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Case Laws
Showing 41 to 60 of 131 Records
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1976 (9) TMI 149 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... order to the Appellate Assistant Commissioner having jurisdiction. Thus, this section enumerates the orders against which appeals can be preferred to the Appellate Assistant Commissioner. An order passed under section 36(4) is not one of the orders mentioned in sub-section (1) of section 31 and, therefore, such order was not appealable and no appeal against such order could have been preferred to the Appellate Assistant Commissioner. If no appeal could be preferred to the Appellate Assistant Commissioner, it is clear that against an order rejecting such an appeal by the Appellate Assistant Commissioner, no appeal could have been preferred to the Tribunal also. Therefore, we are clearly of the opinion that the Tribunal was right in holding that the appeals to the Appellate Assistant Commissioner as well as to the Tribunal were incompetent and not maintainable. The result is the tax revision petition fails and is dismissed with costs. Counsel s fee Rs. 250. Petition dismissed.
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1976 (9) TMI 148 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ovisions therein, the entire action was without jurisdiction and authority and, as such, the application in question was maintainable and the same was duly entertained and no order contrary to the determination as made by the learned Judge in the trial court should be made. Since we have already held that the impugned order was unauthorised, void and without jurisdiction, the submissions made on behalf of the revenue have also no force and the more so when the right of appeal under the statute was frustrated by non-communication of the relevant order. In the facts and circumstances, the said firm had every right and competence to ask for a writ as in the instant case and, as such, the application in question was rightly entertained. In view of the above, all the arguments of Mr. Roy fail and, as such, the appeal should be dismissed and we order accordingly. There will however be no order for costs. All interim orders are vacated. ANIL KUMAR SEN, J.-I agree. Appeal dismissed.
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1976 (9) TMI 147 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... by the slips related to sales or purchases. The learned Additional Government Pleader very strongly relied on section 10 of the Tamil Nadu General Sales Tax Act, 1959, in support of this revision petition. Section 10 merely states The burden of proving that any dealer or any of his transactions is not liable to tax under this Act shall lie on such dealer. The word transaction occurring in the section certainly cannot mean any transaction whatever, and read in the context of the section occurring in the Tamil Nadu General Sales Tax Act, the word transaction can only mean transaction of sale or purchase. Once it is found by the Tribunal that the slips did not evidence any transaction of sales or purchases, there is no question of section 10 being attracted. Under these circumstances, no case whatever has been made out for interference with the order of the Tribunal and, accordingly, this tax revision petition is dismissed with costs. Counsel s fee Rs. 250. Petition dismissed.
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1976 (9) TMI 146 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... in view of the order of the Judge (Appeals), Sales Tax, dated 17th December, 1957, and on his failure to do so a mandamus could be and was rightly issued requiring him to perform his statutory duty. If that be the import of rule 71 it would be inconsistent with section 29(3) in so far as it relates to refund of tax, the liability in respect of which stood admitted in the returns filed by the assessee. A statutory rule cannot enlarge the meaning of the section if a rule goes beyond what the section contemplates, the rule must yield to the statute see Central Bank of India v. Their Workmen 1959-60 17 F.J.R. 57 (S.C.) 1959 29 Comp. Cas. 367 (S.C.) A.I.R. 1960 S.C. 12. and Chandra Kumar v. District JudgeA.I.R. 1976 All. 328 (F.B.). In the result the special appeal is allowed, the judgment of the learned single Judge dated 30th July, 1963, is set aside and the writ petition is dismissed. In the circumstances of the case, the parties will bear their own costs. Ordered accordingly.
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1976 (9) TMI 145 - ORISSA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... onal State Representative if he had experienced difficulty in the matter of reaching a conclusion and even if such authority had not been approached, on his own initiative he should have exercised appropriate control to see that the matter was processed in good time. 8.. When a statute prescribes a period of limitation it is not without any meaning and when the time prescribed for an action runs out, the adversary is entitled to assume that the decision in his favour has come to stand so that such party would work out his activities accordingly. We must say that the Tribunal disposed of the matter in a very imprudent way. 9.. For the reasons indicated above, we quash the order of the Tribunal. The writ applications are accordingly allowed. Normally we would have awarded costs, but in view of the fact that the litigating parties are in fact the Union of India and the State Government, we think it appropriate to make no order for costs. PANDA, J.-I agree. Applications allowed.
