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Case Laws
Showing 21 to 40 of 84 Records
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1968 (10) TMI 96
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... ... ..... ued the notice under section 21 to the petitioner. The material relied upon by the Sales Tax Officer in the Allahabad Milling Co. s case 1965-1966 16 S.T.C. 888 17 S.T.C. 211. was undoubtedly relevant and justified the belief of the Sales Tax Officer. In the instant case there is no such definite material. We are, therefore, not prepared to hold that Desai, C.J., laid down a proposition different from the one laid down by the Supreme Court in S. Narayanappa s case 1967 63 I.T.R. 219., namely, that the reason to believe does not mean purely subjective satisfaction on the part of the Income-tax Officer. For these reasons we allow this and the connected writ petitions. The impugned notices under section 21 of the Act dated 5th March, 1966, relating to the assessment years 1960-61 to 1964-65 are quashed. The respondent, Sales Tax Officer, Etawah, is prohibited from taking any action in pursuance of the impugned notices. The petitioner is entitled to his costs. Petitions allowed.
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1968 (10) TMI 95
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... ... ..... n revision the time-limit of two years prescribed by section 12(1) of the Madhya Bharat Act had expired and he was not competent to exercise his power of revision. 7.. Before concluding we must refer to a decision of a Division Bench of this Court in Commissioner of Sales Tax v. Narain PrasadM.C.C. No. 153 of 1963, decided on 5th February, 1963, to which our attention has been drawn by the learned Government Advocate. In that case it was held that after the Madhya Pradesh Act came into force a revisional proceeding will be governed by section 39 of this Act and not by the provisions of the repealed Acts. That case was decided before sub-section (1-a) was added to section 52 of the Madhya Pradesh Act. The case therefore cannot be taken as an authority for construing section 52 as it now stands. 8.. For the reasons stated above, we answer the question referred to us in the affirmative. There will be no order as to costs of this reference. Reference answered in the affirmative.
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1968 (10) TMI 94
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... ... ..... ication is biris. Notification No. ST-4485/X dated 14th December, 1957, exempts the turnover of biris from sales tax provided additional Central excise duty has been paid on such biris and the dealer furnishes proof to the satisfaction of the assessing authority that the duty has been paid. The exemption is conditional and unless the conditions are satisfied the exemption is not attracted. In other words, if the conditions are absent, the notification does not come into play at all. If that notification does not come into play, then clearly it is the earlier notification which operates. That is our conclusion upon what we perceive to be the clear intent and scope of the terms of Notification No. ST-4485/X dated 14th December, 1957. In this view of the matter we answer the second question in the negative. The Commissioner of Sales Tax is entitled to his costs which we assess at Rs. 50 in each case. Counsel s fee is assessed in the same figure. References answered accordingly.
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1968 (10) TMI 93
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... ... ..... eal against findings of fact recorded by the Commercial Tax Officer and if he did not succeed in that appeal, he could prefer a second appeal to the Sales Tax Appellate Tribunal under section 22, and then, when a question of law is wrongly decided or not decided, he can present a revision petition to this court under section 23 of the Act. But one whom the Deputy Commissioner selects cannot. So, section 12-A as it then stood clearly offended against Article 14 of the Constitution and was therefore void. Section 22, which after its amendment by Act III of 1966, authorises an appeal from an order of the Deputy Commissioner under section 12-A has no relevance to the impugned order which was made before its amendment. In the view that we take, it is unnecessary for us to discuss the further criticism of section 12-A that it affords no intelligible guidance for the selection which it empowers. So, we set aside the order made by the Deputy Commissioner. No costs. Petition allowed.
