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Showing 21 to 40 of 150 Records
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1975 (12) TMI 171 - RAJASTHAN HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... bitrary in nature, a court of reference has no jurisdiction to re-appreciate the evidence on record. We have also no hesitation in holding that the Appellate Tribunal had jurisdiction to appreciate the evidence on record, and in doing so, it could certainly disregard the findings of the assessing authority. If the Appellate Tribunal has no jurisdiction to disregard the fishing of the assessing authority, it would cease to function as an Appellate Tribunal. 27. In view of these circumstances of the case, the Appellate Tribunal had jurisdiction to disregard the finding of the assessing authority Having considered the evidence on record, the Tribunal came to the conclusion that the imposition of penalty on the assessee was not justified. This finding being a pure question of fact, cannot and does not call for any interference by this Court. 28. For the reasons stated above, the question of law referred to by the Tribunal is hereby answered in negative, and we order accordingly.
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1975 (12) TMI 170 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... e documents to the respondent Romesh Chander. The order of the learned Single Judge was affirmed by the High Court on 22 November 1972. No appeal was preferred against the order of the High Court. The order of the High Court was that the amount of ₹ 1,61,411/- and the books and other documents were to be returned to the Station House Officer. After the criminal case had been filed the authorities have no right to keep the money, under any provision of law. There is no question of adjustment of the sum of ₹ 1,61,411/- by reason of the fact that there is no valid order of assessment and there is no demand for income-tax. The Revenue cannot indirectly keep the money on the plea that there will be a demand, and, therefore, the money should be allowed to be kept with the Revenue. There must be authority of law under which the money can be kept. There is no legal order to keep the money. The appeal, therefore, fails and is dismissed with costs. V.P.S. Appeal dismissed.
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1975 (12) TMI 169 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... V must illumine even pre-Independence statutes in the interpretative process. As yet, and hopefully, claims by employers against workmen on ground of tortious liability have not found a place in the pharmacopoeia of Indian Industrial Law. However, as earlier stated, we do not pronounce finally as it is not necessary. There was argument at the bar that the High Court was in error in relying on s. 18 of the Trade Unions Act, 1926 to rebuff the claim for compensation. We have listened to the arguments of Shri B.C. Ghosh in support of the view of the High Court, understood on a wider basis. Nevertheless, we do not wish to rest our judgment on that ground. Counsel for the appellants cited some decisions to show that an award falling outside the orbit of the Indian Arbitration Act can be enforced by action in court. We do not think the problem so posed arises in the instant case. We dismiss the appeal but, in the circumstances, there will be no order as to costs. Appeal dismissed.
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1975 (12) TMI 168 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ce. Now, in the present case, if the telephones of the appellants were to be disconnected on the ground of misuse, then they had to give, in consonance with the principles of natural justice, opportunity to the appellants to explain their conduct before taking action under Rule 427 read with Rules 416 and 421. Resort to the wrong and more drastic course provided in Rule 422, on a ground which was not germane to an action under that Rule, vitiates the impugned order, particularly when it is manifest that in making the impugned order, the General Manager was influenced more by this ground and less, if at all, by the existence of ’public emergency’ certified by the Delhi Administration. For the foregoing reasons we accept these appeals, allow the writ petitions, quash the impugned orders and direct the respondents to restore the telephone connections to each of these appellants. However in the circumstances of the cases we make no order as to costs. Appeals allowed.
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1975 (12) TMI 167 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... dents 1 and 2, which they have under article 19(1) (g) of the Constitution, to carry on trade or business subject to 'reasonable restrictions' imposed by law. The instant case falls well-nigh within the ratio of this Court's decision in Rice and Flour Mills v. N. T. Gowda( 1970 S.C.R. 846.), wherein it was held that a rice mill-owner has no locus standi to challenge under Article 226, the setting up of a new rice-mill by another even if such setting up be in contravention of s. 8(3)(c) of the Rice Milling Industry (Regulation) Act, 1958 because no right vested in such an applicant is infringed. For all the foregoing reasons, we are of opinion that the appellant had no locus standi to invoke this special jurisdiction under article 226 of the Constitution. Accordingly, we answer the question posed at the commencement of this judgment, in the negative, and on that ground, without entering upon the merits of the case, dismiss this appeal with costs. Appeal dismissed.
