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Showing 81 to 100 of 111 Records
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1976 (1) TMI 31 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
Delay In Filing Return, Income Tax Act, Registered Firm, Total Income, Unregistered Firm ... ... ... ... ..... istered. Under these circumstances the conclusion reached by the Tribunal was correct. The passage from the decision of the House of Lords cited by the Supreme Court in Commissioner of Income-tax v. S. Teja Singh would apply with full force in this case. The passage is to this effect If you are bidden to treat an imaginary state of affairs as real, you must surely, unless prohibited from doing so, also imagine as real the consequences and incidents Which, if the putative state of affairs had in fact existed, must inevitably have flowed from or accompanied it. As the House of Lords says, one must not permit one s imagination to boggle when it comes to the inevitable corollaries of that state of affairs. In our opinion, therefore, the Tribunal was right in the view that it took and the question referred to us must, therefore, be answered in the affirmative, in favour of the assessee and against the revenue. The Commissioner will pay the costs of this reference to the assessee.
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1976 (1) TMI 30 - KERALA HIGH COURT
Cash Credits, Income Tax Act ... ... ... ... ..... e officer, had not been produced by him for cross-examination by the assessee. As stated by us earlier, the officer had not denied any reasonable opportunity to the assessee to adduce evidence. In our opinion, the finding of the Tribunal in regard to these borrowings is unsupported by any evidence. In fact, the evidence on record suggests that the Tribunal ought to have extended its reasoning concerning the borrowing from Biharilal to the other two loans as well. Consequently, we answer questions Nos. (1), (3) and (4) in the negative, that is, in favour of the department and against the assessee. We do not find it necessary to answer question No. (2) in view of what we have stated in regard to questions Nos. (1), (3) and (4). We do not, therefore, answer question No. (2). We direct the parties to bear their respective costs. A copy of this judgment under the seal of the High Court and signature of the Registrar will be sent to the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal, Cochin Bench.
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1976 (1) TMI 29 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
Capital Gains, Exemption From Tax ... ... ... ... ..... within a year and purchased another house property of lesser value for residence. These circumstances might also explain as to why the whole of the new property was not actually used for his own residence by the assessee and why about twenty-five per cent. of the total area of the said house was let out. It would thus appear, in the light of the circumstances aforementioned, that the only conclusion possible is that the new property was purchased by the assessee in reality and substance for the purpose of his own residence and that he is entitled to the benefit of exemption under section 54. From the foregoing discussion it follows that we are of the view that the Tribunal was right in law in holding that the capital gain earned by the assessee was exempt from tax under section 54. The question referred to us is, therefore, answered in the affirmative and in favour of the assessee and against the revenue. The Commissioner will pay the costs of the reference to the assessee.
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1976 (1) TMI 28 - GAUHATI HIGH COURT
Cancellation Of Registration Of Firm, Continuance Of Registration Of Firm ... ... ... ... ..... to us that it cannot be said that in this case no sum was payable. It is not possible to accept this position for two reasons. Firstly, under the scheme of the Income-tax Act, whenever a sum is reduced in an appeal by the order of the appellate authority provision is made that the sum which is payable would be the reduced amount. Therefore, it cannot be said that no sum was payable. Secondly in any event, in the facts of this case, this question has become academic because after the order of the Appellate Assistant Commissioner the entire proceedings had been reopened and the old assessment order and the consequential reduction of the amount directed to be paid in that order have all gone and the sum that is payable now is the amount that is determined under the new reassessment proceeding. In the aforesaid view of the matter, we do not think that this decision to which our attention was drawn by the counsel for the assessee in any way affects the position. JANAH J.-I agree.
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1976 (1) TMI 27 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
Income Tax Act ... ... ... ... ..... evidence. Board of directors, as such, cannot be prosecuted. Whether one or two directors or the entire board of directors acted as agents in the company would appear only through evidence. On a careful consideration of the facts and circumstances of the case we are unable to hold that the learned Magistrate had no jurisdiction or competence to issue process. We also hold that it will be premature at this stage to quash the proceedings. The point as to whether the accused persons who are designated as directors are principal officers or agents could only be determined after the witnesses were examined. The result is that five of the petitions fail. The rules except in C.R. No. 274 of 1975, are discharged. The rule in C.R. No. 274 of 1975 is made absolute as the same is barred by limitation. Let the records go back at an early date so that the hearing may be expedited. It may be noted that the rules have abated with regard to H. L. Dey who has since died. CHANDA J.--I agree.
