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Showing 21 to 40 of 70 Records
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1965 (2) TMI 115 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... f certain circumstances which would have necessitated the sale to take place at a different time. That, however, will not make the transaction any the less a transaction which was entered into as an adventure in the nature of trade and carried out as such. We have, therefore, not found it necessary to allow the notice of motion taken out by Mr. Palkhivala and take on record all the material which he has referred to therein. We have, however, looked at the necessary extracts for earlier years from the Tijori account, which we think was the only important part of that material, apart from the material, which is already annexed to the statement of the case by the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal. In the result, therefore, our answers to the two questions, which are referred to us, are in the affirmative. The assessee will pay the costs of the department of the reference. There will be no order on the notice of motion and no order as to costs. Questions answered in the affirmative.
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1965 (2) TMI 114 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... employment by an employer to the employee in exercise of the option given to him by the contract of employment itself, and would, therefore, be profits arising out of employment and would not be compensation for loss of employment within the meaning of Explanation 2 of section 7(1) of the Act. We have already stated that in our opinion there is no such option reserved in favour of the company under paragraph 3 of the letter of 11th October, 1943. On the other hand, what has been provided for is a measure of damages in the event of the termination of the service of the assessee by the company in breach of the service agreement. For the reasons stated, in our opinion, the Tribunal was right in holding that the said amount of ₹ 7 lakhs was not liable to tax under section 7 of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922. In the result, our answer to the question referred to us is in the negative. The Commissioner shall pay the costs of the assessee. Question answered in the negative.
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1965 (2) TMI 113 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ed before the Act from the operation of s. 22. Those observations were not necessary for the purpose of that case, because the widow in that case was clearly entitled to. maintenance from the estate of her deceased husband dying in 1916 under the Hindu law, as it stood then, independently of ss. 21 and 22 of the Act, and in spite of the compromise timing the maintenance before the commencement of the Act, the widow could in view of s. 25 claim alteration of the amount of the maintenance. The decision cannot be regarded as an authority for the proposition that ss. 21 and 22 of the Act affect rights already vested before the commencement of the Act. We therefore, hold that the claim of the respondents to maintenance for their lives is not affected by the Act. o p /o p We see no reason to interfere with the concurrent finding of Courts below with regard to the quantum of maintenance. o p /o p In the result, the appeal is dismissed with costs. o p /o p Appeal dismissed. o p /o p
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1965 (2) TMI 112 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... 8377; 1,00,000 represented concealed turnover. Quite obviously, the entire sales turnover could not become income. Whatever that may be, ₹ 1,00,000 was added finally as income that had escaped tax. It was, therefore, in the circumstances necessary for the authority, acting under section 28, to determine what was the income that was deliberately suppressed, and we cannot conceive in the circumstances of a better method than that adopted by the Appellate Assistant Commissioner in adjudicating upon this question. The Tribunal erred in law in thinking that there was any lack of jurisdiction in the Appellate Assistant Commissioner to deal with the matter in the manner that he did. We are accordingly of the opinion that the question has to be answered in favour of the assessee. That would mean that the Appellate Assistant Commissioner's order would be the operative order in the case. The assessee will be entitled to his costs. Question answered in favour of the assessee.
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1965 (2) TMI 111 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... of the assessment for the year 1949-50. Here again, we have seen the copy of the enclosure to the grounds of appeal before the Tribunal, wherein he has stated specifically that he was withdrawing only the objection regarding the estimated income. There was no request to withdraw the appeal in relation to the legality of the assessment. It is hardly likely that it would have been withdrawn, for the assessee had succeeded in establishing that this income was not includiable in the income of the Hindu undivided family, in the reference to this court relating to 1945-46. Therefore, we feel that the assessee is entitled to claim before us that the action of the Income-tax Officer in reassessing his income for 1949-50 under section 34 of the Act is invalid. For the reasons stated above, we answer the question in the. Negative and hold that, on the facts and circumstances of the case, the; assessment under section 34 of the Act is not lawful. The assessee is entitled to his costs.
