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Case Laws
Showing 81 to 100 of 129 Records
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1976 (12) TMI 49 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
1922 Act, 1961 Act, Assessment Proceedings, Levy Of Penalty, Penalty Proceedings, Reassessment Proceedings
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1976 (12) TMI 48 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
Family Property, Individual Property, Revocable Transfer ... ... ... ... ..... . The power to demand a partition of the joint family property is a power given to him by the Hindu law as a member of the coparcenary and that power does not spring from his earlier unilateral act of impressing the property with the character of joint family property. On the other hand, section 63(a) makes it absolutely clear that a transfer is revocable only if the very transfer or arrangement or agreement or covenant or trust or settlement reserves such a power for the benefit of the transferor. That not being the position in the case of a member of the Hindu coparcenary impressing his separate property with the character of joint family property and subsequently demanding a partition of the properties of the joint family, this argument will have no substance with reference to the case in hand. Under these circumstances, we answer the question referred to this court in the affirmative and against the department. The assessee is entitled to his costs. Counsel s fee Rs. 500.
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1976 (12) TMI 47 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
Deductions From Total Income ... ... ... ... ..... nnected with the earning of such income. A similar view was also expressed in Madras Auto Service v. Income-tax Officer 1975 101 ITR 589 (Mad). But it has to be noticed that squarely the two Bench decisions referred to did not consider the import of the expression gross total income appearing in section 80M of the Act. They were concerned in one case with section 99(1)(iv) and in the other case with section 80K of the Act. But, in our view, those decisions would apply with equal force to the facts of this case also. We are of the view that the expression gross total income appearing in section 80M should be understood in the manner in which this court interpreted a similar expression appearing in section 99(1)(iv) and the present section 80M of the Act. Therefore, it is unnecessary to go into the question further. The Appellate Tribunal came to the correct conclusion. The question is answered against the department. The tax case is dismissed with costs. Counsel s fee Rs. 250.
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1976 (12) TMI 46 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
Diversion By Overriding Title, Profits And Gains Of Business ... ... ... ... ..... cannot be said to be an expenditure, cannot be said to be lost to the assessee and is still available to the assessee and it cannot also be said to be a diversion by overriding title because it does not go out and it cannot be said that it is no longer that of the assessee who diverts it. Simply because the statute has imposed certain restrictions on the manner of utilisation of the amount credited to the reserve it cannot be held that the appropriation of the amount to such a reserve constitutes an expenditure or diversion of profit by overriding title or that the amount was lost to the assessee. Therefore, in our opinion, just as the amount appropriated to the development reserve, the amount appropriated to the contingencies reserve also cannot be deducted for arriving at the assessable profits. In these circumstances, we answer the question referred to this court in the affirmative and against the assessee. The Commissioner is entitled to his costs. Counsel s fee Rs. 500.
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1976 (12) TMI 45 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
Business Expenditure, Entertainment Allowance, Expenditure Incurred, Insurance Business, Management Expenses
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1976 (12) TMI 44 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
Assessment Proceedings, Burden Of Proof, Interference By High Court, Penalty Proceedings, Proof On Revenue
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1976 (12) TMI 43 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
Assessment Year, Deemed Income, Income Tax Act, Set Off, Unabsorbed Depreciation, Written Down Value
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1976 (12) TMI 42 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
Levy Of Penalty ... ... ... ... ..... s contention of Sri Rama Rao does not commend itself to us. The basic precaution that the department should have taken was to have the statements recorded by the Bombay officer placed before the Income-tax Officer, Nellore. They were not brought on record at all. It is very unsafe to act on a mere letter when such statements or their true copies were not enclosed. Even when the Tribunal wanted them to be produced the department did not do it. It was not known whether the two persons have categorically stated that they had not lent any money. As the Tribunal has pointed out, a mere intimation of some statements recorded by the Bombay officer does not form a ground for reopening the assessment. The Tribunal repelled the request of the department to refer this question to the High Court on a full consideration of the facts and circumstances. There is no question of law which arises in this matter. Therefore, we dismiss these two I.T.Cs., but, in the circumstances, without cost.
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1976 (12) TMI 41 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
Interest On Excess Payment ... ... ... ... ..... y interest at 9 per cent. only for the period on or after October 1, 1967, it would have made specific provision in this behalf. An argument which appears to have been advanced before the Tribunal is that if it is held that section 214 of the Act as amended with effect from October 1, 1967, is to be applied to the period anterior to October 1, 1967, it would give retrospective effect to the amendment, and the Tribunal rejected such a contention. We are of the opinion that the Tribunal was right. Simply because the period with reference to which the interest payable is a period anterior to the date of coming into force of the amendment, it cannot be held that the provision as such will have retrospective effect. Consequently, we are of the opinion that the conclusion of the Tribunal is correct and, therefore, we answer the question referred to this court in the affirmative and in favour of the assessee. The assessee is entitled to its costs. Counsel s fee is fixed at Rs. 500.