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1975 (12) TMI 166 - COLLECTOR CENTRAL EXCISE, NEW DELHI
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... ... ..... nit nor their Kinari Bazar firm were able to produce any evidence to show as to from where they had received the subject wires and cables. The allegation against the appellants was that they had surreptitiously removed wires and cables from the Sita Ram Bazar firm to their another firm at Kinari Bazar without payment of duty and without accounting for in the R.G.I. records. In bill book at Kinari Bazar it was found that they had sold 3060 coils of wires and cables during the period from 7-7-1969 to 4-6-1970. Neither the appellants nor their sister concern at Kinari Bazar have been able to prove from where 3060 coils of wires and cables were received. Since the appellants have a factory of their own at Sita Ram Bazar the inference that wires and cables were received in their premises at Kinari Bazar is well founded. Under the above circumstances the order of the Asstt. Collector against the appellant unit is well proved and needs no revision. The appeal is therefore rejected.
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1975 (12) TMI 165 - COLLECTOR CENTRAL EXCISE, NEW DELHI
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... ... ..... dquo; of an excisable goods and as a result of this assembly a new product namely Refrigerating and Air Conditioning appliance falling under Central Excise Tariff Item No. 29A came into existence, whose manufacture is licensed. Under the circumstances the order of the Deputy Collector holding the appellant as a manufacturer of the subject goods is in order. I further observe that the personal penalty imposed on the appellant is only ₹ 150/- and the redemption fine in lieu of confiscation is only ₹ 100/-. The above penalty and fine are very reasonable in the facts and circumstances of the case and call for no further abatement. The Deputy Collector’s order is therefore upheld and the appeal is rejected.
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1975 (12) TMI 164 - COLLECTOR CENTRAL EXCISE, NEW DELHI
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... ... ..... charges does not arise. However, since packing is not a process of ‘manufacture’ within the meaning of Section 2(f) of the Central Excises and Salt Act, in the case of goods manufactured by the appellants, packing charges would be deducted from the wholesale cash price under Section 4(a) of the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944. Subject to the above modification, the order of the Asstt. Collector is upheld and the appeal is rejected.
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1975 (12) TMI 163 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... what was sought to be recovered from the liquor contractors in Panna Lal’s case (supra) was the shortfall occasioned on account of failure on the part of liquor contractor to fulfil the terms of license. It was pointed out in Panna Lal’s case (supra) as follows - "To suggest that the license obliges the contractors to pay excise duty on undrawn liquor is totally misreading the conditions of the license. The excise duty is collected only in relation to the quantity and quality of the country liquor which is drawn. No excise duty can be predicated in respect of undrawn liquor". These appeals are, therefore, not of the type of Panna Lal’s case (supra). These appeals are of the type of Bimal Chandra Banerjee’s case (supra). These appeals relate to the demand of excise only in respect of undrawn liquor. The High Court rightly quashed the demands. The appeals are, therefore, dismissed. Each party will pay and bear its own costs. Appeals dismissed.
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1975 (12) TMI 162 - SUPREME COURT
Whether food made available to a resident customer in a hotel by a hotelier against a consolidated charge for all the services and amenities and food amounts to a sale of an article of food for the purposes of the Food Act
Held that:- The definitions of the term 'sale' have in terms, been made subject to the context of the respective Acts in which they occur. Consequently, in judging whether a transaction is a sale or not, due regard must be had to the purpose, scheme and context of the particular Act under which the question arises. The learned Judges of the High Court appear to have overlooked the important distinction between the connotation of 'sale' for purposes of the Sales-tax Act and the one under the Food Act.
The High Court has not recorded any finding on the merits of these cases. It has maintained the acquittal merely on the ground that the transaction in question did not amount to "sale" of article of food within the meaning of the Food Adulteration Act. The case would therefore have to go back to the High Court for deciding the appeals on merits. Appeal allowed.