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1976 (1) TMI 26 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
Procedure For Reassessment ... ... ... ... ..... t the assessee in reassessment proceedings would be valid. In view of the decision of this court in Commissioner of Income-tax v. Maneklal Harilal Spg. and Mfg. Co. Ltd. 1977 106 ITR 24 (Guj), it must be held that the initiation of the reassessment proceedings having been found to be valid and proper, it must be held that the Income-tax Officer had the power to include in reassessment proceedings this item of withdrawal of 5 per cent. of the rate under clause 1(b)(ii) of Paragraph F of Schedule I of Finance Act, 1965. We, therefore, hold that the Tribunal was not justified in law in upholding the Appellate Assistant Commissioner s Order by which the reassessment under section 147(b) read with section 148 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 was cancelled. We, therefore, answer the question referred to us in the negative, that is, in favour of the revenue and against the assessee. The assessee will pay the costs of this reference to the Commissioner. Question answered in the negative.
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1976 (1) TMI 25 - HIMACHAL PRADESH HIGH COURT
A Firm, HUF Partner, Income Of HUF, Income Returned, Same Business, Share Income ... ... ... ... ..... s an extension of the Hindu undivided family business represented by Satinder Kumar s partnership in the firm, Messrs. Rai Sahib Lehnu Mall Thakur Dass. The question is answered in the affirmative. Question No. 2 In view of the answer to question No. 1, no answer is necessary to this question. Question No. 3 The fact that Satinder Kumar s share income from Messrs. Vijay Traders had been shown in the assessee-Hindu undivided family s return for the assessment year 1967-68 and in its original return for the assessment year 1968-69 does not constitute material for the Tribunal s finding that the 11 per cent. income from M/s. Vijay Traders belonged to the assessee-Hindu undivided family. The question is answered in the affirmative. Question No. 4 In view of the answers to questions Nos. 1 and 3, it is not necessary to reply to question No. 4. The assessee is entitled to its costs, which we assess at Rs. 200. Counsel s fee is assessed at the same figure. C. R. THAKUR J.--I agree.
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1976 (1) TMI 24 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
Charge Of Income Tax, Valuation Date, Wealth Tax Act ... ... ... ... ..... t and that unit of wealth for that particular financial year must be considered to be the wealth of his estate which would exist on the date of the valuation. That being the position, the same unit of wealth cannot under section 19(2) be assessed as the wealth of the individual and at the same time also be assessed as the wealth of the estate of the deceased under section 19A. The manner of assessment as laid down under section 19(2) and section 19A are materially different. This will lead to different manners and methods of assessment of the same unit of wealth for the same financial year. The legislature cannot be deemed to have intended such a position. In any event, the charging section, that is, section 3, is quite clear and it is only the individual, viz., an existing individual, who can be assessed to wealth-tax only if he is in possession of such wealth on the date of valuation. The construction as suggested by Mr. B. L. Pal, for the above reasons, is not acceptable.
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1976 (1) TMI 23 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
Assessment Order, Commissioner To Revise, Revision By Commissioner ... ... ... ... ..... stant Commissioner. This was an independent order passed by the Income-tax Officer though passed to implement the directions given by the Appellate Assistant Commissioner. If that be the position, then the said order is subject to the revisional power of the Commissioner. In the aforesaid view of the matter, I am unable to accept the contention urged in support of this application. Counsel for the respondent drew my attention to the observations of the Supreme Court in the case of Commissioner of Income-tax v. Electro House 1971 82 ITR 824 (SC) and in the case of T.S. Balaraman, Income-tax Officer v. Volkart Brothers 1971 82 ITR 50 (SC). In the view I have taken, it is not necessary for me to consider those decisions in detail. In the aforesaid view of the matter, this application must fail and is accordingly dismissed. Rule nisi is discharged. Interim order, if any, is vacated. There will be no order as to costs. There will be a stay of operation of this order for six weeks.
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1976 (1) TMI 22 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
Assessment Proceedings ... ... ... ... ..... ny is not treating them as properties to be enjoyed in the shape of rents which they yield but as a kind of circulating capital leading to profits of business, which profits may be either enjoyed or put back into the business to acquire more properties for further profitable exploitation. This decision has been followed in the subsequent decision of this court in the case of Commissioner of Income-tax v. Ukhara Estates Zamindaries (P.) Ltd. 1971 82 ITR 103 (Cal). It appears to us that the law, on the point at issue, i.e., the English law, the Indian statute and the exposition thereof by the Supreme Court is well settled and clear. We note in particular that the facts in Karanpura Development Co. Ltd. s case 1962 44 ITR 362 (SC) before the Supreme Court are more or less similar to the facts before us in the instant case. For the reasons mentioned above we answer the question in favour of the assessee and in the affirmative. There will be no order as to costs. DEB J.--I agree.
