|
Advanced Search Options
Case Laws
Showing 41 to 60 of 106 Records
-
1971 (2) TMI 93 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... by an order of stay made by this court. It is for no fault of the revenue that the assessment proceedings are not yet over. It, therefore, follows that the retention of the account books etc., as listed by the department on the date of the search are kept with them lawfully and for the purpose of finalising assessments which could be completed on the basis of such account books etc., seized, though the search is inchoate in the eye of law. There is, therefore, no public duty on the part of the revenue to return the account books as on date. Writ of mandamus is issued only when a person refuses to do what he is enjoined in law to do or fails to perform a public duty. I am, therefore, unable to agree with the learned counsel for the petitioner that a writ of mandamus should issue in the instant case when the very essence for the issue of such a rule is absent. The rule nisi is discharged. The writ petition is dismissed with costs. Advocate s fee is Rs. 100. Petition dismissed.
-
1971 (2) TMI 92 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... Varadarajulu Naidu v. State of Madras(1). Nothing that has been said at the Bar has persuaded us to take a contrary view. We may also mention that the Allahabad High Court in Mahabir Singh Ram Babu v. Assistant Sales Tax Officer 1962 13 S.T.C. 248. took a similar view. Chitta Reddi v. State of Andhra Pradesh 1969 24 S.T.C. 317. decided by a Division Bench of the Andhra Pradesh High Court accepted as correct the view in Varadarajulu Naidu v. State of Madras(1). It is contended that though cinder is the residue of burnt out coal, it may still possess the combustible property. It may perhaps be in a very diluted form. But the fact remains that cinder is not regarded as a combustible matter. Apart from what we have stated, the word cinder must be given its commercial meaning and no man who wants to purchase coal would take cinder when it is offered for coal. The tax cases and the writ appeal are dismissed with costs. Counsel s fee Rs. 100 in each. Petitions and appeal dismissed.
-
1971 (2) TMI 91 - MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... nto consideration at the time of admitting the petition. After the petition has been admitted and this court has found that there was no jurisdiction to impose a penalty, this court will not reject the petition merely because of the existence of an alternative remedy and perpetuate a wrong against the petitioner. Payment of such a large sum of penalty infringes a fundamental right of the petitioner when there was no jurisdiction in the Tribunals to impose a penalty. 7.. The result, therefore, is that this writ petition is allowed. The order of the Sales Tax Officer dated 16th April, 1968 (exhibit P. 2) and that of the Deputy Commissioner of Sales Tax dated 12th January, 1970 (exhibit P. 3) are quashed to the extent that they impose a penalty on the petitioner for non-registration within time. In all the circumstances of the case we direct the parties to bear their own costs. The outstanding amount of the security deposit shall be refunded to the petitioner. Petition allowed.
-
1971 (2) TMI 90 - KERALA HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... reassessment notice is seen to have been issued on 18th March, 1965, the assessee received it only on 27th March, 1965. He has made a definite averment of this fact and neither the Appellate Assistant Commissioner nor the Appellate Tribunal has thought it fit to deny the allegation. Before us also, the counsel for the State was unable to say whether the notice had been served on the assessee earlier than on 27th March, 1965. In these circumstances it is clear that the pre-assessment notice reached the assessee only on 27th March, 1965. The assessment was made on the same date so that the assessee had no reasonable opportunity to make his representations. The assessment order is therefore illegal and we accordingly set aside the order of assessment and direct a fresh assessment to be made after giving the assessee a reasonable opportunity to put forward his contentions. The revision is allowed. But in the circumstances there will be no order regarding costs. Petition allowed.