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1976 (9) TMI 144 - SUPREME COURT
Whether the assessment proceedings with regard to the assessment year 1969-70 could be proceeded with and whether the assessment order could be passed beyond a period of 5 years after the expiry of the period to which the assessment relates?
Whether Central sales tax was payable in respect of sale of electric cables manufactured and sold by the petitioner-company to State Electricity Boards in view of the exemption granted generally under section 8(2A) of the Central Sales Tax Act read with section 5(2)(a)(iv) of the Punjab General Sales Tax Act, 1948?
Held that:- Appeal dismissed. The legislature had not provided any period within which an order was to be made by an appellate or revisional authority; no such period should be imported in the exercise of the power on the basis of section 11(2a).
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1976 (9) TMI 135 - SUPREME COURT
Whether the time taken by the dealer in obtaining another copy of the impugned appellate order could be excluded for the purpose of limitation for filing revision under section 10(1) of the U.P. Sales Tax Act when one copy of the appellate order was served upon the dealer under the provisions of the Act?
Held that:- Appeal dismissed. The High Court, in our opinion, correctly answered the question referred to it in favour of the dealer-respondent and against the revenue. The position of law in a case where there was no allegation of the loss of any copy, a fortiori it would follow that where as in the present case the copy served upon a party is lost and there is no alternative for that party except to apply for a fresh copy in order to be in a position to file revision petition, the time spent in obtaining that copy would necessarily have to be excluded under section 12(2) of the Limitation Act, 1963.
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1976 (9) TMI 134 - SUPREME COURT
Whether the contract for sale of goods was an inter-State sale or an intra-State sale?
Held that:- Appeal dismissed. The steps taken from the beginning to the end by the Bombay branch in co-ordination with the Madras factory show that the Bombay branch was merely acting as the intermediary between the Madras factory and the buyer and that it was the Madras factory which pursuant to the covenant in the contract of sale caused the movement of the goods from Madras to Bombay. The inter-State movement of the goods was a result of the contract of sale and the fact that the contract emanated from correspondence which passed between the Bombay branch and the company could not make any difference.
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1976 (9) TMI 118 - HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY
Shares – Allotment of, Winding up - Company when deemed unable to pay its debts, Powers of tribunal on hearing petition, Meetings to ascertain wishes of creditors or contributors
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1976 (9) TMI 109 - HIGH COURT OF MADRAS
Resignation of director ... ... ... ... ..... I see that there is no obligation under the Companies Act requiring a director, even if he is the only director, to co-opt another in case he intends to resign his office. After going through the provisions of the Act, I find there is nothing to show that such a co-option is a condition precedent for a director validly tendering his resignation. The power of co-option is only an enabling provision to co-opt so as to have the quorum for holding the meeting. There is no specific article in the articles of association of this company that it is imperative on the part of the outgoing director to co-opt another director before he leaves his office. So this contention also fails. In the result I feel that, in order to secure the ends of justice, it would be just and expedient to invoke the inherent power of this court under section 482, Criminal Procedure Code, for quashing the proceedings. Accordingly, the proceedings against the petitioner are quashed and the petition is allowed.
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1976 (9) TMI 108 - HIGH COURT OF MADRAS
Directors, etc. not to hold place of profit ... ... ... ... ..... er, this contention was not raised in the petition nor is there any evidence that a special resolution according the consent of the company to the appointment of directors-surveyors at the general meeting of the company held for the first time after such appointment was passed. A special resolution in that behalf has been produced at the hearing for my inspection, but that purports to have been passed on the 18th of March. 1972, i.e , more than a year and a half subsequent to the appointments and for aught we know it was not passed in the first general meeting held after the appointments were made. For the application of the proviso it is necessary for the company to show that the meeting in question was such a first meeting. Having failed to prove that, the company cannot take any advantage of the proviso. In the result, I hold that no fault can be found with the impugned order of the Registrar. Accordingly, the petition fails and is dismissed, but with no order as to costs.
