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Case Laws
Showing 21 to 40 of 122 Records
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1977 (1) TMI 151 - COLLECTOR OF CENTRAL EXCISE, MADRAS
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... ... ..... be possible to call the resulting grades of powders as manufacture’. The report of the lower authority does not seem to indicate that there is any conscious attempt to produce different grades of powders to meet requirements of specific use in Industries. In view of this position, I hold that mere conversion of lumps into powder does not constitute ‘manufacture’ and as such the levy of duty under Item 68 is not warranted. 4. The other contention made by the appellants that since Barytes is mentioned under Notification No. 114/73, dated 30-4-1973 issued under Tariff Item 14, this is not covered under Item 68, is not tenable. Notification No. 114/73 refers to mixtures of the nature of pigments or dry colours, in which Barytes form one of the ingredients, as exempt from duty. But in their case, the Barytes does not form a component of any dry colours and therefore this exemption has no relevance to their case. In the circumstances, the appeal is allowed.
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1977 (1) TMI 150 - APPELLATE COLLECTOR OF CENTRAL EXCISE, NEW DELHI
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... ... ..... ing material. It is further observed that the warranty is for one year for the entire system except for the sealed system for which it is five years. The warranty cannot be said to be connected in any way with service charges. Even otherwise service charges are always inbuilt in the price of the Refrigerator and are not charged separately. In the above view of the matter the inclusion of service charges in the assessable value of the Refrigerator is in order and is upheld. 3. To sum-up the wholesale cash price of the Refrigerators manufactured by the appellant is ascertainable at the factory gate and the same would be the wholesale cash price under Sec. 4(a) of the Central Excises and Salt Act minus the permissible deductions of trade discount etc. The price of the voltage stablizer will not form part of the assessable value but the deduction of service charges from the assessable value is disallowed. The order of the Assistant Collector is modified to the above extent.
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1977 (1) TMI 149 - PATNA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ed from such price. It only emphasises the fact that as goods have to be moved its transport cost must be excluded. On its analogy other post manufacturing cost or charges may also have to be excluded in appropriate cases. It is not without significance that even in the case of vehicles transferred by the petitioner to its Regional Sales Offices excise duty is collected at the time of the removal of the Vehicles from the factory. 14. In the result, the writ petition is allowed and the orders of respondent No. 2 treating the petitioner’s Regional Sales Offices as ‘related persons’ in Annexure 2 and refusing deduction of post manufacturing charges in arriving at the assessable value in Anexures 5 to 5(e) are quashed. The respondents are further directed to refund the excess amount of excise duty already collected in respect of the vehicles cleared from the 1st of October, 1975, onward. In the circumstances of the case, there will be no order as to costs.
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1977 (1) TMI 148 - SUPREME COURT
Whether the impugned Act Maharashtra Agricultural Lands (Ceiling of Holdings) Act, 1961 so far as it creates an artificial concept of family unit for fixing ceiling on holding of land by such family unit, is in conflict with the second proviso to clause (1) of Article 31A and if it is, whether it is protected under Article 31-B ?
Held that:- Even if the Act, in so far as it introduces an artificial concept of a family unit and fixes ceiling on holding of agricultural land by such family unit, is violative of the second proviso to clause (1) of Article 31A, it is protected by Article 31-B by reason of its inclusion in the Ninth Schedule.
The Act has created an artificial concept of a family unit and aggregated the land held by each member of the family unit for the purpose of applying the limitation of ceiling areas. It could not be disputed by the appellants that the State Legislature had legislative competence to do so.
There are two units recognised by the Act for the purpose of fixing ceiling on holding of agricultural land. One is 'person' and the other is 'family unit'. Where there is a family unit as defined in the Explanation to clauses (1) to section 4., it has to be taken as a unit for the purpose of determining whether land is held in excess of the ceiling area and for this purpose all land held by each member of the family unit, whether jointly or separately, is required to be aggregated and it is deemed to be held by the family unit. There, an individual member of the family unit is not regarded as a unit for the purposes of applying the limitation of ceiling area. The ceiling limit in such a case is applicable only to the family unit and not to an individual member of the family unit. It would not, therefore, be possible to say in the case of an individual member of the family unit that, when any land held by him under his personal cultivation is taken over by the State under the Act by reason of the land deemed to be held by the family unit being in excess of the ceiling limit applicable to the family unit, the acquisition is of any land "within the ceiling limit applicable to him" and hence in such a case there would be no question of any violation of the provision enacted in the second proviso to clause (1) of Articles 31A in so far' as the land held by him is concerned.