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1968 (10) TMI 92
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... ... ..... would be taken-but also even if Sri Choudary s contention is for a moment upheld, and we do not say that we are doing so, the very amendment being invalid, the repeal of the old section cannot be effective. Our conclusion, without the necessity of having to decide this question, achieves the same result, namely, that if the offending sections have been struck down as indicated earlier, the position is the same as that which existed under the old section 11, in that the agent s liability is co-extensive with that of the principal, and he is entitled to the same exemption which each of his principals is entitled to. The writ petitions are allowed with costs, and there will be a direction as indicated above, namely, in cases where assessments have been made based on the amended section 11 of the Act they will be set aside and fresh assessments will have to be made in accordance with this judgment. The petitioners will have their costs. Advocate s fee Rs. 50. Petitions allowed.
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1968 (10) TMI 91
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... ... ..... , will not necessarily amount to full disclosure within the meaning of this section. In my opinion, it is implicit in section 18 of the Bihar Act that, recourse to section 16(3) can be taken by the prescribed authority in making assessment or reassessment. It may be remembered that the original assessment made by the assessment order on the 4th July, 1963, had been obliterated by the appellate order passed on the 30th May, 1964, and the case had been remanded for fresh assessment and, therefore, in my opinion, there was no bar to a fresh assessment for the assessment year 1962-63, as a whole. It must follow that the answer to the second question referred to this court must also be against the assessee. That is to say, the provisions of section 18(1) of the Act include power to assess escaped turnover to the best of judgment. 6.. The two questions, quoted above, are answered accordingly. There will be no order as to costs. B.N. JHA, J.-I agree. Reference answered accordingly.
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1968 (10) TMI 90
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... ... ..... Officer to apply his mind afresh for the purposes of determining whether the cement concrete spun pipes in question can be described as sanitary fittings and, therefore, whether the conclusion come to in the assessment order already made in respect of that turnover, is erroneous. We are of the opinion that in the circumstances of the case it cannot be said that what the Sales Tax Officer proposes to do pursuant to the impugned notice amounts to a rectification of a mistake apparent on the face of the record. The Sales Tax Officer has no jurisdiction to take the proceeding under section 22 of the Act and consequently the proceeding including the notice must be quashed. The petition is allowed. A writ in the nature of certiorari is issued quashing the notice dated 27th February, 1968, issued under section 22 of the U.P. Sales Tax Act. The Sales Tax Officer is restrained from taking proceedings pursuant to that notice. The petitioner is entitled to its costs. Petition allowed.
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1968 (10) TMI 89
Tax liability - Held that:- Appeal dismissed. The tax is at the same rate and therefore the tax cannot be said to be higher in the case of imported goods. It may be that when the rate is applied the resulting tax is somewhat higher but that does not offend against the equality contemplated by article 304. That is the consequence of ad valorem tax being levied at a particular rate. So long as the rate is the same article 304 is satisfied. Even in the case of local manufacturers if their cost of production varies, the net tax collected will be more or less in some cases but that does not create any inequality because inequality is not the result of the tax but results from the cost of production of the goods or the cost of their importation. This ground, therefore, has also no substance.
Thus it necessary to set down here the provisions of the Haryana Amendment Act because they follow the scheme of the Punjab Amendment Act in substance and what we have said in regard to the Punjab Amending Act applies mutatis mutandis to Haryana Amendment Act also.
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1968 (10) TMI 80
Memorandum of association – Special resolution and confirmation by CLB required for alteration of, Political Contributions – Prohibitions And Restrictions Regarding
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1968 (10) TMI 79
Winding up – Liability for fraudulent conduct of business
... ... ... ... ..... lant and for the 3rd respondent from specimen demonstrations before us, that it was impossible to be dogmatic in any given case from mere examination with the naked eye or with a magnifying glass, as to whether the seal is over the writing, or the waiting over the seal, we are not satisfied that the observations made by the learned judge are unjustified. Our own examination of the seal and writing only confirmed the learned judge s impression and observations. The appellant before us has only been issued a show-cause notice in pursuance of the observations made by the learned judge in his judgment. He would hereafter have sufficient opportunity to explain, as he has attempted to do before us, that he was not a party to Application No. 1 of 1959, nor even a witness therein and had no occasion to explain the nature of the writing, signature and seal, or the circumstances under which they happened to be made and affixed. We dismiss this appeal, but without any order as to costs.
