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Showing 41 to 60 of 97 Records
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1974 (7) TMI 57 - HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE ANDHRA PRADESH AT HYD.
Wafer - Dictionary meaning ... ... ... ... ..... known to the market and since wafers are known as biscuits in the market the duty levied is proper. In support of his contention he cites a ruling in S.B. Sugar Mills v. Union of India 1978 (2) E.L.T. (J836) (S.C.) A.I.R. 1958 S.C. 922 where it was held that as the Act does not define goods the legislature must be taken to have used that word in its ordinary, dictionary meaning. The dictionary meaning is that to become goods it must be something which can ordinarily come to the market to be bought and sold and is known to the market. Thus, I am of the opinion that wafer is a kind of biscuit and as such is liable to excise duty. Therefore the action taken by the first respondent cannot be quashed in these writ petitions. 5.Incidentally, after dictating this judgment I came across a tin of wafers manufactured by the petitioner who describes themselves as a manufacturer of Wafer Biscuits . 6.Hence, these writ petitions are dismissed, with costs. Advocate s fee Rs. 100/- in each.
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1974 (7) TMI 56 - HIGH COURT OF PATNA
Cotton fabrics - Interpretation of Statute ... ... ... ... ..... 28 STC 743 (1971 TAX L.R. 1230) (All.) that Dori and Fita are cotton fabrics Cotton fabrics of all varieties were meant to be included is the expression. The two articles, it was not disputed, were manufactured out of cotton yarn. Mere addition of elastic materials, the nature of which was not specified in the statement of the case, could not alter its nature. In my opinion, hosiery goods cannot be equated with the articles Dori and Fita which were under consideration in the Allahabad case. 9.For the reasons stated above, the question of law under reference has got to be answered in the negative in favour of the Department and against the assessee. I accordingly hold that on the facts and in the circumstances of the case the hosiery banyans were not exempt from levy of sales tax under Item 23 of Schedule III of the notification dated the 1st of July, 1959, for the period in question. The assessee must pay the costs of this reference. Hearing fee is assessed at Rs. 100/- only.
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1974 (7) TMI 55 - HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY AT NAGPUR BENCH
Erroneous refund - Computation of limitation -Cotton yarn - Assessment ... ... ... ... ..... the Department. Thus, so far as the amounts refunded on 24-10-1966 are concerned, the demand made by the Department for the first time on 28-1-1967 would be clearly beyond the period of three months and the demand cannot, therefore, be sustained. In view of the mandatory provisions of Rule 10 prescribing the period of limitation the demand to the extent of Rs. 2,051.13 P. consisting of two items of Rs. 1,152.0 1 and Rs. 899.12 must, therefore, be quashed. It must, therefore, be held that the Department was entitled to validly make a demand only in respect of Rs. 1,395.08 which is the only amount which the petitioner was liable to pay the Department under Rule 10 of the Rules. It is not disputed that the petitioner has paid the entire amount of Rs. 4,446.21. The Department is directed to refund the amount of Rs. 2,051.13 in the view which we have taken. 8. In the result, the petition is partly allowed as indicated above. The petitioner will get its costs from the Department.
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1974 (7) TMI 54 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT AT HYDERABAD
Confiscation - Excisable goods - Rule 9(2) - Scope of. - Show Cause Notice - Writ against ... ... ... ... ..... r at Sivakasi has no jurisdiction to enquire into the matter when excisable goods have been seized in Hyderabad. I regret I cannot accede to this contention also because it is to be remembered that the offence has taken place at the place of manufacture for non-payment of excise duty and the place of manufacture is Sivakasi and therefore I hold that the Asstt Collector at Sivakasi is the proper authority to entertain the enquiry. 5. Finally it is to be noted that this writ petition has been filed against the issue of a show-cause notice. The petitioner has got an opportunity to show to the authority that the goods seized from his possession are not liable to be confiscated because he is a second purchaser or for any other reason which the petitioner consider to be in his favour to be advanced before the authority and the authority would dispose of them in the enquiry. Hence I see no merits in this writ petition. It is therefore dismissed with costs. Advocate s fee Rs. 100/-.
