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Showing 61 to 80 of 129 Records
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1976 (12) TMI 69 - ITAT DELHI-C
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... ... ..... his partnership and in the absence of any specific agreement that the minor would also be entitled to share in the property of the firm it cannot be held that he is entitled to such a share. The partnership deed is specific on this point that the minor shall be entitled only to his share in the profits of the firm. In the circumstances, the whole approach of the WT Officer to value to the interest of the assessee as a minor admitted to the benefits of partnership under S. 4(1)(b) of the WT Act read with R. 2 of the WT Rules was erroneous. The minor had no share in the property of the firm. He was entitled only to share the profits without bearing the losses. Therefore the only interest of the assessee as a minor in the partnership would be his capital contribution and his share in profits which is capitalised. We direct the WT Officer to recompute the wealth of the assessee accordingly. 7. No other point was pressed before us. 8. In the result, the appeal is allowed portents.
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1976 (12) TMI 68 - ITAT DELHI
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... ... ..... t they will be outside the purview of the first two sub-clause. The phraseology used by sub-clause (iii) is so wide, as it seems to us, to include orders which are not on merits of the appeal, as for instance, dismissal for default. It is significant in this connection to note that sub-clause (iii) does not use the phrase thereon . 2. The cases relied upon by the appellant were discussed and distinguished. It is not necessary to repeat the grounds for not following these cases. I think in view of the clause (c) of sub-s. (6) of s. 43 which provides for passing of such order as the Tribunal may think fit, this Tribunal has the jurisdiction to dismiss the appeal for default of the appellant. 3. However, in view of the affidavits filed by the proprietor of the firm, I accept his contention that his absence was not intentional or wilful. I, therefore, allow these applications and set aside the ex-parte orders dated 25th Aug., 1976. The appeals are now fixed for 22nd March, 1977.
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1976 (12) TMI 67 - DELHI
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... ... ..... erent. He reduced the amount of penalty but did not entirely set aside the order of penalty. It is urged that the order of penalty cannot alone stand unless the assessment itself is completed. I find that when the appellate authority accepted the explanation of the dealer for setting aside the assessment that explanation should have been considered valid also for not filing the returns and depositing the tax in time. I think that the order of penalty should also have been set aside alongwith the order of assessment. The question of penalty can be considered by the assessing authority when he proceeds to assess the dealer afresh. 2. For the above reasons I allow the appeals, set aside the impugned orders and remand the case to the assessing authority to examine the question of imposition of penalty and its quantum afresh while passing fresh order of assessment in pursuance of the remand order passed by the appellate authority- 3. Announced in the open court before the parties.
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1976 (12) TMI 66 - ITAT CHANDIGARH
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... ... ..... ssessee s son and his grand-sons, the taxability in the hands of the assessee to the extent of alienated land ended. If the assessee, by any stretch of imagination, could be said to be an individual, it could be a case of a gift but the assessments were completely out of range and the WTO and the AAC both fall in error in subjecting the assessee to wealth-tax as has been done in the case. We, however, like to observe that the lands partitioned as per the court decree being ancestral in character, the court s settlement was of the nature of a partition. Viewed from any angle, the accessibility in respect of lands going to the assessee s son and grand-sons cannot be upheld and we hold accordingly. The WTO is directed exclude the value of the lands which, as per the court order dated 21st July, 1971, were decreed in favour of the assessee s son and grand-sons. The WTO shall accordingly modify both the assessments. 7. For the purposes of statistics, both the appeals are allowed.
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1976 (12) TMI 65 - ITAT CALCUTTA-D
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... ... ..... ribunal restored the said addition. In other words, there is honest difference of opinion between the assessee and the taxing authorities regarding the nature and character of Rs. 1,58,250 earned by him in race winnings. Only on this ground it can be held that the assessees s case does not fall within the mischief of s. 271 (1)(c) of the 1961 Act. However, it is pertinent to note that the assessee himself had disclosed the receipt of Rs. 1,58,250 in section F of his return of income. In other words, the assessee had not concealed any thing from the Deppt. After placing his cards on table the assessee claimed that Rs. 1,58,250 was exempt from taxation u/s.10(3) of the 1961 Act. On these facts and circumstances of the case we fail to appreciate how the assessee s case can be brought within the provisions of s. 271(1)(c) of the 1961 Act. In this view of the matter, we have no hesitation in cancelling the order of the I.A.C. under appeal. 7. In the result, the appeal is allowed.
