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Case Laws
Showing 21 to 40 of 70 Records
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1974 (10) TMI 93 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... n. Sri A. Mahadev raised yet another point to the effect that rule 5 of the Andhra Pradesh General Sales Tax Rules is ultra vires, as the rule-making authority was not given the power to fix the point of levy. The power to make rules is conferred on the rule-making authority for the purpose of carrying out the purpose of the Act. The purpose of the Act is to levy taxes on sale or purchase of goods. That, the charging provision provides. The fixation of the point for the levy of tax constitutes one of the integral steps necessary for carrying out the purpose of the Act and that power to carry out the purpose of the Act is admittedly conferred upon the rulemaking authority. I do not find any merit in this contention. I hold that rule 5 is intra vires and valid. For all the aforesaid reasons, I am satisfied that there are no merits in these writ petitions. The writ petitions are, therefore, dismissed with costs. Advocate s fee Rs. 100 in each writ petition. Petitions dismissed.
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1974 (10) TMI 92 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... on of arrears of sales tax and penalty due from the Hindu undivided family for the period prior to the discontinuance of its business in case he is mentioned in the certificate contemplated by section 33 of the Act. In the writ petition it has not been asserted that the petitioner who was the karta was not mentioned in the recovery certificate. The question with regard to the mention of the name of the person against whom the proceedings are sought to be continued arose while the matter was being argued before the Full Bench. For that reason there is no specific mention either in the writ petition or in the counter-affidavit of the factual aspects of this question. In case the name of the petitioner is not mentioned in the certificate issued under section 33 of the U.P. Sales Tax Act, the proceedings could not validly continue against him. Subject to these observations the writ petition fails and is accordingly dismissed, but we make no order as to costs. Petition dismissed.
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1974 (10) TMI 91 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... h in Commissioner, Sales Tax v. Chandok Traders 1973 32 S.T.C. 614 1973 U.P.T.C. 484., in which the question was whether hair clippers were machinery. It was held that since hair clippers are instruments which transmit force from one point to another they were machinery within the meaning of the relevant notification. In the light of these decisions, the water-meters manufactured by the assessee cannot but be held to be machinery because they too work on account of the transmission of energy caused by the movement of water in them. The transmission of energy makes some parts of the meter work. In our opinion, the revising authority was justified in holding that the water-meters in question were taxable as machinery and their parts as parts of machinery. The question referred to us is answered in the affirmative in favour of the department and against the assessee. The Commissioner will be entitled to costs which are assessed at Rs. 100. Reference answered in the affirmative.
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1974 (10) TMI 90 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... complicated machinery employed in mills and factories. In this context the handloom or kargha sold by the assessee would fall within the meaning of machinery or its part because they transmit and transform force or energy from one point to another point and place. Since the commodity in question is machinery and its part, they could not be validly taxed as an unclassified item. The learned counsel for the assessee urged that the handlooms were liable to be assessed as timber products within the meaning of the notification dated 1st July, 1962. The question whether the handloom (kargha) is a timber product is outside the purview of the question referred to us, hence we are unable to deal with this problem. In the result, we answer the question by saying that the handloom (kargha) is taxable as machinery and machinery parts and not as an unclassified item. The Commissioner of Sales Tax would be entitled to his costs, which we assess at Rs. 100. Reference answered accordingly.
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1974 (10) TMI 89 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ottle . As such it was exempt from tax. It has been found that in some of the sale bills the assessee termed the article in question as jars, like American jar , honey jar , etc. The Judge (Revisions) has, however, found that the assessee charged sales tax on the sales of these goods at the rate of 2 per cent. This would show that the assessee never acted on the basis that the articles were glassware, taxable at 10 per cent. The case of the assessee that the turnover of bottles would be taxable at 2 per cent as an unclassified item is not inconsistent with his dealings. No question of any estoppel arises. Our answer to the questions referred to us is that the revising authority was justified in holding the sales of the articles in question to be the sales of bottle and in further holding that the assessee was not estopped from claiming that they were bottles. The assessee would be entitled to his costs, which we assess at Rs. 100 in each case. Reference answered accordingly.
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1974 (10) TMI 88 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... in different ways and adopt different modes of assessment, A taxing statute may contravene article 14 of the Constitution if it seeks to impose on the same class of property, persons, transactions or occupations similarly situate, incidence of taxation, which leads to obvious inequality. It is for the legislature to determine the objects on which tax shall be levied, and the rates thereof. The courts will not strike down an Act as denying the equal protection of laws merely because other objects could have been, but are not, taxed by the legislature. We are not therefore in a position to accept the contention of the learned counsel that there has been an infringement of article 14 of the Constitution in the adoption of different rates for the various types of accessories such as seat covers. These petitions are therefore dismissed with costs in W.P. No. 2942 of 1973 alone. There will be no orders as to costs in the other petitions. Counsel s fee Rs. 150. Petitions dismissed.
