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Showing 21 to 40 of 52 Records
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1975 (5) TMI 64 - HIGH COURT OF PATNA
Directors – Vacation of office by ... ... ... ... ..... to facilitate speedy administration in winding up and to enable the liquidator to get himself apprised without delay of all the relevant facts, relating to the affairs of the company. Ample power, therefore, have been bestowed upon the court to give adequate directions to various classes or categories of persons, otherwise the winding-up order passed by a court may stand frustrated. I would, accordingly, reject all the objections raised on behalf of the four objectors regarding their obligation to file the statement of affairs of the company. I would, therefore, direct (i) Shri Vishnu Narain Arora, (ii) Shri Bhagwat Narain Arora, (iii) Shri Laxman Narain Arora and (iv) Shri Ambika Prasad Verma to file the statement of affairs as required by section 454 of the Companies Act, 1956, either jointly or singly, verified by any or more of them, to the official liquidator within the period of six weeks from to day, failing which the concequence contemplated under the law will follow.
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1975 (5) TMI 51 - HIGH COURT OF DELHI
Amendment to petition ... ... ... ... ..... s allowed, relying on section 141 of the Code of Civil Procedure and even without rule 6, which did not exist then. Whether there is a bona fide dispute concerning the debts claimed by the petitioning-company is one which can be gone into after admitting the petition and recording the evidence. I find that such a course was adopted in In re Welsh Brick Industries Ltd. 1946 2 All ER 197 (CA). All that is being decided at this stage is the propriety of allowing the amendment sought for. It seems to me that the amendment has, in the interest of justice, to be allowed. The petitioner will file an amended petition on or before the 15th of July, 1975, with a copy of the same to the respondent-company who will file further reply, if any, in addition to the one already filed within two weeks thereafter. The application for amendment is allowed subject to the payment of costs of Rs. 250. Time for payment of costs till 15th July, 1975. The main petition to be listed on 18th July, 1975.
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1975 (5) TMI 48 - HIGH COURT OF DELHI
Company – Membership of, Registers, etc., to be Evidence, Winding up – Settlement of list of contributories and application of assets
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1975 (5) TMI 37 - HIGH COURT OF GUJARAT
Compromise and arrangement ... ... ... ... ..... , I confirm the modification as sought in the affidavit of Sanwarmal Todi. In terms, it is hereby directed that Todi Group and Associates shall be the sponsors of the scheme in place of and in substitution of Chhotalal Devchand Shah, Other modifications in the summons of Mansukhlal are of consequential nature. Some have become necessary because some obvious points were missed, such as time for payments was not specified. Therefore, modifications as sought in paragraphs 12(a) to 12(g) in the summons of Mansukhal C. Shah are hereby granted and they should be incorporated in the final scheme. The sponsor in consultation with Mr. R. M. Shukla should work out a phased-out programme within a week and submit it to the court. Accordingly, the summons herein is hereby granted. The scheme finally thus approved must be annexed to the judgment dated 9th and 10th December, 1974. There shall be no order of costs except in favour of the official liqudator and the Textile Labour Association.
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1975 (5) TMI 29 - ITAT MADRAS
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... ... ..... ure maker as first sale under Entry 128. Consistent with such view, the authorities are not justified in taxing the same item are a prior stage in the process of manufacture. The chair base could not even be called a semifinished chair. It is just like the other furniture requisities like handles, seats, back rests etc. No doubt, the chair base is an important part. But it is still a part. We have no doubt that Entry 128 certainly contemplates furniture which is easily recognised, sold and used or usable as furniture. Under the circumstances, the appellant succeeds on this ground also. Since we have held that the appellant is liable for assessment under s. 7 no separate levy of tax on this turnover would be called for, as we have held that the turnover does not fall under s.3(2) of the Act, because it does not fall in the First Schedule at all. 6. In the result, the appeal is allowed. The appellant is assessable on its reported turnover of Rs. 42,746.00 under s. 7 of the Act.