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1977 (1) TMI 147 - SUPREME COURT
Whether in view of the orders dated June 27, 1975 and January 8, 1976 issued by the President under clause (1) Article 359 of the Constitution, the petitions under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution were maintainable?
Held that:- Detenu in asking for their temporary removal from their places of detention to their homes to perform funeral ceremonies or to appear at any examination or to be taken to a doctor of their choice for social medical attention are not enforcing their rights to freedom, the contention is not sound. Any relief that may be asked for through the aid of court for giving facilities to a detenu to be taken from his place of detention to his home or to an examination hall or for special medical treatment under a doctor of his choice or for any other facility would be enforcing fundamental rights through the aid of Court. The Presidential Proclamation is a complete answer against the enforcement of such reliefs through the aid of Court.
The detenus may approach the competent administrative authorities for special medical attention or for facilities for performance of funeral ceremonies of their kith and kin or for facilities to appear at the examination or any other facility of similar nature. It is open to the administrative authorities to take such action as they may be advised under the relevant provisions of the Act. But if the authorities do not give any relief it was said by counsel for the detenus then the detenus could come to the court. This contention is also unsound and unacceptable because that would also be enforcing fundamental rights through the aid and process of court which is not permissible so long as the aforesaid Proclamation is in force.
We are therefore clearly of opinion that the aforesaid writ petitions were not maintainable and the High Court of Bombay and Karnataka were clearly in error in passing the impugned directions which are not warranted by any relevant law including the law relating to preventive detention of the kind with which we are concerned in the present cases. The detenus or their relations may if so advised, approach the appropriate Governments. or other competent administrative authorities invoking their powers under section 5 read with section 12 of the Act or other relevant provisions thereof.
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1977 (1) TMI 146 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... g motor cars, motor taxi-cabs, motor cycles and cycle combinations, motor scooters, etc., etc. Here again it will be seen that the expression cycle combinations is tacked on with the expression motor cycles by the word and and the two expressions are not separated by a comma, as the other expressions are separated in the said entry, thus indicating that cycle combinations goes along with the expression motor vehicles . On the same reasoning, in the present case, the expression cycle combinations occurring in entry 38 will go along with tandem cycles and if so, cycle rickshaws will not come within the scope of that entry. Hence, we hold that the Tribunal has not committed any error of law in coming to the conclusion that cycle rickshaws will not fall within the scope of entry 38 of the First Schedule to the Act. The result is the tax revision case fails and is dismissed with costs of the respondent-counsel s fee Rs. 250 (Rupees two hundred and fifty only). Petition dismissed.
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1977 (1) TMI 145 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... tting the matter back to the Deputy Commissioner was made to the Tribunal on behalf of the State. However, the Tribunal rejected that request. We are of the opinion that the Tribunal was not justified in doing so. There were certain facts to be investigated into and found and under those circumstances, the proper procedure that the Tribunal should have adopted was to remit the matter back to the Deputy Commissioner with a direction to dispose of the two petitions filed by the respondent herein on merits. Accordingly, we allow the tax revision cases in part and set aside the order of the Tribunal in so far as it allowed the appeals of the respondent herein on merits. The result of this will be, the Tribunal will have to restore the appeals preferred by the respondent herein to its file and remit the matter back to the Deputy Commissioner for disposing of the revision petitions preferred by the respondent on merits. There will be no order as to costs. Petitions partly allowed.
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1977 (1) TMI 144 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... t that the purchase of staple fibre was purchase as raw material for the existing business of manufacture of yarn and the respondent had no intention whatever of reselling the same. In that context, the Tribunal held that the sale of staple fibre by the respondent could not be said to be in the course of the business it carries on, apparently in view of the definition of the term dealer and the definition of the term sale as contained in section 2(b) and section 2(g) of the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956, at the relevant time. We are unable to hold that the Tribunal committed any error of law in coming to the conclusion it did. Hence, the tax revision case is dismissed. Petition dismissed.
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1977 (1) TMI 143 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... definition of the term business contained in section 2(d) of the Act. It is true that the said definition is a wide one. According to the said definition, business includes any trade, commerce or manufacture or any adventure or concern in the nature of trade, commerce or manufacture. However, where an organisation is constituted solely and exclusively for the purpose of carrying on research, the purchase of products by the said organisation for the purpose of carrying on its research and the sale of the resulting products by the said organisation cannot be said to be in the nature of trade or commerce so as to bring it within the definition of the term business contained in section 2(d) of the Act. In view of this, we are not convinced that the Tribunal has committed any error of law in coming to the conclusion it did. Consequently, these petitions fail and they are dismissed with costs one set. Counsel s fee Rs. 250 (Rupees two hundred and fifty only). Petitions dismissed.