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1974 (10) TMI 87 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... eing used as furniture was not the correct test. This was not the generally accepted sense of the articles in question. This case is not applicable. Here we are dealing with footwear, which is a term of very wide sweep. It includes all kinds of shoes, including those which may be used on particular occasions or events. Simply because one variety of shoe is generally sold by a dealer in sports goods it will not go outside the purview of the entry footwear . Even if it be assumed that since this variety of shoes is used by sportsmen and so are generally kept and sold by dealers in sports goods, yet since there is no specific category called sports goods in any notification, sports shoes would remain footwear and would be taxed as such. In the result our answer to the question referred to us is in the affirmative, in favour of the department and against the assessee. The Commissioner will be entitled to costs which are assessed at Rs. 100. Reference answered in the affirmative.
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1974 (10) TMI 86 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... a dealer in the series of sales effected inside the State. As has been rightly pointed out by the Tribunal, when the statute in items 2 and 22 referred to the first sale inside the State, the word sale cannot be dissociated from the definition of sale in section 2(n). Section 2(n) defines sale as a transfer of property in goods by one person to another in the course of business. This means that the first sale referred to in items 2 and 22 refers only to the first sale effected by a person in the course of his business. As we have already held that the customs department has not effected the sale in the course of any business, but it has effected the same in discharge of its statutory functions, we have to hold that the sale effected by the customs department cannot be treated to be in the course of business. We have to, therefore, uphold the order of the trial court in this case. The tax case is, consequently, dismissed, with costs. Counsel s fee Rs. 150. Petition dismissed.
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1974 (10) TMI 85 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... posals, Calcutta v. Member, Board of Revenue 1967 20 S.T.C. 398 (S.C.). and Indian Iron and Steel Co. Ltd. v. Member, Board of Revenue 1971 27 S.T.C. 373., the Iron and Steel Controller cannot be considered to be a dealer. Before we conclude we must observe that the counsel for the Government tried to point out, with reference to certain contentions raised before the revenue authorities below, that it was not contended below that the Iron and Steel Controller was not a dealer. What was contended was that the dealings were with registered dealers and time was sought to produce the necessary certificates. It is true that time was sought for that purpose. But the nature of sales in respect of these transactions was a controversy before the authorities. In the aforesaid view of the matter, we answer the question referred to this court in the negative and in favour of the petitioner. Each party will pay and bear his own costs. PYNE, J.-I agree. Reference answered in the negative.
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1974 (10) TMI 84 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... he specifications for the bus body given by the customer. There are no materials in these cases to indicate that the property in the materials which have been worked into the chassis in the process of body-building passed to the customer then and there. There is also no separate agreement for the sale of these materials which were worked into the chassis in the process of body-building. On the materials available, the conclusion is inescapable that the property in the bus body built by the assessees passed to the customer only at the time of handing over the completed bus body along with the chassis. Therefore, the transaction would amount only to a sale of bus body by the assessees to the customer. Following the decision given by this court in T. V. Sundram Iyengar and Sons case(1), which has since been affirmed by the Supreme Court, we have to dismiss the above tax cases and they are accordingly dismissed with costs. Counsel s fee Rs. 100 in each case. Petitions dismissed.
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1974 (10) TMI 83 - SUPREME COURT
Whether a Hindu marriage solemnised within this country can be validly annulled by a decree of divorce granted by a foreign court?
Whether a divorce decree will be recognised in another jurisdiction?
Held that:- Appeal allowed. The International Hague Convention of 1970 which contains a comprehensive scheme for relieving the confusion caused by differing. systems of conflict of laws may serve as a model. But any such law, shall have to provide for the non-recognition of foreign decrees procured by fraud bearing on jurisdictional facts as also for the nonrecognition of decrees, the recognition of which would be contrary to our public policy. Until then the courts shall have to exercise a residual discretion to avoid flagrant injustice for, no rule of private inter- national law could compel a wife to submit to a decree procured by the husband by trickery. Such decrees offend against our notions of. substantial justice. In the result allow the appeal with costs set aside the judgment of the High Court and restore that of the trial court.
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1974 (10) TMI 82 - SUPREME COURT
Validity of section 2(1) of Madras Act 37 of 1964 questioned - Held that:- Appeal allowed. Unable to understand the view of the High Court that if the sale price were taxed and rebate were given then there would be no objection to the tax. We do not understand how that can be done. We asked the learned Advocates appearing for the respondents to tell us how that can be done and they were not able to do so. The cost of conversion of the raw hides and skins to tanned hides and skins might differ from tanner to tanner. It is much easier to get figures for the purchase price of the raw hides and skins or the sale price of the tanned hides and skins than the cost of conversion. As the scheme of taxation is not on the basis of the sale price of tanned hides and skins the suggestion of the High Court cannot be adopted. We, therefore, hold that the High Court was in error in striking down the impugned provision of law.
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1974 (10) TMI 81 - SUPREME COURT
Whether the supply for consideration by an assessee of bus bodies constructed and fitted to chassis provided by the customers amounts to sale chargeable to sales tax?
