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Showing 121 to 137 of 137 Records
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1977 (8) TMI 17 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
Appeal To Tribunal, Assessment Of Income, Income Tax Act ... ... ... ... ..... defendants concerned or that the contracts for construction works were not on the basis of lump sum amounts or that in calculating its profits on all those contracts it had excluded the value of those materials. It does not appear from the record that any attempt was even made by the assessee to prove any one of the aforesaid facts. Therefore, for all the foregoing reasons it cannot be said that on the facts and the circumstances of the case the conclusion reached by the Tribunal on question No. 2 was perverse in its accepted sense. It may also be noted here that the cases cited on behalf of the assessee were decided on different facts as already shown, whereas the facts of the aforesaid case decided by Sabyasachi Mukharji J. and the facts of the instant case before us are substantially the same. In the premises, we answer question No. 1 in the affirmative and question No. 2 in the negative and both against the assessee without making any order as to costs. DEB J.--I agree.
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1977 (8) TMI 16 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
Capital Employed, Capital Expenditure, Capital Or Revenue Expenditure, Computation Of Capital, Income Tax Act, Income Tax Concession, Income Tax Rules, Industrial Undertaking
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1977 (8) TMI 15 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
Change In Constitution Of Firm, Partnership Deed, Previous Year, Retirement Of Partner ... ... ... ... ..... explained in the authorities. In such validly initiated penalty proceedings the competent authority reached the conclusion with the aid of the rule of evidence enacted in the Explanation that there was concealment within the meaning of s. 271(1)(c) in the present case. We are of the view that since the Explanation enacts merely a rule of evidence, it was competent to the authority which imposed the penalty to invoke its aid in reaching the final conclusion on the question of concealment, although the ITO had not resorted to it at the stage when he made the reference. We say this only so far as the question of law is concerned. Whether on facts the Explanation was applicable or not is a matter on which the Tribunal has not applied its mind and that question remains open. In the result, we answer the question referred to us in the negative, that is to say, in favour of the revenue and against the assessee. The assessee will pay the costs of this reference to the Commissioner.
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1977 (8) TMI 14 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
Law Applicable ... ... ... ... ..... the IAC retained jurisdiction to deal with the penalty proceedings in accordance with the law which was prevalent at the time when the proceedings Were initiated and that he, therefore, had jurisdiction to impose the minimum or maximum penalty which the law prescribed when such proceedings were initiated. That is exactly what the IAC has done in the present case and it could not, therefore, have been held by the Tribunal that he had no jurisdiction to impose the penalty of Rs. 5,000 on the assessee after the Amend. Act came into force. In the result, we are of the opinion that the Tribunal erred in law in holding that the IAC was not competent to impose the penalty of Rs. 5,000 under s. 274(2) of the Act, as it stood amended after the Amend. Act, on the assessee. The question referred to us will, therefore, stand answered in the negative, that is to say, in favour of the revenue and against the assessee. The assessee will pay the costs of this reference to the Commissioner.
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1977 (8) TMI 13 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
Accounting Year, Compulsory Acquisition, Fact By Tribunal, Finding Of Fact, Trade Loss ... ... ... ... ..... e reframed question (b) in the negative and against the assessee. It may now be noted here that it does not appear from the order of the Tribunal that any evidence was relied upon on behalf of the company before the Tribunal in support of the aforesaid argument made on its behalf before the Tribunal as rightly contended on behalf of the revenue. In this view of the matter, it is unnecessary for, us to refer to the other cases, cited on behalf of the revenue in support of the contentions, namely, that this reference is misconceived and that in any event the questions are purely academic and should not be answered inasmuch as the company has not challenged the ultimate conclusion of the Tribunal to the effect that the loss suffered by it in Burma is not deductible in arriving at its total income from the business. For the same reason, we express no opinion on the foregoing contentions made on behalf of the revenue. There will be no order as to costs. C. K. BANERJI J.--I agree.