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1968 (10) TMI 76
Winding up – Power of court to assess damages against delinquent directors, etc. ... ... ... ... ..... judge, there will be a decree in the following terms (1)That respondents Nos. 1 to 8 do jointly contribute to the assets of the bank a sum of Rs. 1,99,000 in respect of the second head of claim and that each of them be severally liable under this head for Rs. 40,000, the liquidator not being in any event entitled to recover more than Rs. 1,99,000 under this head of claim. (2)That respondents Nos. 1 to 6 and 8 be jointly and severally liable to contribute to the assets of the bank Rs. 6,155-12-5, being the dividend wrongfully declared for the year 1955. (3)That the 3rd respondent be liable to contribute a further sum of Rs. 7,250 to the assets of the bank under the fifth head of claim, and the 5th respondent be similarly liable to contribute Rs. 250 under the same head of claim. (4)That in other respects the decree of the learned trial judge in so far as the same is against respondents Nos. 1 to 8 do stand vacated. (5)That the parties do bear their respective costs throughout.
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1968 (10) TMI 75
Applications under sections 391 and 394 - Notice to be given to central government for, Advertisement of petition
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1968 (10) TMI 74
Winding up – Company when deemed unable to pay its debts ... ... ... ... ..... nion, will, whilst protecting the rights of the petitioner and other creditors, give the necessary time to the company to work out and place before the court any scheme which it might be in a position to evolve in the near future. I accordingly order that the petition be admitted, but that it be not advertised for a period of twelve weeks from to-day. It will thereafter be advertised in the Times of India, in the Loksatta and in the Maharashtra Government Gazette, unless further orders of the court are obtained by the company in the meantime. I may state that I have not permitted the Kamgar Margadarshak Samitee, which is a registered union of workers, to appear at the hearing of this petition as, in my opinion, it is only individual creditors who can appear, and not a labour union even though it may be registered or may, by reason of such registration, have rights under the industrial law to appear before industrial tribunals. Costs of the petition will be costs in the cause.
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1968 (10) TMI 73
Winding up – Power of tribunal to stay or restrain proceedings against company, Custody of company’s property, Winding up - Powers of liquidator, Overriding preferential payments and Avoidance of certain attachments, executions, etc.
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1968 (10) TMI 50
Admissibility of evidence before the trial was completed - Held that:- Any statement made under Sections 107 and 108 of the Customs Act by a person against whom an enquiry is made by a Customs Officer is not a statement made by a person accused of an offence.
At various stages of argument counsel asked us to make several assumptions on matters of evidence which were not before this Court. In some cases the statements made by the accused before the Customs Officer were tendered in evidence and were objected to; in other cases even before the statements were tendered in evidence, objections were raised. We may also observe that we are not concerned in these appeals to decide whether the statements relied upon were obtained from persons charged with infraction of the provisions of the Customs Act by officers having authority over them, by inducement, threat or promise having reference to the inquiry made against them. These questions, if raised, have to be decided at the trial of the appellants. The appeals fail and are dismissed.
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1968 (10) TMI 49
Whether that prosecution is barred under Article 20(2) of the Constitution which says that no person shall be prosecuted and punished for the same offence more than once?
Whether the prosecution must be quashed because of the delay in instituting the same?
Held that:- We do not think that the High Court was justified in interfering with the discretion of the learned Magistrate. Whether a particular document should be summoned or not is essentially in the discretion of the trial court. In the instant case the Special Public Prosecutor had assured the learned trial Magistrate that he would keep in readiness the statements of witnesses recorded by the Customs authorities sand shall make available to the defence Counsel the statement of the concerned witness as and when he is examined.