Held that:- Appeal allowed. Looking into the agreement eventually executed and not to the invitation for tenders, and, even so, we find that what is specified in that invitation for tenders is that the price for building the bodies should be quoted by the tenderer with respect to each body. That does not mean that the intention of the parties was that the bodies should be treated as independent or composite units to be produced and sold as such. Indeed the preamble to that invitation by the Stores Purchase Committee makes it clear that what the tenderer was expected to do was the construction of the body and not to make a sale.
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1974 (10) TMI 70 - SUPREME COURT
Whether the Parliament in not fixing the rate itself and in adopting the rate applicable to the sale or purchase of goods inside the appropriate State has not laid down any legislative policy and has abdicated its legislative function?
Held that:- Appeal dismissed. Since the very question whether such amendment of the law would make the transactions in question exigible to tax is one which is capable of giving rise to considerable argument, the mistake sought to be rectified ceases to be a "mistake apparent on the record", thus making it unamenable to correction under rule 38 of the State Rules. We are unable to accept this argument. It is true that the impugned notice clearly indicates that it is issued pursuant to the amendments made in the law aforementioned. But the fact that elaborate arguments could be constructed as to the interpretation to be placed on a statutory provision, which in one sense renders an earlier rectification of a mistake, would not, in our judgment, make such a mistake one that is not apparent on the record.
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1974 (10) TMI 54 - HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY
Power to investigate into affairs of a company-in-liquidation, Powers of Central Government to authorise with permission of High Court to takeover management or control of industrial undertaking
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1974 (10) TMI 46 - HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY
Company when deemed unable to pay its debts, Winding up - Meetings to ascertain wishes of creditors or contributors
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1974 (10) TMI 37 - ITAT MADURAI
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... ... ..... f sales according to the invoices issued by the appellant in all the four cases, add upto Rs. 2,76,036 of which Rs. 78,645 has been considered in the appeal relating to the Tamil Nadu General Sales tax Act. This upward variation indicates that the value adopted by Sree Meenakshi Mills Ltd., is much different from that adopted by the appellant, which goes to show that there were separate favourable sales transactions at the appellant rsquo s hands of the identical goods. On the strength of the materials available, we considered that the proper turnover liable to Central Sales Tax on the impugned transactions is Rs. 1,97,391. We therefore, hold that the turnover liable to Central Sales Tax is refixed at Rs. 1,97,391, against Rs. 2,38,866 adopted by the assessing authority and confirmed by the AAC. As we have already held that these transactions are not covered by any valid declaration forms, the penal rate applies. Subject to the above modification, the appeal stands dismissed.
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1974 (10) TMI 36 - ITAT MADURAI
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... ... ..... es, the Revenue was wrong in taxing the appellants an their sale. Having regard to the admitted facts, we agree that the sale by the appellants is only a second sale, and tax liability, as it stood in 1959-60 in regard to machinery, was that it was only goods taxable at the point of first sale only. As we noticed, item 23 omitted from the Schedule only in 1961. Therefore, when the Revenue concedes that the sale by the appellants to the Calcutta firm was within this State and it was only a second sale, the sale transaction at the hands of the appellants, was not exigible to tax. Such a sale was covered by item 23 of the First Schedule which was then in vogue. The appellants also argue that the penalty levied was illegal. We need not consider the legality or the propriety of the penalty levied, since the assessment itself is unsustainable and the penalty has also to go. 5. In the result, the appeal is allowed in entirety, the assessment in annulled and the penalty is concelled.
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1974 (10) TMI 32 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
French Polish and Varnishes - Classification - Classification of goods under Tariff Items ... ... ... ... ..... also a manufacturer of French Polish, the petitioner could be said to have been discriminated against, for, according to petitioner, Mr. Sharma had been granted exemption from payment of excise duty. Now here the admitted facts are that Mr. Sharma had commenced his manufacturing factory of French Polish long prior to 6th July, 1963 whereas admittedly the French Polish in January, 1963 was granted licence on 4th March, 1964, with the result that the petitioner could be said to have commenced manufacturing French Polish thereafter. Therefore, the case of Mr Sharma and that of the petitioner cannot be said to be similarly situated. Obviously, the exemptions that was granted to Mr. Sharma was not the basis that he was a manufacturer of French Polish long prior to 6th July, 1963. The two cases being not indentical, the plea of discrimination must fail. 10. In the result, we feel that there is no substance in the petition even on merits. Rule is, therefore, discharged with costs.
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1974 (10) TMI 31 - SUPREME COURT
Whether the petitioners were entitled to the refund claimed?
Held that:- The appellants could not be allowed to split up their claim for refund and file writ petitions on this piecemeal fashion. If the appellants could have but did not, without any legal justification, claim refund of the amounts paid during the years in question, in the earlier writ petitions, we see no reason why the appellants should be allowed to claim the amounts by filing writ petitions again. In the circumstances of this case, having regard to the conduct of the appellants in not claiming these amounts in the earlier writ petitions without any justification, we do not think we would be justified in interfering with the discretion exercised by the High Court in dismissing the writ petitions which were filed only for the purpose of obtaining the refund and directing them to resort to the remedy of suits. Appeal dismissed.
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