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Showing 21 to 40 of 72 Records
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1969 (3) TMI 85 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... rder, the appellant had directed the up-Pradhan to officiate as Pradhan during the suspension of the respondent. Our attention has not been invited to any provision either in the Act or in the rules framed there under -under which the, appellant could have made such an order. If he could not have made that order, as in our opinion he could not have, then the question arises as to who could discharge the functions of a Pradhan when he is placed under suspension pending enquiry of the charges levelled against him. , Absence of a provision providing for such a contingency is a clear indication of the absence of the power contended for. For the reasons mentioned above, we agree with the appellate bench of the High Court that the impugned order was made without the authority of law. That is also the view taken by the Allahabad High Court in Babu Nandan v. Sub Divisional Officer Salempur (A.I.R. 1966 All. 158.). We accordingly dismiss this appeal with costs. Y.P. Appeal dismissed.
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1969 (3) TMI 84 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... eal. Where there is some evidence which the appellate authority has accepted and which evidence may reasonably support the conclusion that the officer was guilty of improper conduct, it is not the function of the High Court in a petition for writ under Article 226 to review the evidence and to arrive at an independent finding on the evidence. The High Court may interfere where the statutory authority has acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction or where it has committed an error of law apparent on the face of the record. In the present, case, however, it is not shown on behalf of the appellant that the statutory authority has committed any error of jurisdiction or the appellate order dated January 2, 1962 is defective in law. 7. For these reasons we hold that the appellant had made out no case for the grant of a writ under Article 226 of the Constitution and this appeal must be dismissed. In the circumstances of the case we do not propose to make any order as to costs.
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1969 (3) TMI 83 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... of the Public Employment (Requirement as to Residence) Act, 1957, in so far as it relates to Telengana (and we say nothing about the other parts) and Rule 3 of the Rules under it are ultra vires the Constitution. In view of our conclusion on this point it is not necessary to express any opinion whether delegation to the Central and/or State Governments to provide by rules for the further implementing of the law made by Parliament is valid or not. It was argued that the Mulki Rules existing in the former Hyderabad State must continue to operate by virtue of Art. 35(b) in this area. This point is not raised by the petitions under consideration and no expression of opinion by us 'is desirable. For the reasons given above we quash the orders passed and declare s. 3 of the Public Employment (Requirement as to Residence) Act, 1957 as also Rule 3 of the Rules ultra vires the Constitution. The petitions shall be allowed but there shall be no order about costs. Petitions allowed.
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1969 (3) TMI 82 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... on in the new Limitation Act which would justify holding that these changes in definition were intended to make the Limitation Act applicable to proceedings before bodies other than Courts. We have already taken notice of the change introduced in the third division of the schedule by includ- ing references to applications under the Code of Criminal Procedure, which was the only other aspect relied upon by the Bombay High Court in support of its view that applications under s. 33C of the Act will also be governed by the new article 137. For the reasons we have indicated earlier, we are unable to accept the view expressed by the Bombay High Court; and we hold that article 137 of the schedule to the Limitation Act, 1963 does not apply to applications under s. 33C(2) of the Act, so that the previous decision of this Court that no limitation is prescribed for such applications remains unaffected. The appeals fail and I are dismissed with costs. One hearing fee. Appeals dismissed.
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1969 (3) TMI 81 - HOUSE OF LORDS
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... ... ..... than they do. The reimbursement or car allowance is a benefit to A and is a sum of money. In my opinion, it is a perquisite, a profit, an emolument. There is a quite different position when the employee incurs an expense in performing the duties of his employment-e. g., making a journey from head office to branch office and back to head office, or buying stamps and stationery for the firm-and has it reimbursed to him. In such a transaction there is no benefit-no profit or gain-to the employee. He does not receive any emolument. Although the result is unfair, I do not think it can properly be corrected without a change in the system eliminating the artificial division of the professional income between Schedule D and Schedule E. In my opinion, the issues raised in this appeal should be decided in favour of the respondent, and I would dismiss the appeal. Appeal allowed with costs in the House of Lords and below. Solicitors Le Breasseur and Oakley The Solicitor, Inland Revenue.
