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Showing 81 to 100 of 122 Records
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1977 (1) TMI 43 - KARNATAKA HIGH COURT
Appeal To Tribunal, Assessment Of Income, Income Tax Act ... ... ... ... ..... ld avoid Curry v. McCanless 83 L Ed 1339, 13511 see also G. T. Helvering v. Stockholmes Enskilda Bank 79 L Ed 211, 217. that the fiction should not be allowed to work injustice. We do not think that such is the case here for the fiction embodied in Explanation 2 does not inflict any injustice either on the deceased or his heirs. For the reasons stated, we hold that the extinguishment of a debt or any right brought about by the inaction or action of the deceased and whether such inaction or action was conscious or unconscious would amount to a disposition in terms of Explanation 2 to section 2(15) of the Act. In view of the above, we answer the question in the negative and in favour of the revenue and hold that the Appellate Tribunal was not right in excluding the sum of Rs. 1,00,000 from the principal value of the estate of the deceased. In the circumstances of the case and since the question of law has arisen for the first time, we order the parties to bear their own costs.
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1977 (1) TMI 42 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
Net Wealth, Valuation Date ... ... ... ... ..... ed by a judgment of this court in S. Naganathan v. Commissioner of Wealth-tax 1975 101 ITR 287 (Mad) in favour of the assessee, namely, that the benefit of section 5(1)(iv) of the Wealth-tax Act, 1957, will be available also where the property transferred to the wife is included in the wealth-tax assessment of the husband by reason of section 4(1)(a) of the Act. Following that judgment, it must be held that the Tribunal was in error in denying the benefit of the exemption under section 5(1)(iv) to the assessee in the present case. However, it is submitted that under section 5(1)(iv) the assessee will not be entitled to the benefit of exemption to the entire extent of Rs. 1,60,000 but only to the extent of Rs. 1,00,000 as provided for in the very statute itself. Consequently, we answer the second question in the negative and in favour of the assessee to the extent of Rs. 1,00,000 as against the sum of Rs. 1,60,000 mentioned in the question. There will be no order as to costs.
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1977 (1) TMI 41 - KERALA HIGH COURT
Agricultural Income Tax, Supreme Court, The High Court ... ... ... ... ..... at all. In their Lordships view, the decree of the High Court in 1884 brought about a new state of things, and imposed a new obligation on Dhum Singh. He was now no longer in the position of being able to allege that his debt to Baru Mal had been wiped out by the contract, and that instead thereof Baru Mal was entitled to the villages. He became bound to pay that which he had retained in payment for his land. And the matter may be viewed in either of two ways, according to the terms of the Contract Act, IX of 1872, or according to the terms of the Limitation Act, XV of 1877. We do not think this decision in any way helps the plaintiff to get over the bar of limitation. As we pointed out earlier, it was really the High Court s decision which gave Baru Mal a cause of action. In this view we allow the appeal and set aside the judgment and decree of the court below. The suit will stand dismissed but, in the circumstances of the case, the parties will bear their costs throughout.
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1977 (1) TMI 40 - PUNJAB AND HARYANA HIGH COURT
Capital Expenditure, Expenditure Incurred ... ... ... ... ..... the Cane Centre Roads Development Fund was held to be capital expenditure not for repairing old roads but for constructing new roads. In H. R. Sugar Factory (P.) Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income-tax 1970 77 ITR 614 (All) the court merely assumed that the kutcha roads converted into pucca roads were likely to be a permanent benefit to the assessee without going into the question whether such a conversion fell within the meaning of the word repair or not. Lakshmi Sugar and Oil Mills Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income-tax 1970 77 ITR 690 (All) was decided on the basis of Dewan Sugar Mills case 1970 77 ITR 572 (All), and in that case also contribution was made to the Cane Centre Roads Development Fund, which appears to be concerned with the construction of new roads. For the reasons given above, we answer the above-mentioned question in favour of the assessee and against the revenue. We further order that the revenue should pay the costs of the assessee, which are assessed at Rs. 250.
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1977 (1) TMI 39 - PUNJAB AND HARYANA HIGH COURT
Failure To File Return, Wealth Tax ... ... ... ... ..... iability, penalty, forfeiture or punishment as aforesaid and any such investigation, legal proceeding or remedy may be instituted, continued or enforced, and any such penalty, forfeiture or punishment, may be imposed as if the repealing Act or Regulation had not been passed. If the assessee by not filing the returns on June 30, 1964, and June 30, 1965, had committed a default, the repeal or the modification of the provisions relating to penalty could not affect his right to be dealt with in accordance with the repealed or modified statutory provisions. After careful consideration of the whole matter, we are of the considered view that the omission of an assessee to file a return on the due date completes his default as on that date and does not render it a continuing default. Consequently, the penalty can be imposed on him only on the basis of the law which was prevalent on that date. We accordingly answer both the questions in favour of the assessee and against the revenue.
