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Case Laws
Showing 21 to 40 of 177 Records
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1978 (4) TMI 225 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... not cooked food or confectionery. The only question that survives is whether bread sold by a bakery is covered by the entry cooked food . This entry was considered in Jassu Ram s case(2) and it was held by a Division Bench of this Court that in common parlance the term cooked food is generally understood as food which is cooked and is taken in a meal, i. e., breakfast, lunch or dinner. It cannot be disputed that bread sold by a bakery is used in breakfast, lunch and dinner. Applying the principle laid down in this decision, we are of the opinion that bread is covered by the entry cooked food . Accordingly, we answer the question referred to us by holding that biscuits sold by a bakery are neither cooked food nor an item of confectionery, but bread sold by a bakery is covered by the entry cooked food vide Notification No. ST-4025/X-1012(4)-1965 dated 18th August, 1966. As nobody has appeared for the assessee, there will be no order as to costs. Reference answered accordingly.
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1978 (4) TMI 224 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... isions), it is difficult to accept this contention. It cannot be denied that rice bran is primarily used for feeding cattle. The fact that a small portion of it is also used for extracting oil, will not alter the character of the commodity. It is a settled rule of interpretation that commodities have to be classified in accordance with their normal use, and words in a notification have to be interpreted as understood in common parlance. As rice bran is used primarily for feeding cattle and, as in common parlance, it would be classified as a cattle fodder, it is not possible to take the view that it would go outside the purview of cattle fodder only on account of the special use to which it was put by some consumers. We, accordingly, answer the question in the affirmative, in favour of the assessee and against the department. The assessee is entitled to its costs which is assessed at Rs. 100. Counsel s fee is assessed at the same figure. Reference answered in the affirmative.
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1978 (4) TMI 223 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... not defeat the result of the withdrawal application and the refund order by not collecting the amount directed to be refunded. Counsel for the assessee, however, contended that even though the application for reference may have been withdrawn, the assessee has a right to ask for a reference under section 11(4) of the Act. This argument is misconceived. The application under section 11(4) of the Act can be made only in case a reference application is subsisting. The right to apply to the High Court for a reference under section 11(4) points that reference application is on the record of the revising authority. Once the reference application has been withdrawn, the occasion for applying to the High Court under section 11(4) does not arise as the reference proceeding do not survive after a reference application has been withdrawn. In view of this conclusion, the application under section 11(4) of the U.P. Sales Tax Act, 1948, is rejected. Costs on parties. Application rejected.
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1978 (4) TMI 222 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... a condition precedent to the valid exercise of power under that provision see Laxmi Narain Mittal v. Commissioner of Sales Tax(1). It goes to the very jurisdiction of the officer. It is equally well-settled that a point which goes to the root of the matter or affects the very existence of the jurisdiction of an authority can be raised at any time, be it in appeal or in revision see B.K. Gooyee v. Commissioner of Income-tax(2). The finding of fact is that the service by affixation was invalid because the other modes mentioned in the rules were not exhausted. The service of the notice was hence invalid. Since the notice itself was not validly served, the initiation of proceedings was without jurisdiction. The assessment order was rightly annulled. We, therefore, answer the question referred to us in the affirmative, in favour of the assessee and against the department. The assessee will be entitled to costs, which are assessed at Rs. 200. Reference answered in the affirmative.
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1978 (4) TMI 221 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... airpins, hairclips are essentially articles of toiletry and not cosmetics, as this term is understood in common parlance. Hence hairpins and hairclips are toilet requisites within the meaning of entry No. 6 of the notification dated 31st March, 1956. The Full Bench considered the cast of Plastic Products Ltd.(1), and held that the principle of interpretation of the entry cosmetics and toilet requisites in that case was erroneous. The Full Bench has taken the view that the article may either fall under the term toilet requisites or cosmetics in order to be covered by the said entry. There can be no manner of doubt that safety-razors are toilet requisites . They hence fall within the aforesaid entry so as to be taxable at the rate of 7 per cent. We, therefore, answer the question referred to us in the affirmative in favour of the department and against the assessee. The Commissioner will be entitled to costs which are assessed at Rs. 200. Reference answered in the affirmative.
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1978 (4) TMI 220 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ght within the purview of this entry. Articles which cannot be called utensils will not be covered by that entry. In that case, cement pipes were in question. It was held that they were taxable at 2 per cent as an unclassified item. The principle laid down in that decision is applicable to the present case. G.I. and C.I. pipes are not used as utensils. Consequently, they are not covered by the aforesaid entry and were rightly held taxable as unclassified items. The question referred to us is, therefore, answered in the affirmative in favour of the assessee and against the department. The assessee will be entitled to costs which are assessed at Rs. 200 one set. Reference answered in the affirmative.
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1978 (4) TMI 219 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... rgy and as such they were covered by entry No. 7 of Notification No. 7096/X1012 dated 1st October, 1965. In this reference we are concerned with the same notification. Following the decision in Import Association s case(1), we hold that amperometers and voltameters are electrical goods covered by entry No. 7. Galvanometers are also used for measuring electrical energy and, therefore, on the principle laid down in Import Association s case(1), we hold that galvanometers are also electrical goods covered by entry No. 7. Accordingly, we answer the question referred to us in favour of the department and against the assessee. As nobody has appeared for the assessee, there will be no order as to costs. Reference answered accordingly.