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1976 (1) TMI 21 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
Shipping Business ... ... ... ... ..... rriage of goods on account of the charterer s failure to fulfil his obligation. Sub-section (2) of section 172 which enacts a fiction and makes special provision for the levy and recovery of tax from a non-resident ship-owner irrespective of the place where the freight is paid must be construed on its plain language. In a taxing statute of that nature, there is no justification for adding words, a payment made not for carriage of goods but for non-carriage of goods cannot, therefore, be brought within the ambit thereof. In view of the foregoing discussion, it would become clear that the Tribunal was right in the view that it took as regards the non-inclusion of the amount of dead freight in the amount which is to be taken into account for computing income under section 172(2). Accordingly, we answer the question referred to us in the affirmative, that is, in favour of the assessee and against the revenue. The Commissioner will pay the costs of this reference to the assessee.
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1976 (1) TMI 20 - KARNATAKA HIGH COURT
Agricultural Income Tax, Agricultural Land, Land Whether Agricultural ... ... ... ... ..... aw. If it is shown that the land was revenue-free in fact and in law during the relevant accounting years, then one of the conditions of the definition of agricultural income is not satisfied any income derived by agricultural operation on land converted into non-agricultural purposes cannot bring such income within the net of the Agricultural Income-tax Act. In the instant case, the assessee has not produced any material to show that the land was revenue-free in fact and in law. That being the position, the income, admittedly derived by employing the land for agricultural purposes, although the land is allowed to be converted into non-agricultural purposes, is chargeable to tax under section 3 of the Act and is not excluded from its operation. Therefore, the Tribunal was right in upholding the order of the authorities below in levying the tax. Accordingly, these revision petitions fail and are dismissed. In the circumstances the parties are directed to bear their own costs.
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1976 (1) TMI 19 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
New Industrial Undertaking, New Industrial Undertaking, Relief From Income Tax ... ... ... ... ..... 1922, the unabsorbed depreciation could be ignored. The Supreme Court held that, in computing profits of an industrial undertaking, the unabsorbed depreciation could not be ignored and that the contrary view would be inconsistent with the plain terms of section 10. The conclusion of the Supreme Court is the same as that arrived at in the case of Ashok Motors 1961 41 ITR 397 (Mad) cited already. Thus, neither authority nor the statute supports the stand taken by the assessee in the present case. In the result, we hold that the development rebate in respect of the new industrial undertaking should be deducted in computing the profits and gains for the purpose of section 84 and that the assessee is not entitled to any relief under that section in respect of this undertaking for the relevant year. This question is also answered in favour of the revenue. All the three questions are answered as indicated earlier. The department will be entitled to its costs. Counsel s fee Rs. 250.
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1976 (1) TMI 18 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
Capital Gains Tax ... ... ... ... ..... cordingly, we answer the first question referred to us in the negative, that is, in favour of the revenue and against the assessee, and the second question in the affirmative, that is, in favour of the revenue and against the assessee. The assessee will pay the costs of this reference to the Commissioner. An oral application was made at this stage for a certificate under section 261. In our opinion, this is a fit case for appeal to the Supreme Court as the questions referred to and resolved by us in this reference are substantial questions of law. Besides, in R. M. Amin s case 1971 82 ITR 194 (Guj), which was heavily relied upon by both the sides before us and which has a direct bearing on some of the points decided in this case, a certificate has been granted by this court and the appeal is pending before the Supreme Court. It is in the fitness of things, therefore, to certify this case also as a fit one for appeal to the Supreme Court. Accordingly, we grant the certificate.
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1976 (1) TMI 17 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
High Court, Mistake Apparent From Record, Original Order, Wealth Tax ... ... ... ... ..... 974 97 ITR 486 (SC) and Indian Chamber of Commerce v. Commissioner of Income-tax reported in 1975 101 ITR 796 (SC), we are of the opinion that the assessee has carried on those activities for profit and there being no restrictions in its memorandum and articles of association from making profit from those activities, its income from those activities is liable to be taxed and the assessee is not entitled to exemption as claimed in the assessment years concerned. Accordingly, we return our answer to question No. 1 in the negative and in favour of the revenue by saying that the assessee is not entitled to exemption from tax in respect of any of its activities under section 4(3)(i) of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922, and the corresponding section 11 of the Income-tax Act, 1961, as claimed in the assessment years concerned. Accordingly, the remaining questions do not call for any answer and we decline to answer them. There will be no order as to costs. DIPAK KUMAR SEN J.--I agree.