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1976 (12) TMI 40 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
Charitable Purpose, Individual Partner, Registered Firm ... ... ... ... ..... an file an appeal from the assessment order under section 246 of the Act. When a partner is individually assessed on his share in the total income of the firm he may prefer an appeal under section 247 under which the validity of all allocation of firm s income as between the partners may be gone into. Though an appeal lies under section 246 from an assessment order at the instance of the firm, the question of apportionment between the partners cannot be raised in that appeal in view of section 247 of the Act. Accordingly, we agree with the opinion of the Allahabad High Court in the case of Shanker Refrigeration Co. v. Commissioner of Income-tax 1976 102 ITR 275, that in a proceeding for assessment of a registered firm any rebate or allowance to which the individual partners are entitled cannot be gone into or raised. In the premises, we answer both the questions in the negative and in favour of the revenue. There will be no order as to costs. SANKAR PRASAD MITRA C.J.-I agree.
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1976 (12) TMI 39 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
Attributable To, Business Expenditure, Business Income, Foreign Company, Income From Other Sources, Indian Company
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1976 (12) TMI 38 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
Levy Of Penalty ... ... ... ... ..... uld have got out even at the stage of appeal provided for in section 246(g). In the absence of any deliberateness or a conscious avoidance of responsibility and having regard to the peculiar circumstances of this case that the assessee was denied a legitimate opportunity earlier to escape from the clutches of penalty we are of the view that the penalty was not properly levied. At no time an order appointing the representative-assessee as an agent has been made. There has been, therefore, a departure from the express norm set by the statute after the enactment of the 1961 Act. That the assessment proceedings are not disputed cannot be the only foundation for the purpose of levying penalty which provision could be thought of only under a set of circumstances laid down in the chapter dealing with penalty proceedings. Having regard to our opinion as above, we answer the question in favour of the representative-assessee and against the department with costs. Counsel s fee Rs. 250.
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1976 (12) TMI 37 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
Activity For Profit ... ... ... ... ..... in this case is that the activity of the association and its zealous and assiduous interest evinced towards it by its members is only for the purpose of a private gain which is obviously inconsistent with the object of general public utility. In so far as the decision of the Supreme Court in Joint Commercial Tax Officer v. Young Men s Indian Association 1970 26 STC 241 is concerned, the facts are entirely different and that has not been squarely referred to before us. We note that with reference to the assessment years 1962-63 onwards, the Act of 1961 would apply. We have already referred to the difference between the Acts of 1922 and 1961. The activity of the association does not come within the purview of the definition of charitable purpose either under the old Act or under the new Act. The result of our discussion is that our answer to the referred question is against the assessee and in favour of the revenue with costs. The respondent s counsel fee is fixed at Rs. 250.
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1976 (12) TMI 36 - PUNJAB AND HARYANA HIGH COURT
Rejection Of Accounts ... ... ... ... ..... id against it, it was open to the assessee to raise the necessary ground before the Tribunal. Nothing was said against taking into consideration the case of the other liquor contractor for the assessment year 1964-65. All that was said before the Tribunal was that there was a slump in sales because of the Indo-Pakistan war in 1965. From the facts and figures as mentioned in the Tribunal s order it does not appear that there was any particular slump after September, 1965, though there appears to be some slump in September, 1965, only. In fact it was in December, 1965, that there were peak sales of the assessee. It is also revealed from the order of the Appellate Assistant Commissioner that the sales of the contractor for the year 1964-65 amounted to Rs. 4,70,000 only. Therefore, the assessee s sales, which even according to him, amounted to Rs. 10,78,898 were not in any manner hit by the Indo-Pakistan war. The question referred to us is, therefore, answered in the affirmative.
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1976 (12) TMI 35 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
Break Up Method, Net Wealth, Private Company ... ... ... ... ..... market value of the shares by following the break-up method of the assets of the company it is not possible to lay down the precise factor which would operate in the minds of the prospective buyers in the imaginary market. All that one can do is to consider what are the factors which reasonably a prospective buyer might consider and then decide how these factors affect the value of the shares. This decision has been noted by the Supreme Court in the case of Commissioner of Wealth-tax v. Hindustan Motors Ltd. 1976 104 ITR 530 (SC). In our opinion, the market value of the shares cannot vary from person to person or from assessee to assessee. Therefore, in the facts and circumstances of the case, it must be held that the market value of these shares determined by the Wealth-tax Officer under section 7(1) of the Act is correct and, accordingly, we return our answer in the negative and in favour of the revenue. There will be no order as to costs. SANKAR PRASAD MITRA C.J.--I agree.