-
1971 (2) TMI 89 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... dicted by the cross-examination of Guruswami. In this uncertain state of affairs, it would be difficult to assume that there is no error in the order impugned. The very basis of the order is the statement and the slips of Guruswami. Reliance upon them is obviously illegal, besides being unjustified justice should not only be done but seem to be done. It, therefore, follows that there is an apparent error as well in the order impugned. On the ground that the principles of natural justice have been violated and also on the foot that there are apparent errors in the order impugned, the rule nisi has to be made absolute in each of these three writ petitions. The writ petitions are accordingly allowed. There will be no order as to costs. The department of course is at liberty to pursue the matter, if they are entitled to do so in law, hereafter, by producing Guruswami or otherwise satisfying the test of reasonableness based on the principles of natural justice. Petitions allowed.
-
1971 (2) TMI 88 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... nly the records can be complete but justice can be said to have been done. No further directions are necessary. In the peculiar circumstances of this case, wherein an addition of a turnover of nearly 14 lakhs was made by the revenue, without following the essential principles of natural justice, the Appellate Assistant Commissioner shall proceed with the enquiry as directed above without demanding the tax which would flow from the impugned order in question. Writ Petition No. 605 of 1966.-In view of my order in W.P. No. 604 of 1966, the only order that can be passed is to direct the respondent to keep the file relating to the assessment year 1965-66 pending until the appeal for the year 1964-65 is disposed of by the appellate authority and thereafter deal with it in accordance with law. There is no necessity to issue a writ of prohibition as such, excepting the direction as above. No further orders are necessary. The writ petition is dismissed. No costs. Ordered accordingly.
-
1971 (2) TMI 87 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... as even called for a discussion to appear on 8th December, 1967, and the petitioner would not submit himself to the taxing authority but has chosen the remedy of filing a writ already referred to. Even on this basis, the petitioner cannot have a grievance. As the assessing authority has followed strictly the procedure under section 16 as also the substance of the law enabling the respondent to proceed to assess, I am unable to hold that there is any avoidance of public duty or exercise of power not available to the assessing authority. It is only in such circumstances that the extraordinary writ of prohibition is issued. There is no public duty cast on the respondent to stay his hands from proceeding further and assessing the petitioner. In this view of the matter, as the petitioner has no merit to seek for a rule of prohibition, I, in my discretion, discharge the rule nisi. Therefore the petitions are dismissed but under the circumstances without costs. Petitions dismissed.
-
1971 (2) TMI 86 - KERALA HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... ction 41(4) of the Madras General Sales Tax Act, 1959. Though there is some difference between the language employed in the Madras Statute and the Kerala Statute, the purport and effect of both the sections are the same. That decision applies to the instant case. It follows that section 28(4) of the Kerala General Sales Tax Act, 1963, is unconstitutional, as it is beyond the legislative powers of the State to enact the same. The same view has been taken by the Rajasthan High Court in Hiralal Chhaganlal v. StateA.I.R. 1968 Raj. 188., in respect of section 22(6) of the Rajasthan Sales Tax Act, 1954, which corresponds to section 41(4) of the Madras Act and section 28(4) of the Kerala Act. In the result, I quash exhibit P-6 and direct the respondents to refund to the petitioner within one month from the date hereof the sum of Rs. 1,269 which has been recovered from him by way of cash security. In the circumstances of the case there will be no order as to costs. Petition allowed.
-
1971 (2) TMI 85 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... ly those agricultural implements which are worked otherwise than by human or animal power. As regards the question as to whether sprayers would fall in the category of machinery, the same in our opinion does not arise out of the order of the Judge (Revisions), because we find no mention of that point in the revisional order. In any case machinery is a generic name and some of the agricultural implements might well be termed as machinery. But when agricultural implements have been specifically dealt with in the notification of 31st March, 1956, their taxability would be determined with reference to that notification on the principle that specific overrides the general. We accordingly answer the question by saying that sprayers have rightly been treated as agricultural implements falling under the notification of 31st March, 1956. The assessee is entitled to the costs which we assess at Rs. 100. Counsel s fee is also assessed at the same figure. Reference answered accordingly.