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1965 (2) TMI 110 - PUNJAB HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... hese decisions are clearly distinguishable and have no application to the facts of the present case. The word "occupy" has various shades of meaning and that meaning is to be assigned to it which fits in with the context in which the word is used. We are clearly of the opinion that in the context of sections 9 and 10 of the Act, it would be wrong to give a limited and restricted meaning to the word "occupy." For the reasons give above, we answer the first question against the department and hold that the income of the assessee from the buildings or lands appurtenant thereto rented out to its employees is income from business and falls for assessment under section 10 and not under section 9 of the Income-tax Act, 1922. In view of the answer to the first question, the second question must necessarily be answered against the department. However, we leave he parties to bear their owns costs of this reference. KAPUR J.--I agree. Reference answered accordingly.
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1965 (2) TMI 109 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... purchased properties or made investment of those moneys is not sufficient to bring the transaction within the scope of the expression "capital borrowed for the purpose of the business". It was never the contention, as far as we can see, that the partners in their individual capacity were in fact carrying on a business of the nature of investments or purchase of properties. Nor can it be said that it was at all a borrowing. In addition, we have pointed out that the partners utilised the moneys of the firm for the discharge of their own income-tax liabilities. We are unable to see by what process of interpretation the drawal of such amounts from the partners' drawing accounts can be regarded as capital borrowed for the purpose of the business. Neither in fact nor in law can the claim in this regard be at all justified. This question is also answered in favour of the department. The department will be entitled to its costs. Counsel's fee ₹ 250 (one set).
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1965 (2) TMI 108 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... so contended that the computation of the gross profit must be in accordance with law and on the material on record. It is not permissible for the income-tax authorities to allow a part and disallow the rest, if, in law, he is entitled not to take any of these items into consideration in arriving at the gross profits. We think that, on the principles of accountancy as stated by Batliboi, and it has not been shown to us why the above principle is not correct, we must accept the contention of the learned counsel for the assessee. But, since we are holding that no basis is given for the fixation of the turnover and no material upon which the rate of 9 was arrived at, is furnished to the assessee, this point does not assume importance. For the aforesaid reasons our answer to the reference must be in the negative. This, however, does not preclude the authorities from making fresh assessment. Let the reference be answered with costs of the assessee. Advocate's fee, ₹ 250.
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1965 (2) TMI 107 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ight of residence in that portion of the trust property for her lifetime. The trustees have been given a direction to take possession of that portion of the property on the death of the Maharanisaheb for the purposes of the trust. It being a trust property, it was incumbent on the trustees to maintain this property in good repair in the interest of the trust. Lest the trustees may think that there was no obligation on them to keep in good order that part of the property in which the Junior Dowager Maharanisaheb of Kolhapur was staying, the direction appears to have been given in clause (6) of the trust deed. In the circumstances it is not possible to accept this contention raised on behalf of the revenue. In our opinion, therefore, the Tribunal also was right in not accepting this contention of the revenue. In the result our answer to the question referred to us is in the affirmative. The Commissioner shall pay the costs of the assessee. Question answered in the affirmative.
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1965 (2) TMI 106 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... the real position to be that the persons obtaining the property from the sole owner derived title to the property from the recognized sole owner and such a document would have to satisfy the various formalities of law about the passing of title by transfer. The facts of the present case arc different. The agreement, Ex. 3, does not recognize that any of the brothers had the sole and absolute title to any of the properties dealt with by them. On the other hand the recitals in the document indicate that the three brothers considered the property to be joint property of all of them. The fact that in the present proceedings the evidence shows that the landed property at Mawprem was purchased from the moneys of the mother does not affect the nature of the arrangement arrived at between the three brothers. 16. We are, therefore, of opinion that this case does not help in any way the appellant in his contentions. 17. The result is that the appeal fails and is dismissed with costs.