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1976 (1) TMI 16 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
Assessment Year, Change In Constitution Of Firm, Partnership Deed ... ... ... ... ..... ament in sections 187 and 188 of the Act. We affirm the view taken by this court in Commissioner of Income-tax v. T. Veeraraghavalu Chetty & Sons Co. 1975 100 ITR 723 (AP) that the induction of a partner in the midst of an accounting year would amount only to a change in the constitution of the firm and only a single assessment for the whole year's income but not separate assessments, has to be made applying the provisions of section 187 of the Act and section 188 has no application. For all the reasons stated, we hold that the incomes of the two broken periods for each of the two assessment years in question could be clubbed and taxed as a single assessment on the reconstituted firm as the death of the partners in the middle of the accounting year would only amount to a change in the constitution of the firm within the meaning of section 187 of the Act, and answer the question against the assessee and in favour of the department. There shall be no order as to costs.
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1976 (1) TMI 15 - PATNA HIGH COURT
Assessment Order, Provisional Assessment, Regular Assessment ... ... ... ... ..... the passing of the final order of assessment under section 58 of the Act as, in our view, the stage for making an order under section 70 must follow after the making of the final order of assessment. It is not necessary to refer to the statements made in the counter-affidavit of the respondents as this position is not disputed and Mr. Rajgarhia appearing for the respondents could not point out any material to support the order in question. The impugned order contained in annexure 1 is a speaking order and the reasons on which the order has been made is unsustainable in law. We would, accordingly, cancel and quash the same by a writ of certiorari. Annexure 1 having been quashed, the demand on the basis of this order contained in annexure 2 must also be quashed. In the result, this application succeeds and the impugned order contained in annexure 1 and the demand (annexure 2 ) are hereby quashed and cancelled. The petitioner will be entitled to costs. Hearing fee, Rs. 150 only.
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1976 (1) TMI 14 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
Inaccurate Particulars ... ... ... ... ..... ntended that the petitioner had not disclosed the value of the trust property, as she was advised that the trust property did not pass on the death of the beneficiary, and, further, that much before the assessment had been finalised a letter had been sent to the Member, Central Board of Revenue, bringing this to his notice, and soliciting his decision on the question as to whether trust property passes on the death of a beneficiary. The Assistant Controller does not appear to have taken these facts into account while passing the impugned orders. In an inquiry whether there has been concealment of particulars or deliberate furnishing of inaccurate particulars an enquiry into the facts to which our attention has been drawn were relevant. The decision having been entered into without a consideration of these relevant facts cannot be sustained. The petition is accordingly allowed. The impugned order dated August 6, 1975, is quashed. There shall, however, be no order as to costs.
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1976 (1) TMI 13 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
Written Down Value ... ... ... ... ..... equally applicable to the facts and circumstances of the case with regard to the surplus arising out of these sales and the excess on realisation over the written down value of the plant, machinery and buildings, and accordingly the contentions of Mr. J. C. Pal must also fail. We may note here that Mr. B. L. Pal has also relied on the decision of the House of Lords in Odhams Press Ltd. v. Cook (H. M. Inspector of Taxes) 1940 23 TC 233, 237 1941 9 ITR (Supp) 92 (HL) in support of his contention that a parent company and a subsidiary company are two separate taxable entities and the profits and gains of their several businesses are separate profits and gains for the purpose of the Income-tax Acts. We also agree with the above decision of the House of Lords and return our answer to both the questions in the negative and in favour of the revenue. Having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case, we do not propose to make any order as to costs. DIPAK KUMAR SEN J.--I agree.
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1976 (1) TMI 12 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
Acquisition Of Capital Asset, Attributable To ... ... ... ... ..... necessary for us to restore the matter to the file of the Tribunal which would go into the includibility of the following amounts, viz. Rs. Travelling expenses 21,413 Electricity charges 16,310 Salaries and wages 3,32,225 Printing and stationery, telephone, repairs, etc. 37,892 Depreciation, which was included in the figures, is not the subject-matter of dispute, and, therefore, does not require consideration. If the Tribunal had given a finding with reference to the above item also, then it would not have been necessary for us to restore the matter for the decision of the Tribunal. In the absence of a specific finding, we find it necessary to restore the appeal itself on this point for the decision of the Tribunal over again. It will go into each item and see whether the whole or part of it represented expenditure attributable to the new assets and consider it accordingly. In the result, the question referred to us is answered accordingly. There will be no order as to costs.
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