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1975 (12) TMI 161 - THE APPELLATE COLLECTOR OF CENTRAL EXCISE, NEW DELHI
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... ... ..... certain amount of pressure which is created when after is pumped. On the other hand, pipe and tubes as commonly understood are long narrow hollow cylinders for conveying or holding liquids or gases. Pipes and tubes are not meant to withstand and pressure nor they can be fitted with a piston in their bore. The Certificates of Director of Industries, U.P. shows that the appellants are registered as S.S.I Unit and are engaged in the manufacture of Hand pump parts fittings and accessories including brass parts of hand pumps and machines. The evidence produced and the contentions made established that the appellants are not engaged in the manufacture of pipe and tubes as understood in common parlance but the disputed goods are commonly known as Cylinders. I, therefore, order that the subject goods may be classified as Castings falling under sub-item (ia) of Item No. 26A of the Central Excise Tariff. As a result, I set aside the order of the Asstt. Collector and accept the appeal
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1975 (12) TMI 160 - SUPREME COURT
Whether the High Court erred in holding that the State Government had the power to require the appellants to pay the amounts under demand as they represented consideration for the contracts
Reduction of the licence fees for the liquor shops
Whether the refund of fees claimed by the appellant was permissible on the ground that there was no quid pro quo for the same?
Held that:- It is well settled that as the State has the exclusive right and privilege of manufacturing and selling liquor, it has the power to hold a public auction for the grant of such a right or privilege and to accept the payment of a sum therefor. It was therefore permissible for the State to frame rules for the grant of licences on payment of fees fixed by auction, for that was only a mode or medium for ascertaining the best price for the grant of the exclusive privilege of manufacturing and selling liquor.
It would appear that there is nothing in the note to justify the argument that it gave rise to a right in favour of the appellants to obtain a reduction of the fees. As has been pointed out, that was clearly a matter within the discretion of the Board of Revenue under section 39, and the wordings of the note appended to paragraph 130 could not overreach that provision of the law. Moreover, the question whether the circumstances mentioned in the note were at all in existence in the case of the appeals under consideration, was a question of fact which could not be tried in these proceedings.
The High Court has rightly rejected that contention for the reason that the amounts in question were payable for the licences which had been granted for the exclusive privilege in question and, as has been shown, that argument is no longer available to the appellant in view of this Court's decisions in Nashirwar's case (1974 (11) TMI 91 - SUPREME COURT) and Har Shankar's case (1975 (1) TMI 89 - SUPREME COURT). Appeals dismissed.
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1975 (12) TMI 159 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ontemplated by rule 27A of the Bengal Sales Tax Rules does not exonerate the dealer from producing other evidence if relevant and if required nor does it absolve the assessing authority from finding out whether the transaction in question was a genuine one or not. In that view of the matter, in my opinion, the impugned order cannot be challenged as either being on no evidence or on erroneous principle of law. The learned Member, Board of Revenue, was, therefore, justified in rejecting the revision application. Counsel for the respondent contended that, in any event, the petitioner was not entitled to move this application as the petitioner did not resort to the alternative remedy provided by the Act. In the view I have taken, it is not necessary for me to embark on this aspect of the matter. The application, therefore, fails and is accordingly dismissed. The rule nisi is discharged. Interim order, if any, is vacated. There will be no order as to costs. Application dismissed.
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1975 (12) TMI 158 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... referred us to a number of other decisions. It is not, however, necessary to refer to all those cases in view of the authoritative pronouncement of the Supreme Court. We will only refer to the decision of the Allahabad High Court in Commissioner of Income-tax v. Poonam Chand Trilok Chand 1976 105 I.T.R. 618., where also the assessee was following the mercantile system and the court held that the purchase tax collected by him was an allowable deduction. For the foregoing reasons, we hold that the amount of Rs. 17,710 is not includible in the total income of the assessee for the assessment year 1968-69. If and when the sales tax claim was finally disposed of and any deduction was made, the balance will be includible in the income during that year. We, therefore, answer the first question in the negative and against the revenue. Reference is answered as above. Regarding the circumstances of the case, we direct the parties to bear their own costs. Reference answered accordingly.
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1975 (12) TMI 157 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... e licensing authorities issue the necessary letter of authority for which the application is made. The legal effect of the documents on the record leaves no doubt that in the matter of the imports under the said three contracts the applicants acted as the agents of the manufacturers, Messrs. Navjivan Bobbin Industries and that they did not purchase any of the wood imported under the said three contracts themselves and that there was no sale of any of these goods by the applicants to the said Messrs. Navjivan Bobbin Industries. Accordingly, we answer question No. (1) in the negative. In view of this answer to question No. (1), no answer is necessary to question No. (2) either in the form in which it was asked to be referred to us by the applicants or in the form as reframed by the Tribunal. The respondents will pay to the applicants the costs of this reference fixed at Rs. 250. The fee of Rs. 100 paid by the applicants will be refunded to them. Reference answered accordingly.
