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Case Laws
Showing 21 to 40 of 109 Records
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1977 (10) TMI 108 - COLLECTOR OF CENTRAL EXCISE, NEW DELHI
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... ... ..... ctor for submitting a separate refund claim was to be accepted it would make the fresh refund claim as time-barred because the same relates to the period 16-3-1976 to 8-6-1977. The appellants submitted a combined claim under Notification Nos. 45/73-C.E., dated 1-3-1973 and 67/76, dated 16-3-1976 and both should have been considered on merits. If the proof of payment of duty was not furnished, Assistant Collector should have directed them to submit the same now and establish the identity of the goods by co-relating them with the Gate Passes issued. The directions to submit a fresh refund claim is, therefore, not in order. 3. In view of the above discussions, I order that the refund claim of the appellants under Notification No. 45/73, dated 1-3-1973 should be sanctioned by the Assistant Collector, if it is otherwise in order. The claim set off or refund under Notification No. 67/76, dated 16-3-1976 should be considered on merits after calling for the necessary documents.
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1977 (10) TMI 107 - PATNA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... en deemed to include any footwear which is affixed with the brand or the trade name registered or not of any manufacturer. By this explanation, the word ‘manufacture’, has been included to mean a purchaser of a manufactured product i.e. the footwear as also such footwear to which is affixed the brand or trade name registered or not of any manufacturer. In doing this, the Central Government has, to my mind gone beyond the four corners of the Statute itself and has acted in excess of the corners of the Statute itself and has acted in excess of the power delegated to it under sub-rule (1) of Rule 8. The submission, of the learned Standing Counsel, appearing on behalf of Respondent Nos. 1 to 3, that the explanation appended to the impugned notification was merely a condition as contemplated under Rule 8(1 ) imposed by the Central Government for exemption of certain footwears from the duty leviable on such goods, cannot in view of what I have stated above, be accepted
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1977 (10) TMI 106 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... paid on the copper or copper contents of such alloy. As the petitioners had claimed that their goods were manufactured out of old scrap of copper and Copper Alloy, the Central Excise autuhorties should have examined the claim for refund on the above basis. As the authorities did not do so, the impugned orders are clearly unsustainable. They should be directed to decide afresh the petitioner’s claim for refund on the above basis. 11. In the result, we allow this petition, quash the impugned orders of the Asstt. Collector, the Appellate Collector, Central Excise and the Central Government passed in revision and direct the Asstt. Collector of Central Excise to examine and decide afresh the petitioner’s claim for exemption in the light of the aforesaid elucidation of the legal position and refund to the petitioner the excess amount, if any, excise duty collected from them. 12. In the circumstances of the case, we direct the parties to bear their own costs.
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1977 (10) TMI 105 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... at the time of the filing of the Writ petition, his client was being harassed by the departmental authorities and hence he preferred to approach this court directly without availing the statutory remedies. The learned Government Pleader also stated that the departmental authorities would consider the appeal if the petitioner prefers one with an application for the condonation of the delay. As there is a change in the personnel of the departmental authorities, who are alleged to have given trouble to the petitioner, I feel it just and proper to dismiss this Writ Petition on the ground that the petitioner may approach the Collector, Central Excise by preferring a statutory appeal with an application to Condone the delay in filing. The petitioner may prefer an appeal to the Collector with an application to condone the delay and I am sure the Collector will consider the desirability of condoning the delay in filing the appeal. In circumstances there shall be no order as to cost.
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1977 (10) TMI 104 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... al is exigible to tax (see State of Gujarat v. Raipur Manufacturing Co. Ltd. 1967 19 S.T.C. 1 (S.C.) The turnover relating to sales of scrap material was not exigible to tax prior to 1976 amendment of the Central Sales Tax Act. Mr. Venkatarama Reddy also contended that the assessee only acted under the instructions of the customer, in other words, as his agent and that the assessee s only function was to credit the balance discount to the account of the distributors. It makes no difference, as already pointed out by us, in view of the definitions of sale price and turnover . In the result, T.R.C. Nos. 11 and 12, in so far as the turnovers relating to balance discount paid to the distributors are concerned, are dismissed and allowed in so far as the turnover relating to the sale of scrap material is concerned. T.R.C. No. 13 of 1977 is dismissed as it only relates to the turnover representing the balance discount . No costs. Advocate s fee Rs. 200 in each. Ordered accordingly.