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1976 (9) TMI 95 - ITAT SURAT
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... ... ..... ses cited by him. The appellant is rightly held to be a dealer liable to tax under this Act. 9. This brings us to the question of penalty imposed under s. 45 (2)(a) of the Act. The argument of the learned Advocate was that the question of liability of the appellant as a dealer was not free from doubt and is debatable one and, therefore, penalty imposed under s. 45(2) (a) of the Act should be removed. On this point we are in agreement with the learned Advocate. The penalty imposed under s. 45(2)(A) of the Act should be removed. 10. No other point is urged before us. 11. The present second appeal is, therefore, partially allowed. It is held that the appellant is a dealer liable for registration under the act and in this respect the orders passed by the Sales Tax authorities are upheld. Penalty imposed under section 45(2)(a) of the Act is removed. The orders of Sales Tax authorities shall be modified accordingly. The amount of penalty if paid, shall be refunded to the appellant.
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1976 (9) TMI 93 - ITAT PATNA-B
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... ... ..... the appellants, it has to be presumed that the consideration for such transfer as not been truly stated with such object as is referred in clause (a) or clause (b) of subs. s. (1) of s. 269C. considering all the aspects of the case, we hold that the Competent authority was justified in acquiring the properties transferred to the various transferees except in respect of the property which had been transferred to Smt. Malti Sah and also in the case of Miss. Sumitra Kumari. In respect of the properties transferred to these transferees, no acquisition proceedings has been started. In view of this, the acquisition of these properties would not be valid. We may mention that the conditions of acquisition are satisfied in respect of other transferees separately in each case. In view of the above discussion, the appeals in income tax (acquisition) Appeal No. 10 (Pat) of 1974-75 and Income-tax (Acquisition) Appeal No. 11 (Pat) of 1974-75 are allowed and the other appeals are dismissed.
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1976 (9) TMI 92 - ITAT PATNA-B
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... ... ..... find from the case of Addl. CIT, Harayana, Himachal Pradesh and Delhi-III vs. Roshan Lal Kuthiala (deceased) (100 ITR 329) that in that case Tribunal, Chandigarh Bench, Chandigarh, had taken the view that the assessee had reasonable cause for not filing the return up to the period the return remained unfiled because the assessee rsquo s submission asking for extention of time remained unreplied by the ITO and the assessee could be taken to be under a reasonable belief that his request had been acceded to and, therefore, the assessee was under no obligation to file the return. Their Lordships of the Punjab and Haryana High Court held that this finding of the Tribunal was a finding of fact. 9. In view of our discussions above, we hold that there was reasonable cause for the assessee for the delayed filing of the return and so the AAC was justified in cancelling the penalty order of the ITO. We, therefore, uphold the order of the AAC. 10. In the result, the appeal is dismissed.
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1976 (9) TMI 87 - ITAT PATNA-A
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... ... ..... is filed. We find that this question has been considered in detail in the Full Bench decision of the Tribunal in the case of WTO vs. Smt. G.S. Poddar and her Issue Trust, Bombay. After reviewing the case laws on this point the President of the Tribunal and other Members constituting the bench held that the law that is to be applied is the one in force during the period the default continued. We do not find any decision of Patna High Court on this point. We respectfully agree with the view taken in the Full Bench decision and we, therefore, hold that for the period prior to 1st April, 1969 it is the law prior to amendment that would apply while for the period beginning from 1st April, 1969, the provision of law as amended w.e.f. 1st April, 1969 would apply. The limit on this penalty would be only the prescribed limit in the amended law as that will be greater of the two limits. The WTO was directed to calculate the penalty on the above basis. 5. The appeal is allowed in part.
