Indian Copper Corporation case (1964 (10) TMI 41 - SUPREME COURT OF INDIA). In dealing with stationery use of stationery undoubtedly facilitates the carrying on of a business of manufacturing goods or of processing goods or even mining operation but the expression 'intended to be used' cannot be equated with 'likely to facilitate' the conduct of the business of manufacturing or of processing goods or of mining". These observations apply to the items "furniture" and "sanitary fittings ". These two items are likely to facilitate the business of mining but it cannot be said that they are intended to be used in mining.
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1965 (11) TMI 124 - SUPREME COURT
It is no doubt true that when there is an alternative remedy, the High Court will not normally entertain an application under Article 226, but where, as in the instant case, the High Court has chosen to exercise its jurisdiction to grant relief to the respondent, this Court will not interfere with the jurisdiction exercised by the High Court - Appeal dismissed.
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1965 (11) TMI 123 - SUPREME COURT
Whether the hire-purchase agreements entered into by the appellant with its customers are transactions of sale of goods or are only documents securing the return of the loans advanced by it to its customers?
Held that:- Appeal allowed. The intention of the appellants in obtaining the hire- purchase and the allied agreements was to secure the return of loans advanced to their customers, and no real sale of the vehicle was intended by the customer to the appellants. The transactions were merely financing transactions.
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1965 (11) TMI 108 - SUPREME COURT
Whether a dealer who has been assessed to tax on the turnover of the previous year according to his election can change his option and elect the assessment year by filing quarterly returns with- out the previous sanction of Sales Tax Commissioner?
Held that:- Accept the appeal, and answer the question referred to the High Court in the affirmative. Judge (Revisions) was in error in holding that the assessee was not entitled to make an election under rule 39(1) without the sanction of the Sales Tax Commissioner, and the answer to the question referred to the High Court should be in favour of the assessee.
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1965 (11) TMI 103 - SUPREME COURT
GOODS USED FOR THE PURPOSE OF PRODUCING OTHER GOODS FOR SALE — PURCHASE OF UNGINNED COTTON — USER OF GINNED COTTON IN TEXTILE MANUFACTURE AND SALE OF COTTON SEEDS — REFUND OF PURCHASE TAX
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1965 (11) TMI 101 - SUPREME COURT
Whether a firm could be assessed to sales tax after it was dissolved?
Held that:- Appeal dismissed. The High Court was right in holding that the assessment order on the dissolved firm could not be supported under the provisions of the Act. The High Court has given a correct answer to the question propounded for its decision.
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1965 (11) TMI 97 - SUPREME COURT
Whether the said iron bars, flats and plates are not iron and steel within the meaning of item, No. 39 of the Notification No. 58, dated October 24, 1953?
Held that:- Appeal dismissed. Iron and steel used as raw material for manufacturing other goods are exempted from taxation. So long as iron and steel continue to be raw materials, they enjoy the exemption. Scrap iron purchased by the respondent was merely re-rolled into bars, flats and plates. They were processed for convenience of sale. The raw materials were only re-rolled to give them attractive and acceptable forms. They did not in the process lose their character as iron and steel. The dealer sold "iron and steel" in the shape of bars, flats and plates and the customer purchased "iron and steel" in that shape. We, therefore, hold that the bars, flats and plates sold by the assessee are iron and steel exempted under the Notification.
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1965 (11) TMI 95 - SUPREME COURT
Whether the coffee powder had been sold by the assessee inside the State of Mysore instead of selling it in the course of inter-State trade, no sales tax could have been demanded from him under the Mysore Sales Tax Act, 1948, or the Mysore Sales Tax Act, 1957 - Appeal allowed.
