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Case Laws
Showing 21 to 40 of 97 Records
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1974 (7) TMI 108 - KARNATAKA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ees cannot attract the liability to payment of sales tax is not tenable. 6.. The next question is whether in respect of the turnover of the sales effected by the sub-lessees the petitioner can be held liable under the Act to pay sales tax. It may be that a principal is liable to pay sales tax when a person acting within the scope of his authority has effected sales. But that liability depends upon the nature or scope of authority. The authorities under the Act who have passed the impugned orders have not applied their mind to the nature and extent of authority under which these sublessees functioned. In the circumstances, I am of the view that the impugned orders passed by the authorities without going into the relevant questions are unsustainable and are liable to be set aside. They are accordingly set aside. The case is remanded to the Commercial Tax Officer to dispose of the case afresh in accordance with law and in the light of the observations made above. Case remanded.
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1974 (7) TMI 107 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... the revenue lies. It is here the distinction emerges between the two types of offences, the revenue and penal ones. On that view, we are of the opinion that the owner of the goods may come up on the scene and offer to compound under section 46 in spite of the fact that the notice had been served on the driver for laches under section 44. This is not because the liability of the driver is vicarious, but because of the peculiar position arising out of revenue exigency. We hold, therefore, that the respondent had the locus standi. So far as the appeal in which compounding has been done, we can do nothing for the assessee because compounding is more or less by the consent of the dealer or the driver concerned. In the other case also, we decline to interfere. But at the same time we should observe that, if the owner of the goods came forward to compound the offence, he should be allowed to do so by the department. On that view, the appeals are allowed. No costs. Appeals allowed.
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1974 (7) TMI 106 - KARNATAKA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... omponent parts used. In our judgment, the Tribunal has not correctly followed the principles to be applied as has been pointed out by the Supreme Court in Arun Electrics v. Commissioner of Sales Tax 1966 17 S.T.C. 576 (S.C.). There is another decision of the Supreme Court reported in Government of Madras v. Simpson and Company Ltd. 1968 21 S.T.C. 21 (S.C.)., which also enunciates the principles to be borne in mind in determining whether a transaction is a works contract or a sale of finished article or of components forming it. The Tribunal has to determine the point in dispute having regard to the principles enunciated in the said rulings. Accordingly, we set aside the order of the Tribunal and remand the matter to it for fresh adjudication in the light of the observations made above. It would be open to the Tribunal to remit the matter to the assessing authority if it considers necessary to do so. There will be no order as to costs in this revision petition. Case remanded.
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1974 (7) TMI 105 - KARNATAKA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... h the State is incompetent to levy. A mere device cannot be permitted to defeat the provisions of the Constitution by clothing the claim in the form of a demand for depositing the money with the State which the dealer has collected, but which he was not entitled to collect. (Underlining is ours.) The law settled by the Supreme Court is that there cannot be a provision in any Sales Tax Act to compel a dealer who has deliberately or erroneously recovered an amount from the purchaser on a representation that he is entitled to recover or recoup himself for payment of tax to pay that amount to the State when there is no levy of tax on the sale or purchase of the goods. Therefore, the view taken by this court in Dhundushi s case is right and, accordingly, the Tribunal was right in reversing the order of the authorities below and setting aside the order levying penalty. Accordingly, this revision petition fails and is dismissed with costs. Advocate s fee Rs. 50. Petition dismissed.
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1974 (7) TMI 104 - KARNATAKA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... nd cannot be allowed to proceed. In the course of arguments, there was some discussion as to whether in the recovery proceedings under section 13(3)(b) of the Act it is open to the dealer to contend that the notice served in one of the modes prescribed under rule 53 is not valid and whether the Magistrate had jurisdiction to decide that question. We do not wish to express any opinion on this matter in the circumstances of the case. Even assuming that the Magistrate had no jurisdiction, the petitioner could have approached this court under article 226 of the Constitution. Instead of driving the petitioner to file a writ petition, we consider it appropriate that relief should be granted in these petitions. Accordingly, we allow these revision petitions and reverse the order of the Magistrate reserving liberty to the department to serve the notices of demand in accordance with law and thereafter proceed to recover the tax. It is ordered accordingly. No costs. Petitions allowed.
