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Case Laws
Showing 41 to 60 of 122 Records
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1977 (1) TMI 131 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... if there was a misprint, the misprint was in the earlier editions of the said Rules. So far as the applicants are concerned, there is no dispute that their vendors, Aurobrite (India) Private Limited, have recovered tax from them, including general sales tax. There is equally no dispute that the other conditions in rule 45 applicable to them have been satisfied. The only ground on which their claim for drawback, set-off or refund was disallowed was that their vendors invoice did not show the amount of tax recovered from them separately. For the reasons set out above, we answer the questions referred to us as follows Question No. (1) Unnecessary to answer in view of the statement made on behalf of the applicants that they did not desire to have it answered. Question No. (2) In the negative. The respondents will pay to the applicants the costs of this reference fixed at Rs. 300. The fee of Rs. 100 paid by the applicants will be refunded to them. Reference answered accordingly.
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1977 (1) TMI 130 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... out that if a person were to go to a shop and ask for sugar, nobody would give him patasa, harda and alchidana, nor if he goes to purchase rice, would the shopkeeper give him chira or muri nor if he goes and asks for meat, would the shopkeeper supply him with dressed poultry. The question is not what a particular form of cereal or pulse is called. The question is whether it is a form of cereal or pulse. That maida is a form of cereal has been held by the Commissioner of Sales Tax himself in his said order dated 16th April, 1968. The Tribunal has agreed with the Commissioner of Sales Tax on this point. Merely because maida is separately specified, we are unable to see why a form of maida, namely, in dried up slender threads, should not be a form of cereal. For the reasons set out above, we answer both the questions submitted to us in the affirmative. The applicant will pay to the respondents the costs of this reference fixed at Rs. 300. Reference answered in the affirmative.
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1977 (1) TMI 129 - SUPREME COURT
Whether the enhanced rate under notifications dated 8th June, 1948, and 30th June, 1948, issued under section 3-A of the U.P. Sales Tax Act, 1948, are applicable to the sales of goods mentioned in paragraph 2 above which took place before 8th June, 1948, and 30th June, 1948?
Whether sub-section (ii) of section 3-A of the U.P. Sales Tax Act, 1948, empowers Provincial Government to fix the rate of sales tax in respect of an assessment year or in respect of certain specified sales only?
Held that:- Appeal is allowed and the impugned judgment of the High Court dated February 11, 1970, is set aside. When section 31 of the Act is clearly valid and is retroactive, and the legislature has shown the intention of restoring the assessments and orders made under the provisions of sub-section (1) of section 7 (as it stood prior to its amendment by section 7 of U.P. Act 19 of 1956) as good and valid assessments in law, as if they had been duly made, that was enough to set the controversy at rest and there is nothing wrong with the view which has been taken by the Additional Judge (Revisions) in his order dated December 28, 1968.
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1977 (1) TMI 121 - SUPREME COURT
Petition under article 226 of the Constitution of India filed by the appellant dismissed.
Held that:- Appeal dismissed. As the sales tax due amount, however, was not paid in spite of the fact that ten days' time was granted to do the needful no valid ground to interfere with the judgment of the High Court, dismissing the writ petition filed by the appellant.
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1977 (1) TMI 112 - SUPREME COURT
Whether the period of four years is to be calculated from March 21, 1963, when the initial assessment orders were made, or from June 8, 1966, when the orders under section 12A of the Act were made?
Held that:- Appeal allowed. As the period of four years should be calculated from June 8, 1966, i.e., the date on which orders under section 12A of the Act were made. The reason for that is that once an assessment is reopened, the initial order for assessment ceases to be operative.
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1977 (1) TMI 103 - HIGH COURT OF GUJARAT
Compromise and arrangement, Amalgamation ... ... ... ... ..... r is brought before the court, the court would adjudicate upon the dispute between the revenue and the assessee on the rival contentions. That is not the situation here. In such a situation, the court would not be concerned as to the modality of avoidance of tax but here the tax cannot be avoided unless the court lends its assistance, namely, by sanctioning the scheme of amalgamation. In other words, the judicial process is used or polluted to defeat the tax by forming an appropriate device or subterfuge. Such a situation can never be said to be in public interest. It is clearly opposed to public interest and on this ground the court would not sanction the scheme of amalgamation. Accordingly, Petitions Nos. 10 of 1975 and 12 of 1975 are rejected. As the Central Government after notice did not appear, Mr. V.B. Patel was appointed by the court to assist it in unraveling the implications of law in this case and it is reasonable that he should be paid his fees by the petitioners.