-
1971 (2) TMI 84 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... al, there is little doubt that that right of appeal is partially paralysed. If such an amendment is not retrospective, it should not apply to cases where a right of appeal has accrued much earlier. But where the power of stay of recovery of tax, fine or penalty is by a subsequent amendment taken away, it is difficult to see how the right of appeal is taken away or crippled. We are unable to discern any direct and necessary connection between the power of stay and the right of appeal. The latter may exist without the former. So the first argument fails. For the reasons already given in relation to the first ground the second ground also cannot succeed, for the amended sub-section (4) of section 10 has curtailed the power of the revising authority to stay recovery of the amount of tax, fee or penalty, and the power of stay is now less extensive than what it was before the amendment. There is no force in this petition. It is accordingly dismissed with costs. Petition dismissed.
-
1971 (2) TMI 83 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... the tax in respect of the first purchases of split or processed foodgrains merely because tax had been imposed, levied or collected earlier in respect of the first purchases of those foodgrains in their unsplit or unprocessed form. It has been provided that this explanation shall be deemed always to have been inserted in the Act so that the amendment has been given retrospective effect and, as such, shall apply to the present case also. According to the amendment, the split dal and whole dal are two different commodities, and, therefore, even if the purchase tax had already been imposed on the whole dal, the first purchase of split dal can also be subjected to tax. In the circumstances we answer both the questions in the affirmative, in favour of the Commissioner, Sales Tax, and against the assessee. As, however, no one has appeared, we make no order as to costs. The fee of the learned counsel for the department is assessed at Rs. 100. Reference answered in the affirmative.
-
1971 (2) TMI 82 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... e power of retaining the documents may be exercised only in such an exigency. So the criterion for the exercise of power is the immensity of inspection. This criterion is reasonably embedded in section 13(3). Accordingly section 13(3) does not conflict with article 14. 32.. Counsel has relied on Suraj Mall Mohta and Co. v. A.V. Visvanatha Sastr 1954 26 I.T.R. 1 (S.C.) 1955 1 S.C.R. 448., Shree Meenakshi Mills Ltd. v. A.V. Visvanatha Sastri 1954 26 I.T.R. 713 (S.C.) 1955 1 S.C.R. 787., Anandji Haridas and Co. v. S.P. Kushare 1968 21 S.T.C. 326 (S.C.) 1968 1 S.C.R. 661. and Harakchand Ratanchand v. Union of IndiaA.I.R. 1970 S.C. 1453., but they are all distinguishable from the provisions of law before us. 33.. Our answers to the two questions referred to us are Section 13(3) of the Sales Tax Act does not contravene articles 14 and 19(1)(f) and (g) of the Constitution. In view of our answer to question No. (1), the second question does not arise. Reference answered accordingly.
-
1971 (2) TMI 81 - KERALA HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... s already held by the Supreme Court, did not involve any sale of goods and the proceedings to recover sales tax on such transactions would obviously be without authority of law. In such a case, the assessments would also be without authority of law and such assessments cannot afford any basis for the recovery proceedings. The above decision does not, therefore, help the petitioner. Counsel for the petitioner referred me also to certain passages in the decision of the Madras High Court in Rayalseema Constructions v. Deputy Commercial Tax Officer 1959 10 S.T.C. 345 A.I.R. 1959 Mad. 382. The above Supreme Court case is an appeal from this decision and it is not, therefore, necessary to read those passages. Sufficient to say that this decision also does not help the petitioner, as the impugned proceedings related to recovery of a tax which the State was not authorised to collect. 6.. In the result, this writ petition is dismissed. I make no order as to costs. Petition dismissed.
-
1971 (2) TMI 80 - KERALA HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... appeal. The learned Judge has stated very weighty reasons for the above conclusion and I respectfully agree with the same. It is not, therefore, necessary to repeat them here. 5.. It follows that the rejection of the appeal by the second respondent on the ground that the petitioner did not pay the admitted tax as required by the proviso to section 34(1) of the Kerala General Sales Tax Act, 1963, was wrong. The question whether the petitioner has paid the admitted tax must depend on the sole fact as to what is the disputed turnover in the appeal, and whether the petitioner has paid the tax payable on the turnover, in respect of which the liability for being taxed is not disputed in appeal. The order, exhibit P-5, is, therefore, quashed and the second respondent is directed to readmit the appeal to file, and dispose of the same according to law and in the light of the observations herein contained. In the circumstances of the case I make no order as to costs. Petition allowed.