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1977 (10) TMI 103 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... further orders were placed for the remaining quantity supplied by the assessee. The assessee did not place any material before the authorities below to show that the excess quantity of rock phosphate supplied was also covered by the order in respect of which the assessee filed C form. It, therefore, transpires that the assessee had supplied 500 tons of rock phosphate valued at Rs. 74,628.99 in accordance with the terms of the contract. The Tribunal held that this turnover is liable to be taxed at the concessional rate of tax at 3 per cent. The Tribunal rightly rejected the claim of the assessee for taxing the balance of the turnover at the concessional rate and we see no reason to interfere with its finding. In the result, the revision is allowed in so far as the turnover in dispute covered by items 2, 4 and 6 is concerned and dismissed in respect of the turnover in dispute covered by item 7. The parties will bear their own costs. Advocate s fee Rs. 200. Ordered accordingly.
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1977 (10) TMI 102 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... em and (ii) that it is illustrative of the chemicals that would fall under that item and, in that view, may drag into its net, items similar which are not specifically mentioned. The matter is now set at rest by the decision of the Supreme Court in State of Tamil Nadu v. Pyare Lal Malhotra 1976 37 S.T.C. 319 (S.C.). , which has been relied on by this Court in the decision in Deputy Commissioner of Commercial Taxes, Tiruchirappalli v. Sowrirajan 1977 40 S.T.C. 359., that item 21 is more like a definition which states that chemical fertilisers mean, so and so and so and so. In that view, the exemption granted by the Tribunal regarding the turnover of Rs. 39,595 for the year 1969-70 with which we are concerned in T.C. No. 481 of 1974 cannot be justified. We, therefore, direct that the turnover would be fixed for that year by adding back the sum of Rs. 39,595. We dispose of the tax revision cases in the above terms and direct the parties to bear their costs. Ordered accordingly.
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1977 (10) TMI 101 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... nd it falls within the ambit of clause (c) of sub-section (4) of section 14. It is for that reason that he sought to reassess on the basis of the rate provided in entry 15. The Tribunal was, therefore, right in holding that it is for the assessing authority alone to determine the correct rate of turnover that has been assessed at a lower rate and, therefore, it is a case where the power conferred by sub-section (4) of section 14 on the assessing authority was exercised by the Deputy Commissioner who as a higher authority is empowered to exercise also the powers of the assessing authority. The impugned order of the Deputy Commissioner dated 11th November, 1975, in Revision No. 68 is therefore time-barred. It is not in dispute that if this view is to prevail, the order of the Deputy Commissioner in T.R.C. No. 8 of 1977 would be time-barred. In the result, both the revisions fail and they are accordingly dismissed with costs. Advocate s fee Rs. 200 in each. Petitions dismissed.
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1977 (10) TMI 100 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... as been made the subject of an appeal to the Appellate Assistant Commissioner or the Appellate Tribunal, or of a revision in the High Court ........ The order has been made the subject-matter of appeal to the Appellate Assistant Commissioner. The question is not whether every part of that order has been the subject-matter of appeal. Such a contention is not justified by the wording of the section. The Tribunal was right in saying that the Deputy Commissioner interfered without jurisdiction. We dismiss this tax revision case. Petition dismissed.
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1977 (10) TMI 99 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... tioned in the judgment is that it was not contended that the State Trading Corporation acted as the agent of the local sellers in the matter of exporting goods. In the light of the above, we have to uphold the view taken by the Tribunal that the turnover is not taxable, but for reasons entirely different from those that have been relied on by the Tribunal. We hold that there have been no sales by the association to its members and, therefore, there was no taxable turnover and no tax can be imposed. Accordingly, we dismiss T.C. No. 264 of 1976. T.C. No. 265 of 1976 will also have to be dismissed because the assessment relates to the surcharge imposed on the association on the basis of the tax that has been imposed which is the subject-matter of T.C. No. 264 of 1976. We, therefore, dismiss T.C. No. 265 of 1976 as well. The matter had not been clear till it was discussed at length at the Bar. We, therefore, direct the parties to bear their respective costs. Petitions dismissed.