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1974 (7) TMI 53 - HIGH COURT OF MADRAS
Acquittal - Liability ... ... ... ... ..... ent recorded by P.W. 1 from the second respondent, we do not find any admission that the lumber room belonged to the respondents Excise P. 5 does not amount to a confession. Excise P. 5 appears to have been obtained on a promise. It is very significant to note the following sentences in that statement which would vitiate the statement as voluntary confession. This statement would exonerate the Respondents as he (second Respondent) would state that in his absence, it was done by his servants and that the same mistake would not be repeated. It appears that the statement was obtained from the second respondent on a promise that no action would be taken against him, but with a warning that he should not repeat this again. I am therefore, of the view that Excise P. 5 far from incriminating the Respondent (Accused) exonerates them. So, on this view, I do not find, in spite of the shabby judgment of the Sub-Magistrate, any compelling reason to interfere with the order of acquittal.
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1974 (7) TMI 52 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
Additional Super Tax ... ... ... ... ..... 23A of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922, being penal in nature, the jurisdiction of the Income-tax Officer under that section could be exercised only if the ingredients and the circumstances set out in that section are established. That decision will help the assessee only if it is shown that the board of directors or the general body decided to declare a lesser dividend with a view to create a reserve for the future development of the company. From the mere declaration of a lesser dividend, it cannot be automatically inferred that the directors wanted to create a reserve for the future expansion of the company. We are, therefore of the view that, on facts, the principle laid down in that decision cannot apply. In our view, the Tribunal has rightly held that section 23A is applicable. In the result, the question referred to us is answered in the affirmative and against the assessee. The revenue will have its costs. Counsel s fee Rs. 250. Question answered in the affirmative.
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1974 (7) TMI 51 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
Additional Super Tax ... ... ... ... ..... e cases they would not be considered for the purpose of applicability of section 23A. Barring such exceptional cases, we are of the view that the Income-tax Officer would be justified in considering the amounts received by way of capital gains as forming part of the profits of an assessee while exercising the powers under section 23A of the Act. We have already held that, on the facts and circumstances of this case, it was not a capital a return, but capital gain. There is no evidence to show that the directors did not declare the dividend for the reason that the same is required for replacement of the assets sold. In fact, the question referred to us does not warrant any consideration as to whether the distribution of the capital gain was a prudent action of the directors and, therefore, the non-declaration could not be said to be unreasonable. For the foregoing reasons, we answer the reference in the affirmative and against the assessee, with costs. Counsel s fee, Rs. 250.
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1974 (7) TMI 50 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
Business Expenditure, Managing Agent ... ... ... ... ..... n respect of such loss or expenditure in order to attract the provisions of section 10(2A). It does not cover a mistaken payment or mistake in calculation. The allowance, which was legally made, to the extent the assessee was able to reimburse himself, was added on to the assessee s income in the years in which the assessee was able to reimburse himself. That has nothing to do with a case where the assessee had paid or expended any money which is not for the purpose of the business. The amount is not deductible as an allowance under section 10(2)(xv) in the year of assessment and there is no question of the applicability of section 10(2A). We are, therefore, unable to accept the contention of the learned counsel that this amount is an allowable deduction under section 10(2)(xv) of the Act even on the basis of this argument. We, accordingly, answer the reference in the negative and in favour of the revenue with costs. Counsel s fee Rs. 250. Reference answered in the negative.
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1974 (7) TMI 49 - PATNA HIGH COURT
Capital Expenditure, Revenue Expenditure ... ... ... ... ..... ital assets had none of the elements of rent nor even of premium and as such the payment of those sums could not be treated as rent or revenue expenditure. As already stated above, so far as the present case is concerned, I may re-emphasise that the finding of the Tribunal that the expenditure in question was incurred for the purpose of protection of the capital asset without which the assessee could not carry on the business in question in the year concerned is sufficient to bring this item of expenditure within the term revenue expenditure . For the reasons stated above, I would answer the question referred to us thus On the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the protection charge incurred by the assessee-company in digging a trench was revenue expenditure. The question is thus answered in favour of the assessee and against, the department. The assessee will be entitled to the costs of this reference. The hearing fee is assessed at Rs. 100. UNTWALIA C.J.--I agree.
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1974 (7) TMI 48 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
Assets To Minor Child ... ... ... ... ..... h respect, we are unable to agree with the view taken by the Calcutta High Court in the above decision. In our opinion, the Tribunal was right in taking the view that for the three assessment years the income of the trust cannot be included in the income of the settlor under clause (a) or (b) of section 16(3) of the Act. When such is the position, then naturally the income has to be assessed in the hands of the trustees under section 41(1) of the Act as that position has not been controverted by Mr. Palkhivala. In the result, our answer to the question referred to us is as under On the facts and in the circumstances of the case and upon proper construction of annexure A to the statement of the case, the income of the trust is not assessable in the hands of H. H. Mahendrasinhji Maharaja of Morvi under section 16(3) of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922, but it is assessable in the hands of the trustees under section 41 of the Act. The revenue shall pay the costs of the assessee.
