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Case Laws
Showing 21 to 40 of 106 Records
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1971 (2) TMI 113 - SUPREME COURT
Proceedings commenced by the Collector of Central Excise by means of the notice challenged - Held that:- There are no provisions in the Gold (Control) Act, 1968 which are inconsistent with Rule 126(1)(10) of the "Rules". As the Gold (Control) Act, does not exhibit a difference or contrary intention, proceedings initiated under the repealed law must be held to continue. We must also remember that by Gold (Control) Ordinance, ''Rules" were deemed as an act of Parliament. Hence on the repeal of the "Rules" and the Gold (Control) Ordinance, 1968, the consequences mentioned in Section 6 of the General Clauses Act, follow. For ascertaining whether there is a contrary intention, one has to look into the provisions of the Gold (Control) Act, 1968.
In order to see whether the rights and liabilities under the repealed law have been put an end to by the new enactment, the proper approach is not to, enquire if the new enactment has by its new provisions kept alive the rights and liabilities under the repealed law but whether it has taken away those rights and liabilities The absence of a saving clause in a new enactment preserving the rights and liabilities under the repealed law is neither material nor decisive of the question.
For the reasons mentioned above we agree with the High Court that the proceedings commenced by the Collector of Central Excise by means of the notice dated June 5, 1965 must be deemed to be continuing. Appeal dismissed.
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1971 (2) TMI 112 - SUPREME COURT
Whether the dismissal of the said eight workmen by the appellant firm was justified?
Held that:- In the absence of any proof that that would be the consequence of reinstatement, the conclusion of the learned Single Judge that it would so result was only an assumption. It is true that the workmen could not have lien on the posts to which they were employed in tne technical sense of that term but, as aforesaid, there was evidence of the firm following the practice of engaging the same workmen when they presented themselves for work at the commencement of the next season. The appellant having failed to lead evidence as to a reasonable possibility of recurrence of trouble if the concerned workmen were to be reinstated or of their not being entitled to be employed at the beginning of the next season, it was impossible to say that the case of an exception to the general rule of reinstatement was made out. The case before the High Court thus was not one where there was any error of law on the record, nor was it a case where the Labour Court had acted in excess of its jurisdiction or failed to exercise its jurisdiction. Appeal dismissed.
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1971 (2) TMI 111 - SUPREME COURT
Whether relief by way of payment of compensation should’ not be substituted for the relief by way of reinstatement granted by the Labour Court to the workman, H. P. Bhagavati, Store, Clerk?
Held that:- Unable on the existing record to sustain the appellants submission that the order of reinstatement made by the Labour Court suffers from any legal infirmity justifying its substitution by an order of payment of compensation to the workman. A suggestion has been thrown by Shri Chagla that in all probability the employee must have secured employment elsewhere as he could not have remained idle all these years an payment of compensation in place of reinstatement would, therefore, cause him no prejudice. On behalf, of the employee it is denied that he had been employed anywhere else during this period. In our opinion, this matter being controversial should have been raised before the Labour Court and we are not in a position to express any opinion on it in the present proceedings. Appeal dismissed
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1971 (2) TMI 110 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... under section 19 or by a Deputy Commissioner under sub-section (4-c) of section 14 or under sub-section (2) of section 20 may appeal to the Appellate Tribunal within 60 days from the date on which the order or proceeding was served on him. Similarly, section 20 of the Act providing for revisional powers to be exercised by the Board of Revenue or by a Deputy Commissioner prescribes a limitation of four years from the date on which the order was served on the dealer. Therefore, it is clear from the language of sub-section (7) of section 14 that it was not the intention of the legislature, where an assessment order made under section 14 has been set aside by the Appellate Tribunal or a court, to exclude the time taken for communicating the Appellate Tribunal s or court s order, as the case may be, for the purpose of computing the period of limitation. We, therefore, uphold the order of the Tribunal and dismiss the revision with costs. Advocate s fee Rs. 100. Petition dismissed.
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1971 (2) TMI 109 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... on is No. ST-4126/X-950(12)-1967. It amends the two notifications mentioned in the question referred to this court. The amendment reads For the entry against serial number 3 of the aforesaid notification, the following shall be substituted 3(a) Bamboo and its products other than furniture (b) Products of timber other than furniture. This amendment unambiguously shows that the two notifications mentioned in the question referred to us were intended by the rulemaking authority to include even furniture in the word products . The July 31 notification now excludes furniture from the ambit of the word products . It will necessarily follow that other things made of timber would be included in the word products . So I agree with my brother that the chir packing boxes are covered by the word products . By the Court We answer the question referred to us in the affirmative. The Commissioner shall get costs. We assess the counsel s fee at Rs. 100. Reference answered in the affirmative.