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1974 (7) TMI 103 - KARNATAKA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... n that the orders of assessment are null and void. 4.. The petitioner has a right of appeal. It is stated in the statement of objections filed on behalf of the respondent that the books of account in question have been handed back to the petitioner on 30th January, 1973. It is open to the petitioner to file appeals before the appellate authority and convince him that the decision of the Commercial Tax Officer based on the books of account in question was liable to be reversed. The petitioner has not filed appeals till now since he had approached this court under article 226 of the Constitution. The petitioner is permitted now to file appeals against the impugned orders before the appellate authority within thirty days from today. If he files those appeals within thirty days, the appellate authority shall entertain them without reference to the question of limitation and dispose them of in accordance with law. These writ petitions are dismissed. No costs. Petitions dismissed.
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1974 (7) TMI 102 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... , 1972). But that decision has no application to the facts of the present cases. It is now sought to be contended by Sri N. Madhusudhan Raj that, in respect of the turnover of rice, the rate has been altered by the revising authority. Therefore, it is a fresh assessment sought to be made by the revising authority and it cannot be done by the revising authority beyond the period of four years prescribed by rule 14-A(11). But the turnover relating to rice is not the subject-matter of the writ petitions. Moreover, there does not seem to be any force in the contention even on merits because what all the Deputy Commissioner did was to apply the correct rate at which the turnover of rice is taxable under the Central Act. This, the revisional authority can undoubtedly do in exercise of the revisional power. In the result, all the contentions raised by the learned counsel fail and these two writ petitions are dismissed with costs. Advocate s fee Rs. 100 in each. Petitions dismissed.
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1974 (7) TMI 101 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... learned judges held that he would not be liable to tax because he was not the first seller. For these reasons, we do not think that this decision would advance the contention of the assessee before us. For the aforesaid reasons, we are of the opinion that the majority view of the Tribunal holding that the tanned hides and skins now sought to be assessed are generally exempt from tax is not correct. We hold that they do not enjoy the benefit of section 8(2A) of the Central Act and the dealers only remedy is to claim reimbursement of the State tax after they have paid the Central tax as well. In the result, the tax revision case is allowed and the majority opinion of the Tribunal is set aside. The writ petition also is dismissed. However, having regard to the difficult question of law involved, we think that in the interests of justice no order as to costs should be made in these cases. Advocate s fee Rs. 100 in each case. Tax revision case allowed and writ petition dismissed.
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1974 (7) TMI 100 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ed, there would be no question of the statutory offence having been made out on such conjectures in the present case. Therefore, on both the questions the answer must be in the negative. As regards the third question, the same would not arise in view of our answer on the first two questions. We would, however, point out that as the Tribunal had reduced the penalty to a rate of only 4 per cent, this third question as to whether the maximum limit specified in section 10A was of 4 1/2 per cent or 15 per cent on the basis of concessional rate of 3 per cent under section 8(1)(b) or higher rate of 10 per cent under section 8(2) would not arise on the facts of the present case and no such question could have been referred. In that view of the matter, our answer to the first two questions is in the negative. Question No. (3) does not survive and does not arise for our decision. The State shall pay the costs of the petitioner-company of this reference. Reference answered accordingly.
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1974 (7) TMI 99 - KARNATAKA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... d copies and they were asked to appear and take the certified copies. It was the duty of the assessing authority to send copies of the assessment orders to the assessee. Therefore the Tribunal was in error in holding that the period of limitation commenced from 1st January, 1972, the date of service of the demand notice. The period of limitation commenced on 1st February, 1972, when copies of the assessment orders were received by the petitioners. If that is the date which has to be reckoned, the appeals were within time. The Tribunal as also the Assistant Commissioner were in error in rejecting the appeals as barred by time. 5.. Accordingly, these revision petitions are allowed, the order of the Tribunal is reversed and the matters are remitted to the Assistant Commissioner of Commercial Taxes, Mangalore, to register the appeals and dispose of the same in accordance with law. 6.. The petitioners are entitled to their costs. Advocate s fee Rs. 100 one set. Petitions allowed.
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1974 (7) TMI 98 - JAMMU AND KASHMIR HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... onstitution of India. As these are the only offending parts of the notification which are severable from the rest of the notification, we strike down and quash the aforesaid parts. The result is that Writ Petition No. 93 of 1972-Glacier Cold Storage and Ice Mills v. Assessing Authority-fails and is dismissed, whereas Writ Petition No. 99 of 1972-Sain Dass v. State of Jammu Kashmir-succeeds, and a writ of certiorari is issued striking down and quashing item 34 and the second proviso of Notification No. S.R.O. 729 dated 11th October, 1972. There will be no order as to costs. WASI-UD-DIN, J.-I agree. JASWANT SINGH, J.-I have had the advantage of going through the elaborate and illuminating judgment prepared by the Honourable the Chief Justice after a very exhaustive and analytical review of the authorities bearing upon the various questions involved in the petitions and agree with the conclusions arrived at and the order proposed to be made by his Lordship. Ordered accordingly.