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1978 (4) TMI 218 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... therefore, allowed the appeal and directed the turnover of these things to be exempt from sales tax. The Judge (Revisions) affirmed this view. It observed that he had taken the same view in several other cases also. The question of law mentioned by us at the beginning has been referred at the instance of the Commissioner of Income-tax (sic). It is not disputed that in the Manual of Orders of the Irrigation Department, U.P., T. squares and drawing-boards have been mentioned as survey and mathematical instruments at page 160. The normal use of T. squares and drawing-boards appears to be for survey and mathematical purposes. The authorities were, therefore, justified in holding that the turnover of these things was exempt from tax. We, therefore, answer the question referred to us in the affirmative in favour of the assessee and against the department. Since no one has appeared on behalf of the assessee, there will be no order as to costs. Reference answered in the affirmative.
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1978 (4) TMI 217 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... as may be prescribed in this behalf- (i) the amount for which goods are sold shall include any sums charged for anything done by the dealer in respect of the goods sold at the time of or before the delivery thereof, other than cost of freight or delivery ... when such cost is separately charged (ii) ..... (iii) ..... The Judge (Revisions) found as a fact that the assessee had charged freight as well as octroi separately. He looked into the bills and came to this conclusion. In view of this finding of fact, there can be no manner of doubt that the cost of freight and octroi was not liable to be included in the taxable turnover. It is evident that the octroi that was paid by the assessee was part of the cost of delivery, and hence was excludable. We, therefore, answer the question referred to us in the affirmative, in favour of the assessee and against the department. The assessee will be entitled to costs, which are assessed at Rs. 200. Reference answered in the affirmative.
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1978 (4) TMI 216 - MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ule unenforceable. This consequence is avoided by treating the State rule to be directory and not mandatory in spite of the imperative language of the State rule. This is the course we have adopted in the present case to avoid any inconsistency between the relevant provisions. 19.. The result, therefore, is that the view taken by the Tribunal that rule 8-D of the Madhya Pradesh Sales Tax (Central) Rules, 1957, is merely directory and not mandatory is correct and we uphold that conclusion for the reasons already given. In view of the facts found, as stated in the statement of case, we hold that the assessee was entitled to get the exemption under section 6(2) of the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956, in the present case even without production of declarations in form C obtained from its purchasing dealer. 20.. Accordingly, the reference is answered in favour of the assessee and against the revenue. The parties will bear their own costs of this court. Reference answered accordingly.
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1978 (4) TMI 215 - MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... f that term, it would be business within clause (i) of that sub-clause as introduced by the amending Act. These two decisions of the Supreme Court really conclude the point against the assessee, who admittedly is a dealer in automobiles, and the sale of the office car must, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, be held to be not only incidental but also ancillary to and connected with the business that it carries on. In Spheroidel Castings Ltd. v. State of Tamil Nadu 1977 40 S.T.C. 596., the Madras High Court has taken the same view. 10.. For the reasons aforesaid, the reference is answered in favour of the Commissioner of Sales Tax and against the assessee. It must accordingly be held that the Board of Revenue was not justified in holding that the sale price of the Ambassador car, purchased by the assessee for its office use and then sold, was not liable to be included in its taxable turnover. There shall be no order as to costs. Reference answered accordingly.
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1978 (4) TMI 214 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... s have been mentioned or referred to in the statement. Relevant and material facts have not been set out. Conclusions and findings of fact by the Board are also absent and no distinction appears to have been made between the fact admitted or found, the conclusions of fact deduced therefrom and the conclusion of the Board on law on which the finding is based. Only part of the arguments advanced at the final hearing before the Board have been set out in the statement. The Act has been in force since 1941 and it is expected that after over 30 years, the authorities concerned would be sufficiently aware as to what a statement of case should contain. Statements drawn up by the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal may serve as useful guides. We expect that the authorities concerned will take note of these observations and take steps so that in future proper statements are drawn up. This will lead to better utilisation of judicial time. BANERJI, J.-I agree. Reference answered accordingly.
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1978 (4) TMI 213 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ation certificates. It appears that although they described themselves as partners, the applicant was not the firm. The registration certificates also do not show that the firm was registered on the contrary they show that the certificates were issued in the names of the appellant and his brother Kanak Chandra Paul. As the firm was not registered, as it could not be, the question of dissolution of the firm is quite immaterial. So, even on the assumption which we have made, the appellant has no cause against the respondents. The learned judge was, therefore, perfectly justified in dismissing the writ petitions of the appellant. No other point has been argued in these appeals. For the reasons aforesaid, these appeals are dismissed, but there will be no order for costs in any of them. Let the operation of this judgment remain stayed for a period of six weeks from date, as prayed for on behalf of the learned Advocate for the appellant. CHAKRAVORTI, J.-I agree. Appeals dismissed.