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1971 (2) TMI 108 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... s if penalty levied thereon is not paid is ancillary or incidental to the power to tax sale or purchase of goods under entry 54 of List II of Schedule VII of the Constitution. We must, therefore, agree with the petitioners that sub-sections (3) and (4) of section 29 of the Act, which empower the concerned officer to seize the goods which are not covered by a way bill containing the prescribed particulars and to confiscate them if the penalty levied is not paid within the time limited for the purpose, are beyond the legislative competence of the State and are, therefore, not valid. In the view expressed above, it is unnecessary to examine the other contentions urged on behalf of the petitioners to assail the validity of the impugned provisions of section 29. In the result, therefore, both the petitions are allowed with costs and writ of certiorari and mandamus respectively as prayed for in those petitions will issue. Advocate s fee Rs. 100 in each petition. Petitions allowed.
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1971 (2) TMI 107 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... the petitioner that his case that he abandoned the business on 31st July, 1964, which is the date when his premises was searched is an acceptable one, as it is against the materials on record. With regard to the next contention about the absence of dates and signature in the slips, I have already expressed the view that it is for the assessing authorities to decide whether such materials could be linked with the petitioner. This they have done. If the petitioner was really aggrieved against the finding of the assessing authority, he should have canvassed the propriety of such a conclusion before the appellate authority under the Act. This has not been done. For the reason that the petitioner did not avail himself of the other remedies under the Act and also because the theory of closure of business is not acceptable, I am not able to sustain the rule nisi and it is discharged. The writ petition is accordingly dismissed. There will be no order as to costs. Petition dismissed.
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1971 (2) TMI 106 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... be held that the order of the assessing authority in adding the freight charges to each of the cases to the turnover and refusing to grant exemption in respect of this item is illegal and runs contrary to the decision of the Supreme Court. So far as the other item relating to cost of packing material is concerned, it will be open to the petitioners in each of the cases to prefer appeals against the assessment orders and show that they are entitled to exemption in respect of that item also. In the result, the assessments in each of these petitions, in so far as they relate to freight charges, are quashed. It is represented by Mr. Srinivasa Murthy, appearing for the petitioners, that the petitioners in Writ Petition No. 4889 of 1970 have paid the tax relating to freight charges and if that is so, they will be entitled to refund. The writ petitions are allowed accordingly in part but in the circumstances, without costs. Advocate s fee Rs. 100 in each. Petitions partly allowed.
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1971 (2) TMI 105 - KERALA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... s, therefore, also gone to the extent of making an untrue assertion of fact for justifying his refusal to comply with the direction of the appellate authority to summon the above persons for being cross-examined by the petitioners. 7.. In the result, I quash the assessment orders, exhibit P-6 in O.P. Nos. 3695 and 3697 of 1969 and exhibit P-7 in O.P. No. 3936 of 1969 and the cases are remitted to the respondent for being dealt with and disposed of in compliance with the direction of the Appellate Assistant Commissioner and in the light of the observations herein contained. The petitioners have been subject to unnecessary expense wholly due to the contumacious conduct of Shri N. Venkitachalam who passed the above orders. He is, therefore, directed to personally pay the costs of the petitioners in all these three cases. Counsel s fee is fixed at Rs. 150 in each case. A copy of this judgment will be forwarded to the Board of Revenue, Trivandrum, for information. Cases remitted.
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1971 (2) TMI 104 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... e way even if it should involve an element of coercion. Section 21(6) is, therefore, more likely to deprive dealers of their right of appeal to the Tribunal even when they have a strong and tenable case rather than to discourage frivolous appeals. We have, therefore, no hesitation in concluding that the impugned classification, besides being unreasonable and discriminatory, has absolutely no connection with the object sought to be achieved by the Act. Section 21(6) is accordingly struck down being violative of the provisions of article 14 of the Constitution. In the view we have taken, it is not necessary to examine if and how far the contention that section 21(6) is repugnant to the provisions of article 19(1)(f) and (g), is well-founded. In the result, the petition is allowed with costs and a direction to entertain the petitioner s appeal A.R. No. 859169 without insisting on proof of payment of tax will issue to the 3rd respondent. Advocate s fee Rs. 100. Petition allowed.
