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Case Laws
Showing 21 to 40 of 71 Records
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1973 (5) TMI 85 - PUNJAB AND HARYANA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... negatived by the Tribunal and, at the instance of the department, the aforesaid question was referred to this court. Here the finding of fact is that these instruments were sold for being used in school and college laboratories for educational purposes. For the reasons already given by us, these items cannot be treated as luxury goods and, as already indicated by us, in view of the words used in the proviso to sub-section (1) of section 5 of the Act, it is open to the court to adjudicate whether a particular item, which answers the general description of an entry given in the schedule, is or is not luxury goods because, the State Government must be taken to have used general words in the sense of covering all goods which can be treated as luxury goods . For the reasons given above, therefore, the answer to the question referred must be given in the affirmative. The respondent is entitled to his costs. Counsel s fee Rs. 100. Appeals dismissed. Reference answered accordingly.
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1973 (5) TMI 84 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... effected during the period 1st April, 1966, to 30th September, 1966. It was held that the corporation was not a dealer carrying on a business in old or scrapped vehicles and other scraps to be liable to be assessed to sales tax. It was, however, held that in order that an incidental or ancillary transaction or activity might amount to business within the meaning of clause (ii) of section 2(bbb), it should be in connection with the trade or commerce or adventure by the assessee and should itself partake of the character of trade, commerce, manufacture, adventure or concern. For the aforesaid reasons, it appears to us, that when the railway effected sales of unclaimed and unconnected goods, it is not a dealer within the meaning of section 2(c) of the Bengal Finance (Sales Tax) Act, 1941. The question referred to us, therefore, is answered in the negative and in favour of the petitioner. There will be no order as to costs. HAZRA, J.-I agree. Reference answered in the negative.
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1973 (5) TMI 83 - ORISSA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... in exercise of our reference jurisdiction to decide whether the notification is ultra vires. It is the State s notification and that it was bad had never been contended, and at any rate in our reference jurisdiction we are not competent to hold that it is bad even if it is really bad. 9.. Our answers to the questions shall, therefore, be (1) On the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the dealer is entitled to exemption of Central sales tax on the turnover of sales on the purchase of which tax had been levied inside the State. It would not make any difference if the purchase tax had not been paid by the dealer but by his vendor who was the first purchaser. (2) On the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Tribunal was right in allowing the exemption claimed and thereby reducing the assessment to the returned figure and thus accepting the return of the dealer. We make no order as to costs of this reference. B.K. RAY, J.-I agree. Reference answered accordingly.
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1973 (5) TMI 82 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... Court in State of Madras v. S. Padmanabhan on the ground that the Government had the necessary power to issue a notification in advance or in anticipation of the coming into force of the enactment. The result of the Supreme Court s decision is that G.O. No. 976, Revenue, dated 28th March, 1959, is valid, and that, therefore, the Tribunal s reasoning that the said notification is invalid and it cannot be taken into account for the purpose of finding out whether the assessee is entitled to exemption or not cannot be sustained. As per Notification G.O. No. 976, Revenue, dated 28th March, 1959, as modified by G.O. No. 4725, Revenue, dated 30th October, 1961, sales of reading books including text-books alone are exempted. Copy note-books cannot be said to be either reading books or text-books. Therefore, the Tribunal s decision has to be set aside and it is set aside accordingly. The tax case is, therefore, allowed. There will, however, be no order as to costs. Petition allowed.
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1973 (5) TMI 81 - ORISSA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... never been the assessee s case and if it is permitted to be argued, we have no doubt in our mind that the contention deserves only to be repelled. It is this very sale from the licensee to the joint Director of Food that leads to the export. What could otherwise have been an intraState sale becomes an inter-State sale under section 3 of the Central Sales Tax Act. There is no merit in the assessee s contention. Our answer to the question referred to us, therefore, shall be that on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Tribunal was correct in finding that there is a sale in the course of inter-State trade in respect of the sales to the joint Director of Food exigible to Central sales tax. We make no order as to costs because the reference had been occasioned on the authority of a decision of the Supreme Court on Narain Das case 1970 26 S.T.C. 344 (S.C.)., which held the field when the reference was asked for. B.K. RAY, J.-I agree. Reference, answered accordingly.
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1973 (5) TMI 80 - ORISSA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... to be of commercial nature......The activities, e.g., selling forms, rubber stamps, etc., which are commercial in character are nowhere contemplated. I do not think such activities can be considered as anything otherwise than a business. True it is that the Tribunal referred to Indal s case 1968 22 S.T.C. 460. and noticed the fact that profit-motive was not an essential element yet in what has been said above we find that the Tribunal came to a factual conclusion that the activities of the press were commercial in character and the assessee entered into the field for carrying on a business as popularly understood. 6.. On the findings of the Tribunal, no question of law arose for determination of this court and what has been referred to us are questions of fact which the Tribunal as the duly constituted final fact finding authority was competent to find. Accordingly, we decline to answer the question. We make no order as to costs. B.K. RAY, J.-I agree. Reference not answered.