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1977 (1) TMI 38 - PATNA HIGH COURT
Application For Extension, Application For Rectification, High Court, Interest Levied For Delayed Filing
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1977 (1) TMI 37 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
Annuity Deposit, Taxing Statutes ... ... ... ... ..... s it possible, therefore, to assess that portion of the amount receipted by the nominee irrespective of the taxable level on the only ground that the depositor was liable to pay the tax and, therefore, the nominee cannot escape the tax ? We are unable to see any justification in it as the contention of the revenue, if accepted, should apply to all situations uniformly and as it cannot apply in the illustration given by us, it makes us think that the amount received by a nominee of a depositor under the annuity deposit scheme would not be his income and it is not exigible to tax under the provisions of the Act. With great respect, we are unable to accept the broad proposition set down by the Gujarat High Court in 1976 102 ITR 455 (Commissioner of Income-tax v. Narottamdas K. Nawab). The question is, therefore, answered against the applicant and in favour of the assessee with costs. The assessee shall have his counsel s fee fixed at Rs. 250 (Rupees two hundred and fifty only).
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1977 (1) TMI 36 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
High Court, Income Tax ... ... ... ... ..... prejudicial to him may prefer an application to the High Court against the order on the ground that the Commissioner has either decided erroneously or failed to decide any question of law. In this case, admittedly, there is no question of enhancing the assessment. The only other question is whether the order of the Commissioner can otherwise be said to be prejudicial to the petitioner herein. We are of the opinion that so long as the Commissioner has not interfered with the order of the Agricultural Income-tax Officer and placed the petitioner herein in a position worse than what he was when he approached the Commissioner, the order of the Commissioner merely dismissing the revision petition filed by the petitioner cannot be said to be prejudicial to the petitioner. That is the view taken by a Bench of this court in M. V. S. Kathirvelu Nadar v. Commissioner of Agricultural Income-tax 1968 68 ITR 786 (Mad). Consequently, this revision petition is dismissed as not maintainable.
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1977 (1) TMI 34 - GAUHATI HIGH COURT
Assessment Year, Best Judgment Assessment, Objection To Jurisdiction ... ... ... ... ..... SC). In considering a taxing Act, the court is not justified in straining the language in order to hold a subject liable to tax. In Champalal Binani v. Commissioner of Income-tax 1970 76 ITR 692 (SC) it has been held that a petition for a writ of certiorari lies to the High Court where the order is on the face of it erroneous or raises the question of jurisdiction or of infringement of fundamental rights of the petitioner. Since the order of reassessment passed by the Income-tax Officer, Jorhat, is on the face of the proceeding without the authority of law the petitioner is entitled to relief. Hence, both the points are answered in favour of the petitioner. The writ petition is, therefore, allowed and the impugned order of assessment and the notice of demand dated, March 24, 1965, are quashed. Consequently, the impugned orders dated November 26, 1968, and November 24, 1969, are set aside. Respondents are directed to refund the sum of Rs. 10,000 collected from the petitioner.
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1977 (1) TMI 33 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
Capital Gains Tax, Income Tax Act ... ... ... ... ..... f the Tribunal, we will not be justified in directing the Tribunal to go into the question. As we pointed out already, the status of the company is fundamental and basic to the applicability of section 46(2) and that necessarily has to be investigated before section 46(2) of the Income-tax Act, 1961, could be applied. In these circumstances, we hold that the question referred to this court cannot be answered one way or the other without there being a finding as to the status of the company and, consequently, we return the reference without answering the question referred to this court. The result of this will be that the Tribunal will have to restore the appeal preferred by the assessee to its file and dispose of the appeal afresh in the light of the judgment of the Supreme Court after recording a finding as to the status of the company, viz., the Bank of Chettinad Ltd. as to whether it is a company as defined under section 2(17) of the Income-tax Act, 1961, or not. No costs.