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1971 (2) TMI 103 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... uty Commissioner seems to have been under a misapprehension that the Board would be pleased to hear from him if he told the Board that he had already made up his mind in the matter pending before him. We hope there will be no repetition of such performances by quasi-judicial Tribunals functioning under the Andhra Pradesh General Sales Tax Act. The Tribunal found on the question whether the revision made by the Deputy Commissioner was justified, that there is no justification whatsoever for the revision made by the Deputy Commissioner. In view of the finding of fact recorded by the Tribunal that there is no material at all to imply an implied contract to sell the gunnies, we do not propose to interfere with that finding. In the result the revision is dismissed subject to the finding recorded by us that the construction placed by the Tribunal on the expression suo motu occurring in section 20 of the Act is erroneous in law. No costs. Advocate s fee Rs. 100. Petition dismissed.
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1971 (2) TMI 102 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... nue Commissioners 1921 1 K.B. 64. In a taxing Act one has to look merely at what is clearly said. There is no room for any intendment. There is no equity about a tax. There is no presumption as to a tax. Nothing is to be read in, nothing is to be implied. One can only look fairly at the language used. The expression book itself is comprehensive enough to take in all kinds of books and the word all will make it abundantly manifest and plain that the notification was issued to cover all cases of sales of books and is not restricted in its application to books of literary material or other kinds of reading material. The Allahabad case, Industrial and Commercial Service v. Commissioner of Sales Tax 1963 14 S.T.C. 299., therefore renders no assistance to the contention of the Government Pleader. In the result, we set aside the order of assessment in these four cases and allow the revisions but in the circumstances, without costs. Advocate s fee Rs. 100 in each. Petitions allowed.
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1971 (2) TMI 101 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... if on a prima facie investigation the High Court finds that there is total absence of jurisdiction on the part of the assessing authority to further the process of assessment undertaken, then certainly it can interdict the authority from proceeding further. Even so, in Veeri Chettiar v. Sales Tax Officer 1970 26 S.T.C. 579. , the principle is restated in a different way It is well settled that a writ of prohibition will issue in a case where it has been reasonably established that an assessing authority or the authority which issues the impugned order acted without jurisdiction and without any necessary power statutorily derived, to act in the manner it did. I am, therefore, unable to agree that the request for the issue of a rule by the assessees in these cases is premature. Having regard to the well-established principles of law, the rule nisi in each of these cases is made absolute and the writ petitions are allowed. There will be no order as to costs. Petitions allowed.
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1971 (2) TMI 100 - MYSORE HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... rcial activity, the sales effected in the course of performing the statutory obligation do not amount to carrying on the business of buying or selling goods. Consequently, we hold that even after the amendment of the Act by Act No. 9 of 1964, the proceeds of sales made through the canteen by the petitioner-company for the benefit of its employees are not exigible to tax and the said sale proceeds are not to form part of the taxable turnover for the years 1964-65 and 1965-66. The levy of tax on the said sale proceeds not being authorised by law, the assessment orders dated 30th September, 1969, and 3rd December, 1969, and the notices issued pursuant thereto are liable to be quashed. We accordingly allow these writ petitions with costs and quash the impugned assessment orders and the notices of demand reserving liberty to the second respondent to make fresh assessment orders after excluding the proceeds of the canteen sales. Advocate s fee Rs. 100 (one set). Petitions allowed.
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1971 (2) TMI 99 - MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... power of the State Government under serial No. 1 of Schedule I is only to specify agricultural implements by a notification. If something which is obviously not an agricultural implement is specified to be so by the State Government, the Government would be acting in excess of the power conferred by the Schedule and the notification will not be valid. The burden to prove, however, that the implement specified is not an agricultural implement would be on those who contend that it is so and not on the assessee who wants to take the benefit of the notification. 11.. As a result of the above discussion, our answer to the question is as follows Phawadas that are not spades and shovels fall within the description of hoes (all kinds) and are covered by item No. 1 of Separate Revenue Department Notification No. 736/3694/V-SR dated 1st April, 1959, and are exempt from tax under serial No. 1, Schedule 1 to the Madhya Pradesh General Sales Tax Act, 1958. Reference answered accordingly.