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1974 (7) TMI 97 - PATNA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... tton fabrics. Cotton fabrics of all varieties were meant to be included in the expression. The two articles, it was not disputed, were manufactured out of cotton yarn. Mere addition of elastic materials, the nature of which was not specified In the statement of the case, could not alter its nature. In my opinion, hosiery goods cannot be equated with the articles, dori and fita, which were under consideration in the Allahabad case(2). 9.. For the reasons stated avove, the question of law under reference has got to be answered In the negative in favour of the department and against the assessee. I accordingly hold that, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the hosiery banyans were not exempt from the levy of sales tax under item 23 of Schedule III of the notification dated 1st July, 1959, for the period in question. The assessee must pay the costs of this reference. Hearing fee is assessed at Rs. 100 only. S.K. JHA, J.-I agree. Reference answered in the negative.
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1974 (7) TMI 96 - KARNATAKA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... age used in section 25A of the Act is analogous to the language used in rule 33 of the Travancore-Cochin General Sales Tax Rules and hence the decision of the Supreme Court cannot be distinguished from the facts of the present case. It is no doubt true that the provisions of any law relating to taxation should as far as possible be interpreted in favour of the assessee. But the said rule cannot be taken as of universal application. The instant case and the case in Sales Tax Officer, Special Circle, Ernakulam, and Another v. Sudarsanam Iyengar and Sons 1970 25 S.T.C. 252 (S.C.). can very well be treated as exceptions to the said rule. I do not, therefore, consider that the Commercial Tax Officer has exceeded his jurisdiction in passing the impugned orders of rectification because, show cause notices had been issued to the petitioner before the expiry of the prescribed period of five years. These petitions, therefore, fail and they are dismissed. No costs. Petitions dismissed.
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1974 (7) TMI 95 - HIGH COURT OF GUJARAT
Winding up – Suits stayed on winding-up order ... ... ... ... ..... of the Supreme Court in J.K, ( Bombay) P, Ltd. v. New Kaiser-I-Hind Spg. and Wvg. Co. 1970 40 Comp. Cas. 689 (SC). In both these cases principles which we have discussed above were not involved nor did the question directly arise in this form before the House of Lords or the Supreme Court and, therefore, we have not gone closely into either of those cases. Under these circumstances this judge s summons is dismissed with costs and the leave sought for is refused. Oral application for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court under article 133(1) of the Constitution is rejected as the question as to when leave under section 446 of the Companies Act, 1956, should be granted is not a substantial question of law of general importance which is needed to be decided by the Supreme Court. Moreover, the application of the principles (which are well known) as to when the leave should be granted on the facts of the case cannot be said to be a substantial question of law of general importance.
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1974 (7) TMI 87 - HIGH COURT OF PATNA
Kinds of share capital - Two kinds of share capital ... ... ... ... ..... mount to which the shareholders may be entitled to receive or the company may be liable to disburse. So long as the shareholders of the Corporation are potentially entitled even at a future date to receive dividend at a rate of more than 3 frac12 per cent., such shareholders cannot in any view of the matter be termed as preferential shareholders. In the result, therefore, I must answer the first part of the question referred in the negative and hold that, on the facts and in the circumstances of the cases, the shares of the Bihar State Financial Corporation, Patna, were not preference shares, and the second part of the question in the affirmative holding that the Tribunal was right in holding that the assessee was not entitled to a further rebate of 7 frac12 per cent. on the amount of dividend declared the question is thus answered against the assessee and in favour of the department. The department will be entitled to its costs from the assessee. Untwalia, CJ. mdash I agree.
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1974 (7) TMI 78 - SUPREME COURT
Whether there was no equity in favour of Shelat so that he may claim a right to complete what was left incomplete by the donor in her lifetime even though there could be no doubt that Bai Ruxmani had intended to donate the shares to Shelat?