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1977 (1) TMI 32 - PUNJAB AND HARYANA HIGH COURT
Application For Registration, Delay In Application, Retirement Of Partner ... ... ... ... ..... as no proper application before the Income-tax Officer for the registration of the firm. In that situation, the question of registration of the firm does not arise at all. However, a reference to section 184(4) and section 185(1) of the Act shows that registration can be sought for the whole assessment year and not for a part of the year. We, accordingly, answer questions Nos. 2 and 3 in favour of the revenue and against the assessee. The point raised in question No. 4 is also concluded against the assessee by a Division Bench judgment of this court in Rodamal Lal Chand v. Commissioner of Income-tax ITR No. 8 of 1974, decided on November 3, 1976 1977 109 ITR 7 (Punj) . In that case, it was held that even if the assessment of a partner of the firm had been finalised for a particular year, it was still open to the Income-tax Officer to assess a partnership firm as a unit for that year. We, accordingly, answer this question also in favour of the revenue and against the assessee.
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1977 (1) TMI 31 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
Additional Evidence, Appellate Authority, Best Judgment Assessment, Right To Receive ... ... ... ... ..... ontention advanced is that the appellate authority has no jurisdiction to entertain any such additional material at all. It is section 62 of the Act which deals with appeals against orders of the Assistant Controller and in that section there is absolutely nothing to detract from the general principles of law referred to above, namely, the powers of an appellate authority are co-extensive with that of the original authority. Under these circumstances we are clearly of the opinion that the Appellate Controller in the present case was entitled to receive the additional materials produced by the accountable person and the fact that the assessment was made by the Assistant Controller under section 58(4) of the Act does not in any way militate against such a power on the part of the Appellate Controller. This position being obvious, there is no need to direct the Tribunal to make a reference to this court. Accordingly, this petition is dismissed with costs. Counsel s fee Rs. 250.
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1977 (1) TMI 30 - PUNJAB AND HARYANA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... the respondent was personally aware of the figures pertaining to the Solan branch as contained in the account books produced before the Appellate Assistant Commissioner, he would have never exposed himself by producing the very account books. Considered from whichever angle, it appears to be merely a case of negligence on the part of the respondent to have accepted the figures supplied to him by his clerical staff at Solan, which figures were incorporated in the return and which the respondent perhaps signed and verified in routine. After a penalty had been imposed upon the respondent in this matter, his further prosecution was not called for. This apart, an appeal against acquittal stands on a different footing and this court is not called upon to reassess the credibility of the evidence, when the view taken by the trial court is not shown to be so patently erroneous as to cause miscarriage of justice. The appeal is, therefore, dismissed. BHOPINDER SINGH DHILLON J.-I agree.
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1977 (1) TMI 29 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
Capital Expenditure, Expenditure Incurred ... ... ... ... ..... ve indicated already, it is not possible to dissociate the said proviso from the main body of sub-section (1) of section 23, when we construe the language, namely, the annual value shall first be determined as in sub-section (1) occurring in sub-section (2) of section 23. It may be pointed out that there is nothing illogical in determining the income from house property occupied by the owner himself, as if it was let out to a tenant , because the very basic concept of the annual value is itself notional as being the sum for which the property might reasonably be expected to let from year to year. Under these circumstances, for the reasons given above, we hold that the conclusion of the Appellate Assistant Commissioner, as confirmed by the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal, is correct in law and, therefore, we answer the question referred to this court in the affirmative and against the revenue. The assessee is entitled to her costs. Counsel s fee Rs. 500. (Rs. five hundred only).
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1977 (1) TMI 28 - GAUHATI HIGH COURT
Litigation Expenses, Revenue Expenditure, Tea Estate ... ... ... ... ..... o, the interest on the loan that was taken for purchasing Phookanbari Tea Estate must be held to be a revenue expenditure. Similarly, the travelling expenses and litigation expenses incurred in connection with the purchase of Phookanbari Tea Estate have also to be held as revenue expenditure. In the result, we find that, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Tribunal was justified in allowing the interest paid to the State Bank of India, the court expenses and the travelling expenses incurred for acquiring Phookanbari Tea Estate even though the transaction did not ultimately materialise. We would like to observe that the Tribunal has correctly followed the principles laid down by the Supreme Court in State of Madras v. G. J. Coelho 1964 53 ITR 186 (SC). We, accordingly, answer the question of law referred in the affirmative and against the department. The reference is accordingly disposed of. There will be no order as to costs. N. IBOTOMBI SINGH J.--I agree.