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1973 (5) TMI 79 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ge of the provision used, specially the language used in section 5(2)(a)(ii) and the proviso thereto, no warrant for such a consequence. We are in respectful agreement with the Punjab and Haryana High Court that a person or dealer who had applied for registration should not be criminally made liable or should not be proceeded against under the Sales Tax Act because he could not be expected to do anything more, but that would not make him a registered dealer and the person dealing with him in such circumstances could not be said to be dealing with a registered dealer and in so far as the Punjab and Haryana High Court held to that effect, with great respect, we are unable to accept that conclusion. In the aforesaid view of the matter the question referred to this court must be answered in the negative and in favour of the sales tax authorities. In the facts and circumstances of the case, there will be no order as to costs. HAZRA, J.-I agree. Reference answered in the negative.
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1973 (5) TMI 78 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... the cycle. Seat cover is definitely an accessory or accompaniment to the cycle seat. In this case, it is not as if seat covers were made to order. The assessee had manufactured seat covers and offered them for sale just like any other commodity he was dealing in. The learned counsel for the assessee contends that the assessee is not dealing in cycle or cycle parts and, therefore, the sale of seat covers cannot be said to be a sale of accessory to a cycle. But the fact that the assessee does not deal in cycle or cycle parts will not decide the issue as to whether the seat covers sold by the assessee are accessories to the cycles. It is not also the case of the assessee that cycle covers sold by him could be put to any other use. They could be used only as covers for the cycle seats. Therefore, following the decision of this court in T.C. No. 107 of 1971 (Khetty Traders v. State of Madras(1)), these tax cases are allowed. There will be no order as to costs. Petitions allowed.
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1973 (5) TMI 77 - ORISSA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... essee. The assessee has contended that it has sold paper qua paper and there has been no violation of the declaration. On the record before us that appears to be the only conclusion possible to be drawn. Several cases have been cited to us including some of this court on the point. We do not, however, find any necessity to refer to those decisions because, in our view, this case can be disposed of on what we have said above. Our answer to the first question shall, therefore, be On the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the revenue has failed to establish any contravention of the proviso to section 5(2)(A)(a)(ii) of the Act and, therefore, the petitioner is not liable to pay tax on the value of the paper sold. On the aforesaid finding, the second question does not arise for determination. We decline to answer it. 10.. The reference is thus disposed of against the department. We, however, make no order as to costs. B.K. RAY, J.-I agree. Reference answered accordingly.
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1973 (5) TMI 76 - ORISSA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... is a case of inter-departmental rivalry. If tax were exigible, it was to be paid by the forest department to the commercial taxes department. We really see no justification as to why the two departments of Government had not been able to settle their dispute on the administrative basis and the matter had to be thrashed out by such a long-drawn process, wasting time and energy of public officers. Since any direction for payment of costs would add to the futility, we refrain from making any such direction. 12.. Before we part, we must dispose of what had been reserved by an earlier direction in this court to be dealt with in the final order. The railways had applied to intervene. There is no provision for intervention in a reference application and, therefore, we had not allowed intervention. Mr. Pal, appearing for the railways had, however, been heard amicus curiae to assist us in reaching a proper decision in the matter. B.K. RAY, J.-I agree. Reference answered accordingly.
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1973 (5) TMI 75 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... have been paid under a mistake has got to be adjudged with reference to a litigant who claims the refund, and has not got to be adjudged by the yard-stick of a prudent and diligent assessee. Thus, in case the petitioners were to establish that there was a mistake of law committed by it at the time when the payments in question were made, the mere fact that it might have been possible for the petitioner, by the exercise of due care and diligence, to have known of the correct position in law, would not disentitle it to the benefit of section 72 of the Contract Act. The petitions are accordingly dismissed. There shall, however, be no order as to costs. The petitioner may, if he so chooses, now take appropriate proceedings before the sales tax authorities for setting aside the assessment orders and in case sufficient cause is shown, we entertain no doubt whatsoever that the appeals would be entertained and disposed of on merits by the appellate authorities. Petitions dismissed.
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1973 (5) TMI 74 - HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA
Meeting and Proceedings – Power of Company Law Board to Order Meeting to be Called ... ... ... ... ..... rishan Lal and Gurdial exist against their names as members at the time of taking ballot papers but they did not exercise the right of vote. Likewise, Hari Singh and Natha Singh were supplied with ballot papers and some other interested persons filled those ballot papers and voted. 9.Teja Singh, Palwa Ram, Paro Bai, Uttar Singh, Pala Singh and Bhola Singh are illiterate and did not vote themselves, but some other interested persons voted for them. It is quite clear from the nature of the objections raised to the conduct of the meeting that it is not a matter for decision under section 186 of the Companies Act. Under that section, this court can call a meeting of the shareholders of the company other than an annual general meeting, if it is satisfied that, for any reason, it is impracticable for the company to call, hold or conduct a meeting. No such allegation has been made by the petitioners. In my opinion, therefore, this petition is incompetent. It is dismissed with costs.
