|
Advanced Search Options
Case Laws
Showing 21 to 40 of 76 Records
-
1970 (8) TMI 83 - SUPREME COURT
... ...
... ... ..... ge or neglect a sentence of imprisonment may not be imposed. In this case he was abroad at the time of contravention and it is possible that the contravention took place without his knowledge or because of lack of diligence. It seems to us that on the facts of this case a sentence of fine of Rs. 2,000/-will meet the ends of justice. 15. The learned Counsel for the respondent State urges that this is not a case fit for review because it is only a case of mistaken judgment. But we are unable to agree with this submission because at the time of the arguments our attention was not drawn specifically to Sub-section 23C(2) and the light it throws on the interpretation of Sub-section (1). 16. In the result the review petition is partly allowed and the judgment of this Court in Criminal Appeal No. 211 of 1969 modified to the extent that the sentence of six months' rigorous imprisonment imposed on Girdharilal is set aside. The sentence of fine of Rs. 2,000/-shall, however, stand.
-
1970 (8) TMI 82 - DELHI HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... the Excise Act and the Rules. The contention, therefore, of Mr. Palkhiwala, the learned Counsel for the petitioner that even if Polymer chips were covered under the entry of plastics, the petitioner would still not be liable to pay excise duty because Polymer chips are not removed within the meaning of the Act and Excise rules, therefore, has no force and must be rejected . 82. In view, however, of my finding that the Polymer chips produced by the petitioner company are not covered by Item 15A(iii) of the First Schedule to the Central Excises and Salt Act of 1944, under Plastic of all sorts, this petition must be allowed and the impugned order of the respondent dated 1-2-1963 (Annexure A) is hereby quashed and appropriate writ is issued restraining the respondent, his agents from recovering from the petitioner-company the excise duty in pursuance of the said order of the respondent dated 1-2-1963 . In the circumstances of the case, however, there will be no order as to cost.
-
1970 (8) TMI 81 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... uthority concerned was aware that the three months’ period mentioned in rule 10, which was in fact applicable had expired This question of law is discussed in greater details in the judgment of the Division Bench of this Court is the matter of Appeal No. 69 of 1963 decided on July 1, 1965. For the reasons discussed above and following the decision in the above appeal, we are bond to hold that the above two notices of demand issued by resorting to rule 10A which was not applicable were illegal. These notices are accordingly liable to be set aside. All the three notices are liable to be set aside for the main reasons which we have already discussed above. 24. In the result, the rule is made absolute. The three reassessments mentioned in the petition and the three notices of demand and the letter of modification of demand dated March 22, 1968 are held illegal and are set aside. Rule absolute. The Respondents will pay costs of the Petitioners fixed at ₹ 2000/-.
-
1970 (8) TMI 80 - SUPREME COURT
Whether certain provisions of the Kerala University Act, 1969 (Act 9 of 1969) to be ultra vires the Constitution of India?
Held that:- High Court was right in its appreciation of the true position in the light of the Constitution. We agree with the High Court that sub-ss. (2) and (4) of ss. 48 and 49 are ultra vires Art. 30(1). Indeed we think that sub-ss. (6) of these two sections are also ultra vires. They offend more than the other two of which they are a part and parcel. We also agree that sub-ss. (1), (2), (3) and (9) of s. 53, sub-ss. (2) and (4) of s. 56 are ultra vires as they fail with ss. 48 and 49. We express no opinion regarding these sub- sections vis-a-vis Art. 30(1). We also agree that Section 58 (in so far as it removes disqualification which the founders may not like to agree to) and Sec. 63 are ultra vires Articles 30(1) in respect of the minority institutions.
We do not accept the contentions of the seven appellants who have challenged some of the other provisions of the Act except ss. 48 (6) and 49(6) and do not consider it necessary to repeat what is said by the High Court. These appeals are dismissed except as to those sections but without costs.
-
1970 (8) TMI 79 - MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... ter of decision of fact based on the facts and circumstances of a case. In the present case, we are clearly of the opinion that the assessee had no intention to deceive the sales tax department. The expression has deliberately concealed his turnover ... or furnished a false return in section 43(1) of the Act necessarily indicates a guilty intention of trying to deceive the department. In the present case, no such intention can be inferred. In M/s. Delhi Cloth and General Mills Co. Ltd., Gwalior v. Commissioner of Sales Tax, M.P.(1), it was held by a Division Bench of this Court in very similar circumstances that the assessee was not liable to penalty. 4. We accordingly answer the question referred as follows On the facts and circumstances of the case, the penalty of Rs. 7,500 imposed on the applicant under section 43(1) of the Act was not imposed lawfully and for reasons sustainable in law. Parties shall bear their own costs of this reference. Reference answered accordingly.