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1976 (12) TMI 64 - ITAT CALCUTTA-D
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... ... ..... any other records . 6. The finding of the Tribunal to the effect that the belief of the Income-tax Officer was not based upon any material and that no such material was communicated by the Income-tax Officer to the Central Board of Direct Taxes to enable the latter to decide whether the approval should be granted or not for the reopening of the assessments was a pure finding of fact, based upon its appreciation of the facts and circumstances of the case. In arriving at that finding the Tribunal had not taken into consideration any irrelevant material or failed to take into consideration any material on record. The finding recorded by the Tribunal is a pure finding of fact, and we are supported in this view by the decision of the Supreme Court in CIT vs. Lakhiram Ramdas(2). 7. For the above reasons, we hold that the questions sought for reference are not questions of law arising out of the consolidated order of the Tribunal. We therefore, reject these reference applications.
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1976 (12) TMI 63 - ITAT ALLAHABAD-A
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... ... ..... as 2123 instead of 3123. In paragraph 2 in line 7 the date of the filing of the returns shall be read as 26th August, 1972 instead of 26th November, 1972. In paragraph 3 in the 10th line the figure of Rs. 1,60,000 shall be read as Rs. 1,65,000. In para 5 at page 5 line 2, April 4, 1969, shall be read as 1st April, 1969. 2. The application is thus allowed.
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1976 (12) TMI 62 - HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
Seized goods - Confiscation ... ... ... ... ..... ecessary, the department was of the view that it was the petitioner who had imported the contraband articles contained in the packages in dispute and so a show cause notice was issued to him on 9th January, 1975 and it appears that his prosecution has also been ordered. The circumstances thus revealed amply justify the extension of time for concluding the investigations. We are, therefore, of the opinion that the impugned order dated 12th September, 1974 (Annexure F) by which the Collector extended the period for issuing the show cause notice to the petitioner which was necessary for conducting further enquiry in the case and the impugned order does not suffer from any legal infirmity or any violation of the rule of natural justice and is certainly passed on sufficient material placed before the Collector. 11.Accordingly, the contention of the petitioner fails and no sufficient ground has been shown for issuance of the writ. Consequently, the petition is dismissed with costs.
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1976 (12) TMI 61 - HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE OF ANDHRA PRADESH AT HYD.
Confiscation - Illegal search and seizure - Adjudication ... ... ... ... ..... the Collector to extend the time only if there is sufficient cause. The order of the Collector extending the time must prima facie show as to what that sufficient cause was. We are aware that no Court can sit in judgment and say that the cause shown by the Collector was not sufficient in the circumstances. The Court cannot sit in judgment over the sufficiency of the reason-but the legal requirement remains that there should be a sufficient cause for extending time. That cause must be indicated in the order. The order of the Collector, dated 16th December 1970 is conspicuous by absence of any reference to any cause. This also vitiates the order of extension. For these reasons, we are in full agreement with our learned brother Gangadhara Rao, J., in allowing the writ petition, quashing the orders of the Deputy Collector and the Collector of Excise, and directing the return of the seized articles. 16. In the result, the writ appeal is dismissed with costs. Advocate fee Rs. 150.
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1976 (12) TMI 60 - HIGH COURT OF GUJARAT AT AHMEDABAD
Valuation of goods manufactured with customer's brand name ... ... ... ... ..... ustomers and we have already stated that the petitioner have no grievance to be made in that contention. Clause 4 in ex facie the extension of clause 2 which we are inclined to strike down in its latter part and obviously it shall have to fall through along with it. 7. We, however, make it clear that if the department thinks that this alleged contracts Annexure A and B are only a camouflage to screen the manufacturer of the goods in question by the buyer, it will be open to the department to have recourse to law and it will be perfectly within their statutory powers to take such an action as deemed fit. Equally it will be open to the administration to enquire and find out the real value of the goods for the purpose of duty in strict compliance with Section 4 of the Act as interpreted by the Supreme Court in Atic Industries s case (supra). 8. The result is that the petition is allowed in part to the extent indicated in the judgments. Rule is made absolute only to that extent.
