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Showing 141 to 160 of 177 Records
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1978 (4) TMI 37 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
Cash Credits, Income From Undisclosed Sources, Undisclosed Income ... ... ... ... ..... al earlier. The only contention of the revenue before the Tribunal was that the Tribunal should reappreciate the evidence. For the reasons given above, we answer question No. 1 for the assessment year 1963-64, in the negative and in favour of the assessee. On question No. 2 in respect of the assessment year 1963-64, we have already noted that this transaction was by cheque and passed through a bank. There was a confirmation letter from the creditor. So it cannot be said that there was no evidence before the Tribunal to hold that the said khata-peta loan is genuine. Accordingly, we answer this question in the affirmative and also in favour of the assessee. The questions referred in respect of the assessment year 1964-65 are consequential and in view of the answers given to the questions in the earlier year, we answer both the said questions in the affirmative and in favour of the assessee. In the facts and circumstances, there will be no order as to costs. BANERJI J.-I agree.
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1978 (4) TMI 36 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
Rental Income ... ... ... ... ..... ty of initiation of reassessment proceedings. For the reasons given above we hold that the Tribunal s order is erroneous and that the reassessment proceedings cannot be held to be invalid on the ground relied on by the Tribunal. To such extent both the questions referred are answered in the affirmative and in favour of the revenue. We, however, make it clear that in view of the law clearly laid down by the Supreme Court it will be necessary for the Tribunal to go into the question further and determine whether in the instant case any information came into the possession or the hands of the succeeding ITO from the materials on record as a result of his subsequent investigation or enquiry so as to justify his action in reopening the same. The Tribunal will determine the matter as indicated above after giving the parties opportunity of being heard on this aspect. If necessary, the Tribunal will take further evidence. There will be no order as to costs. C. K. BANERJI J.-I agree.
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1978 (4) TMI 35 - KARNATAKA HIGH COURT
Disclosure Petition, Income Tax, Liability To Tax, Net Wealth, Wealth Tax ... ... ... ... ..... ular course for some reason or other. We are of the opinion that the liability under s. 68 of the Finance Act, is nothing other than the liability under the I.T. Act. In order to claim deduction of the amount payable as income-tax in determining net wealth under s. 2(m) of the W.T. Act, it is unnecessary that it should have been, ascertained. What is ascertained or payable will be a debt that is owed by the assessee on the valuation date (vide Kesoram Industries case 1966 59 ITR 767 (SC)). The Tribunal was, therefore, in error in not having deducted the income-tax liability on the various valuation dates for the assessment years in question on the amounts declared by the assessee under s. 68(2) of the Finance Act, 1965. In, the result, we answer the first question in T. R. C. Nos. 5 to 10 of 1974 in the affirmative and the second question in T. R. C. Nos. 5 to 10 of 1974 and the only question in T. R. C. No. 11 of 1974 in the negative and in favour of the assessee. No costs.
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1978 (4) TMI 34 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
Estate Duty Act, Estate Duty Gift ... ... ... ... ..... were that the deceased, his three sons and a daughter were partners in a firm which carried. on money-lending business. Prior to his death the deceased transferred to his sons and daughter various amounts by adjustment entries in the books of the firm against the balance, to his credit in the firm. The amounts remained with the firm and were utilised in the business. The assessee continued to be a partner of the firm till his death. A question arose whether the sums transferred to the sons and daughter of the assessee would be included in the property passing on his death. The Supreme Court, following its earlier decision in CED v. C. R. Ramachandra Gounder 1973 88 ITR 448 (SC), held that the said amount would not be liable to estate duty and was not property deemed to pass on the death of the deceased. Following the said judgment, we answer the question in the affirmative and in favour of the accountable person. There will be no order as to costs. C. K. BANERJI J.--I agree.
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1978 (4) TMI 33 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
Assessment Proceedings, Income Tax, Reassessment Proceedings ... ... ... ... ..... It appears that the assessee had loan transaction with M/s. Lachminarayan Atmaram for a sum of Rs. 25,000 on 24-5-1962. As the assessee has confessed stating that the transactions are not genuine, I propose to reopen the case and formal proposal u/s. 147(a) is sent separately for your kind approval. It is not the case of either party that the respondent had made any confession to the effect that the transactions were not genuine. The CIT, West Bengal, seems to have not applied his mind before he granted sanction. In any event, it may be said that the Commissioner proceeded on the footing that the respondent had made a confession that the transactions were not genuine. No other point has been argued in this appeal. For the reasons aforesaid, this appeal is dismissed but there will be no order for costs. As prayed for by the learned advocate for the appellants, the operation of this judgment will remain stayed for a period of six weeks from date. D. C. CHAKRAVORTI J.--I agree.