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1977 (8) TMI 12 - ORISSA HIGH COURT
Cash Credits ... ... ... ... ..... formity with the direction of this court. It took into account the Explanation, placed the initial burden on the assessee, proceeded on the footing that it was a rebuttable presumption and could be displaced by the assessee by proving that the failure to return the correct income did not arise from any fraud or gross or wilful neglect on its part. The Tribunal scrupulously followed the ratio indicated in the reported decision and as a fact has now come to hold against the revenue. It is the settled view in law that where on consideration of all facts and circumstances, pros and cons, a conclusion is reached, it is one of fact. There may be cases where errors of law would be committed in reaching a conclusion. It is not the case of the revenue before us that any such error was committed. Our answer, therefore, in the facts and circumstances of the case, is that the Tribunal did not err in law in deleting the imposition of penalty. We make no order for costs. PANDA J.-I agree.
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1977 (8) TMI 11 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
Capital Gains Tax, Income Tax Act, Market Value ... ... ... ... ..... er the question which has been referred to us on the ground that the Tribunal has failed to consider and decide the question in the light of the provisions of s. 40(c)(ii). It would be open to the Tribunal to dispose of the appeal before it under s. 260(1) of the I.T. Act in the light of the observations made by us after determining the questions which ought to have been decided. It will be open to both sides to lead evidence after the appeal goes back to the Tribunal either by way of additional evidence or on remand, if the Tribunal so thinks fit, so that the whole question, whether the expenditure on motor cars, both by way of expenditure as well as depreciation, was unreasonable or excessive having regard to the business needs of the company and the benefit derived by the company or accruing to the company from that expenditure can be gone into completely in the light of the evidence which the revenue or the assessee may be able to lead. There will be no order as to costs.
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1977 (8) TMI 10 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
Illegal Search ... ... ... ... ..... umber of exporters seeking to export de-oiled cakes in view of the concession appeared to have been extended under sub-cls. (ii) and (iii) of s. 2(5)(a) and which is now negatived by this judgment. In view of the fact that the question is a substantial question of law since it involves the construction of sub-cls. (ii) and (iii) of cl. (a), and cl. (c) of s. 2(5) of the Finance Act, 1966, and also because it is a question of general public importance inasmuch as it affects a large number of exporters who must have exported de-oiled cakes on the supposition of their entitlement to the concession under sub-cls. (ii) and (iii) of cl. (a) of s. 2(5) of the Finance Act, 1966, and since there is no authoritative pronouncement we are of the opinion that this is a question which is fit to be decided by the Supreme Court, we accept the oral application of Mr. Patel and grant certificate that this matter is a fit one for appeal to the Supreme Court. Certificate is accordingly granted.
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1977 (8) TMI 9 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
Registered Firm ... ... ... ... ..... lar proceeding before the TRO under r. 11 of the Second Schedule cannot proceed. It appears from the notice itself that the ITO has already made the determination in terms of s. l82(4) of the Act. That being so, further investigation by the TRO becomes unnecessary. Accordingly, the orders passed by the TRO with respect to the petitioner are quashed excepting that the petitioner shall pay to the TRO a sum of Rs. 7,500 being the rent of the godown payable to Smt. Panna Devi, wife of D. P. Agarwal, and the TRO is directed to grant a proper receipt for the said amount. In the result, this rule is made absolute. The petitioner shall be at liberty to withdraw the sum of Rs. 19,000 which has been deposited with the Registrar, A. S., of this court, in pursuance of the order of this court, on a proper application. Let the operation of this order be stayed for a period of four weeks from date. This order, however, shall not prevent the petitioner from withdrawing the sum of Rs. 19,000.