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1977 (1) TMI 142 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... action could not be called a sale. The second of these two cases was a judgment of the Madras High Court in Shivaji Films Private Limited v. State of Madras 1972 30 S.T.C. 66. That was a case where the question to be decided was whether a film producer who imported raw films and transferred the balance of the stock left with him and not required by him to another after obtaining the permission of the licensing authority was a dealer. Following an earlier decision of the Madras High Court, the court held that, even though the transaction might amount to a sale, it did not constitute the petitioners a dealer. The questions arising in that case were different from those which we have to consider. For the reasons set out above, we answer the first question referred to us, being the only question in respect of which this reference has proceeded, in the negative. The respondents will pay to the applicant the costs of this reference fixed at Rs. 300. Reference answered accordingly.
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1977 (1) TMI 141 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... se, the assessee purchased scrap iron locally and imported iron plates from outside, and after converting them into bars, flats and plates in his mills sold them in the market. Under a notification issued by the Government of Madhya Bharat, no tax was payable on the sale of iron and steel. But, under Schedule IV of Notification No. 59 issued by the said Government, sales tax at the rate stated therein was payable in respect of a sale by an importer or producer of goods prepared from any metal other than gold and silver. It was held by the Supreme Court that scrap iron purchased by the assessee was processed for convenience of sale. The raw materials were only re-rolled to give them attractive and acceptable forms. They did not in the process lose their character as iron and steel. In the result, we answer the question referred to us in the affirmative. The applicant to pay to the respondents the costs of this reference fixed at Rs. 300. Reference answered in the affirmative.
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1977 (1) TMI 140 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ape, except that of a thin flat sheet, and it is only when it is coated on to the cheese cube that it takes the shape of that cheese cube. We, therefore, hold that the Tribunal was right in coming to the conclusion that these aluminium foils in which the cheese cubes were packed were not containers and, therefore, the goods sold by the respondents were not taxable under entry 6 of Schedule E but were taxable under entry 22 of Schedule E to the said Act. For the reasons stated above, we answer the question submitted to us in the affirmative. At the time when the rule issued on the application for reference made to this High Court by the respondents was by consent made absolute the costs of the said application were made costs in the reference. Accordingly, we order the applicant to pay to the respondents Rs. 550 by way of costs of this reference, which will include the sum of Rs. 250 being the costs of the said application for reference. Reference answered in the affirmative.
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1977 (1) TMI 139 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... icle within the meaning of entry 58 of Schedule C to the said Act. It was held that essentially, it is a crane operated by use of gasoline and is mounted on a crawler. That the crawler is propelled by a motor is undoubtedly the feature of the machine, but that by itself would not make it a motor vehicle in the sense in which entry 58 has to be understood. It appears to us that, in a sense, a fork-lift truck of the type in question before us can be regarded as a sort of crane which is used to move goods vertically with a view to stack them. As indicated above, in our view, the fork-lift truck cannot fall within entry 58 of Schedule C to the said Act. It is common ground that if it is not covered by this entry, it must fall within the residuary entry 22 of Schedule E to the said Act. In the result, we answer the question referred to us in the affirmative. The applicant to pay to the respondent the costs of this reference fixed at Rs. 300. Reference answered in the affirmative.
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1977 (1) TMI 138 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... tions do not amount to works contract. We are unable to accept the above contention of Sri Agarwal. The mere fact that the decision of this court is under appeal does not make it any less binding on courts, tribunals and other authorities within this State until it (that decision) is reversed by the Supreme Court. For the foregoing reasons, we are unable to accept the contention of Sri Agarwal that the impugned notices are without jurisdiction and that the Sales Tax Officer had no power to initiate rectification proceedings. But nothing said by us herein should be understood by the Sales Tax Officer as expressing any opinion on the questions that arise for determination before him in the proposed rectification proceedings. In the result, these two petitions fail and are dismissed. In the circumstances of the case, we direct the parties to bear their own costs. The interim orders made by this court on 2nd December, 1975, in both the petitions are vacated. Petitions dismissed.
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1977 (1) TMI 137 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... he aforesaid observation of the Tribunal on which reliance is placed by Mr. Joshi occurs in connection with the discussion as to whether a polythene bag is a container and not in connection with the question as to whether it can be regarded as a sealed container. This observation, therefore, in our view, cannot amount to a finding that the polythene bags in the present case were such as could be opened and closed again. In fact, the finding of the Tribunal that some portion of the polythene bags would have to be removed or broken open before the contents could be got at would show that the Tribunal could not have arrived at the finding as suggested by Mr. Joshi. In our view, therefore, the polythene bags used by the respondent in packing the chikki must be regarded as sealed containers. In the result, the question referred to us is answered in the negative. The respondent to pay to the applicant the costs of the reference fixed at Rs. 300. Reference answered in the negative.