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1974 (7) TMI 47 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
Act Of 1922, Original Assessment, Rate Applicable, Total Income ... ... ... ... ..... m the testamentary document that was produced before the Income-tax Officer when he made the initial assessment order on 3rd of February, 1958, it is difficult to accept Mr. Hajarnavis s contention that any fresh or new information came into the possession of the Income-tax Officer when he issued the notice on 19th of February, 1962, for the purpose of reopening the assessment for the assessment year 1957-58 and, in our view, therefore, it is clearly a case of change of opinion and not the case of any information having come into the possession of the Income-tax Officer in consequence of which he could be said to have realised that either the income had escaped assessment or that the same had been under-assessed. In this view of the matter, we feel that the Tribunal was right in the view which it took and the question before us will have to be answered in the negative and against the revenue. The revenue will pay the costs of the reference. Question answered in the negative.
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1974 (7) TMI 46 - KARNATAKA HIGH COURT
Market Value ... ... ... ... ..... lore City. The factors taken into consideration by the Tribunal are irrelevant for the purpose of that determination. It should have also taken into consideration the method of valuation of the very buildings in the assessment for wealth-tax for the assessment year 1957-58. The adoption of the multiple of 10 is patently arbitrary. We have already referred to what Parks has stated on this question. According to the learned author, an investor would except between 6 and 8 return and the years purchase would be between 12 and 16. Same is the view taken by Gulanikar. There was no material for the Tribunal to support its conclusion that it is reasonable to adopt the multiple of 10. Our answer to question No. (i), is, therefore, in the negative and in favour of the assessee. The Tribunal has to rehear the appeal and determine the rate of return which an investor in this class of property would expect in January, 1954. The assessee is entitled to his costs. Advocate s fee, Rs. 250.
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1974 (7) TMI 45 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
Accounting Year, Managing Agent ... ... ... ... ..... g agents for the whole year, they will be clearly entitled to the 10 of the net profits of the company during the accounting year. On that basis, for the period of 7 months during which the managing agents did service, their remuneration has to be calculated proportionately having regard to the remuneration they would have earned for the whole year, if they had served. It is not in dispute that the sum of Rs. 94,505 was the amount of remuneration worked out on the above pro rata basis and that the same was actually paid to the managing agents during the assessment year. It cannot be contended by the revenue that the said sum was not an expenditure incurred for the purpose of the business of the company. In these circumstances, we hold that the entire sum of Rs. 94,505 is allowable. The question referred to us is, therefore, answered in the negative and in favour of the assessee. The assessee will be entitled to costs. Counsel s fee Rs. 250. Question answered in the negative.
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1974 (7) TMI 44 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
Previous Year, Substantially Interested ... ... ... ... ..... ng in the Explanation to section 23A(1), we do not think it necessary to consider the position arising under the third proviso to section 23A of the Act. In our view, therefore, the Tribunal was right in coming to the conclusion that the two criteria mentioned in the Explanation were satisfied by the assessee-company and as such the provisions of section 23A were not attracted to the assessee-company for the assessment year 1951-52. The question referred to us is, therefore, answered thus The assessee-company could be held to be a company in which the public were substantially interested within the meaning of the Explanation to section 23A(1) by reason of the fact that the shares of the company carrying not less than 25 of its voting power were not in fact freely transferable by holders to other members of the public for a large part of the previous year even though they were freely transferable as at the end of previous year. The revenue will pay the costs of the reference.
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1974 (7) TMI 43 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
Business Expenditure, Donations To Political Party, Wealth Tax ... ... ... ... ..... e position under the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922, was concerned, this specific provision was made in section 4 of the amending Act. Section 4 of the amending Act provides that Nothing contained in the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922, shall be deemed to authorise, or shall be deemed ever to have authorised, any deduction in the computation of the income of any assessee chargeable under the head Profits and gains of business, profession or vocation or Income from other sources for the assessment year commencing on the 1st day of April, 1957, or any subsequent assessment year, of any sum paid on account of wealth-tax ............ In view of this provision the law has been altered and question No. 3 has to be answered in the negative. Both Mr. Hajarnavis on behalf of the revenue and Mr. Dilip Dwarka- das on behalf of the assessee have reserved the right to argue to the contrary in case the matter is considered by any higher court. Each party will bear its own costs of the reference.