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1965 (2) TMI 105 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... . Whatever rights the respondents have. are against the Bharati Central Bank and not the appellant. Indeed, having claimed, as against the Bharati Central Bank to be treated as preferential creditors of that Bank to the rune of ₹ 8,800, particularly on their own showing what was owing to them from the appellant was something less than ₹ 6,000 they cannot now be heard to say that they merely acted as the appellant's agents. For these reasons, disagreeing with the High Court, I hold that the appellant's name cannot be included in the list of the respondent's debtors. I would, therefore, allow the appeal and dismiss the application of the Liquidator under s. 45-D of the Banking Companies Act in so far as it relates to the appellant, with costs throughout and would direct further that the respondents pay the appellants costs both here and in the High Court. ORDER BY COURT In accordance with the opinion of the majority, this appeal is dismissed with costs.
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1965 (2) TMI 104 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... r case. This is also the intention of s. 68 as interpreted in the context of the several delegated powers. This is apparent from the fact that the order of the delegate amounts to an order by the Commissioner and is appealable as such. If it were not so the appeal to the Bombay City Civil Court would be incompetent and the order could not be assailed. The order of the delegate was the order of the Commissioner and the control envisaged both in s. 68 and the order of delegation was not control over the decision as such but over the administrative aspects of cases and their disposal. No allegation has been made that the Commissioner intervened in the decision of the case or improperly influenced it. In these circumstances the order impugned in the appeal cannot be sustained. We allow the appeal and set aside the order of the Bombay City Civil Court and restore the order of the officer who exercised powers under s. 105B of the Act, but make no order about costs. Appeal allowed.
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1965 (2) TMI 103 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... e or under any other law for the time being in force he is still below the District Magistrate for certain purposes mentioned in S. 10(3) of the Code. Besides there is only one District Magistrate in a district and all other Magistrates whether they be Magistrates first class or even Additional District Magistrates must obviously be below him in rank. As S. 3(2)(p) of the Act provides that the power of detention cannot be exercised by any officer below the rank of the District Magistrate, such power cannot be exercised by an Addition District Magistrate who is in our opinion an officer below the rank of a District Magistrate. THE order of detention passed by Shri Lall Singh on 30/06/1964 when he was not the District Magistrate of Amritsar but only an Additional District Magistrate is not in accordance with the Act and the Rules and must be set aside. ORDER, DATED 20-1-1965 The appeal is allowed and the appellant is directed to be released. Reasons will follow.Appeal allowed.
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1965 (2) TMI 102 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... tion of excluding the application of the various provisions mentioned in Section 29(2), Limitation Act can be gathered. 12. Section 29 (2) of the Limitation Act 1908 did not make the provisions of Section 5 thereof applicable. In his respect the new Limitation Act is different. It does make Section 5 applicable for purposes of determining the period of limi-tation prescribed by any special or local law. Section 417 (3), Cr. P. C. being such a special law the period of limitation prescribed by it can be determined with the aid and assistance of Section 5, Limitation Act. 13. The preliminary objection is overruled. 14. On the merits, the facts stated in the affidavit accompanying the petition under Section 5, Limitation Act have not been controverted by any counter-affidavit. On the face of it they make out a sufficient cause for condoning the delay. 15. The petition is allowed. The delay in filing the application for special leave under Section 417 (3), Cr. P. C. is condoned.
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1965 (2) TMI 101 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... a mere irregularity that can be cured. Non-signing of a notice under section 34 of the Income-tax Act does not come within the formula of an obvious clerical mistake. As the finality of the assessment is one of the main principles to be followed in tax cases and as the re-opening of the assessment under section 34 is a matter of public policy (though I am not unmindful that it is not a case of fundamental right) and as a right under section 34 is not intended to be conferred only for the benefit of the assessee (though it might dominate and condition the right of the assessee), i.e., it is not a private right, meant merely for individual benefit, there is a prima facie difficulty in my way to hold that there can be waiver of the notice under section 34 of the Income-tax Act. The subsequent conduct of the assessee is also of no moment. For these reasons the answer given by my learned brother in favour of the assessee along with the order for costs, has my entire concurrence.
