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Showing 141 to 150 of 150 Records

• 1975 (12) TMI 11 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
  

  Income Tax Act

  
  
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  ... ... ..... ning and, therefore, we are not entitled to enlarge the meaning of the word fertiliser on any consideration of common usage of the word fertiliser . In fact, the restrictive nature of the use of the word namely has been even extended to the interpretation of documents in 1908. The Law Reports, I Chancery Division, at page 185 Brocket, In re Dawes v. Miller-- 1908 1 Ch 185 (Ch D) . In that case, while interpreting a will the use of the word namely was interpreted as equivalent to what the testator meant by the use of the generic description. We are, therefore, of the view that by the use of the word namely in item 13, the legislature has restricted the application to those enumerated items and since the bonemeal manufactured by the assessee is not one of those enumerated items, the assessee is not entitled to the rebate claimed. We, accordingly, answer the reference in the negative and in favour of the revenue. The revenue will be entitled to its costs. Counsel s fee Rs. 250.

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• 1975 (12) TMI 10 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
  

  Assessing Officer, Assessment Notice, Original Assessment, Reassessment Notice

  
  
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  ... ... ..... ince reported 1978 115 ITR 471 (Cal) under art. 226 of the Constitution, and as no affidavit has been filed by respondent No. 2 denying the case of the petitioner, namely, that the said document was produced before him by the petitioner at the time of original assessment I hold that there was no failure or omission on the part of the petitioner to disclose fully and truly all relevant facts for the purpose of assessment and that the condition precedent for issuing the impugned notice has not been fulfilled in this case. In the premises, the impugned notice dated March 24, 1973, is hereby quashed and the respondents are restrained from giving effect to the said notice. If, in the meantime, any assessment has already been made in pursuance of the said impugned notice the same is also quashed and is hereby set aside. The rule is made absolute without any order as to costs. The operation of this order will remain stayed for eight weeks from today as prayed for by the respondents.

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• 1975 (12) TMI 9 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
  
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  ... ... ..... which is now in question, are vested, cannot be said to be itself a literary institution, nevertheless, the buildings being appropriated, for the purposes of free public libraries, being devoted exclusively to that use, and incapable of being legally applied to any other purpose, may properly be said to be the property of a literary institution. A similar liberal meaning was attached to the property owned by a religious and charitable institution, namely, Dayalbagh Satsang Sabha, by the Allahabad High Court in its decision reported in CIT v. Radhaswami Satsang Sabha 1954 25 ITR 472. We are, therefore, of the opinion that merely because the immovable properties, namely, the buildings and the lands of the college, have not so far been formally vested in the petitioner society, it would not in any manner deprive it of the character of an educational institution existing solely for educational purposes. The writ petition is, therefore, allowed with costs. Advocate s fee Rs. 100.

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• 1975 (12) TMI 8 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
  

  Business Income, Estimated Income, Income From Business, Income From Other Sources, Undisclosed Income, Unexplained Cash Credits

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• 1975 (12) TMI 7 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
  

  Income Tax Act, Religious Purpose, Wealth Tax Act

  
  
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  ... ... ..... ) Ltd. 1974 97 ITR 140 that the deduction in question should be made not from the gross amount of dividend but from the net amount thereof. Therefore, if this question is required to be answered, we would say that the Tribunal was not right in holding that the assessee was entitled to tax deduction in accordance with S. 85A of the Act calculated on the amount of gross income and not on the amount of dividend as reduced by any amount of expenditure on the same by way of interest. To summarise, our answer to the first question is in the negative, i.e., in favour of the revenue and against the assessee. Our answer to question No. 2 is in the affirmative, i.e., in favour of the assessee and against the revenue. Our answer to question No. 3 is in the negative, i.e., in favour of the revenue and against the assessee and our answer to question No. 4 is that the income from dividend must be assessed under S. 56. This reference is accordingly disposed of without any order as to costs.

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• 1975 (12) TMI 6 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
  

  Income, Mutual Benefit Society

  
  
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  ... ... ..... on fund of the club, which is the property of the permanent members. We fail to see how it could be an income of the club. These fees go to constitute the fund, with the aid of which amenities are provided to the members. So these fees, whether received from permanent members or from other members of the club, are not income and are not, therefore, assessable to tax. We are fortified in this view by two Bench decisions of this court, in Secunderabad Club v. CST 1957 8 STC 850, and CIT v. Merchant Navy Club 1974 96 ITR 261. Even the Appellate Assistant Commissioner held that the fees received from the permanent members cannot constitute income . By parity of reasoning, the same varieties of fees, received from other members also, cannot be income . They go towards the common fund of the club. For the foregoing reasons, we answer the question in the negative, i.e., against the Revenue and in favour of the assessee. The Revenue shall pay costs of this reference to the assessee.

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• 1975 (12) TMI 4 - SUPREME COURT
  

  Capital Employed - company was not required under the law to deduct at source tax from the dividends which they were declaring to the shareholder - company was entitled to an appropriate certificate from the Income-tax Officer u/s 197(3). The appeals are, therefore, dismissed and the impugned orders are set aside. The company will be entitled to approach the Income-tax Officer for such appropriate certificates u/s 197(3) as may be admissible on proper computation under the relevant rules

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• 1975 (12) TMI 3 - SUPREME COURT
  

  Validity of rules 112B and 112C with reference to article 14 of the Constitution - Rule 112B relates to the release of the articles seized u/s 132(5) and merely provides that Officer shall deliver the same to the person from whose custody they were seized. Rule 112C provides for the release of the remaining assets, and it is to the effect that they shall be paid to the person from whose custody they were seized - Both rules beneficial rules - rules are valid

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• 1975 (12) TMI 2 - SUPREME COURT
  

  whether it is open to the Income-tax Officer to change his opinion subsequently on the same materials and reopen the original assessment - we would refrain from giving any definite decision on this point, particularly when in the view we take in the instant case, this point does not really arise for determination in this case, which is really based on another principle, namely, that the information was derived by the Income-tax Officer from fresh facts

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• 1975 (12) TMI 1 - SUPREME COURT
  

  Whether the assessee should be informed of the reasons for transfer of a file and whether the reasons are to be recorded in the order for transfer - non-communication of the reasons in the order passed under section 127(1) is a serious infirmity in the order for which the same is invalid. The judgment of the High Court is set aside. The appeal is allowed and the orders of transfer are quashed

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