Held that:- We do not think that the respondent has made out a case for defeating the clearly expressed intentions of the donor coupled with the authority with which the donee was armed by reason of the signed blank transfer forms. We think that the implied authority was given with regard to a subject-matter in which Shelat had acquired an interest. On a correct interpretation of the gift, deed and the other facts mentioned above, we are of opinion that the right to obtain transfer of shares was clearly and completely obtained by the donee-appellant. There was no question here of competing equities because the donee-appellant was shown to have obtained a complete legal right to obtain shares under the gift deed and an implied authority to take steps to get his name registered. This right could only be defeated by showing some obstacle which prevented it from arising or which could defeat its exercise. No such obstacle having been shown to us to exist, the rights of the donee-appellant would prevail as against any legal rights which could have accrued to others if the donee had not already acquired the legal right which, as held by us above, had become vested in him. Appeal allowed.
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1974 (7) TMI 77 - HIGH COURT OF GUJARAT
Compromise and arrangement ... ... ... ... ..... avourably by the workers. A discrimination made between the workmen and the clerical staff in the matter of repayment of their dues is also one, which cannot be appreciated. In that view of the matter, therefore, I do not think that the scheme can be said to be either reasonable or practicable in the interest of the secured creditors as well as workmen and the office staff. The main consideration which has weighed with me at this stage is that the two secured creditors representing more than half the interest in the total value of the secured creditors have opposed the scheme. In that state of affairs, therefore, the scheme would not be able to be passed by the majority of the creditors of the secured class representing more than 3/4th value. The result is that for the reasons hereinabove, I do not think that I can persuade myself to give the directions to convene the meeting of the shareholders and creditors. The application is, therefore, rejected with no order as to costs.
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1974 (7) TMI 76 - HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH
Company when deemed unable to pay its debts, Winding up - Application for ... ... ... ... ..... pa Adi v. S. G. Motor Transport Company (P.) Ltd. 1966 36 Comp Cas 606 (Mys.) that the court is not bound to order the winding-up of a company and that a discretion vests in it in the matter, and there 13 no absolute right in a. petitioner to a winding-up order under section 433 of the Art. There is the further consideration that the interests of the general public should also be considered before a winding-up older is made. In the present case the respondent-company provides transport facilities in a, backward and hilly area in Hirmachal Pradesh. When it is clearly established that the respondent-company is in a position to run its business profitably in the future, this aspect, of the matter assumes some significance. In my opinion, it has not been proved that an order for winding-up of the company should be made on the ground mentioned in section 433(e) of the Companies Act, 1956. The petition fails and. is dismissed, but in the circumstances there is no order as to costs.
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1974 (7) TMI 59 - ITAT BOMBAY-E
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... ... ..... -back of interest of Rs. 20,923 for the asst. yr. 1970-71 and Rs. 14,351 for the asst. yr. 1971-72. 12. The net objection of the assessee-firm for the asst. yr. 1970-71 relates to disallowance of 1/4th of motor car expenses and motor car depreciation as relating to non-business purpose. In the subsequent year, the AAC has limited the disallowance to 1/5th. We consider that on the facts it would be reasonable to restrict such disallowance to 1/5th of car expenses and deprecation also for the year under consideration. 13. The net objections of the assessee firm for the asst. yr. 1971-72 relates to disallowance of sum Rs. 2,000 out of miscellaneous expenses of Rs. 17,000. We find that in similar circumstances, in the earlier year, the amount disallowed was Rs. 2,000. We consider that on the facts the expenditure disallowed in the year under consideration is not excessive and no interference is called for in this regard. 14. The appeals are allowed to the extent indicated above.
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1974 (7) TMI 58 - ITAT BOMBAY-E
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... ... ..... -back of interest of Rs. 20,923 for the asst. yr. 1970-71 and Rs. 14,351 for the asst. yr. 1971-72. 12. The net objection of the assessee-firm for the asst. yr. 1970-71 relates to disallowance of 1/4th of motor car expenses and motor car depreciation as relating to non-business purpose. In the subsequent year, the AAC has limited the disallowance to 1/5th. We consider that on the facts it would be reasonable to restrict such disallowance to 1/5th of car expenses and deprecation also for the year under consideration. 13. The net objections of the assessee firm for the asst. yr. 1971-72 relates to disallowance of sum Rs. 2,000 out of miscellaneous expenses of Rs. 17,000. We find that in similar circumstances, in the earlier year, the amount disallowed was Rs. 2,000. We consider that on the facts the expenditure disallowed in the year under consideration is not excessive and no interference is called for in this regard. 14. The appeals are allowed to the extent indicated above.
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