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1976 (9) TMI 85 - ITAT ORISSA
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... ... ..... ssessee was justified in paying tax 3 . The taxing authorities were incorrect in assessing tax at the rate exceeding 3 . 9. For the aforesaid reasons I arrive at the following conclusion (i) The sale turnover of stainless steel sheets shall be assessed with tax 3 . (ii) The sale turnover of stainless steel articles such as utensils shall be assessed with tax at the rate prescribed in sl. 61 of the schedule of taxable goods (as it was then) and according to sl. 27 of the schedule of luxury goods. (iii) The sale turnover of black gram shall be assessed with tax 3 . 10. As there is no mention in the records regarding the exact amounts of the sale turnovers of different item referred to above, they have to be found out by the assessing officers. 11. In the result, therefore, the appeals are allowed in part. The assessing officer shall recompute the gross and taxable turnovers and assess tax rateably according to directions given above. Excess tax, if realised, should be refunded.
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1976 (9) TMI 82 - ITAT MADRAS-D
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... ... ..... four sons came to only Rs. 51,398 and that there is no justification for adding Rs. 77,364 . 4. We have carefully considered the rival submissions. Taking into consideration the entirely of the movable and the immovable properties of the family, it is common ground that there was a shortfall of Rs. 51,398 in the share of the deceased. The ruling of the Madras High Court in the case of Ranganayaki Ammal vs. Controller of Estate Duty(1), squarely supports the stand of the Revenue that the aforesaid short-fall was liable to estate duty by reason of s.9(1) read with s.27 and Explanation to s.2(15) of the Estate Duty Act, 1953. The above ruling of the Madras High Court has since been affirmed by the Supreme Court in R. Ranganayaki Ammal vs. Controller of Estate Duty(3),as submitted by the learned departmental representative. We therefore, hold that the sum of Rs. 51,398 is includible in the principal value of the estate and we direct accordingly. 5. The appeal is allowed in part.
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1976 (9) TMI 81 - ITAT MADRAS-D
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... ... ..... ved in the transfers in question. We, are, however, of the opinion that the alternative claim of the assessee that the transfers in question fell under ss.5(1)(vii) and 5(1)(xii) of the Gift-tax Act has merit and should be considered. Since, this question has not been considered by the authorities below we consider that in the interest of justice the matter has to go back to the Gift-tax Officer for such examination and fresh disposal. We, therefore, set aside the orders of the authorities below and restore the assessment to the file of the Gift-tax Officer with a direction to consider the question whether the transfer of the sum of Rs. 30,000 to the three minor daughters of Shri. A.S. Dharmaraj is liable to exempted under ss. 5(1)(vii) and 5(1)(xii) of the Gift-tax Act, 1958, with reference to the status of the family and other relevant circumstances and make a fresh assessment in accordance with law. 4. For the purpose of statistics the appeal is treated as allowed in part.
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1976 (9) TMI 80 - ITAT MADRAS-D
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... ... ..... he purpose of the assessee. The learned departmental representative pointed out that the annual letting value in respect of the ground floor, which was let out, was fixed at Rs. 3,300, whereas the annual letting value for the self-occupied portion in first floor was fixed at Rs. 2,400 and therefore the assessee could not be said to have used the property mainly for her residence. We are unable to accept this argument, The annual letting value in respect of the ground floor has been fixed at Rs. 3,300 because it was based upon the actual rent received. This would not justify the inference that the let out portion was bigger than the self-occupied portion, more especially when the extent of the carpet area as pointed out above clearly support the assessee rsquo s contention that the assessee was using the property mainly for her residence. We have, therefore, no hesitation in upholding the order of the Appellate Assistant Commissioner. 5. The appeal of the Revenue is dismissed.
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1976 (9) TMI 76 - ITAT MADRAS-A
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... ... ..... y would stamp it with the character of joint family property once the correct test to be applied is that of the members of the family in being and yet to be born. On this test the only conclusion which can be reached is that of the property received by the assessee on the death of his father, Manilal, became the property of joint Hindu family which at the valuation date consisted of the assessee, his wife, his daughter and his mother and the value of that estate on the valuation date must be treated as the value of the estate belonging to the Hindu Undivided Family. 6. Having carefully perused both the above rulings of the Allahabad and Gujarat High Courts, with respect we prefer to follow the ruling of the Gujarat High Court. The Appellate Assistant Commissioner has accepted the assessee rsquo s contention, following the above Gujarat High Court ruling. We, therefore, uphold the order of the Appellate Assistant Commissioner. The appeals of the Revenue fail and are dismissed.
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