-
1970 (8) TMI 78 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... declared invalid on the ground that it is also part of the same scheme and was designed to serve the same purpose and is inextricably mixed up with the invalid part of section 30-B. The valid parts alone cannot be said to be sufficient to accomplish the legislative purpose. When it becomes clear that the purpose of these sections would be defeated by the invalidity of their parts, both sections become void. Since the validity of the impugned provisions have not been sought to be supported on any other ground and for the foregoing reasons, we hold that sections 30-A and 30-B are invalid in toto and are ultra vires of the Constitution and therefore are void. As the respondents are trying to enforce these sections in proceedings initiated against the petitioners, the writs of prohibition as asked for by the petitioners will have to be issued. The writ petitions are accordingly allowed. The petitioners shall get their costs. Advocate s fee Rs. 50 in each case. Petitions allowed.
-
1970 (8) TMI 77 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... estion for consideration is whether the assessee s books of account for the year 1959-60 should be accepted or rejected. It is significant that no survey was made in the year 1959-60. This circumstance coupled with the fact that no material whatever in the shape of a suppressed transaction in the year 1959-60 was detected would make the fact that the account books were rejected in 1958-59 and were also held defective in the year 1960-61 quite irrelevant. In our opinion, there was no material for rejecting the accounts of the assessee for the year 1959-60. We, therefore, answer the question referred to us as follows On the facts and in the circumstances of the case there was material for rejecting the accounts version for the assessment year 1958-59, but there was no material for rejecting the accounts version for the year 1959-60. In view of the divided success the parties would bear their own costs in both the references. The counsel fee is assessed at Rs. 100 in each case.
-
1970 (8) TMI 76 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... wanted the figure of the admitted turnover to be corrected. The amendment, if allowed, would not necessitate the payment of any additional tax. In the circumstances the stand taken by the department is wholly unjustified and contrary to the law. The view taken by the Judge (Revisions), in my opinion, was perfectly right. No fault, therefore, can be found with the order of the Judge (Revisions), remanding the case to the Sales Tax Officer. I accordingly answer the question in the affirmative in favour of the assessee and against the department. The assessee will get his costs which I assess at Rs. 100. Counsel s fee is assessed at the same figure. By the Court For the reasons stated in our respective judgments, we answer the question in the affirmative in favour of the assessee and against the department. The assessee is entitled to the cost of this reference which we assess at Rs. 100. Counsel s fee is also assessed at the same figure. Reference answered in the affirmative.
-
1970 (8) TMI 75 - MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... ng and conversion into rice. We think that paddy is completely destroyed as paddy and it is, therefore, consumed in the process of manufacture when rice is prepared. So also, other grains when they are ground into dal completely lose their original identity and become different article, namely, dal. In this view of the matter, we think that the decision of the sales tax department on this question was correct. 6.. Our answers to the questions referred are (i) Paddy and other grains before dehusking are raw material as defined under section 2(1) of the Madhya Pradesh General Sales Tax Act, 1958. (ii) Dehusking of paddy into rice or of other grains into dal amounts to manufacture within the meaning of section 2(j) of the Madhya Pradesh General Sales Tax Act, 1958. (iii) On the facts and in the circumstances of the case levy of tax under section 7 read with section 8(1) of the Act is legal. Parties shall bear their own costs of these references. References answered accordingly.
-
1970 (8) TMI 74 - MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... sclosing all the relevant facts in the return so that if the legal position taken by the applicant is not accepted, full tax can be imposed, it cannot be said that the assessee has filed a false return. The assessee can always argue that under the law a particular item is not taxable. In this particular case the argument does not even seem to have been very absurd. At one time the Board of Revenue had held that view. However, the opinion of the Board of Revenue is not material. The question is whether merely putting forward a legal plea in the return amounts to making a false return. We are of opinion that such a statement in the return cannot be called a false return. 4.. The result, therefore, is that the question referred must be answered in the negative, i.e., the applicant cannot be said to have furnished a false return, and consequently the penalty of Rs. 900 imposed was neither legal nor justified. Parties will bear their own costs. Reference answered in the negative.
