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Case Laws
Showing 41 to 60 of 96 Records
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1975 (3) TMI 113 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... alur to their depot at Calicut and the sales were effected either locally or inter-State by the Calicut office only. But certainly any relevant fact stated in those proceedings would be pieces of evidence which could be relied on for considering the question whether the sales were inter-State sales or not. In State of Madras v. B. Tavanappanavar 1974 33 S.T.C. 601. , a Division Bench of this Court to which one of us was a party, the fact of the receipt of the C form was taken as a material consideration for deciding the question because normally it is not expected that a purchaser would give the C form unless he considers that he is purchasing from an outside State seller. We therefore agree with the view of the Tribunal that the transactions in this case are inter-State sales and that the orders of the assessing authorities are not liable to be interfered with. The petition accordingly fails and the same is dismissed with costs. Counsel s fee is Rs. 250. Petition dismissed.
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1975 (3) TMI 112 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... he representation is implied in the issue of C forms to the out-of-State seller. As already stated even in the objection filed by the respondents to the notice issued proposing to initiate proceedings under section 10A read with section 10(b), the respondents pleaded bona fides and contended that they bona fide thought that it will be included in category (b) as well as category (c). But the Joint Commercial Tax Officer had not given any finding that the respondents either did not entertain any bona fide doubt or could not have entertained any bona fide doubt as to whether the certificate of registration covered this item and that, therefore, the offence under section 10(b) has been committed. In fact, even the Appellate Assistant Commissioner did not give any finding. We, therefore, have to sustain the order of the Tribunal though not on the same reasonings given by it. The petition accordingly fails and it is dismissed with costs. Counsel s fee Rs. 250. Petition dismissed.
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1975 (3) TMI 111 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... s not liable to be taxed under the Tamil Nadu General Sales Tax Act and any levy made under the Tamil Nadu General Sales Tax Act would be invalid. It was next contended by the learned counsel that the Government of Tamil Nadu in exercise of their power under section 8(5) of the Central Sales Tax Act issued a notification to the effect that if the tax had been levied and collected in respect of a sale or purchase of declared goods under section 4, the same goods shall not be subjected to levy and collection under the Central Sales Tax Act. Apart from the doubt on the applicability of this notification to the facts of this case, that notification came into force only on 28th December, 1963, long after the assessment year in question. That notification, therefore, could not be relied on by the learned counsel for the petitioners. No other point is argued by the petitioners. The petition accordingly fails and it is dismissed with costs, counsel s fee Rs. 250. Petition dismissed.
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1975 (3) TMI 110 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ortication with some third party millers. As cooly charges or charges for hulling, husk is given to the mills and only groundnut kernel is taken delivery of by the petitioners. The contention of the revenue was that there is a sale of the husk to the mill by the petitioners and that, therefore, the value of the husk is liable to be taxed. We are entirely at a loss to understand either the reasoning or finding of the Tribunal that the value of the husk is liable to be taxed. The facts clearly establish that part of the bargain with the mill is that in lieu of the decorticating charges the miller will have to take the husk itself and give the kernel to the petitioners. There is no sale of the husk involved in this matter. Husk is given only as charges for decortication and there is no sale. The petition is accordingly allowed. The turnover of Rs. 14,258 is therefore deleted from the assessment. The petitioners will be entitled to costs. Counsel s fee Rs. 250. Petition allowed.
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1975 (3) TMI 109 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... next contended by the learned counsel that appropriation was only at Bombay and that therefore this State had no right to impose sales tax under the Central Sales Tax Act. This argument is not supported by any factual basis. As we have already seen, in pursuance of definite orders the exact quantity of goods were sent with the intention to deliver the goods to a particular out-of-State purchaser. In these circumstances, we are unable to agree with the learned counsel that there was no appropriation in this State. In fact, we doubt very much whether there was any depot at all for the appellant at Bombay. The evidence does not disclose the existence of any depots where large quantities were stored and as and when orders were received from the local purchasers such quantities were removed from those depots and delivered to them. For the foregoing reasons, we agree with the order of the Board of Revenue and dismiss this appeal with costs. Counsel s fee Rs. 250. Appeal dismissed.