-
1971 (2) TMI 79 - KERALA HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... ake one observation in respect of the decision of the learned Single Judge in P.V.M. Koya v. Sales Tax Officer, KozhikodeO.P. No. 975 of 1960., which has been relied on by counsel for the petitioner. Section 25 of the Travancore-Cochin Act empowers the Government only to do anything necessary for the purpose of removing any difficulty arising in giving effect to the provisions of that Act. That section has nothing to do with any difficulty that may arise in respect of the assessment proceedings under the Cochin Sales Tax Act, or in giving effect to the revisional provision therein. In the absence of any statutory provision specifically dealing with such matters, resort can only be had to the provisions of the Cochin Act for appointing competent authorities thereunder. That question does not, however, arise in view of the decision of the Division Bench referred to above. 4.. In the result this writ petition is dismissed. There will be no order as to costs. Petition dismissed.
-
1971 (2) TMI 78 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... he petitioner says that the said service is not effective service within the meaning of rule 52 of the Madras General Sales Tax Rules, 1959, and that justice requires that he should be given an effective opportunity to disprove such service. In this behalf the Appellate Assistant Commissioner is directed to give an opportunity to the petitioner to establish that the pre-assessment notice dated 9th September, 1966, was not served on the petitioner and that the order of assessment is consequently illegal. If the petitioner desires to examine the process-server who effected the service, the department shall take all steps to produce the process-server for cross-examination by the petitioner before the Appellate Assistant Commissioner. If the service is proved, the appellate authority is at liberty to hear and dispose of the appeal on merits and in accordance with law. With these observations the writ petition is dismissed. There will be no order as to costs. Petition dismissed.
-
1971 (2) TMI 77 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... ating to tapes, niwars and laces , in our opinion, they would be covered by the entry cotton fabrics of all varieties . A cotton fabric is a fabrication of cotton yarn. It is not disputed that the articles in question are manufactured out of cotton yarn. The addition of elastic material, the nature of which has not been specified in the statement of the case, will not alter its nature. By the addition of the elastic material, the product can be called as elastic cotton fabric, but it remains a cotton fabric nevertheless. As stated above, we answer the question by saying that dori and fita are a kind of lace and tape, and, in any case, they fall within the entry cotton fabrics of all varieties , and, as such, are covered by the Notification No. S.T. 4064/X-960(4)-58 dated 25th November, 1958, and, are therefore, exempt from tax. The assessee is entitled to the costs, which we assess at Rs. 100. Counsel s fee is also assessed at the same figure. Reference answered accordingly.
-
1971 (2) TMI 76 - HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY
Meetings and Proceedings – Chairman’s declaration of result of voting by show of hands to be conclusive, Directors - Right of person other than retiring director to stand for directorship
-
1971 (2) TMI 74 - SUPREME COURT
Power of court to assess damages against delinquent, directors, etc. - Held that:- In the present case the High Court has found and that finding has not been shown to be wrong or erroneous in any manner that it was the appellant who enabled M to perpetrate the fraud which apparently resulted in loss to the company. The appellant himself also derived a certain benefit from the fraudulent acts of M. He would thus be clearly liable to repay or restore to the bank the amount in respect of which there was misapplication, misfeasance and breach of trust resulting in loss to the company. The appellant cannot escape liability for the entire amount for which an order has been made against him by the High Court. Appeal dismissed.
-
1971 (2) TMI 64 - HIGH COURT OF DELHI
Transfer to Shares – Power to refusal registration and appeal against refusal, Power to refuse and appeal against refusal
|