-
1970 (8) TMI 73 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... ple. The judge (Revisions) is a final factfinding authority and it is open to him to accept or reject any piece of evidence. When he accepts a piece of evidence that is the end of the matter and in our opinion such a finding cannot give rise to any question of law, unless the finding is without any material or is otherwise arbitrary or perverse. Upon the circumstances of this case it cannot be held that the finding of the judge (Revisions) falls in that category. We accordingly answer the second part of the question by saying that in the first instance it is a question of fact and not a question of law and secondly even if we were to answer such a question, our answer would be that in the circumstances of the case, the presumption of service had been sufficiently rebutted. We answer the two questions accordingly in favour of the assessee and against the department. As no one has appeared on behalf of the assessee, we make no order as to costs. Reference answered accordingly.
-
1970 (8) TMI 72 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... s not necessary that the notice of demand in respect of the tax assessed should contain the warning that in case the tax assessed was not paid the assessee would become liable to pay interest under section 8(1-A). The interest payable under section 8(1-A), as the Full Bench has said in the aforesaid case, commences to run automatically as soon as the conditions set out in the provision are fulfilled. It is not necessary that any notice should be sent to the assessee warning him to pay the tax assessed within time otherwise it would become liable to pay interest under section 8(1-A). No such warning is contemplated by the statute and, in our opinion, it is wholly unnecessary. Upon this we would answer the question by saying that the assessee was liable to pay interest. As the assessee has chosen not to appear in this reference, we make no order as to costs. The fee of the learned counsel for the Commissioner of Sales Tax is assessed at Rs. 100. Reference answered accordingly.
-
1970 (8) TMI 71 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... ended copies of those documents which are necessary for properly appreciating the facts set out in the statement and which are already on the record. In order to draw up a proper statement of the case it is advisable for the revising authority to draw up a draft statement of the case first and send a copy thereof to the dealer as well as the Commissioner of Sales Tax inviting suggestions from the parties for amendment or modifications of the draft statement thereafter upon a proper hearing given to the parties, the revising authority should finalise the statement of the case. The statement of the case so finalised should then be submitted to this court for its opinion on the question of law set out therein. As, in our opinion, there is no proper statement of the case before us, we return the references to the Additional judge (Revisions) directing him to submit fresh references after drawing up a full and complete statement of the case in each reference. References returned.
-
1970 (8) TMI 70 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... me terms as section 12-A(4) of the Madras General Sales Tax Act, 1939, which was in pari materia with section 33(4) of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922. In our view, therefore, regulation 9 framed by the Sales Tax Appellate Tribunal, is consistent with the provisions of the Madras General Sales Tax Act, 1959, and is valid. But in the circumstances, we are inclined to think that the Appellate Tribunal should not have dismissed the relative appeals for default. In one case, the appeal was part-heard, and there was adequate reason for asking for an adjournment, which should have been granted. In the other cases too, the Tribunal should have set aside the ex parts dismissal. The power under regulation 9 should, in our view, be carefully and sparingly used, and with a view to advance the cause of justice. We accordingly set aside the orders of the Tribunal, allow the tax case and writ petitions, and direct the Tribunal to dispose of the appeals afresh. No costs. Petitions allowed.
-
1970 (8) TMI 69 - MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... oner of Sales Tax, M.P. v. Dr. RamkumarsinghMiscellaneous Civil Case No. 353 of 1967 decided on 31-10-1969. In that case a reference had been made to this court for answering certain questions arising out of a remand order. A Division Bench of this court, of which one of us (B. Dayal, C.J.) was a member, refused to answer the questions on the ground that no final assessment having been made, no liability to pay tax had been affected. A petition for special leave to appeal against this order was taken to the Supreme Court and their Lordships rejected the same by order dated 26th February, 1970 (Petition for special leave to appeal (Civil) No. 266 of 1970). It is true that in the operative part of the order of the Supreme Court it is mentioned that it was dismissed as withdrawn. 9.. In the result, therefore, we are of opinion that these references are incompetent. The papers are accordingly returned to the department. Parties will bear their own costs. References not answered.