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1977 (10) TMI 98 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ntry 20 in Schedule E to the Bombay Sales Tax Act, 1959. We do not think that this decision can be of any assistance to the learned Government Pleader, as butter churn is in the nature of a machine and not an utensil. But, so far as weigh bowl is concerned, it is an article made of stainless steel like any other household utensil and, therefore, squarely falls within the ratio of the decision in State of Gujarat v. KeshavIal and Sons 1966 17 S.T.C. 170. In the result, we hold that weigh bowl falls within entry 54 of Schedule I of the Andhra Pradesh General Sales Tax Act, and the Tribunal to that extent rightly so held. But, so far as butter churn is concerned, the decision of the Tribunal as well as the Deputy Commissioner holding that it falls within entry 54, is set aside, and the order of the assessing authority treating butter churn as an item not falling within entry 54 is upheld. The revision is partly allowed. No costs. Advocate s fee Rs. 200. Petition partly allowed.
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1977 (10) TMI 97 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... March, 1972. The proceedings for reassessment should be taken to have been initiated on 30th March, 1972, which is within the period contemplated by section 16 of the Tamil Nadu General Sales Tax Act, 1959. Therefore, the proposed reassessment cannot be said to be barred by limitation. If the reassessment proceedings are not barred by time, then the petitioner has to agitate all the factual questions before the assessing authority. Since no assessment has yet been made, it is open to the petitioner to put forward its objections to the assessing authority before he passes a final order in the reassessment proceedings. Since the petitioner has not yet filed its objections, the assessing authority will consider the objections, if any, filed by the petitioner within four weeks from the date of the receipt of records and proceed to make a final order of assessment. Subject to this direction, this writ petition is dismissed. There will be no order as to costs. Petition dismissed.
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1977 (10) TMI 96 - PUNJAB AND HARYANA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... can have the documents produced before the court. In the view I have taken of the interpretation and application of section 26 of the Act, it is unnecessary to split up the second document so as to exclude from its purview that part of the statement of Baghu Ram, wherein he has referred to two transactions, of which the bills have not been entered. In any case, the second document also relates to the seizure proceedings and is in effect nothing but a detailed receipt for the return of the seized books, etc. The department does not appear to have filed any affidavit claiming the privilege. For the reasons assigned above, I allow this petition, set aside and reverse the order of the trial court and decline the privilege claimed by the department or the counsel for the other side in respect of the two documents specifically referred to above. Parties are left to bear their own costs and have been directed to appear before the trial court on 7th November, 1977. Petition allowed.
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1977 (10) TMI 95 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... see cannot be found to be acceptable by the assessing authority and, therefore, the assessing authority rejected his explanation and added to the turnover, which is justified, in the proceedings which was adopted by the assessing authority, would not by itself afford a necessary ingredient of a wilful non-disclosure of an assessable turnover. There must be something more tangible. Something far more concrete is required which would indicate that the assessee has got the mental element which is called mens rea and that is insisted by the section by the use of the words wilful non-disclosure of assessable turnover . It may be that it is often difficult to establish this element when the penalty is imposed but that is of no moment, for, penalty can be imposed under section 16(2) if the ingredients of the section are made out. As we said earlier, we see no error in the order of the Appellate Tribunal. We dimiss this revision with costs. Counsel s fee Rs. 250. Petition dismissed.
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1977 (10) TMI 94 - KARNATAKA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ing to evade payment of any tax, fee or other amount due from it under the Act, the purpose appears to be to find out if any first purchasers in the State had paid the tax. It is clear that the idea was to explore whether third parties had conformed to the Act or paid the taxes due by them. This is clearly not a purpose for the seizure envisaged in section 28(3) of the Act. The notices, exhibits B and C, also do not give any idea that there was any suspicion against the petitioners as such in regard to the payment of any tax by them. From the facts stated above it is clear that the seizure was unwarranted and the retention of the books and records seized under exhibit A is contrary to law. 3.. Accordingly, a writ shall issue to the respondents to return the books and records seized under exhibit A and also the notes, if any, made by the first respondent from the said books and accounts within 15 days from today. Parties shall, however, bear their own costs. Petition allowed.