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1976 (12) TMI 59 - HIGH COURT OF GUJARAT AT AHMEDABAD
Trailers - Valuation - Dutiability of accessories ... ... ... ... ..... from any other Engineering works which may not manufacture trailers. We cannot understand how a tool box or a jack or angles supporter or chains could be construed as forming integral or components of a trailer. Tool box is a separate box where tools are kept. Similarly, a jack is not fixed to a trailer and it is a portable item. Unless it is shown that the items in question are components or integral parts of a trailer and without them a trailer is not a complete manufactured item and cannot be used, it would be difficult to hold that these items which are only in the nature of accessories could be characterised as components or integral parts of a trailer. We are, therefore unable to agree with the learned counsel for the respondents that the items in question are excisable items. 3. We, therefore, set aside the impugned orders and allow the petition. Rule made absolute. No costs. The short levy amount, if it had already been collected, shall be refunded to the petitioner.
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1976 (12) TMI 58 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
Industrial Company, Processing Of Goods ... ... ... ... ..... manufacture conducted by the assessee-company. The printing having been done by a different concern, the question as to whether the assessee has been carrying on the business of manufacture would not arise on the facts here. However, the expression used in section 2(6)(d) is manufacture or processing of goods . Therefore, it is enough if the assessee, in order to get the benefit of this provision, is engaged in the processing of goods. The goods in the present case would be the parts or volumes of Sales Tax Cases. The processing engaged in by the assessee is to fold and stitch the printed sheets and convert them into parts or books, as the case may be, which were later on despatched to the subscribers. This, in our opinion, would constitute processing of goods so as to come within the scope of section 2(6)(d) of the Finance Act, 1968. Consequently, the question which we have refrained is answered in the affirmative and against the revenue. There will be no order as to costs.
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1976 (12) TMI 57 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
Jurisdiction Of Tribunal, Powers Of Tribunal, Quoted Equity Shares, Wealth Tax ... ... ... ... ..... R.C. No. 36 of 1974 Addl. Commissioner of Income-tax v. Rajkamal Hotel and Bar 1977 107 ITR 737 (AP) was not correct and that view must be held to be overruled by this decision of ours. In the light of the above discussion, we answer the question referred to this court for its opinion, in the affirmative, i.e., in favour of the revenue and against the assessee. It is clear from the order of the Tribunal in the instant case that the Tribunal dealt only with the question of limitation and has not dealt with the merits of the order levying penalty. The matter will now go back to the Tribunal, so that the Tribunal will deal with the merits of the case and we are not expressing any opinion whatsoever on the merits of the order levying penalty, viz., whether there was reasonable cause for the delay in filing the returns or not and whether the quantum of penalty was proper or not or any other question on merits. The question is, therefore, answered accordingly. No order as to costs.
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1976 (12) TMI 56 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
Levy Of Penalty, Notice Of Penalty ... ... ... ... ..... vied. We have already indicated that the mere incurring of a liability by the assessee does not automatically compel the Income-tax Officer to impose a penalty and that the Income-tax Officer has to decide in each case whether any penalty should be levied at all and, if so, what should be the quantum of the penalty. The Tribunal will have now to consider this question and dispose of the appeal preferred by the department finally. We make it clear that we have not expressed any opinion on the question whether section 221 of the Act can be applied at all to a default in payment of advance tax, since that did not arise for consideration, in view of the terms in which the question has been referred to this court, and we have proceeded only on the assumption that section 221 of the Act applies to a case of default in payment of advance tax also. There will be no order as to costs. We place on record our appreciation of the assistance rendered by Mr. K. R. Ramamani at our request.
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1976 (12) TMI 55 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
Retrospective Effect ... ... ... ... ..... w taken by the Tribunal of the effect of the consent terms is erroneous or improper or illegal. Bearing in mind the several clauses of the consent terms, which need not be gone into in detail, the background of the litigation, the relationship of the contesting parties in the suit and the opinion expressed by the rribunal in paragraph 38 of its order that all these proceedings were bona fide, it appears to us that there was a compromise and not a declaration of a clear, patent and obvious legal position. In view of this compromise Dr. Ferreira agreed with his daughter and wife that what was his would thenceforth belong to and be deemed to be the property of the trust. Once that position is realised, it will have to be agreed that the effect of the settlement would be only prospective and not retrospective. In the result, the question referred to us is answered in the negative and in favour of the assessee. The Commissioner will pay to the assessee the costs of this reference.