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1975 (3) TMI 108 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... hat are included and are sold as brasswares under that heading. The use of the words gulli bhatties , para bhatties and darja bhatties also go to show that the word brasswares used in the notification has been used in a wide sense to cover up the basic metal brass and to include all the varieties of brass like gilet, German silver, kansa and phoolwares. In the result, the writ petition must succeed. We, therefore, allow the writ petition and quash the orders of the Sales Tax Officer being annexures V to XIX refusing exemption and we also quash the provisional assessment orders being annexures XX to XXII, XXIV, XXVI, XXVIII and XXX, XXXVIII, XXXIX and XL. We also quash the demand notices annexures XXIII, XXV, XXVII, XXIX and XXXI to the writ petition. We further direct the Sales Tax Officer, Mirzapur, to consider the exemption applications of the petitioners and decide the same according to law. In the circumstances of the case, we make no order as to costs. Petition allowed.
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1975 (3) TMI 107 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... attaching to that turnover by the original order of assessment is set at large and it cannot be said that the assessability of that turnover has been finally determined. Therefore, the production of the C form declaration at the reassessment stage would also come within the observations of the Supreme Court, referred to above. For the foregoing reasons, we consider that the assessing officers and the Tribunal ought to have received the C form declarations filed by the petitioners and considered them on the merits. Accordingly, the order of the Tribunal, in so far as the assessment years 1961-62 to 1963-64 are concerned, is set aside and the matter is remanded to the Tribunal to determine afresh the turnover which is entitled to the concessional rate and that which is not entitled to the concessional rate, in the light of the C form declarations now produced. The petitioners will be entitled to their costs in these petitions. Counsel s fee Rs. 150 in each. Petitions allowed.
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1975 (3) TMI 106 - KERALA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... sion prawns . Menon, C.J., held that prawns after drying are still prawns and would therefore come within the expression prawns . This decision of a Division Bench of this Court, with which we respectfully agree, is directly in point. The court held in that case that prawn pulp was nothing other than prawn cured by sundrying, the traditional method for preservation adopted in earlier days. It is observed there that with the adoption of modern methods of preservation and quick-freezing a new chapter has opened in the history of Indian seafood industry. That is what has happened in this case also. Instead of the old method, modern methods have been adopted and raw prawns have been canned and kept in scaled containers ready for the table. Except for canning, the commodity has kept its character. We therefore hold that the taxation authorities were right in rejecting the contentions of the petitioner. In the result, we dismiss the tax revision case. No costs. Petition dismissed.
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1975 (3) TMI 105 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
Confiscation of Gold Coins. ... ... ... ... ..... he Customs Act was inapplicable to the adjudication proceeding, the Additional Collector of Customs by imposing penalties also upon the firm has really twice punished the petitioners Nos. 1 to 4 for the same sets of acts. Therefore, although I propose to sustain the imposition of penal ties under the Customs Act and the Defence of India (Gold Control) Rules upon the petitioners 2 to 4, the penalties of fine imposed upon the petitioner No. 5 firm should be quashed. 18. I accordingly make this Rule absolute in part and quash the penalties imposed upon the petitioner No. 5, Messrs. Shyamlal Sen and Company under Section 112 of the Customs Act and under Section 126-L(16) of the Defence of India (Gold Control) Rules, 1962. I do not interfere with the penalties imposed upon the petitioners 1 to 4 under the aforesaid two provisions of law. The rest of the Rule is accordingly discharged. 19. There will be no order as to costs. 20. The operation of this order is stayed for four weeks.
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1975 (3) TMI 104 - SUPREME COURT
Whether there was any contract of sale pursuant to which goods were moved from the State of Tamil Nadu to the State of West Bengal?
Held that:- Appeal dismissed. The movement of goods from Madras to Calcutta did not take place as a result of any contract of sale, but in pursuance of instruction contained in authorisation for transfer of stocks from Madras to Calcutta. The transactions were not inter-State sales liable to tax under the Central Sales Tax Act. The movement of goods from one State to another without any of the elements of "sale" within the meaning of the Central Act cannot be subject to tax. The shipment was movement of stocks of cement belonging to the State Trading Corporation from one place to another. There was shortage of supply of cement at Calcutta. The State Trading Corporation moved stocks from Madras to Calcutta. The area of need and the availability of stocks of cement were known to the State Trading Corporation. The transactions could not be subjected to Central sales tax.