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1976 (12) TMI 34 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
Burden Of Proof, Cash Credits, Levy Of Penalty, Penalty Proceedings ... ... ... ... ..... had the Inspecting Assistant Commissioner and subsequently the Tribunal levied penalty at a higher rate than the minimum against the assessee. In case penalty at a higher rate had been imposed, it might perhaps have been open to the assessee to urge that, in spite of the agreement, the proper amount that could have been properly added in the assessment year was less than the amount actually added by the Income-tax Officer. As earlier stated, this aspect of the matter might have had a bearing on the quantum of penalty if the penalty had been levied at a higher rate than the minimum. On the facts before us, it is the admitted position that penalty at the minimum rate, i.e., at the rate of 20 on the tax avoided, had been imposed and, therefore, it is unnecessary to go further into this aspect of the matter. In the result, the question referred to us is answered in the affirmative and in favour of the revenue. The assessee will pay to the Commissioner the costs of this reference.
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1976 (12) TMI 33 - ORISSA HIGH COURT
Concealment Penalty, Jurisdiction Of High Court, Question Of Law ... ... ... ... ..... ity competent to impose the penalty to refuse to impose penalty, particularly where the default flows from a bona fide belief that the assessee had not to act in a particular way. It is not disputed that the Tribunal was competent to exercise the same power as the penalty imposing authority and, therefore, when taking into consideration the broad features of a given case, the Tribunal comes to conclude that no penalty is exigible, no question of law can be said to arise. Having given our anxious consideration to the matter, our answer to the question referred to us, therefore, is On the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Tribunal was right in holding that the assessee was not liable to be visited with penalty in respect of a sum of Rs. 14,050 representing income from house property, a sum of Rs. 5 1,000 said to be income from undisclosed sources and a sum of Rs. 30,400 said to be capital gains. We direct both parties to bear their own costs. MOHANTI J.--I agree.
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1976 (12) TMI 32 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
Original Order ... ... ... ... ..... eless. In view of the general propositions which the Supreme Court has laid down in the above case, it seems to us that our Division Bench judgment in Income-tax Reference No. 117 of 1967 can no longer be followed. We are, therefore, of opinion that the special period prescribed in section 33B applies to the first order that the Commissioner had made in the instant reference. That order was passed within time. The subsequent order of the Tribunal has to be given effect to by the Commissioner irrespective of the period of limitation prescribed by section 33B. In this view of the matter, our answer to the question referred to us is in the affirmative and in favour of the revenue. We make no order as to costs. In this case Mr. Murarka, appearing for the assessee, orally applies for a certificate for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court. As our judgment is based on the Supreme Court decision reported in 1974 96 ITR 390 the application of Mr. Murarka is rejected. DEB J.--I agree.
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1976 (12) TMI 31 - PUNJAB AND HARYANA HIGH COURT
Additional Evidence, Appeal From Best Judgment Assessment, Jurisdiction Of AAC ... ... ... ... ..... essary reply to any reference that may hereafter be made to you in that behalf. This significant sentence can only lead to one conclusion, namely, that Makhan Lal had deposited a sum of Rs. 4,00,000 belonging to himself in Munshi Ram s name and was informing Munshi Ram about it so that the latter might be in a position to, suitably, answer queries that might be raised about it. The next letter clinches the question. Makhan Lal said in it, Rs. 4 lakhs which I had deposited in your name have been duly received back by me with interest thereon . The words duly received back by me can only mean that Makhan Lal had taken back his own money. In the face of these letters, we are unable to say that it is possible to draw any conclusion other than that the money belonged to Makhan Lal. Our answer to question No. 6, therefore, is in the affirmative. In view of our answers to questions Nos. 1, 2 and 6, we do not propose to answer the rest of the questions. There is no order as to costs.
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1976 (12) TMI 30 - PATNA HIGH COURT
Income Tax, Writ Petition ... ... ... ... ..... by a separate order) to hear the appeal and dispose of the same, which is pending before him, after giving the petitioners full opportunity of hearing. We would also direct him to permit the petitioners to examine either of them, if they so like, and produce any documentary evidence. The learned Appellate Assistant Commissioner would then proceed to dispose of the appeal in the light of the materials on the record taken by the Income-tax Officer and those taken by him in the appellate stage and dispose of the same on its merits. It is further made clear that if it is held that the appeal by the father of the petitioners, Bansidhar, is not maintainable, he being not an assessee within the meaning of section 246 of the new Income-tax Act, the petitioners would be at liberty to come to this court again. In the result, this application is accordingly dismissed with the obser. vations and directions as indicated above. There will be no order as to costs. P. S. SAHAY J.--I agree.
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