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1965 (11) TMI 78 - HIGH COURT OF ALLAHABAD
Memorandum of association – Special resolution and confirmation by CLB required for alteration of
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1965 (11) TMI 70 - HIGH COURT OF KERALA
Annual Return – Penalty for not filing ... ... ... ... ..... n shown as the governing director and he has signed the return as the governing director. Exhibit P-13 is another very important document. It is a letter written by the petitioner and it is stated therein that even though he had sent his resignation letter on 7th August, 1961, the other directors have not taken charge and relieved him and he has stated that the audited balance-sheet and the returns would be submitted to the Registrar as early as possible and requesting that no action may be taken. It is, therefore, practically admitted that the petitioner continues as the governing director and has not been relieved of that post. The decision referred to by the learned counsel in Abdul Huq v. Katpadi Industries Ltd. 1960 73 MLW 106 AIR 1960 Mad. 482 cannot help the petitioner as it refers only to the resignation of an ordinary director. The conviction of the accused in the two cases is, therefore, proper and no interference is called for. The revision petitions are dismissed.
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1965 (11) TMI 69 - HIGH COURT OF MADRAS
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... ... ..... itors in sections 224 and 255 of the Act. Therefore, whether the directors acted regularly or irregularly in recording at their meeting on May 6, 1965, that Dr. Bail (petitioner) continues in office , there was no question of his being appointed by the directors on that date, because obviously the directors had no such power. Therefore, the recording of continuance of Dr. Bail as director in the minutes of the meeting of the board of directors will not constitute an appointment for the purpose of section 282(2)(b), and much less an invalid appointment, attracting the first limb of that section. For the foregoing reasons, I am of the opinion that the case of the petitioner does not fall within the four corners of section 282(2)(b) of the Act, which is the section for whose contravention, he has been prosecuted and convicted in this case. I allow the revision case, set aside the conviction of the petitioner, acquit him and direct the fine amount, if paid by him, to be refunded.
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1965 (11) TMI 68 - HIGH COURT OF MADRAS
Government company ... ... ... ... ..... e Neyveli Lignite Corporation is nothing other than a Government organisation. This argument cannot possibly be accepted. There is more than one decision of the Supreme Court which establishes that the entity of the corporation is entirely separate from that of its shareholders. Unless Mr. Ramaswami is able to show that all the administrative actions of the corporation are controlled by the Government, he cannot successfully establish that the corporation is a public authority. Nor am I satisfied that the proceedings of a domestic tribunal of a private body can be brought under challenge under article 226. It is impossible to say that when an employer is engaged in taking disciplinary proceedings against his employee, he is deciding any rights whatever. I am accordingly of the opinion that the petition has to fail on the ground that the writ jurisdiction of this court cannot be extended to a case of this kind. The petition is dismissed, but there will be no order as to costs.
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1965 (11) TMI 67 - IN THE CHANCERY DIVISION
Reduction of share capital – Application to Tribunal for confirming order, objections by creditors, and settlement of list of objecting creditors
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1965 (11) TMI 42 - SUPREME COURT
Whether section 35(10) authorises the Income-tax Officer to bring to tax rebate granted in assessment years commencing prior to April 1, 1956?
Whether distribution by the liquidator of accumulated profits in the previous years could be regarded as declaration of dividend within the meaning of section 35(10) so as to attract the applicability of the provisions enabling withdrawal of rebate and demand for tax?
Held that:- It is true that the definition of " dividend " in section 2(6A)(c) will apply only if there is nothing repugnant in the subject or context in which the expression " dividend " occurs in section 35(10), but there is nothing in section 35(10) which suggests that the expression " dividend " was to have a meaning different from the meaning assigned to it by the interpretation clause.
The liquidator of the appellant-company did from time to time distribute accumulated profits, and within the meaning of section 2(6A)(c) read with the provisions of the Companies Act, they were distribution of interim dividends. It is true that power under section 35(10) may be exercised if accumulated profits are availed of by the company " for declaring dividends in any year ", but since the Companies Act does not in the matter of distribution of interim dividends set up any special machinery, nor impose any special condition before power in that behalf may be exercised, no artificial meaning can be attached to the word " declaring dividends ". Distribution of accumulated profits by the liquidator together with the income-tax refund certificate in the course of voluntary winding up may, therefore, for the purpose of section 2(6A)(c), be regarded as declaration of dividend. Appeal dismissed.
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