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1975 (3) TMI 96 - SUPREME COURT
Whether the sales made by the petitioner in pursuance to clause 7 of the second supplemental agreement to Government of India through the agency of Indian Oil Corporation were sales in the course of inter-State trade and were, therefore, liable to sales tax under the Central Sales Tax Act?
Held that:- Appeal partly allowed. The sales in question were sales in the course of inter-State trade and that the Bihar Government had no jurisdiction to tax the sales under the sales tax law of the State. The petitioner is, therefore, entitled to the alternative reliefs prayed for in the writ petitions, namely, that respondents Nos. 4 to 6 in each of the petitions should be enjoined not to impose sales tax under the provisions of the Bihar Sales Tax Act in respect of sales made in pursuance of clause 7 and that they should be directed to refund to the petitioner the sales tax collected from the petitioner by way of sales tax as the various assessment orders made by respondent No. 4 stand quashed. The writ petitions are allowed to the extent indicated and they are dismissed in other respects.
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1975 (3) TMI 87 - HIGH COURT OF DELHI
Oppression and Mismanagement – Right to apply under section 397 and 398, Amendment to petition
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1975 (3) TMI 80 - HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA
Meeting and Proceedings – Power of Company Law Board to Order Meeting to be Called ... ... ... ... ..... s bona fides. For the same reason, we do not express any opinion on the preliminary objections raised on behalf of the company regarding the maintainability of the appeal, viz., (i) that section 4 of the Karnataka High Court Act, 1961, is unconstitutional, and (ii) that no appeal is maintainable against an order passed under section 186 of the Act, in the absence of an express provision in the Act. We, however, observe that the constitutionality of section 4 of the Karnataka High Court Act, 1961, has been upheld by a Full Bench of this court in Writ Appeal No. 35 of 1973, and the appeal filed against the order of the Full Bench is still pending before the Supreme Court. We do not also consider it necessary to decide the question whether a meeting can be held in this case after the expiry of three months from the date of deposit of requisition in view of section 169(7) of the Act. In the result, this appeal fails and is dismissed. There shall, however, be no order as to costs.
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1975 (3) TMI 79 - HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA
Winding up – Overriding preferential payments ... ... ... ... ..... 29 of the Act. I am of the view that section 529 which makes section 46 of the Provincial Insolvency Act applicable does no more than recognise the rights of a debtor under ordinary law. There is no dispute that under ordinary law the respondents could have pleaded the sums due to them by way of set-off if suits had been filed before liquidation. The question is, whether that right is destroyed by the companies going into liquidation? I do not think so, as there is no provision in the Act which takes away that right. In the result, I hold that the respondents herein are entitled to plead by way of set-off the amounts which they were entitled to recover from the company in question, under other chit fund accounts or fixed deposits with the company. They are liable to pay only the balances as remaining after giving credit to the sums in respect of which set-off is pleaded. Accordingly, the objections raised by the official liquidator and the additional liquidator are overruled.
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1975 (3) TMI 78 - HIGH COURT OF MADRAS
Company when deemed unable to pay its debts ... ... ... ... ..... the circumstances of each case. The test is, whether the dispute is raised only to avoid payment of the debt and not based on a substantial ground. Bona fide dispute means that the dispute is based on a substantial ground and if such a dispute is raised, the court should refuse to make an order of winding-up, even if only a part of the debt is disputed on substantial ground. Since, as seen above, I have come to the conclusion that there has been no entrustment by the petitioner to the respondent-company, there cannot be any debt at all. Even otherwise, as to who paid for and whether the goods have been delivered back to Gee Aar Traders or the petitioner, are matters under dispute. Hence, there is undoubtedly a case of bona fide dispute. Following the propositions laid down in the above two decisions of the Supreme Court and that of Palaniswamy J., I come to the conclusion that this petition is without any merit. Hence, it is dismissed. But there will be no order as to costs.