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1978 (4) TMI 32 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
Search And Seizure ... ... ... ... ..... eal, it is not competent for the first petitioner to have straightaway applied under s. 132(11). We are not impressed by this submission. Petitioners Nos. 2 and 3 may have been entitled to file an appeal but that could not debar them from objecting under sub-s. (11). Similarly, the first petitioner from whose custody the money was actually seized, was a person interested in recovering the money and so he was also entitled under sub-s. (11) for the return of the money. The fact that petitioners Nos. 2 and 3 did not make an application would not, in our opinion, debar the first petitioner from applying under sub-s. (11). In the result, the petition succeeds and is allowed. The impugned order of 6th September 1976, is quashed. The matter is remitted to the Notified Authority for deciding the application made by the petitioners under s. 132(11) of the I.T. Act afresh and in accordance with law keeping in view the observations made above. The petitioners will be entitled to costs.
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1978 (4) TMI 31 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
Interest In Property, Leasehold Interest, Net Wealth, Search And Seizure, Wealth Tax ... ... ... ... ..... every description, movable or immovable, but does not incude,- (1) in relation to the assessment year commencing on the 1st day of April, 1969, or any earlier assessment year -...... (v) any interest in property where the interest is available to an assessee for a period not exceeding six years from the date the interest vests in the assessee. The right of a lessee under a lease is an interest in property within the meaning of the Transfer of Property Act and in the instant case the period under the lease being over six years the interest created thereby is clearly an asset within the meaning of the W.T. Act. The pronouncement of the Supreme Court in the case of P. N. Sikand 1977 107 ITR 922 that a leasehold interest is an asset within the meaning of the W.T. Act concludes the controversy in the matter, if any. For the reasons given above, we answer the question referred in the affirmative and in favour of the revenue. There will be no order as to costs. BANERJI J.- I agree.
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1978 (4) TMI 30 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
Share Income ... ... ... ... ..... two principles of law being well-settled, the rest of the question revolves round a point of fact. The Tribunal has given various reasons detailed above in coming to the conclusion that in fact the two partners were representing their respective charitable trusts. In other words, they were partners in their capacity as trustees. The partnership firm was genuine. Its partners were not acting as partners in their individual capacities. Hence, the share income from this firm could not be included in the individual assessments of the partners. On the admitted and found facts, the conclusion drawn by the Tribunal that the two persons were partners in their capacity as trustees and, as such, the share income could not be included in the computation of their income, seems proper, fair and reasonable. We, therefore, answer both the questions in the affirmative, in favour of the assessee and against the department. The assessee will be entitled to costs which are assessed at Rs. 200.
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1978 (4) TMI 29 - KARNATAKA HIGH COURT
Estate Duty, Family Property, Impartible Estate ... ... ... ... ..... force of this Act and the holder shall be deemed to be an occupant within the meaning of the Code in respect of such land and shall primarily be liable to pay land revenue to the State Government in accordance with the provisions of the Code and the rules made thereunder all the provisions of the Code and rules relating to unalienated land shall, subject to the provisions of this Act, apply to the said land. A combined reading of ss. 3(4) and 4(1) of the Watans Abolition Act establishes that the property in the hands of Bullappa and his wife and sons during his lifetime was the joint family property without the restriction of impartibility. The Tribunal was, therefore, right in holding that, consequent on the abolition of the watan and regrant made in favour of Bullappa, the property did not form his separate property, but formed the joint family property in which he had 1/7th share. We, therefore, answer the question in the affirmative and against the department. No costs.
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1978 (4) TMI 28 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
Chargeable Profits, Income Tax Act, Total Income ... ... ... ... ..... . The occasion to act under sub-r. (ii) of r. 3 would arise only if any expenditure incurred on account of commission, entertainment and advertisement had, in fact, been allowed as a deduction on the income-tax side. Then r. 3(ii) authorises the ITO to consider if any part of such allowed expenditure was excessive. If he prima facie comes to that conclusion, he has to obtain the previous sanction of the IAC, and then alone he can hold any part of the allowed expenditure to be excessive, with a view to add such amount to the net amount of income. The question as framed presupposes that any part of the expenditure was treated as excessive in arriving at chargeable profits. As we have shown, this was an erroneous view. No amount was sought to be added under r. 3(ii) of the First Schedule. We, therefore, answer the question referred to us in the negative, in favour of the department and against the assessee. The department will be entitled to cost, which are assessed at Rs. 200.