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1977 (1) TMI 102 - HIGH COURT OF GUJARAT
Compromise and arrangement ... ... ... ... ..... nditions to meet all the objections and difficulties which were envisaged by the Association and even Mr. Bhatt rightly stated that he is satisfied with those conditions and he does not challenge these conditions and he wants them to be maintained in the order. As, now, time-limits prescribed in the order have expired, it would be proper to extend the time limit up to January 24, 1977, for complying with the various conditions envisaged by the learned single judge. We are happy to note that Mr. Bhatt has on the authority of the Association made a statement to be recorded by us in the order. The Association has taken up a very fair attitude by stating that in view of the findings of this court that the company had continued as a member, the Association now agrees to release the aforesaid quota as per the conditions mentioned by the learned single judge. Accordingly, this appeal fails except for the aforesaid clarification and is accordingly dismissed with no order as to costs.
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1977 (1) TMI 101 - HIGH COURT OF ORISSA
Oppression and mismanagement ... ... ... ... ..... the company. The Corporation must not lose sight of the fact that it is a Government Corporation and it is its duty to co-operate with the State Government in fulfilling the well laid-out policies of the State. There can be no two opinions about the fact that the State Government does not want the company to disrupt. I must note that the State Government has not chosen to appear in spite of public notice on the petition. I have not examined the alternative claim for sale of the shares in view of the nature of the order I have passed. I would accordingly allow the application in the manner and to the extent indicated above. Ordinarily, the petitioner would have been entitled to costs, but, in view of the nature of the order passed in the petition, I think it appropriate to require parties to bear their own costs. Before I part with the case, I would like to place on record that counsel for the petitioner as also for the Corporation ably assisted me at the hearing of the case.
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1977 (1) TMI 82 - ITAT PATNA-A
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... ... ..... the learned representative of the assessee before us that the assessee produced all the details of sales and purchases of Badam oil and Khandsari sugar lsquo before the Income Tax Officer, but he could not point out any discrepancy in the same. A copy of this statement produced by him before us shows the goods sold and purchased, the rates of sales and purchases, the freight and other miscellaneous expenses etc. The authorities below have not pointed out any discrepancy in these accounts. Not have they referred to any specific items of sales or purchases which were not verifiable. The observations of the Appellate Assistant Commissioner in this respect are not supported by any material. In view of these circumstances, we are unable to endorse the findings of the authorities below specially when the accounts of the assessee in as many as 65 other items have been accepted by them. The claims of the assessee, are, therefore, accepted. 16. In the result, the appeals are allowed.
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1977 (1) TMI 81 - ITAT PATNA-A
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... ... ..... he valuer rsquo s report, the value of construction as in September, 1970, was Rs. 91,143. It is an admitted fact that the major portion was constructed four years earlier, so the actual cost of construction was bound to be lesser than this figure. The value of land was shown at Rs. 13,128 whereas the actual investment in land was Rs. 6,500. On this basis, it cannot be held that there was any unexplained investment by the assessee in the course of this assessment year. If the Commissioner had doubted the valuer rsquo s report he could have examined or tried to find out whether the valuer of the fittings etc. was included in that valuation or not. The prejudice to the revenue has not been established and there is no definite material to indicate an extra investment of Rs. 16,000 in this property. We are therefore, of the view that the addition made was not called for. We, therefore, set aside the order of the Commissioner directing the above addition. 5. The appeal is allowed.