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1978 (4) TMI 212 - KERALA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... 17 S.T.C. 326 (S.C.). was treated as authority. The recent decision in Deputy Commissioner of Sales Tax v. V.S. Chamunni 1978 41 S.T.C. 474. (T.R.C. No. 26 of 1977) considered the position purely with Here italicised. respect to the provisions of the 1125 Act, uncomplicated by section 61 of the 1963 Act or the principle in Sales Tax Officer v. K.S.V. Gupta 1971 28 S.T.C. 722. We are of the opinion that there is no bar to the proceedings being continued under the provisions of section 61 of the 1963 Act as construed by the Division Bench in the earlier case noticed. 3.. Counsel for the assessee contended that, even so, the assessment in this case had been made only on the revision petitioner, who is only one of the partners of the dissolved firm. This is a point which has not been pleaded or considered by any of the authorities below and we are unable to entertain it for the first time in this revision. We dismiss this tax revision case, but without costs. Petition dismissed.
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1978 (4) TMI 211 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... Sales Tax Act, 1959. It has been held there that the words the sale or purchase of which is liable to tax under the Act used in section 7-A of the said Madras Act qualify the term goods , and exclude by necessary implication goods, the sale or purchase of which is totally exempted from tax at all points under section 8 or section 17(1) of the Madras General Sales Tax Act. We are unable to see how this can support the contention that only goods the sale or purchase of which is completely exempt from tax can be said to be excluded from the levy of tax under the said Act, viz., the Bombay Sales Tax Act, 1959. In fact, the observations in this judgment of the Supreme Court clearly show that the event on which the sales tax or purchase tax is imposed is the sale or purchase of goods. In the result, we must answer the question referred to us in the negative. The respondents must pay to the applicant the costs of this reference fixed at Rs. 300. Reference answered in the negative.
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1978 (4) TMI 210 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... termination of the question whether grounds exist for the imposition of such penalty. In order that penalty may be imposed, it must be possible first to come to the conclusion that there was actually turnover and further that that turnover was not disclosed. The mere fact of a best judgment assessment, particularly when the assessment is based on the inference flowing from the inability of the assessee to establish the case pleaded by him, will not be sufficient for the purpose of imposition of penalty, for the degree of proof required for the imposition of penalty is quite different from and is of a much higher order than that required for the purpose of making a best judgment assessment. In the light of the above, we set aside the order of the Tribunal, in so far as it has imposed penalty on the revision petitioners. We allow the revision petition to this extent and dismiss it in other respects. We direct the parties to bear their respective costs. Petition partly allowed.
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1978 (4) TMI 209 - KERALA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... nt. 6.. Section 19 of the Act says ........proceed to determine to the best of its judgment the turnover which has escaped assessment to tax...and assess the tax payable on such turnover after issuing a notice on the dealer........ This means that the assessing authority has to proceed to determine, in the sense that proceedings for the determination of the escaped turnover, must commence within the period stipulated, and assess , using that expression in the wider sense given to it by the Supreme Court so as to include the proceedings leading to the final order of assessment. It does not matter that the final order itself was passed beyond the stipulated period of four years. In the present case, the proceedings commenced well within time, although the revised order was passed out of time. But that by itself does not affect its validity. In the circumstances, we see no merits in the tax revision case, and it is dismissed with costs. Counsel s fee Rs 150. Petition dismissed.
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1978 (4) TMI 208 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... pointed out in that case, there was nothing on the record to show that any new or different commercial commodity came into existence as a result of the process of hand-blending applied to the oil purchased by the respondent therein, whereas, in the present case, as we have already observed, the mixing carried out by the respondent has resulted in a new commercial commodity which is sold in the trade name of Methimix. In the result, the question referred to us must be answered in the negative. As far as the question of the rate of tax applicable to the sale of Methimix is concerned, that question has not been considered by the Tribunal and no question has been referred to us regarding the same. In view of this, it will be for the parties to make submissions before the Tribunal on this question and the Tribunal will determine the same in accordance with law. The respondent to pay to the applicant the costs of this reference fixed at Rs. 300. Reference answered in the negative.
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1978 (4) TMI 207 - HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH
Winding up – Definition of contributory, Exclusion of certain time in computing periods of limitation
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1978 (4) TMI 198 - HIGH COURT OF DELHI
Investigation of company’s affairs in other cases ... ... ... ... ..... ium Chemicals 1966 Supp SCR 311 36 Comp. Cas. 639 AIR 1967 SC 295, an allegation that the company had entered into an un-remunerative or imprudent transaction cannot suffice to attract section 237. If the basis of the order under section 237( b) was only the data furnished in A-l, the material was woefully inadequate to support the order. But even the additional facts furnished in A-4 and A-6 do not add much substance to the charges. We, therefore, hold that the respondent has failed to make out the existence or circumstances justifying the formation of an opinion that there was fraud, misfeasance or misconduct on the part of the persons in management of the company towards the company or its members. We, therefore, make the rule absolute and quash the impugned orders marked annexs. C, G, H and I to the writ petition. The respondents are restrained from giving effect in any manner to the aforesaid orders against the petitioner-company. The writ petition is allowed with costs.
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