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1975 (5) TMI 27 - ITAT JAIPUR
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... ... ..... td.(1), Andhra Pradesh High Court decision in Addl. CIT vs. Maddi Venkataratnam and Co.(2) and Bombay High Court decision in CIT vs. Nanji Nagsi (3). As against that the Department claims on the authority of Allahabad High Court decision in the case of Brijramandas and Sons, (4) Kerala High Court decision in Veeriah Reddiar rsquo s (5) case and Punjab High Court decision in Gherulal Balchand (6), that the impugned expenditure has been rightly treated as entertainment expenditure by the authorities below. Moreover, the Jaipur Bench has already held in several cases that such expenditure incurred in respect of customers and adatias is entertainment expenditure. Following the view consistently taken by us we hold that in the present case except for Rs. 500 which we estimate as expenditure incurred in respect of employees, the remaining amount of Rs. 1,492 and Rs. 620 was rightly disallowed. We sustain the disallowance to that extent. 7. In the result the appeal succeeds in part.
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1975 (5) TMI 26 - ITAT DELHI-B
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... ... ..... valid in Law. For the Department it was argued that the assessee had recorded no objection before the ITO and hence he could not dispute the jurisdiction. The Court observed (at 408). As my findings made herein before the ITO had no jurisdiction whatsoever to proceed under s. 155 and that being the position any amount of consent could not have conferred such jurisdiction in the ITO rsquo s . 11. I am therefore, unable to agree that the transferees had waived their right to question the irregularity that has occurred in procedure in the initiation of the proceedings. The irregularity is not something superficial or one which can be ignored or cured. It is fundamental and cuts at the very root of jurisdiction of the competent authority. 12. In view of the above position, I would quash the order of acquisition as bad in law. On the alternative submission for the transferees (regarding the fair market value computation). I agree with the conclusion reached by my learned brother.
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1975 (5) TMI 25 - ITAT DELHI-A
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... ... ..... Parkash Ravinder Nath on which deposit he has earned interest also on various dates which was also brought to tax by the ITO in his hands as will be clear from the copy of the assessment order dt.27th Jan., 1973for the asst. yr. 1970-71 filed by the assessee before me. It was later on that a sum of Rs. 25,000 was deposited in the firm Ramji Lal Rajinder Parshad on5th Oct., 1970in his amount. This investment, in my opinion, cannot be said to be the capital of the minor in the firm in which his father was a partner. The order of the Tribunal reported in (1973) Taxation 34(6) page 19, in my opinion, supports the contention raised by the assessee rsquo s representative and following the same with respect, I am of the opinion that the authorities below were not right in upholding the addition of Rs. 1,020 the interest received by Sanjay Kumar, minor son of the assessee, in the hands of his father under s. 64 of the IT Act. The same is accordingly deleted. 5. The appeal is allowed.
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1975 (5) TMI 24 - ITAT DELHI
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... ... ..... urged on behalf of the Department that the illness of the accountant was more relevant for the asst. yr. 1964-65 is rather inconsequential as the after effect of this illness continued to have their impact on the future maintenance of the accounts. The new accountant had to look after the day to day accounts. He had natural difficulty as the partners were having serious disputes. The fact that the assessee did not apply for extension of time is also of no consequence because penalty proceedings are independent proceedings and penalty cannot be imposed if an assessee does not make an application for extension of time. As already stated we are satisfied on the facts of the case that there was reasonable cause for the assessee s failure to file the returns within the time allowed by law and the entire period of default was covered by that reasonable cause. We therefore, have no hesitation to confirm the orders of the AAC. 7. In the result the departmental appeals are dismissed.
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1975 (5) TMI 23 - ITAT COCHIN
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... ... ..... evious asst. yr. 1971-72 and for which year the assessee did not make any claim. 7. As regard the quantification to be provided for, it is not permissible to compute the account by multiplying 15 days wages with the completed year of service which in the case of this assessee for this assessment year is one year of service. It must be on an actuarial valuation. We had in many cases laid down the principles of such quantification. We are assured that all the IT authorities in this region are aware of our guidelines laid down in those cases. So the assessee will have to produce an actuarial valuation of the liability for this yea before the ITO within a reasonable time. If not produced, the ITO may work it out in accordance with the guidelines laid down by us and if necessary after obtaining from the assessee further particulars about the matter. 8. The appeal is therefore allowed in part. The assessment to the extent of gratuity is referred back to the ITO or redetermination.