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1974 (7) TMI 42 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
Earning Income, Estate Duty, Expenditure Incurred ... ... ... ... ..... the legal representative of the deceased) on the death of the deceased shall be a first charge on such interest . It was not disputed by Mr. Joshi for the revenue that in view of the aforesaid provision at the date when the proportionate estate duty was paid by the assessee in this case, the movable property, viz., shares and securities which were held by them on trust must be regarded as having been charged with the liability to pay the proportionate estate duty on the movable property which passed on to them on the death of the deceased. In this view of the matter it would be clear that the interest paid by the trustees on the borrowings made for the purpose of payment of proportionate estate duty liability will have to be allowed as a deduction under section 12(2) of the Act. The question will have, therefore, to be answered in the affirmative and in favour of the assessee. Revenue will pay the costs of the reference to the assessee. Question answered in the affirmative.
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1974 (7) TMI 41 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
Litigation Expenses ... ... ... ... ..... e facts of the case The position, however, with regard to the expenditure incurred on criminal litigation is different. The expenditure incurred in prosecuting Mander Das could not be said to have been incurred for realising or protecting any asset. The primary object of a criminal proceeding is to see that the guilty person is punished. Sri Gopal Behari argued that criminal proceedings had been taken with a view to putting pressure upon Sri Mander Das so that he could make good the loss caused to the assessee-company. There is no finding that that was the intention with which the criminal proceedings were launched against Sri Mander Das nor indeed is there any finding that as a result of criminal action the company was able to recoup its loss. For all these reasons we answer the question in the negative, in favour of the department and against the assessee. The Commissioner of Income-tax is entitled to the costs which we assess at Rs. 400. Question answered in the negative.
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1974 (7) TMI 40 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
Interest On Tax, Refund Of Tax ... ... ... ... ..... getting refund the assessee claimed interest on the amount refunded which was, however, refused on the ground that under section 244 of the new Act the assessee was not entitled to any interest. The court held that as the refund became due by virtue of the order passed by the Tribunal under section 66(5) on 6th June, 1968, the provisions of the new Act relating to refund have to be applied in supersession of the provisions of the old Act, that section 297(2)(i) is a self-contained provision so far as the refund is concerned and that, in the of that provision, section 66(7) of the old Act cannot be invoked by the assessee. We are, therefore, of the view that the petitioner s claim for interest has to be considered only under section 244 of the new Act in view of section 297(2)(i) of the new Act. In this view, the relief claimed by the petitioner for a larger interest cannot be sustained. The writ petition is, therefore, dismissed. There will, however, be no order as to costs.
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1974 (7) TMI 39 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
Additional Super Tax ... ... ... ... ..... placed on the decisions in the case of Murray (H. M. inspector of Taxes) v. Imperial Chemical Industries Ltd., in the case of Rose and Co. (Wallpaper and Paints Ltd.) v. Campbell (H. M. Inspector of Taxes) and in the case of McVeigh (H. M. Inspector of Taxes) v. Arthur Sanderson and Sons Ltd. and reliance was also placed on the observations at page 283 of the report and on the decision in the case of Wolf Electric Tools Ltd. v. Wilson (H. M. Inspector of Taxes). In the view we have taken of the facts and circumstances of the case and in view of the agreement referred to hereinbefore, we do not think that the principles laid down in these decisions can be applied to the instant case. In the aforesaid view of the matter we are of the opinion that the Tribunal came to the correct conclusion and the sum of Rs. 22,039 should be allowed under section 37 of the Income-tax Act, 1961. The question is answered accordingly. Each party will pay and bear its own costs. JANAH J.--I agree.
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1974 (7) TMI 38 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
Litigation Expenses ... ... ... ... ..... . (P.) Ltd., the distributable commercial profits are to be arrived after deduction of tax and the tax to be deducted is not that appropriate to the commercial profits but the tax which the company could on the date of declaration of dividend have reasonably anticipated as likely to become payable. Neither of these decisions is a decision of the Supreme Court and in our opinion as the decision of the Supreme Court in Gangadhar Banerjee s cases has clearly laid down the principle, the above submission cannot be accepted. In the result, on question No. 3 referred to us, our view is that in arriving at the balance of commercial profits available for distribution the assessees claim for deduction of Rs. 1,02,223 for charity and donations was not valid but the deduction of further tax liability in the sum of Rs. 2,32,873 in respect of Rs. 5,36,113 was valid. As both the parties have partially succeeded in this reference, each party will bear its respective costs of the reference.
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