The High Court has not come to the conclusion that the documents in question, if not produced in court are likely to be destroyed or tampered with or the same are not likely to be made available when required. It has proceeded on the erroneous basis that the accused will not have a fair trail unless they are supplied with the copies of those statements even before the enquiry commences. Except for very good reasons, the High Court should not interfere with the discretion conferred on the trial courts in the matter of summoning documents. Such interferences would unnecessarily impede the progress of cases and result in waste of public money and time as has happened in this case.
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1968 (10) TMI 48
Whether statements of the appellant and other accused persons recorded by the Customs Authorities under the provisions of the Customs Act, 1962 hereinafter called the new Act, were admissible in evidence at their trial for the alleged offences under Section 120B of the Indian Penal Code read with Section 135 of the New Act and Sections 23(1A) and 23B of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1947 and under Rule 131B of the Defence of India Rules?
Held that:- It is difficult and indeed it would be contrary to all rules of interpretation to spell out any such special power from any of the provisions contained in the new Act. In this view of the matter even though under the new Act a Customs Officer has been invested with many powers which were not to be found in the provisions of the old Act, he cannot be regarded as a police officer within the meaning of Section 25 of the Evidence Act. Thus as with reference to the old Act has been reaffirmed on the question under consideration and it has been held that under the new Act also the position remains the same. This appeal fails and it is dismissed.
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1968 (10) TMI 47
Import — meaning of — Baggage — Connotation of — Res judicata ... ... ... ... ..... may be that it is a matter of discretion with the proper officer to accept or not to accept but once the discretion has been exercised, the proper officer is under a statutory obligation to return the article to the passenger on his leaving India and there is no question of his being entitled to revoke the discretion subsequently. 14. The last argument which was addressed by the appellants was that the Customs Act contains provisions for appeal and revision against any action that may be taken under the Act and, therefore, this Court should not interfere in the exercise of its powers under Article 226 of the Constitution. Such an argument was addressed before the learned Single Judge also and was repelled. The learned Single Judge exercised his discretion by entertaining the petition under Article 226 of the Constitution. In my view, the learned Single Judge was right in exercising his discretion in the circumstances of this case. I, therefore, dismiss the appeal with costs.
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1968 (10) TMI 46
Whether under the circumstances of the case the confiscation ordered by the Collector, Central Excise is illegal?
Whether under any circumstances he could not have confiscated the entire quantity of tobacco used in the mixture?
Held that:- At the same time no person can be permitted to benefit by his wrongful act. No rule of law should be so interpreted as to permit or encourage its circumvention. If by the wrongful act of a party he renders it impossible for the authorities to confiscate under Rule 40 the non-duty paid goods, it is in our opinion open to those authorities to confiscate from out of the goods seized, goods of the value reasonably representing the value of the non-duty paid goods mixed in the goods seized. Applying that rule to the facts of this case, it follows that the Collector Central Excise could have confiscated out of the tobacco seized so much of it as can be held to reasonably represented the value of the tobacco on which the duty had not been paid.
As noticed earlier the tobacco confiscated had been returned to the appellants after realising from them a sum of ₹ 1 lac. as fine. The Counsel for the parties agreed at the hearing that the value of the Biri Patti tobacco used in the mixture for which no duty had been paid could be fixed at ₹ 35,000/-. In view of this agreement it is not necessary for us to remit the case back to the Collector of Central Excise for assessing the value of the tobacco on which duty had not been paid. In view of our earlier findings the fine to be levied on the appellants in lieu of the confiscation that could have been ordered has to be fixed at ₹ 35,000/-. From this it follows that the Collector has to refund to the appellants a sum of ₹ 65,000/- which he has collected from them in excess of the aforementioned ₹ 35,000/-. The appeal is allowed to that extent. In the circumstances of the case we direct the parties to bear their own costs both in this Court as well as before the High Court.
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1968 (10) TMI 45
Demand - Limitation - Iron and steel products - Rate of duty on - `Plus' - Interpretation of taxing statute - Badly drafted entry
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