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1976 (12) TMI 54 - PUNJAB AND HARYANA HIGH COURT
Charitable Purpose, Individual Partner, Registered Firm ... ... ... ... ..... Haryana in Commissioner of Income-tax v. Sardar Singh Sachdeva 1972 86 ITR 387 (Punj) and the High Court of Orissa in Commisssioner of Income-tax v. Narula Cold Storage and Ice Factory 1976 104 ITR 148 (Orissa) have consistently taken the view that the Income-tax Act does not contemplate a limit of time for claiming development rebate. The Gujarat High Court has taken a contrary view in Keshavlal Vithaldas v. Commissioner of Income-tax 1976 105 ITR 601 (Guj). We are bound to follow the view of the Punjab and Haryana High Court, which, as we have pointed out, is the view of the majority of the High Courts. In view of the earlier decision of this court, the question referred to us is answered in the affirmative. No costs.
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1976 (12) TMI 53 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
Estate Duty ... ... ... ... ..... n gained by the disclosed facts is that it would be unreasonable to say or to suggest that it was at the instance of Ramanujam that this interest has been created. The essential limb or the forging link which would make the interest referred to in section 15 and the benefit of that interest on the death of the person concerned, viz., that he was responsible for the creation of such an interest either by an arrangement or by reason of a concerted act on his part with any other person is absent in this case. The Tribunal, therefore, rightly accepted the accountable person s case that this sum of Rs. 65,000 secured by reason of the company paying the benefits of the policy on the death of Ramanujam cannot be said to be an interest which shall be deemed to have passed on his death. In these circumstances, therefore, we answer the question against the revenue and in the affirmative. The reference is, therefore, answered in favour of the assessee with costs. Counsel s fee Rs. 250.
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1976 (12) TMI 52 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
Appeal To Tribunal, Appellate Assistant Commissioner ... ... ... ... ..... ome-tax Officer, he had the right to file an appeal before the Appellate Assistant Commissioner and once the assessee could not have had any grievance in view of the statement made by the partner, the appeal to the Appellate Assistant Commissioner was incompetent and equally the appeal to the Tribunal was incompetent. If so, the reference to this court of the two questions said to arise out of the order of the Tribunal is also incompetent. We may point out in this context the fact that one of the partners of the assessee appeared before the Income-tax Officer and stated that the assessee had no objection to the proposed revision has not been disputed at any stage and even before us, and every one of the authorities, viz., the Income-tax Officer, the Appellate Assistant Commissioner and the Tribunal has referred to this fact in the course of their orders. Under these circumstances, we return the reference without answering the questions extracted already. No order as to costs.
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1976 (12) TMI 51 - PUNJAB AND HARYANA HIGH COURT
Unexplained Investments ... ... ... ... ..... a H. Shah 1971 82 ITR 367 (SC) and Bankepur Club Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income-tax 1971 82 ITR 831 (SC), Shri Bhagirath Dass argued that there was but a mere change of opinion on the part of the Income-tax Officer and, therefore, there was no valid ground for reopening the assessment under section 147(b). He urged that langer expenses had been allowed at the time of the original assessment as business expenditure and that the Income-tax Officer had later changed his opinion and treated langer expenses as entertainment expenses which fell within section 37 of the Act. We do not agree with the submission of Shri Bhagirath Dass. The assessment orders of the Income-tax Officer show that the Income-tax Officer never applied his mind to the question and was blissfully unaware of the limit of Rs. 5,000 prescribed by section 37(2) in regard to expenditure in the nature of entertainment expenditure . For the foregoing reasons, we answer the question referred to us in the affirmative.
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1976 (12) TMI 50 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
Assessment Order, Revision By Commissioner ... ... ... ... ..... ndependent power under section 263 directed the Income-tax Officer to levy interest. Such an order by no stretch of imagination can be said to be an order of a superior court or authority in which the order of an inferior court or authority became merged. It may be that when the Commissioner in exercising power under section 263 enhances or modifies an assessment, the Income-tax Officer s order would merge in the Commissioner s order. But even in that case the period of limitation of the Commissioner s order would be the one prescribed by sub-section (2)(b) of section 263. In the premises our answer to the question is that the assessment order dated the 25th September, 1967, did not merge with the order of the Commissioner of Income-tax dated the 19th September, 1969. The Commissioner s order dated the 19th September, 1969, is not barred by limitation. The answer, therefore, is in the negative and in favour of the revenue. There will be no order as to costs. DEB J.--I agree.
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