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1978 (4) TMI 27 - RAJASTHAN HIGH COURT
Jurisdiction Of High Court, Legal Representative, Writ Petition ... ... ... ... ..... s. The Explanation added to s. 141, C.P.C., has now settled the controversy which existed amongst the various High Courts and categorically lays down that the section does not include proceedings under article 226 of the Constitution. We are, therefore, definitely of the opinion that the technical rules of limitation contained in O.22, r. 4, read with art. 120 of the Limitation Act, 1963, providing for making an application within 90 days is, not at all applicable to writ proceedings. We, therefore, overrule the preliminary objection of Mr. Lodha that the application for bringing the legal representatives of the petitioner is barred by time. The application has not been made with inordinate delay and we, therefore, do not see any valid justification to hold that the writ petition has abated on that account. In the result, we hold the application for bringing legal representatives on record to be in order. We further direct that the case be set up for admission in due course.
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1978 (4) TMI 26 - MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT
Assessment Year, Best Judgment Assessment, Law Applicable, Levy Of Penalty ... ... ... ... ..... n the assumption that the quantum of penalty was governed by cl. (iii) as it originally stood. The returns, in this case, for the assessment years 1966-67 and 1967-68 were both filed on April 9, 1968, i.e., after the new cl. (iii) was substituted. In a case falling within s. 271(1)(c), from April 1, 1968, to March 31, 1976, penalty had to be computed under the Act, by reference to the amount of income concealed, and not by reference to the amount of tax avoided, as the law was prior to April 1, 1968. For all these reasons, both the questions must be answered in favour of the CIT and against the assessee. It must, accordingly, be held that the Tribunal was justified in holding that in view of the Expln. to s. 271(l)(c), the charge of gross and wilful neglect on the part of the assessee was proved, but it was clearly wrong in holding that the penalty was leviable at 20 of the tax sought to be avoided. The Commissioner shall have the costs of this reference. Hearing fee Rs. 100.
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1978 (4) TMI 25 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
A Partner, Minor Child, Total Income ... ... ... ... ..... as a partner in the firm in the capacity of karta. He being not an individual, as contemplated in s. 64(ii), the income could not be clubbed along with the income of the minor sons and daughter. This very argument was raised in the case of Madho Prasad v. CIT 1978 112 ITR 492 (All) and the Division Bench, after applying the principles laid down in two Supreme Court decisions, Firm Bhagat Ram Mohanlal v. CEPT 1956 29 ITR 521 and CIT v. Bagyalakshmi and Co. 1965 55 ITR 660, came to the conclusion that the karta who is a partner is an individual within the meaning of s. 64(ii), and as such the income of the minor sons and daughter admitted to the benefits of the partnership shall be clubbed with the income of such individual. Following the decision in Madho Prasad v. CIT 1978 112 ITR 492 (All), we answer the question referred to us in the affirmative, in favour of the department and against the assessee. The Commissioner will be entitled to costs, which are assessed at Rs. 200.
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1978 (4) TMI 24 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
Business Connection, Income Tax ... ... ... ... ..... come has accrued or arisen in India to the non-resident M/s. Invest Export. In view of the aforesaid observations of the Supreme Court and the agreement read as a whole it must be held that there was not only a business connection between the assessee-company and M/s. Invest Export as already stated but also from such business connection the aforesaid business income had directly or indirectly accrued or arisen in India to the said non-resident from the aforesaid business operations carried out by it in India. The agreement read as a whole also shows that the assessee-company was employed by the said non-resident as its agent within the meaning of that term in s. 163(1) of the Act. We, accordingly, answer the reframed question No. 2 and also question No. 3 in the affirmative and both in favour of the revenue. In view of the valuable assistance rendered by the learned counsel for both parties, we do not propose to make any order as to costs. SUDHINDRA MOHAN GUHA J.-- I agree.
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1978 (4) TMI 23 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
Activity For Profit, Charitable Purpose, General Public Utility, Income Tax Act ... ... ... ... ..... pect, we are inclined to base our decision on the decision of the Supreme Court in Indian Chamber of Commerce v. CIT 1975 101 ITR 796 and the other decisions mentioned above, relied upon on behalf of the revenue. We find that the object of the assessee is not a charitable purpose within the meaning of s. 2(15) of the Act. Accordingly, we hold (1) that the Appellate Tribunal erred in holding that the income of the assessee from the General Fund and the South Indian Women Workers Executive Committee Fund was entitled to exemption under s. 11 of the I.T. Act, 1961, and (2) that the income from the purchase and sale of handicrafts, affording monetary facilities without setting up educational institutions or training centres for advancement of studies, does not constitute charitable purpose and would not, as such, qualify for exemption and answer the questions in the negative and in favour of the revenue. The assessee shall pay the revenue s costs. Advocate s fee Rs. 500 one set.