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1977 (1) TMI 77 - ITAT MADRAS-A
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... ... ..... st the partners would have been deductible as expenditure under s. 37 of the Act but for s. 40(b). The question whether an agreement to pay salary to a partner is a bona fide one or not is a question of fact. Obviously, considering the opportunities for fraud that any such alleged agreement would offer to make unreasonable and excessive claims, Parliament enacted s. 40(b) making the payments referred to therein made by the firm to any of its partners non-deductible while computing the income of the firm for purposes of levy of income-tax. The Karnataka High Court in the above case, had followed the rulling of the Madras High Court, referred to above in 58 ITR 312, that of the Delhi High Court in 81 ITR 624, that of the Calcutta High Court in 69 ITR 890 and that of the Delhi High Court in 76 ITR 123, all of which took the same view. For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the order of the AAC and restore the order of the ITO. 5. The appeal of the Revenue succeeds and is allowed.
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1977 (1) TMI 76 - ITAT MADRAS-A
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... ... ..... ot has to be decided on a consideration of the entirety of the facts and circumstances of each case and no exercise of judicial discretion. Even if penalty is imposable, it need not be imposed in every case and that if the breach complained of is technical or venial, the authority concerned need not impose penalty vide the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Hindustan Steel Ltd. vs. State of Orissa. The above dictum of the Supreme Court was followed by many High Courts, in India. Recently, the Madras High Court followed it in the case of V.L. Dutt vs. CIT 1976 CTR (MAD) 210 103 ITR 634 (MAD). Having regard to the circumstances of the case as explained above and having regard to the fact that the returns were filed voluntarily which were also accepted by the Department, we are satisfied that this is not a fit case for the levy of penalty. We, therefore, uphold the order of the AAC for this year also. 6. In the result, the appeals of the Revenue fail and are dismissed.
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1977 (1) TMI 75 - ITAT MADRAS-A
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... ... ..... ctive accounts which warrant an estimate of the income. Actually, the addition that has been made was only in respect of the omitted items for which bills were admittedly not issued. It is not the case of the Revenue that the assessee had factually collected the cooly charges from M/s Chandra Printing Mills and omitted to issue the bills therefor. Only if M/s. Chandra Printing Mills had paid the cooly charges to the assessee and the cooly charges were not accounted for by the assessee in its books, a charge of concealment can be said to be made out. We are in agreement with the finding of the AAC that though the accounts were maintained in a defective manner, there was no systematic design to understate the profits. Having considered the entirety of the facts of the case, we are convinced that the assessee cannot be said to be guilty of concealment of income or of fraud or wilful negligence. We confirm the order of the AAC. 6. The appeal of the Revenue fails and is dismissed.
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1977 (1) TMI 74 - ITAT MADRAS-A
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... ... ..... f penalty have to be set aside the necessarily the matters must go back to the Assessing Officer for fresh consideration of the matter. In the view we have taken, it is unnecessary for us to go into the other objections as even if done, still, we will have to find the order of assessment and the levy of penalty cannot stand in view of the decision referred to above. 10. In the result, the levy of tax on the disputed turnovers is both the appeals and the levy of penalties on the appellant made for both assessment years are set aside and the entire matter is remanded to the assessing officer to consider the returns filed by the appellant for both the assessment years and also the objections raised by him to the pre-assessment notice and then finally determine the taxable turnovers in the light of the materials available before him. The assessee/appellant is entitled to adduce further evidence and materials in respect of the objections raised by him before the Assessing Officer.
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1977 (1) TMI 69 - ITAT HYDERABAD-B
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... ... ..... es within the meaning of s. 40(c) (iii) or 40 (a) (v) of the Act. Hence the house rent allowance and the entertainment allowance paid to the employees being cash allowances, cannot be considered as perquisites disallowable in the hands of the assessee. The Appellate Assistant Commissioner is correct in holding that bonus and dearness allowance should be treated as part of the salary in view of the contract of service and this view finds support from the recent decision of the Madras High Court in the case of Commissioner of Income-tax, Madras vs. India Radiators Ltd. (1) City allowance, City compensatory allowance and car allowance cannot be considered as perquisites as they are cash allowances paid. Hence we hold that none of the above allowances can be subject to any disallowance under s. 40(c) (iii)/40 (a) (v) of the Act. 8. In the result, the appeals filed by the assessee for all the four years are allowed and the departmental appeals for all the four years are dismissed.