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1977 (8) TMI 8 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
Revenue Expenditure ... ... ... ... ..... major or heavy structural repair to a building is by itself not a decisive factor for the reasons already stated. Accordingly, the contention of Mr. Pal must fail. It has been found by the Tribunal that the expenditure was incurred by the company with the object of maintaining and preserving the Crescent House and also to save the recurring expenditure on repairs and not with a view to bring into existence an advantage or benefit of an enduring nature. It is also the finding of the Tribunal that no additional space was created. The Revenue has accepted the aforesaid finding by not challenging them by an appropriate question. We also agree with the finding of the Tribunal, namely, that the process of guniting has not brought into existence any new benefit or advantage of an enduring nature to the company. In the premises, we answer the question in the affirmative and in favour of the assessee. We, however, do not propose to make any order as to costs. C. K. BANERJI J.-I agree.
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1977 (8) TMI 7 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
... ... ... ... ..... ure licence. The agreement also clearly bears out that finding. In view of this finding the question referred to us would be covered by the decision of this court in I.T. Reference No. 7 of 1967, decided on 10-11-1976 (CIT V. Bayer Agrochem Ltd.) ( 1982 134 ITR 240). The question referred to us is, therefore, answered in the negative and in favour of the assessee. No order as to costs.
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1977 (8) TMI 6 - MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT
Estate Duty, Property Passing On Death ... ... ... ... ..... mily can be made only when there are two or more members of the Hindu undivided family. It, therefore, cannot be doubted that a male member along with his wife could also constitute a Hindu joint family, and in view of this pronouncement of their Lordships of the Supreme Court, the question cannot any longer be agitated before us. Consequently, in our opinion, as regards the second question, our answer is that the Tribunal was wrong in holding that the entire coparcenary interest of the deceased in the coparcenary property passed on his death. In fact the property vested in the joint Hindu family consisting of the deceased and his wife and on the death of the deceased it is only his share which passed and, therefore, our answer to the second question is in the negative. It is only the deceased s share in the joint Hindu family which, admittedly half, will be the property which passed on his death. In the circumstances of the case, parties are directed to bear their own costs.
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1977 (8) TMI 5 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
Agricultural Market Committee, Local Authority ... ... ... ... ..... lar agricultural land to consider whether it is absolutely unavoidable to acquire such land, even though it was a good agricultural land. We cannot in this writ petition interfere with the discretion, which is, even according to the G.O., vested in the land acquisition authorities. The question of avoidability of acquisition, because of the land being a good agricultural land, is a matter left to the discretion of the acquisition officers. There is no question of violation of any fundamental right arising in this case. In these circumstances, the second argument of Mr. Babulu Reddy must also be rejected. In these circumstances, we agree with our learned brother, Raghuvir J., that the notification issued under s. 6 was a valid notification since the acquisition was for a local authority. This writ appeal, therefore, fails and is dismissed with costs. However, possession not to be taken till the crop which is standing on the land at present is harvested Advocate s fee Rs. 150.
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1977 (8) TMI 4 - SUPREME COURT
HUF - female member - Whether a female member of a HUF can blend her absolute property with joint family property - The rights to blend was limited to coparceners. A female member cannot blend her separate property even though she was the absolute owner of it. Therefore, the income from such property cannot be assessed in the hands of the family
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1977 (8) TMI 3 - SUPREME COURT
House property - Hold that the Income-tax Officer in the circumstances is entitled to reopen the assessment under section 147(b) - revenue's appeal allowed
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1977 (8) TMI 2 - SUPREME COURT
Income derived by the assessee from the kuries is exempt from taxation under section 11(1)(a) - power to set apart reserves under article 39 will not, without more, vitiate the charitable nature of the institution - revenue's appeal dismissed
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1977 (8) TMI 1 - SUPREME COURT
Whether finding of the Tribunal that the assessee was not guilty of any fraud in returning the income, which resulted in the income being returned at a figure lower than 80 per cent. of the income assessed, is contrary to the weight of the record and was arrived at without considering the entire evidence on the record - Whether in view of section 271(1)(c) Tribunal was right in law in cancelling the penalty - we direct that the High Court shall call for a statement of case from the Tribunal
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