-
1970 (8) TMI 68 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... uld have been justified if they had added a sum of Rs. 2,85,773 to the U.P. turnover because that much worth of goods had admittedly been taken out of the assessee s stock, the sale whereof had not been accounted for. It would have been a logical inference for the sales tax authorities to draw that the goods worth Rs. 2,85,773 had been sold in the market and the sale proceeds had not been included in the turnover. As it is, that course has not been adopted and instead an addition of Rs. 1,60,000 only has been made. In our opinion, the addition upto Rs. 2,85,773 would have been fully justified and the sum of Rs. 1,60,000 being less than that amount, it cannot be said that such an addition was not permissible or was without any legal justification. We accordingly answer question No. (3) in the affirmative in favour of the department and against the assessee. In the circumstances we make no order as to costs. Counsel s fee is assessed at Rs. 100. Reference answered accordingly.
-
1970 (8) TMI 67 - KERALA HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... ove decisions, I am of the opinion that this court has no jurisdiction to interfere with the order passed by the trial Magistrate. The right to pass the order in exercise of the power conferred on the Magistrate under the Act cannot be equated with the power of the Magistrate to pass an order under the Criminal Procedure Code as he is not an inferior criminal court as required by the provisions of the Criminal Procedure Code. The Magistrate in such cases does not function or exercise his authority under the Criminal Procedure Code. The proceedings to recover fine may be identical to the proceedings to recovery of tax. But, the recovery of tax by the Magistrate is conferred upon him as he is designated under the Act to recover it. He cannot be regarded as an inferior court exercising jurisdiction under the Criminal Procedure Code. The revision petition, therefore, is not sustainable. 7.. In the result, the revision petition fails and the same is dismissed. Petition dismissed.
-
1970 (8) TMI 66 - KERALA HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... extent, namely, that the order of the learned Single Judge directing a refund is set aside so far as the levy for the year 1963-64 is concerned it is affirmed so far as the levy for the year 1962-63 is concerned. We direct the appellant revenue to pay the costs of the respondent writ petitioner both here and before the learned Single Judge. Advocate s fee Rs. 250 both here and before the learned Single Judge. 6.. Perhaps a word of explanation is necessary as to why we are making this direction regarding costs. Although the validating Act, namely, the Amendment Act, 1969, was pleaded in three places in the counter-affidavit filed by the revenue, counsel for the revenue addressed no argument before the learned Single Judge on the basis of that Act. Indeed, the learned Single Judge has observed that counsel was not able to show any provision of law entitling the department to retain the amounts collected after the orders of assessment had been set aside. Appeal Partly allowed.
-
1970 (8) TMI 65 - PUNJAB AND HARYANA HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... . As I have pointed out above, cotton seed is used in industry for the manufacture of vanaspati. The words or in industry are not to be found in clause (vi) of section 14 of the Central Act. Thus, I am of the opinion that even according to the definition of oil-seeds in entry (3) of Schedule C to the Punjab Act, cotton seeds fall in the category of oil-seeds. For the reasons given above, I hold that cotton seeds are oil-seeds as defined in entry (3) of Schedule C to the Punjab Act as the oil produced from the cotton seeds is used in industry for the manufacture of vanaspati ghee which is meant for human consumption. The writ petitions are, therefore, accepted and the assessing authority is directed to amend the impugned orders in so far as they relate to cotton seeds, in the light of the observations made above, that is, considering cotton seeds as oilseeds. Since the point involved was not free from difficulty, I leave the parties to bear their own costs. Petitions allowed.
-
1970 (8) TMI 64 - SUPREME COURT
Whether "Sarin Tooth Powder" manufactured by M/s. Sarin Chemical Laboratory is "cosmetic" or a "toilet requisite" as held by the High Court of Allahabad or it is an unspecified commodity liable to sales tax at all points of sale as held by the Additional Judge (Revisions) Sales Tax, Agra?
Held that:- Appeal dismissed. The question whether tooth-powder can be considered as a toilet came up before the Madras High Court in V.P. Somasundara Mudaliar v. State of Madras []1963 (7) TMI 67 - MADRAS HIGH COURT] and before the Bombay High Court in Commissioner of Sales Tax v. Vicco Laboratories [1968 (2) TMI 99 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT]. Both the courts took the view that the tooth-powder is a toilet. The same view has been taken by the Allahabad High Court
|