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1977 (1) TMI 68 - ITAT HYDERABAD-B
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... ... ..... as lamented that the assessee would be able to pursue two parellal remedies. That, Mr. Swaminathan contends, would be a result highly inconvenient to the taxing authorities. We are unable to spell out any such inconvenience as impinged by the learned representative for the department. If for any reason, the Tribunal upholds the order of the Commissioner of Income Tax, the assessee has no option but to withdraw the appeal before the Appellate Assistant Commissioner filed against the order of the Income Tax Officer giving effect to the directions of the Additional Commissioner of Income Tax. This case falls within the ratio of the decision of the Calcutta High Court viz. Kooka Sidhwa and Co. vs. Commissioner of Income Tax(2). We find ourselves unable to sustain the argument of the department regarding the maintainability of the appeals before the Appellate Assistant Commissioner. No other argument has been debated before us. 3. In the result, the appeals fail and are dismissed.
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1977 (1) TMI 67 - ITAT DELHI-B
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... ... ..... ficer has no doubt extended time upto a particular date but no information to the assessee was given by him with the result the assessee was continued to entertain a belief that his application for extension of time upto 30th Sep., 1971 has been allowed and that is why he submitted the return of income on 14th Sep., 1971 and as such there was no default on its part, but the authorities below have not agreed with the plea of the assessee and have levied a duty of the assessee to know from the Income Tax Officer as to upto which date the extension of time has been allowed. In our view, this could be said to be a reasonable cause for the assessee in not filing the return in time and as such no penalty under the law could be said to be a late filing the return more so when the assessee has been found to be quite vigilant about its legal obligations. In the circumstances of the case we cancel the penalty imposed by the Income Tax Officer and allow the appeal filed by the assessee.
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1977 (1) TMI 66 - ITAT DELHI-A
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... ... ..... the payments were made had no bank accounts. It, therefore, follows that it was not practicable to make payments to them either by crossed cheques or by crossed bank drafts because the same could not be encashed by them in the absence of the bank accounts. It also is clear from the certificates filed by these parties before the Appellate Asstt. Commissioner that it was the term of the contracts with them that payments would be made in cash. The reason was that they were purchasing Bardana from lsquo Pheriwalas etc. to whom the payments had to be made in cash. Having regard to these facts and circumstances, I am of the view that the payments by crossed cheques or crossed bank drafts were not practicable and would have caused genuine difficulties to payee having regard to the nature of the transactions, and, therefore, R. 6DD (j) is clearly attracted. I therefore, allow the assessee rsquo s claim for deduction of payments of Rs. 15,790. 7. In the result, the appeal is allowed.
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1977 (1) TMI 65 - ITAT DELHI
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... ... ..... 4)of the Central Sales Tax Act. 1956 read with R. 4(2) of the Central Sales Tax (Delhi) R. 1957 the declaration in form C should be produced before the Assessing Authority at the time of the assessment. 4. I have considered the contentions raised by the Commissioner. The Financial Commissioner was the last fact finding authority under the Bengal Finance (Sales Tax) Act and therefore, he could go into the question of fact to determine whether sufficient opportunity was given to the dealer or not. 5. The questions whether Sales Tax Officer was justified in passing ex-parte order of assessment and whether sufficient opportunity was given to the dealer or not is plainly not a question of law. The learned Financial Commissioner was entitled to draw his own conclusion of the evidence. 6. In my opinion, no question of law arises out of the order of the Financial Commissioner. I, therefore refuse to draw up a statement of the case and refer any question of law to Hon ble High Court.
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1977 (1) TMI 64 - ITAT DELHI
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... ... ..... ld not be worked unless electrical energy was made to pass through them, were electrical goods. In Bansi Lal Aggarwal vs. Commissioner of Sales Tax(13), which was relied upon in the aforesaid case, is was held that electrical goods according to its connotation may be those articles which could be used only with the application of electrical energy. It was also that the articles meant to generate electrical energy were also within the purview of electrical goods. 20. From the discussion of the above cases, it appears that after the decision of the Supreme Court in Ram Avatar Budhai Prasad s(9) case, the real test to be applied was that of common parlance. Here applying that test it must be held that battery chargers which transmit their electricity from the main to the batteries and worked only by electrical energy, are electrical goods. The decision of Shri Kidwai, Asstt. Commissioner does not call for any interference by this Tribunal. The appeals are accordingly dismissed.
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