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1973 (5) TMI 65 - HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA
Winding up - Powers of liquidator, Summons for directions to be taken out by official liquidator, Power of Supreme Court to make rules
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1973 (5) TMI 56 - HIGH COURT OF DELHI
Meeting and Proceedings - Power of Company Law Board to Order Meeting to be Called, Directors - Right of person other than retiring director to stand for directorship
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1973 (5) TMI 54 - HIGH COURT OF DELHI
Company – Membership of, Share capital - Further issue of, Powers of Court to rectify register of members, Meeting and Proceedings – Power of Company Law Board to Order Meeting to be Called, Appointment of directors and proportion of those who are to retire by rotation
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1973 (5) TMI 51 - HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA
Memorandum of association - Special resolution and confirmation by CLB required for alteration of
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1973 (5) TMI 35 - HIGH COURT OF KERALA
Copra - Cess ... ... ... ... ..... ss by way of excise duty on all copra consumed in a mill. Copra was subject to cess or excise duty under the Coconut Committee Act, 1942. The above item was included in the Produce Cess Act, as a substitute for the cess levied under the Coconut Committee Act. The contention of the petitioners Counsel cannot be accepted also on a literal interpretation of the description of the relevant item, since consumption of copra in the mills of the petitioners is with a view to produce oil, which admittedly is goods as the term is used in the said description. In other words, the description is comprehensive enough to include oil also. The argument that oil is not something different from copra, or that it would not come within the term any goods , which term can only comprise goods manufactured from oil, has no substance. 4.For the reasons stated above, the petitioners cannot succeed in these cases. These original petitions are accordingly dismissed. There will be no order as to costs.
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1973 (5) TMI 34 - DELHI HIGH COURT
Business Expenditure ... ... ... ... ..... e wholly and exclusively for the purpose of the business. In so holding, this court had followed the decision of the Punjab High Court in J. N. Singh and Company Private Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income-tax. Though the amount claimed by the assessee in the present year is different from the amount claimed by the assessee in the earlier years, the rule laid down by this court in the assessee s own case in the earlier years is applicable to the assessee s claim for this year also. There appears to be no dispute about the actual amount of expenditure incurred by the assessee. We have, therefore, to hold that the sum of Rs. 30,959 spent by the assessee in the criminal case against Ramji Dass and other employees of the assessee-company is allowable under section 10(2)(xv) of the Act. The question is, therefore, answered in the affirmative, i.e., in favour of the assessee and against the department. There shall, however, be no order as to costs. Question answered in the affirmative.
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1973 (5) TMI 33 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
Income Tax, Rectification Of Mistakes, Substantially Interested ... ... ... ... ..... Income-tax Officer to. the respondent it appeared that the list of shareholding was not before the Income-tax Officer at the time when the assessment was made, but was furnished to him at a later point of time. We asked Mr. Bhattacharyya to produce the records of the respondent to satisfy us that the list of shareholding was furnished by the respondent to the Income-tax Officer at a point of time subsequent to the making of the original assessment order. No such record was produced before us. We must, therefore, hold that the materials on the record on which the Income-tax Officer relied, namely, the lists of shareholding, were before the Income-tax Officer at the time of making the assessment for the assessment year 1964-65. For the reasons mentioned above this appeal succeeds and is allowed. The judgment and order under appeal are set aside. The rule is discharged. Each party to pay and bear its own costs. Operation of the order is stayed for six weeks. JANAH J.--I agree.
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1973 (5) TMI 32 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
Purchase And Sale, When Assessable As Income ... ... ... ... ..... factors to be considered. The consistent and repeated activity of purchase and sale of house properties year after year shows that the assessee, in addition to his carrying on hotel business, is also engaged in an activity of purchase and sale of houses with a view to earn profit therefrom. Though we are not inclined to agree with the view of the Tribunal that the purchase and sale of houses forms part of his whole business, we are inclined to hold that the assessee has been carrying on an activity as an adventure in the nature of trade in real estates, apart from his admitted business of running hotels. As the transactions amount to an adventure in the nature of trade, the income therefrom has to be assessed as business income. We have to, therefore, uphold the assessment of the surplus profits as income from business. The question is, therefore, answered in the affirmative and in favour of the revenue. The assessee will pay the costs of the revenue. Counsel s fee Rs. 250.
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