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1975 (12) TMI 156 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... l that, in any case, it might fall under section 3(b) of the Central Sales Tax Act is also not acceptable. The assessee had not produced the railway receipt or any other evidence to show that the sale was by transfer of documents of title when the goods were in movement. There is also no evidence to show the exact location of the goods when the actual transfer of documents was effected. Unless there is evidence to show that the consignor was different from the seller of the petitioner and, during the time the goods were in movement, by transfer of documents the sale was effected in favour of the petitioner, it is not possible to bring the transaction under section 3(b) of the Central Sales Tax Act. There is absolutely no evidence on this point. We are, therefore, unable to accept the argument that the transactions in dispute fall under section 3(b). In the result, the tax revision petition fails and it is dismissed. But there will be no order as to costs. Petition dismissed.
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1975 (12) TMI 155 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... a question of the property passing in movable property, the question of intention of the parties is most material. Had this question been raised before the Tribunal, evidence could have been led on the question of intention. No such evidence seems to have been led by either side in the present case. The judgment of the Tribunal shows that the only evidence, which appears to have been produced by the assessees, consisted of a supplementary paper book supplied by the assessees referring to the various terms and conditions in the contract and certain other documents, none of which throw light on this question. In view of this, it is not open to the assessees to take up this contention at this stage at all. In the result, the question referred to us must be answered in the affirmative and the assessees must pay the costs of the reference fixed at Rs. 250. The fee of Rs. 100 deposited by the assessees to be appropriated towards these costs. Reference answered in the affirmative.
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1975 (12) TMI 154 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... Reddy, J., while observing that the case appeared to be covered by the decision of the Supreme Court in Firm A.T.B. Mehtab Majid and Co. v. State of Madras 1963 14 S.T.C. 355 (S.C.)., held that the Supreme Court appeared to have struck a new note in the cases of State of Madras v. Nataraja Mudaliar 1968 22 S.T.C. 376 (S.C.). and Rattan Lal and Co. v. Assessing Authority 1970 25 S.T.C. 136 (S.C.)., and that they were bound to follow the later judgments of the Supreme Court. We also feel the same way. Entry 9(b) appears to us to offend article 304(a) of the Constitution in the light of what was said by the Supreme Court in Firm A.T.B. Mehtab Majid and Co. v. State of Madras 1963 14 S.T.C. 355 (S.C.). But, in the light of the principles laid down in the two later cases by which also we are bound, we have to uphold the validity of entry 9(b). The writ petitions are, therefore, dismissed, but in the circumstances without costs. Advocate s fee Rs. 100 in each. Petitions dismissed.
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1975 (12) TMI 153 - ORISSA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ification in existence applicable to the situation and, therefore, he computed tax by adopting the rate prescribed under serial No. 27 and imposed tax. 7.. A number of authorities were cited by Mr. Bhattacharya, but we have not found it necessary to refer to them as, in our view, the dispute could be disposed of by a plain analysis of the matter without reference to precedent. 8.. Our answer to the question referred, therefore, is On the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Member, Sales Tax Tribunal, is right in holding that gold and silver ornaments are taxable at the rate of 7 per cent under serial No. 27 of the list of taxable goods, with effect from 15th May, 1970. 9.. This case was heard along with several connected matters. We were surprised to find that on the same materials, the same Tribunal has come to contradictory conclusions in many of these cases. We make no direction for costs of this reference. N.K. DAS, J.-I agree. Reference answered accordingly.
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1975 (12) TMI 152 - PUNJAB AND HARYANA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ltural produce. Learned counsel for the State has submitted that entry No. 39 only exempts the growers to pay the sales tax and it does not exempt the dealer from payment of purchase tax. This argument has no merit. As section 4B of the Act is quite clear, the goods mentioned in Schedule B are exempted from the payment of purchase tax. If the State also wants to levy purchase tax on sugarcane or any other agricultural produce, it has the ample authority to remove this item from Schedule B. Till the agricultural produce is mentioned in Schedule B and the goods mentioned in Schedule B are exempt as provided in section 4B of the Act, no purchase tax can be levied on such goods. For the reasons recorded above, this petition is allowed and the assessment order (annexure P-1) is quashed and the respondents are directed not to realise the purchase tax from the company for the assessment year 1973-74. In the circumstances of the case, there is no order as to costs. Petition allowed.
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