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1977 (10) TMI 93 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... sible to say, merely from-the fact that there has been a reassessment of escaped turnover on the basis of best judgment, that there has been a wilful non-disclosure of assessable turnover. There must be something to indicate that the turnover did in fact exist and that the assessee had wilfully not disclosed that assessable turnover. In view of the finding rendered by the assessing officer, the Tribunal cannot set aside the penalty merely on the ground that there is no finding but the Tribunal has to deal with the matter by reference to the wording of the section and on the basis of what we have stated in this order. In the light of the above, we set aside the order of the Tribunal in so far as it relates to the cancellation of the penalties imposed for the two years 1965-66 and 1966-67 and direct the Appellate Tribunal to deal with the matter afresh and pass appropriate orders in accordance with law. We direct the parties to bear their respective costs. Ordered accordingly.
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1977 (10) TMI 83 - ITAT PUNE
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... ... ..... ions of the Board should be taken into account by the ITO in determining the value of the perquisite received by him and the AAC concurred with this claim of the assessee. 4. In our opinion, the decision taken by the AAC is well founded and there is no reason to deviate from the said decision. Here is an assessee whom the employer has provided services of servants such as sweeper, gardener and watchman etc. to taken care of his residential house. Since the services of the servants etc. have been provided by the employer, that is a perquisite in the hands of the employee and the value of that perquisite is to be ascertained as per the norms prescribed in the above quoted circular. In these circumstances, we are satisfied that the decision taken by the AAC to include in the assessee rsquo s total income the value of the perquisite amounting to Rs. 2,160 is a proper decision. According we reject the Revenue rsquo s contention. 5. In the result, the appeal fails and is dismissed.
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1977 (10) TMI 80 - ITAT PATNA
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... ... ..... f two partners which is dissolved by the death of one of them, for, in that event, there is no partnership at all for any new partner to be inducted into without the consent of others . From the observations of the Supreme Court it is clear that the firm came to an end on 21st Aug., 1973. The assessee firm started its business from 22nd Aug., 1973 on the basis of a partnership deed by which Shri Kumud Chand Ojha and Shri Jagdish Chandra Ojha started a partnership business. A separate books of accounts have been maintained and a separate return has been filed claiming registration for the new firm. Under the circumstances, the ITO was not justified to club the income of the new firm with the income of the firm which was dissolved on 21st Aug., 1973 by operation of law. The cases relied on by the assessee are not relevant to the facts of the case. I, accordingly, maintain the finding of the AAC but on a different reason. 8. In the result, the departmental appeals are dismissed.
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1977 (10) TMI 79 - ITAT PATNA
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... ... ..... ated above that the Department accepted the savings of the assessee to the extent of Rs. 9,200, Rs. 15,200 and Rs. 22,000 upto the asst. yrs. 1970-71, 1971-72 and 1972-73. If the Department had entertained any doubt about the accumulated savings of the assessee in the asst. yrs. 1970-71, 1971-72 and 1972-73, it should have made necessary enquiries then and there. After having accepted the position taken up by the assessee in those years, the Department should not now turn round and reopen the whole issue. After all, there must be finality to litigation and the assessee should not always be kept in the dock. That apart, when the Department has accepted, the savings of the assessee at Rs. 10,000 there is no good reason to disbelieve him for the balance of Rs. 10,000. Thus, after appraising the entire material on record, I am of the opinion that this is not a fit case for making the addition of Rs. 10,000. The same is, therefore, deleted. 5. In the result, the appeal is allowed.
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1977 (10) TMI 76 - ITAT NEW DELHI
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... ... ..... and they should be set aside. At this stage an argument has been raised that since the proceedings were taken under s. 148 and the returns were filed in response to these proceedings, the law applicable on the date when the returns were so filed must be applied. This question posed by the Departmental Representative is squarely answered by the Allahabad High Court in the case of CIT vs. Ram Achal Ram Sewak 106 ITR 144 (All) later followed in CIT vs. Krishnan Subhkaran (108 ITR 271 (All). In this case the Allahabad High Court held that even though proceedings under s. 148 were initiated the concealment of income was referable to the original return field and it could not be said that there was a fresh concealment of in Court in the second return filed. I am therefore, of the opinion that the penalties levied in this case with reference to the provisions amended on 1st April, 1968 are wholly unjustified in law and I therefore, set aside these penalties and allow these appeals.
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