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1965 (2) TMI 100 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... e. We must therefore, hold that the State Electricity Board was not required to give the notice under sub-s(4) of s.6 in respect of its option of purchase on the expiry of 25 years. It must follow that the Board cannot be deemed to have elected not to purchase the undertaking under sub-s(4) of s.6. By the notice served upon the appellant, the Board duly elected to purchase the undertaking on the expiry of 25 years. Consequently, the State Government never became vested with the option of purchasing the undertaking under sub-s(2) of s.6. The State Government must, therefore, be restrained from taking further action under its notice, Ex. G, dated November 20, 1959. In the result, the appeal is allowed, and the respondent State of Kerala is restrained from taking any action under the notice, Ex. G, dated November 20, 1959. The respondent shall pay to the appellant the costs in this Court. We direct the parties to pay and bear their own costs in the Courts below. Appeal allowed.
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1965 (2) TMI 99 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... the offender would be entitled to compound the offence by paying the amount specified in the summons, which the Magistrate would be bound to accept, if the contention raised by the appellants is correct. Having regard to the phraseology used by theLegislator which prima facie gives a discretion to the Magistrate exercisable at the time of issuing the summons, and having regard also to the scheme of the Act, we are of the view that the HighCourt was right in holding that the Magistrate is not obliged in offences not specified in Part A of the Fifth Schedule to make an endorsement in terms of cl. (b) of sub-s. (1) of s. 130 of the Act. We are of the opinion that the view to the contrary expressed by the High Court of Allahabad in State of U.P. v. Mangal Singh (1962) 1 Cr.L.J. 684., and the High Court of Assam in State of Assam v. Suleman Khan (1961) 2 Cr.L.J. 869., on which the Sessions Judge relied is not correct. The appeal therefore fails and is dismissed. Appeal dismissed.
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1965 (2) TMI 98 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... other materials, and shall have metallic covering with an aperture. Each of such hundials shall be under double lock and sealed by the Trustee or his nominee and the Kattalai Thambiran. One set of keys shall be with the Kattalai Thambiran and the other set with the Trustee or his nominee. The hundials shall be opened every day or at such intervals as the Trustee may direct in the presence of the Kattalai Thambiran and the worshippers of the temple and the collections shall be kept by the Trustee. Clause 13. The words "Executive Officer" will be substituted by the words "Kattalai Thambiran". Clause 14. The words "Executive Officer" will be substituted by the words "Kattalai Thambiran". Clause 15. The words "Executive Officer" will be substituted by the words "Kattalai Thambiran". In the result, the decree of the High Court is modified as. aforesaid. The parties will their respective costs throughout. Decree modified.
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1965 (2) TMI 97 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... upon action of a foreign country in issuing the passport. We are therefore of the view that the High Court was in error in holding that the decision of the Government of India without giving an opportunity to the appellant to prove his case that he had been compelled by the police to obtain a passport from the High Commissioner for Pakistan will sustain the order of deportation against the appellant. It will of course be open to the Central Government to determine whether the appellant has lost the citizenship of India by voluntarily acquiring the citizenship of Pakistan by obtaining a passport from the High Commissioner, for Pakistan, or in any other manner. But the determination must be made in accordance with law. The appeal is allowed, and it is ordered that the order of deportation passed by the Commissioner of Police, Madras shall not be enforced until the Central Government determines the status of the appellant according to law. No order as to costs. Appeal allowed.
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1965 (2) TMI 96 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... s and circumstances as they exist at the time when the question has 5 to be determined. On the facts as found, at the time when the assessee came in possession of these articles he did not intend to put them to a personal or household use nor has he put them to any such use at any time thereafter so far. In the present assessment at any rate the assessee cannot get exemption for the said articles on the ground that they are intended for personal or household use. What the position will be in future assessment if the assessee starts using these articles for his personal use hereafter we need not consider at present. As things stand at present, we are of the opinion that the decision of the Tribunal is correct, and the assessee is not entitled to exemption under section 5(1)(viii) of the Wealth-tax Act in respect of the gold articles. 9. Our answer, therefore, to the question which has been referred to us is in the negative. The assessee will pay the costs of the Commissioner.
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