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1969 (3) TMI 80 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... xes v. Manohar Brothers 1962 13 S.T.C. 686. and the learned Judges pointed out that non-observance of the rule by the assessee in the matter of producing the C forms would deprive the assessee of the benefit of the favourable rate of tax under section 8(1) of the Central Sales Tax Act. They did not say that even if the assessee was deprived of the opportunity of filing the C forms for no fault of his the appellate authority was not empowered to rectify the situation. Upon these considerations, and upon the particular facts of this case, I answer the question referred in the affirmative. The assessee is entitled to his costs which I assess at Rs. 100. Counsel s fee is also assessed in the same figure. By the Court For the reasons contained in our respective judgments we answer the question referred in the affirmative. The assessee is entitled to his costs which we assess at Rs. 100. The fee of counsel is also assessed in the same figure. Reference answered in the affirmative.
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1969 (3) TMI 79 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... f the foregoing discussion I am of opinion that ornamented glass bangles cannot be regarded as a commodity distinct and apart from plain glass bangles for the purposes of section 3-A of the Act. They are merely two varieties of glass bangles and the distinction sought to be made by the State in the impugned notification is artificial and is, therefore, unauthorised. In the circumstances I must hold that the impugned notification is ultra vires being beyond the ambit of section 3-A of the Act. I, therefore, allow the writ petition, declare the impugned notification to be ultra vires and issue a writ of certiorari quashing the assessment order for the year 1965-66. In the circumstances, however, I would make no order as to costs. By the Court The petition is allowed. A writ in the nature of certiorari shall issue quashing the assessment order dated 18th November, 1966, made against the petitioner for the assessment year 1965-66. There is no order as to costs. Petition allowed.
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1969 (3) TMI 78 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... pre-eminently reasonable. The view of the Appellate Tribunal that the principle actio personalis moritur cum persona is applicable to this case is clearly erroneous. That principle has no application, where the law clearly provides for the survival of the liability after the death of the concerned persons. The Sales Tax Act and the Rules made thereunder provide for the survival of the liability of the deceased dealer, when that is so, the dealer s liability to pay tax and/or penalty does not disappear with his death. The Appellate Tribunal clearly erred in applying this principle. Thus, we see no force in either of the two objections raised by Sri Rama Rao. We, therefore, hold that rule 23(1) is not ultra vires the powers of the rule-making authority, but is valid and enforceable. It, therefore, follows that the levy of penalty in this case is valid and in accordance with law. The tax revision case is accordingly allowed with costs. Advocate s fee Rs. 100. Petition allowed.
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1969 (3) TMI 77 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... der XLVII, Civil Procedure Code, which deals with an analogous provision for review, holding the view that the production of a new ruling or authority which if brought to the notice of the judge at the first hearing might have altered the judgment, is not a new and important matter within the meaning of the provision in Order XLVII, rule 1, Civil Procedure Code. (Vide Mulla s Code of Civil Procedure, Volume 2, page 1670, 13th Edition). There is one other point to be considered in this connection. Our judgment was given on 13th April, 1967, and the Supreme Court s judgment was given on 4th May, 1967. It was open to the petitioner to appeal against our judgment, basing the appeal on the view expressed by the Supreme Court. But no such steps were taken and nearly one year later, the petitioner has come with this review petition before us. We are of opinion that the review petition is not maintainable in the above circumstances, and it is dismissed in limine. Petition dismissed.
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1969 (3) TMI 76 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ve sales and was therefore ultra vires, or a provision to assess hirepurchases which have been held to be not sales for the purpose of the sales tax. Those are clearly cases where the charging provision was declared unconstitutional. Therefore when the Supreme Court in Dhulabhai s case 1968 22 S.T.C. 416. referred to the unconstitutionality of an assessment as offending Article 301 of the Constitution, the observations were made in the context of the unconstitutionality of the charging section. But they did not have in view an assessment which becomes illegal only because the turnover in question cannot be assessed by reason of the bar under Article 286 of the Constitution. A decision of the sales tax authority on that point, according to the principles laid down in Kamala Mills case 1965 16 S.T.C. 613., is one within the exclusive jurisdiction of the taxing authority and cannot be challenged in an independent suit. We, therefore, allow the appeal with costs. Appeal allowed.