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1977 (1) TMI 136 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ntries could constitute any material at all. Mr. Andhyarujina next placed reliance on the decision of a Division Bench of the Gujarat High Court in Jayantilal Thakordas v. State of Gujarat 1969 23 S.T.C. 11.On the other hand, Mr. Surte, the learned counsel for the assessees, drew our attention to the fact that this decision of the Gujarat High Court has been dissented from by a single Judge of the Kerala High Court in V.S. Narayanan Nair v. Sales Tax Officer 1972 29 S.T.C. 37. and by a Division Bench of the Orissa High Court in Muralimohan Prabhudayal v. State of Orissa 1970 26 S.T.C. 22. In our view, it is not necessary for us to consider the decision of the Gujarat High Court at all, because it turns on its own facts which are altogether different from the facts of the case before us. In the result, we answer the question referred to us in the negative. The respondent to pay to the applicants the costs of this reference fixed at Rs. 300. Reference answered in the negative.
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1977 (1) TMI 135 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ry 21 of the amended Act and the same reads as follows Any mixture of two or more of the articles mentioned in items (1) to (21) above with or without the addition of other articles (on the turnover relating to components thereof which have not already suffered tax). Thus, it will be clear that only under the amendment, there can be a mixture of articles enumerated in that entry without any organic manure or any other article. As we have pointed out already, the N. P. K. complex fertilisers do not contain any organic manure at all and, therefore, they cannot fall within the scope of item (16) of entry 21. The result is the conclusion of the Tribunal is erroneous in law. Consequently, the tax revision petition is allowed and the order of the Tribunal so far as the turnover referable to N. P. K. complex fertilisers till 5th August, 1970, is concerned is set aside and that of the Appellate Assistant Commissioner is restored. There will be no order as to costs. Petition allowed.
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1977 (1) TMI 134 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... is a soap because it shares all the properties of soap with only the addition of silica and builders. Under these circumstances, since soap base, which also goes into the making of soap powders, hard soaps, glycerene, hard soaps (genuine), toilet soaps and soap flakes, is also used in the preparation of a scouring powder like Vim , it must be held that Vim is a soap for the purpose of item 48 in the First Schedule to the Act. 5.. T. R. C. No. 41 of 1976 is, therefore, decided in favour of the assessee and against the department. In each of the writ petitions, the relief sought for is granted and the sales tax authorities are directed to proceed on the footing that Vim is soap and falls within the purview of item 48 of the First Schedule to the Act. The petitioner in each of these four matters succeeds. Rule is made absolute. The respondents in each of these four matters will pay the costs of the respective petitioners. Advocate s fee Rs. 150 in each case. Petitions allowed.
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1977 (1) TMI 133 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... s all meaning and would be without any purpose behind it. In view of this statement of law made by the Supreme Court, it must be held that the various items enumerated in entry 21 are exhaustive and that anything which does not fall within the scope of any one of the items enumerated in entry 21 cannot be characterised as chemical fertiliser for the purpose of single point taxation under the Act. It is the admitted case that nitro phosphate is not one of the items enumerated in entry 21. The result of that will be, entry 21 itself cannot be invoked in support of the respondent in the present case and, therefore, the order of the Tribunal Is clearly erroneous in law. Hence, we allow the tax revision petition and set aside the order of the Sales Tax Appellate Tribunal dated 1st August, 1972, and restore that of the Appellate Assistant Commissioner, as far as the turnover relating to the sale of nitro phosphate is concerned. There will be no order as to costs. Petition allowed.
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1977 (1) TMI 132 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... llegally collected. The amount so collected would not be in the nature of tax on sale or purchase, while the refund of amount was considered to be within the competence of the legislature. Similarly, in Burmah Construction Co. v. State of Orissa 1961 12 S.T.C. 816 (S.C.)., the Supreme Court held that the legislative provisions providing for power of granting refund of tax improperly or illegally collected and laying down restrictions on the exercise of that power are both ancillary or subsidiary matters relating to power under the primary head of tax on sale of goods. If the legislature finds it necessary to prescribe or prohibit collection of any amount as tax in excess of what is due or when it is not due and provides for its forfeiture followed by penalty, it cannot be said that it is exercising power which is not ancillary or incidental to the power conferred by entry 54 of List II. For these additional reasons, I concur with the judgment delivered by my learned brother.
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