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1975 (3) TMI 61 - HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA
Winding up - Overriding preferential payments ... ... ... ... ..... 29 of the Act. I am of the view that section 529 which makes section 46 of the Provincial Insolvency Act applicable does no more than recognise the rights of a debtor under ordinary law. There is no dispute that under ordinary law the respondents could have pleaded the sums due to them by way of set-off if suits had been filed before liquidation. The question is, whether that right is destroyed by the companies going into liquidation ? I do not think so, as there is no provision in the Act which takes away that right. In the result, I hold that the respondents herein are entitled to plead by way of set-off the amounts which they were entitled to recover from the company in question under other chit fund accounts or fixed deposits with the company. They are liable to pay only the balances as remaining after giving credit to the sums in respect of which set-off is pleaded. Accordingly, the objections raised by the official liquidator and the additional liquidator are overruled.
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1975 (3) TMI 60 - HIGH COURT OF MADRAS
Inherent powers of Court
... ... ... ... ..... rom deriving a benefit out of their own wrong conduct. We think that this argument is adding insult to injury because, having obtained an interim order of stay of the meeting, and also having served a copy of the order at the registered office, they could not be expected, as the respondents would have it, to attend the meeting and then warn the shareholders at the meeting against passing any resolution contravening the order of this court. We do not think that there is any substance in this contention of the respondents. On the above view of the matter, we are of opinion that C. M. P. No. 10935 of 1974 should be allowed. Accordingly, we declare that the parties are put back in the same position as they stood immediately prior to the service of the stay order of this court, which means that the meeting on September 14, 1974, and the resolutions passed at that meeting would have no effect whatsoever. C. M. Ps. Nos. 10347, 13855 and 13856 of 1974 will stand dismissed. No costs.
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1975 (3) TMI 59 - SUPREME COURT
Whether section 23(1A) of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1947 violates article 14 of the Constitution?
Held that:- We do not think that there is any merit in the contention that the classification made in section 23(1A) is discriminatory. Even according to the respondents, it is the classification made in section 23(1)(a) which is under-inclusive and is, therefore, unreasonable. If this court were to declare that the classification made in section 23(1)(a) is under-inclusive and, therefore, unreasonable, the result would be that contraventions of the provisions specified in section 23(1)(a) would also fall within section 23(1A) and would have to be dealt with by the criminal court—a consummation which the respondents devotedly want to avoid.
We do not think that the High Court was right in holding that section 23(1A) was bad. Appeal allowed.
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1975 (3) TMI 40 - ITAT TRIVANDRUM
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... ... ..... upport of the rejection of accounts. In these circumstances, we find that it is idle on the part of the appellant to contend that the rejection of the accounts is unwarranted. We accordingly confirm the rejection of the accounts as proper. 3. The next contention is that the estimate of the turnover is higher arbitrary and excessive. The addition made is to the tune of Rs. 48,369 representing three times the actual suppressions seen. We find that the addition is a bit excessive. In our view the ends of justice will be met if Rs. 16,123 representing the actual suppression seen is added to the turnover conceded. We accordingly limit the addition to this figures and fix the taxable turnover at Rs. 94,087. 4. No other points arise for our decision. In the result the appeal stands allowed to the extent indicated above and dismissed in other respects. The assessing authority will amend the assessment according to law in the light or our findings and refund the excess to paid if any.
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1975 (3) TMI 38 - ITAT MADRAS
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... ... ..... Tribunal. We are inclined to permit the appellant to raise the contention that the dispute turnover should have been fully exempted as per G.O. Press 1042, Revenue dt. 29th March, 1966, by which exemption is granted to handmade soap. 5. The question whether the product manufactured by the appellant is handmade soap has not been gone into either by the AO or the AAC. That is a question of act which requires investigation by the AO. The disputed turnover will be eligible to exemption for tax only if it is proved that it is handmade soap. As there is no finding either by the AO or the AAC that the product manufactured by the appellant is handmade soap, this matter has got to be remitted to the AO. 6. In result, the appeal is allowed and the order passed by the AO and the AAC are set aside and the AO will pass afresh assessment order in the light of the observations made by us above. The finding of this Tribunal that the product manufactured by the appellant is a soap will stand.
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