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1969 (3) TMI 75 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... from May 8, 1956, books, magazines and exercise books shall be exempt from payment of tax. In the Oxford English Dictionary the following meaning has been given to the word brochure A stitched work, a short printed work, of a few leaves merely stitched together, a pamphlet. In the same dictionary the word booklet has been given the following meaning A tiny book . Magazines also partake of the nature of books. They are stitched and bound. Even the folders are printed paper-sheets bound together. In our opinion, therefore, brochures, booklets, magazines and folders are comprehended in the word books as used in the notification mentioned above. In the ordinary business practice also they are treated to be books. Our answer to the question referred to us is in the affirmative in favour of the dealer and against the Commissioner of Sales Tax. The Commissioner of Sales Tax shall pay a sum of Rs. 100 by way of costs of this proceeding to the dealer. Reference answered accordingly.
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1969 (3) TMI 74 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... power which is within his competence under section 20(2) as the revisional authority. We, therefore, express our respectful dissent with the contrary view stated in State of Andhra Pradesh v. Varre Pothuraju 1964 15 S.T.C. 222 (1963) 2 A.L.T. 201. We may also point out that there cannot be any doubt in this regard after the addition of section 14(4-A) in 1963. The Tribunal distinguished the decision in State of Andhra Pradesh v. Varre Pothuraju 1964 15 S.T.C. 222 (1963) 2 A.L.T. 201.on the ground that the Commercial Tax Officer acted not as a revisional authority, but only as an assessing authority, a view which we have not accepted. But, even so, for the reasons stated above, the order passed by him is within his competence as revisional authority, and is not illegal or without jurisdiction. Though for different reasons, the order of the Sales Tax Appellate Tribunal is upheld, and the tax revision petition is dismissed with costs. Advocate s fee Rs. 100. Petition dismissed.
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1969 (3) TMI 73 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... nt from section 34 of the Income-tax Act of 1922 or section 147 of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1961. In section 34 of the 1922 Act the words used are or even under-assessed or assessed at too low a rate . Similarly in explanation 1 of section 147 of the 1961 Act it has been provided that for the purposes of this section, the following shall also be deemed to be cases where income chargeable to tax has escaped assessment, namely (b) where such income has been assessed at too low a rate. There is no such provision in section 21 of the Act. In our opinion, the proper provision to apply was section 22 of the Act because it appears to us that the present case is one of rectification or of correcting an error. For the reasons mentioned above, we answer the question referred to us in the negative against the Commissioner of Sales Tax, U.P., and in favour of the assessee. We award a sum of Rs. 100 by way of costs of this proceeding to the assessee. Reference answered in the negative.
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1969 (3) TMI 72 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ot liable to tax except when it is sold by the manufacturer or the importer. In a situation like this the onus would clearly lie upon the department to prove that a particular sale which is sought to be assessed under the notification is a sale by the importer or by the manufacturer, unlike the position that would prevail under section 3 where once a person is found to be a dealer, the onus would lie upon him to show that he is not liable to tax in respect of the turnover of a particular commodity. This legal position is absolutely plain and requires no further elucidation. We, therefore, answer the question by saying that the onus lay upon the department to prove that the tincture had been imported by the assessee and not upon the assessee to prove that he was not the importer. As the answer is in favour of the assessee, it is entitled to its costs which we assess at Rs. 100. The fee of the learned counsel is also assessed at the same figure. Reference answered accordingly.
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1969 (3) TMI 71 - SUPREME COURT
Power to grant amendment of the pleadings - Held that:- Appeal allowed. The power to grant amendment of the pleadings is intended to serve the ends of justice and is not governed by any such narrow or technical limitations. Since the name in which the action was instituted was merely a misdescription of the original plaintiff, no question of limitation arises - the plaint must be deemed on amendment to have been instituted in the name of the real plaintiff, on the date on which it was originally instituted - the order passed by the Trial Court in granting the amendment was clearly right. The proceedings will stand remanded to the High Court for disposal according to law on the merits of the dispute between the parties.