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1977 (1) TMI 27 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
Registered Firm ... ... ... ... ..... of the amount of penalty, and it has nothing to do with the liability to pay as such. In view of this we are of the opinion that the contention of the learned counsel for the assessee that, notwithstanding the amendment to section 271(1), no penalty can be imposed on the assessee is without substance. Since the Tribunal has held that no penalty as such was imposable on the assessee herein, it did not go into the quantum of the penalty. The question covered by Tax Case No. 389 of 1974 is essentially concerned with the quantum of penalty. In view of our conclusion that as a result of the subsequent retrospective amendment of the Act, the penalty is imposable on the assessee, the Tribunal will have now to determine the quantum of penalty to be levied on the assessee under section 271(1) read with section 271(2) of the Act. In view of this, we are returning the question covered by Tax Case No. 389 of 1974 unanswered. There will be no order as to costs in any of these references.
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1977 (1) TMI 26 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
Assessment Proceedings, High Court ... ... ... ... ..... r any other interlocutory order pending the appeal is within the discretion of the Tribunal, and this court will not ordinarily interfere with the exercise of discretion by a Tribunal, unless a strong case is made out establishing that the Tribunal has exercised its power in a totally arbitrary manner, or under a total misapprehension of legal position, or without applying its mind to the relevant circumstances and without regard to the principles enunciated by the Supreme Court in the aforementioned decision in 1969 71 ITR 815 (SC). Of course, the grounds indicated by us are not exhaustive the question of interference will be a matter to be decided by the court in each case having regard to the facts of the case. In view of the above circumstances, we do not find any grounds warranting interference with the interlocutory orders passed by the Tribunal and, accordingly, these writ petitions are dismissed but, in the circumstances, without costs. Advocate s fee Rs. 150 in each.
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1977 (1) TMI 25 - GAUHATI HIGH COURT
Lease Rent, Tea Estate ... ... ... ... ..... facturing of tea are carried on. That being the position, rule 8 will be attracted to the produce of the tea gardens in question and since the lease rent also comes within the definition of agricultural income and since this agricultural income is derived in part from agriculture and in part from business, rule 8 will be attracted to this sum of Rs. 10,000, which is stated to be the lease rent or the guaranteed profits from the tea estate in question. We, therefore, hold that, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Tribunal was justified in holding that the lease rent of Rs. 10,000 received by the assessee, Haroocharai Tea Co., Jorhat, from M/s. Gatoonga Tea Estate for Samaguri Tea Estate was assessable at 40 in view of rule 8 of the Income-tax Rules, 1962. The question of law referred is accordingly answered in the affirmative and against the department. The reference is accordingly disposed of. There will be no order as to costs. IBOTOMBI SINGH J.--I agree.
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1977 (1) TMI 24 - GAUHATI HIGH COURT
Carrying On Business, Tea Business ... ... ... ... ..... ances of the case the Tribunal was justified in holding that rule 8 of the Income-tax Rules, 1962, did not apply to income from interest received by the assessee on loans advanced by it and that such income was liable to be included in the assessee s total income in full and not to the extent of 40 only. The learned counsel for the assessee referred to 1971 82 ITR 452 (SC) (Commissioner of Income-tax v. Maharashtra Sugar Mills Ltd.), 1967 63 ITR 632 (SC) (Commissioner of Income-tax v. Prithvi Insurance Co. Ltd.) and 1969 73 ITR 685 (SC)(Hooghly Trust (P.) Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income-tax). We, however, find that the facts of these cases are different from the facts of the case before us and the principles laid down in those cases are not applicable to the facts of the present case. In the result, the question of law is answered in the affirmative and against the assessee. The reference is accordingly disposed of. There will be no order as to costs. B. N. SARMA J.--I agree.
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1977 (1) TMI 23 - GAUHATI HIGH COURT
Assessed Income, Cash Credits, Delay In Filing Return, Income Returned ... ... ... ... ..... Allahabad High Court. In the instant case we find that the income of the assessee crosses the non-taxable limit because of additions in the trading account on percentage basis and certain cash credits which could not be proved. As observed above, there is no finding that the assessee acted in any way mala fide in showing the income as it did in its returns. That being so, we hold that, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Tribunal was justified in holding that there was no obligation on the assessee to file the return of income under section 139(1) since the income returned was below the taxable limit notwithstanding that the assessed income was chargeable to tax and on this ground to hold that no penalty was leviable under section 271(1)(a) of the Act. In the result, the question of law referred is answered in the affirmative and against the department. The reference is accordingly disposed of. There will be no order as to costs. IBOTOMBI SINGH J.--I agree.
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