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1975 (5) TMI 22 - ITAT CHANDIGARH
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... ... ..... view that in an otherwise validly filed appeal, levy of interest under s. 217 can be challenged. Since in the present case, it was not even suggested much less contended that the assessee s appeal was frivolous or wrong or not maintainable, the assessee was within its rights to contest the levy of interest before the AAC and the issue having been decided against it on merits in the first appeal, it has rightly challenged such issue in the present appeal. We have already discussed the facts of the case and as far as the merits are concerned, we are of the clear view that the case did not warrant charging of interest under s. 217, the difference between the IT as demanded under s. 210 of the Act and the one estimated on the current income being not more than 33per cent. We therefore, delete the interest of Rs. 1,734. In the result the assessee gets relief of Rs. 3,000 in respect of trading account in addition to the deletion of interest of Rs. 1,734. 12. Appeal partly allowed.
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1975 (5) TMI 21 - ITAT CALCUTTA-D
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... ... ..... cancelled the impugned assessment order as illegal and void. 8. The Departmental Representative has referred to us the case reported in 90 ITR, 197. There the assessment was raised without issuing a notice under s. 23(2) of the Indian Income Tax Act, 1922 (analogous to s. 143 (2) of the Income Tax Act, 1961). The AAC set aside the assessment with a direction to the Income Tax Officer to make fresh assessment after issuing the notice u/s. 23 (2) of the 1922 Act. The Appellate Tribunal upheld the Appellate Assistant Commissioner s direction. On reference, the question as to whether the Tribunal was justified in its decision was answered in the positive. The question of limitation was not agitated in that case. Moreover, the facts of the two cases are distinguishable. Hence, we do not find any application of the ratio of the decision reported in 90 ITR 197 to the facts of the instant case. 9. In the result, the impugned assessment order is cancelled. 10. The appeal is allowed.
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1975 (5) TMI 20 - ITAT BOMBAY
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... ... ..... ect of stocks and shares by a dealer or investor therein. When the price of stocks and shares go down, the holder thereof would attempt to cut short his speculative scrip with a view to buy back the same in a depressed market, thereby to even up his deprecation loss in his holdings. This kind of transaction is transparently one in which there is no intention at any time either to effect or take delivery, nor is any taking or giving delivery, ever made. The differences along are settled. The holder may buy each and sell forward, or he may contract vice versa. The profits or losses in such transactions are exempted from the category of speculative transactions. Such losses or profits can be adjusted and carried forward like any other ordinary commercial profits or loss. This passage gives the complete answer to every one of the points raised by the lower authorities against the assessee s claim. The assessee s contention must hence be upheld. The appeal is accordingly allowed.
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1975 (5) TMI 19 - GAUHATI HIGH COURT
Estate Duty, Levy Of Penalty ... ... ... ... ..... of revised assessment under section 61 of the Estate Duty Act. That order of rectification passed under section 61 of the Act by the Appellate Controller was challenged in this court which was the subject-matter of Civil Rule No. 119 of 1971 (Pranavi Ram Baruva (No. 1) v. Assistant Controller of Estate Duty) in which we have delivered our judgment today, and that revised assessment under section 61 of the Estate Duty Act passed by the Appellate Controller has been quashed. So the demand that was made in the demand notice dated 22/23-1-71 is no longer a valid demand in its entirety and that being so the imposition of penalty for non-compliance of that demand notice also must fall through. In any view of the matter, we find that the impugned order of penalty is not sustainable in law. Accordingly, we quash the impugned order of penalty. The petition is accordingly allowed and the rule is made absolute. There will be no order as to costs. D. M. SEN J.-I agree. Petition allowed.
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1975 (5) TMI 18 - GAUHATI HIGH COURT
Estate Duty, Original Assessment, Rectification Of Mistakes ... ... ... ... ..... red by the Appellate Controller and he also did not take into account the area not under crops, and on that basis the principal value of the estate was determined and his liability to pay the duty was quantified. Thereafter, the impugned order of rectification was made. In our considered opinion, there was no such mistake apparent from the record giving jurisdiction to the Appellate Controller to pass the impugned order under section 61 of the Act. In the circumstances, we hold that, in any view of the matter, the impugned order of rectification dated November 14, 1969, is liable to be quashed, which we hereby do. The demand notice based on the impugned order of rectification, which has been quashed by this order, is also quashed. The demand for estate duty on the accountable person should be in accordance with the appellate order dated July 8, 1969. The petition is, accordingly, allowed and the rule is made absolute. There will be no order as to costs. D. M. SEN J.-I agree.