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1969 (3) TMI 70 - HIGH COURT OF CALCUTTA
Winding up - Company when deemed unable to pay its debts ... ... ... ... ..... the respondent, which is being permanently stayed, will be costs in the said proceedings. If no such steps are taken by the respondent within the time aforesaid, each party will pay and bear its own costs of this application and also of the winding-up petition. In the facts of this particular case and taking into consideration the largeness of the claim alleged, I make an order of injunction against the company from dealing with, disposing of, transferring or encumbering the assets of the company except in the usual course of business for a period of three months from date. I, however, make it clear that this order of injunction will not prevent the company from carrying on its business in the usual course and from dealing with all its assets in the usual course of business and I also make it clear that this order of injunction will be limited in duration for a period of three months to enable the respondent to take such steps as the respondent may be advised in the meantime.
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1969 (3) TMI 62 - CHANCERY DIVISION
Meetings and Proceedings – Quorum for meeting ... ... ... ... ..... willing to act, though I now understand that (although I have no connection at all with him or his firm) his firm acts as auditors to a company with which the respondent s brothers-in-law are associated. I cannot, with the greatest respect to the respondent, believe that this connection could in any way affect Mr. Walker s discharge of his responsibilities, but I am quite willing to meet the respondent by agreeing (as my solicitors already suggested in the correspondence) that a partner in any one of the big city firms of chartered accountants be appointed. As I say, I think it is better to have someone with no connection at all with any of the Oppenheim family. The registrar tells me that he will give an appointment to both sides on this matter at 2.15 p.m. tomorrow afternoon so there is no question of any delay. The applicant, I suppose, should formally restore the summons in the registrar s chambers first, and that appointment is available, as I say, at 2.15 p.m. tomorrow.
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1969 (3) TMI 61 - HIGH COURT OF CALCUTTA
Investigation of company’s affairs in other cases ... ... ... ... ..... -authorities have failed to discharge the onus of proving even a prima facie case to support the impugned order. The learned judge in the court below has relied on only one paragraph of the affidavit-in-opposition and this does not contain the necessary averments, and is useless for the purpose of the respondents. The result is that, applying the tests set out in the two Supreme Court decisions mentioned above, this appeal should succeed and the judgment and order of the court below is set aside and the rule is made absolute and the impugned orders are set aside and/or quashed by appropriate writs and the respondents are restrained by a writ in the nature of mandamus from giving effect to the same. This will not, however, prevent them from issuing any further orders in accordance with law. The appellants are entitled to the costs of the appeal. Certified for two counsel. The operation of this order will remain stayed for six weeks from this date. B. C. Mitra J. mdash I agree.
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1969 (3) TMI 59 - HIGH COURT OF CALCUTTA
Oppression and Mismanagement ... ... ... ... ..... facts in the pleading, yet the court should grant relief to the petitioner by directing an investigation, in the hope that the report of the investigation might disclose materials for further orders against the company, and in favour of the petitioner. In our view, to hold that an investigation should be directed or relief ought to be granted to a petitioner, even though facts relating to mismanagement, oppression, misappropriation and improper conduct have not been pleaded and proved, would open the door to grave injustice. It would enable a group of shareholders, having the requisite shareholding, to obtain an order for investigation into the affairs of the company, or other orders, on allegations which may subsequently turn out to be entirely unfounded. This, in our view, cannot and ought not to be done. In our opinion, the court below was right in coming to the conclusion that the appellants were not entitled to any relief. The appeal is accordingly dismissed with costs.
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1969 (3) TMI 40 - HIGH COURT OF MYSORE
Government company ... ... ... ... ..... w of the statement was to be considered. It was submitted at the bar that a subsequent decision had been taken to exclude officers of the category like that of the petitioner. It would thus follow that the petitioner was considered by the management as belonging to a class separate from the class of workmen including grade III officers or workmen. From the material before us it is clear that there cannot be any charge of discrimination against the respondent in applying clause 7 contained in exhibit A. We may also add that it is one of the conditions of service which the petitioner willingly accepted by his letter of acceptance under exhibit B. We, therefore, see no merit in this contention. In the view that we have taken it is unnecessary to consider the respondent s objection as to the jurisdiction of this court and to our competence to issue any writ affecting him. For the aforesaid reasons the writ petition fails and is accordingly dismissed. We make no order as to costs.
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