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1978 (4) TMI 22 - MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT
Appeal From Best Judgment Assessment, Appeal To AAC, Assessment Year, Jurisdiction Of AAC ... ... ... ... ..... r this section to the assessee and to the Commissioner. (4) Save as provided in section 256, orders passed by the Appellate Tribunal on appeal shall be final. It is no doubt true that s. 254(1) gives a wide power to the Appellate Tribunal to pass such orders as it thinks fit. But it could not be doubted that the Appellate Tribunal could interfere with the orders passed by the AAC only if his orders are in any manner found to be defective and if, as discussed above, it is held that the AAC s order could not be said to be bad in law there appears to be no justification for the Tribunal to interfere with that decision. Consequently,our answers to the questions referred to us are Questions Nos. 1 and 2.-In the affirmative. Question No. 3.-In the negative. Question No. 4.-Is also the direct consequence of the finding of the Tribunal on question No. 3. Consequently, it is also answered in the negative. In the circumstances of the case, parties are directed to bear their own costs.
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1978 (4) TMI 21 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
Capital Or Revenue Expenditure ... ... ... ... ..... elevant facts found and stated by the Tribunal may now be briefly stated. Rs. 1,54,767 was the premium paid by the assessee at the rate of Rs. 100 per bigha for 1,547.87 bighas of lands of the said colliery. Out of this amount, Rs. 90,000 and Rs. 33,987 were paid in the relevant accounting years and by incurring the aforesaid expenditure the assessee had brought into existence a new source of income and a benefit of an enduring nature. The contract, read as a whole, conclusively shows that the aforesaid amounts were paid by the assessee as premium for the acquisition of a new source of income as found by the Tribunal. This expenditure has also brought into existence a benefit of an enduring nature and accordingly it must be held that the aforesaid expenditure is not a revenue expenditure but a capital expenditure. In the premises, I do not propose to deal with the cases cited at the Bar. I agree with the answer given by my learned brother and also with the order as to costs.
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1978 (4) TMI 20 - MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT
Additional Evidence, Income From Property, Jurisdiction Of High Court ... ... ... ... ..... imilar course was adopted in CIT v. George Henderson and Co. Ltd. 1967 66 ITR 622 (SC) and CIT v. Greaves Cotton and Co. Ltd. 1968 68 ITR 200 (SC). Their Lordships decision in CIT v. Indian Molasses Co. Ltd. 1970 78 ITR 474 (SC) and Ragunath Prasad Poddar v. CIT 1973 90 ITR 140 (SC) lays down the proposition that if the court declines to answer the question but merely lays down the legal principles, the Tribunal is entitled, while disposing of the case under s. 66(5) and (6) of the Indian I.T. Act, 1922, to take additional evidence. Kanga and Palkivala s Income-tax, Seventh Edn., Vol. I, p. 1164. For the foregoing reasons, the answer to the question referred by the Tribunal is self-evident, as observed by their Lordships in Agha Abdul Jabbar Khan v. CIT 1971 82 ITR 872 (SC) and, therefore, we decline to answer it. In consequence, the application made by the Commissioner under s. 66(2) of the Indian I.T. Act, 1922, is rejected as untenable. There shall be no order as to costs.
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1978 (4) TMI 19 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
Best Judgment Assessment, Contract Business ... ... ... ... ..... law made out. It could not hence be said that the ITO exercised the discretion vested in him capriciously or arbitrarily. In the present case, no one has appeared on behalf of the assessee. We would hence refrain from making a concluded opinion on the view expressed by the Tribunal that the discretion under s. 186(2) for cancelling the registration of a firm can be used only by way of punishment where there has been a conscious disregard of statutory obligation or defiance of law, on the basis that the proceedings for cancellation are quasi-criminal in nature. We will leave the point open, after noticing the statement of the learned counsel for the department that the cancellation of registration is only denial of a benefit which has been conferred by section 184 of the Act. In the result, we answer the question referred to us in the negative, in favour of the department and against the assessee. As no one has appeared on behalf of the assessee, we make no order as to costs.
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1978 (4) TMI 18 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
Actual Cost, Amalgamating Company, Capital Asset, Fair Market Value, Income Tax Act ... ... ... ... ..... r of a capital asset and not of an entire business by succession, inheritance or devolution. It is not in dispute that the capital assets of Orient Jute Mills Co. Ltd. stood transferred to Cheviot Mills Co. Ltd. The question is whether such transfer took place by way of succession or devolution. Whether the entire business of Orient Jute Mills Co. Ltd. was transferred to Cheviot Mills Co. Ltd. or not is of little relevance. The transfer took place pursuant to an order of this court under the said s. 394 of the Companies Act, 1956, and appears to us to be a clear case of devolution by operation of law. In any event, there is a specific finding in the instant case that the entire business of Orient Jute Mills Co. Ltd. has been succeeded to and continued by the Cheviot Mills Co. Ltd. This finding is not challenged. By reason of the aforesaid, the question is answered in the affirmative and in favour of the assessee. There will be no order as to costs. C. K. BANERJI J.--I agree.
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