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1975 (5) TMI 17 - GAUHATI HIGH COURT
Act Of 1922, Act Of 1961, Cancellation Of Registration Of Firm ... ... ... ... ..... , in the instant case the assessee was not at all prejudiced. On the other hand, the assessee was given all reasonable opportunity of being heard and the previous approval of the Inspecting Assistant Commissioner was also obtained in addition to that, which requirements are not found in rule 6B. That being so when the source of power of cancellation is referable to rule 6B, the assessee cannot be said to be prejudiced in any way and the order of cancellation passed by the Income-tax Officer cannot be said to be without jurisdiction. In the result we hold that, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Tribunal was justified in restoring the order of the Income-tax Officer by which he cancelled the renewal of registration granted to the assessee-firm for the assessment year 1955-56. The question of law referred is answered against the assessee and in favour of the revenue. The reference is accordingly answered. We make no order as to costs. D. M. SEN J.--I agree.
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1975 (5) TMI 16 - GAUHATI HIGH COURT
Firm And AOP ... ... ... ... ..... al was adopted by Balchand Barjotia. While determining the question whether the assessee is a firm, the Tribunal failed to consider the essential requirements of a partnership-firm, but on the other hand, the Tribunal travelled to some circumstances which are remotely relevant or at the most which may raise some suspicion as to the genuineness of the firm, and, therefore, the finding of fact that the assessee is not a firm cannot be said to be justified in law on the basis of such perverse finding. Consequently, the finding to the effect that the assessee is to be treated as a Hindu undivided family and should be assessed afresh as such is also not justified in law and the Tribunal is not justified in setting aside the orders made by the Income-tax Officer and directing him to make assessments afresh as Hindu undivided family. We, accordingly, answer the question referred in the negative and gainst the department. BAHARUL ISLAM J.--I agree. Question answered in the negative.
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1975 (5) TMI 15 - GAUHATI HIGH COURT
Development Rebate Reserve, Withdrawal Of Development Rebate ... ... ... ... ..... nless the assesee has fulfilled that condition, there is no justification for straining the language of the statute in favour of the assessee for conferring the benefit. From the record it is found that the Income-tax Officer allowed the development rebate at 35 though the required reserve was not made for the relevant assessment year by his order dated February 20, 1968. But when this apparent mistake was discovered he rectified the same by withdrawing the development rebate of Rs. 12,319 which was wrongly allowed. On a consideration of the facts and circumstances of the case, we find that the learned Tribunal correctly held that the development rebate of Rs. 12,319 was wrongly allowed by the Income-tax Officer and he was justified in withdrawing the same. We accordingly, answer the question of law in the affirmative and against the assessee. The reference is answered accordingly. We make no order as to costs. BAHARUL ISLAM J.--I agree. Question answered in the affirmative.
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1975 (5) TMI 14 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
Assessment Year, Burden Of Proof, Income Tax, Jurisdiction Of High Court, Notice Of Reassessment, Previous Year, Works Contract
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1975 (5) TMI 13 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
Capital Or Revenue Receipt, Sale Proceeds ... ... ... ... ..... ty as an individual in respect of property acquired on reversion, and income from this property could not be added to the income received by him as karta of the Hindu undivided family. The Board seems to have lost sight of the charging section, i.e., section 3 of the Act, which imposes a charge on the total agricultural income of every person . The word person in the context must mean the assessable entities set out in section 2(11) of the Act, and inasmuch as a Hindu undivided family is treated is a separate entity and as there is no provision for lumping together the whole income of a Hindu undivided family with the separate income of the coparcener, the Board was in error in adding up the income from the two estates. We, accordingly, answer the question referred in the negative, in favour of the assessee and against the department. The assessee is entitled to costs which we assess at Rs. 200. Counsel s fee is assessed at the same figure. Question answered in the negative.
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