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1971 (2) TMI 98 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... d,- (i) it shall not be necessary for the assessing authority to serve upon the dealer a fresh notice (ii) if any recovery proceedings are pending, the assessing authority shall give intimation of the fact of such reduction to the Collector who shall thereupon take steps for the recovery of only the reduced amount and (iii) any proceedings initiated on the basis of the notice or notices served upon the dealer before the disposal of such appeal..... including any recovery proceedings, may be continued in relation to the amount so reduced from the stage at which it stood immediately before such disposal ..... This amendment is a legislative overruling of the court s decision in M/s. Ram Kishan Das Brij Mohn Lal 1971 27 S.T.C. 312. and completely dooms the petitioner s arguments. 20.. The petition is accordingly dismissed. As it was filed after the court s decision in M/s. Ram Kishan Das Brij Mohan Lal 1971 27 S.T.C. 312., there will be no order as to costs. Petition dismissed.
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1971 (2) TMI 97 - ORISSA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ssed with the contention of Mr. Mohapatra and as such a reference was made to the Full Bench to decide the correctness of B. Patnaik Mines (P.) Ltd. v. N.K. Mohanty, Sales Tax Officer, Assessment Unit, Government of Orissa, Calcutta, and OthersI.L.R. 1967 Cutt. 446. and Uttareswari Rice Mills, Berhampur v. Sales Tax Officer, Intelligence Wing, Vigilance, Berhampur, and Another(1). Before the Full Bench, however, Mr. Rath did not press that contention and as such the necessity of examining the correctness of B. Patnaik Mines (P.) Ltd. v. N.K. Mohanty, Sales Tax Officer, Assessment Unit, Government of Orissa, Calcutta, and OthersI.L.R. 1967 Cutt. 446. and Uttareswari Rice Mills, Berhampur v. Sales Tax Officer, Intelligence Wing, Vigilance, Berhampur, and Another A.I.R. 1969 Orissa 1. did not arise. 8.. As both the contentions of Mr. Rath fail, the writ application is dismissed with costs. Hearing fee Rs. 100. A. MISRA, J.-I agree. B.K. PATRA, J.-I agree. Application dismissed.
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1971 (2) TMI 96 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... he department to appreciate and apply the correct law on it. In these circumstances, I am unable to interfere by issuing a writ of mandamus which presupposes that the department has no jurisdiction to assess the petitioner and that there is indeed a public duty on the part of the respondent to avoid undertaking any such assessment proceedings against the petitioner. As the main limbs which are necessary for the issue of a writ of mandamus are absent and even otherwise as there are no facts or material on which the correct law could be applied, I, in my discretion, am unable to make the rule absolute. The rule nisi is discharged. The writ petition is dismissed. No costs. The petitioner, however, is at liberty to place all the material to substantiate its contention that it would come under the rule of exemption in one of the cases cited above, and the department would afford such opportunity to the petitioner, and thereafter proceed in accordance with law. Petition dismissed.
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1971 (2) TMI 95 - MYSORE HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... bags what is understood is the big gunny bags in which foodgrains, sugar etc., are filled, weighing roughly a quintal or 100 pounds. With that observation of the Tribunal, we are not inclined to agree. In trade and commerce, not only big gunny bags are used, but small gunny bags are used, say for packing cement or fertilisers. Even those small gunny bags would come within the the meaning of the term gunny bags found in the second proviso to section 5(1) of the Act. But in the instant case the articles in question are really hand-bags and they are provided with a handle though the bag is made of jute cloth. Such hand-bags are not used for packing but only to carry articles by hand. In trade and commerce such hand-bags are not called as gunny bags. Therefore, we agree with the view taken by the assessing authority in his order made under section 12-A of the Act. Therefore, there is no merit in this revision petition. Accordingly, it is dismissed. No costs. Petition dismissed.
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1971 (2) TMI 94 - KERALA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... subsequently returned it to the person from whom it was wrongly collected did not make any difference. In revision, the Madras High Court set aside the demand, holding that The effect of the refund of the amount of tax collected by the petitioner from its purchasers, is as if the petitioner had not made any initial collection of sales tax. I respectfully agree with the above view. The wording of section 8-B of the Madras Act, in so far as it relates to the contention advanced before me in the instant case, is similar to that of section 10 of the Amendment Act. So the above decision supports the petitioner and he is entitled to succeed on this ground. 5.. In the light of my above conclusion, it is unnecessary for me to consider the other grounds raised by the petitioner. I allow this writ petition and quash the demand made on the petitioner pursuant to the order of assessment, exhibit P-6. In the circumstances of the case there will be no order as to costs. Petition allowed.
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