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Case Laws
Showing 61 to 80 of 177 Records
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1978 (4) TMI 118 - ITAT DELHI-C
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... ... ..... o get the raw material, which was necessary for the manufacturing of the commodity for which the licence was granted to it and which was unfortunately not available inIndiaand for which purpose he had to apply for import licence etc. It cannot, however, be said that even after that date the assessee rsquo s business has not commenced. The assessee could have started his business and produced the goods but for want of raw material, it could not do so. In our opinion, it would be fair and reasonable to reject the assessee rsquo s claim for expenditure prior to14th Dec., 1973and to allow the assessee rsquo s claim thereafter. The assessee rsquo s representative has submitted that such expenses which were incurred prior to14th Dec., 1973came to Rs. 2,942.00. However, no details of the same had been furnished before us. The assessee rsquo s contention will be verified by the ITO and only the expenses incurred upto14th Dec., 1973would be disallowed. 6. The appeal is partly allowed.
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1978 (4) TMI 117 - ITAT CUTTACK
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... ... ..... 1976 and so the first appeal was within limitation. 3. The other aspect is that the appeal petition was sent to the address of the Assistant Commissioner of Sales-tax by registered post with A.D. on 13th March, 1976 and was received in the office of the former on 18th March, 1976. Postal receipt was produced to prove the posting on 13th March, 1976. One of the modes of presentation of appeals is by registered post and so the date of posting must have to be treated as the date of presentation of the appeal. In this view of the matter also the first appeal was not barred by limitation. 4. In the ultimate analysis, the first appeal was not barred by limitation. The impugned order of the Assistant Commissioner of Sales-tax cannot be sustained. The appeal must have to be remanded for disposal according to law. 5. In the result, the appeal is allowed and the impugned order of the Assistant Commissioner of Sales-tax is set aside. The appeal is remanded for disposal according to law.
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1978 (4) TMI 116 - ITAT COCHIN
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... ... ..... admitted items of expenditure. This return, as we stated above, is not furnished bona fide but only to be of use if possible to the assessee in the COFEPOSA proceedings. So it is, first of all, not established that there was an income of Rs.7000 in the hands of the brother. Just because Philipose said that he may be assessed for Rs. 7,000 it does not mean that there is actually Rs.7,000 as regards the question when it comes to the assessment of the assessee. So we delete the addition. Addition deleted. 9. Addition of Rs.12,500 out of income assessed in the hands of Kuriakose, brother of the assessee The details furnished by Kuriakose for his income are as follows Business income No investment during the year, Income estimated Rs.12,500 . Rs.12,500 The same reasons more particularly the one given in the case of brother Philipose about intangible amounts apply to this case. Therefore, the addition is deleted. 10. Appeal allowed in part. Assessment will be revised accordingly.
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1978 (4) TMI 115 - ITAT COCHIN
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... ... ..... contentions regarding the applicability of the Rule must be understood in a broad and liberal sense. The assessee was having dealings with M/s. Ramarkrishna Oil Mills. They were apparently in need of certain funds for then alone would they borrow the same. The borrowing was made after banking hours and this, in my view, is an exceptional circumstance which necessitated the payment in cash, for had the assessee declined to make the payment it may have resulted in strained by relationship when the other party was in need of funds and had approached the assessee for making an accommodation by way of payment in cash after banking hours. On the facts of the case, I would hold that the requirements of r. 6DD (j) are satisfied and I would delete the addition of Rs. 3,000. In the view taken, it is not necessary to go into certain arguments of a legal nature advanced regarding the interpretation of the provisions of sub-cl. (1) and sub-cl. (2) of r. 6DD (j). 9. The appeal is allowed.
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1978 (4) TMI 114 - ITAT COCHIN
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... ... ..... where the Madras High Court follows such a procedure. So Rs. 6,535 is only the income of that year and which can be said to be the income concealed for that asst. yr. 1972-73 which is before us. 18,650 is not the income of this year. So the account of Rs. 6,535 can be the only account said to have been concealed quantum of penalty has to be reduced to that figure. Of course, these two figures form, in the aggregate, only Rs. 25,185. The IAC says that the concealed account Rs. 25,488 we are not able to find out how the IAC arrived at that figure. Even if that is the correct figure we find that it is not possible to find concealment in respect of that small amount of Rs. 300 or so which is only the result of some add back and disallowances. 11. Appeal of the assessee allowed in part. The imposition of penalty for concealment of income for this year is confirmed but the quantum of penalty imposable is reduced to Rs.6,535 (Rupees six thousand five hundred and thirty five only).
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1978 (4) TMI 113 - ITAT COCHIN
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... ... ..... e. In this also the same practice continued. On the date of closing of the business a sum of Rs. 6,042 was still outstanding from these boats repairers. It was found difficult to recover these amounts as these were due from very many persons like boat repairers in small amounts because this intermediary used to distribute it among the boat repairers. 3. (iii) This amount is written off. The business was closed on 31st Dec., 1971 in the middle of the accounting year. The amounts are petty amounts advanced to various boat repairers. Under these circumstances it is only wise and prudent to think that it is not recoverable and are lost to the assessee. No extra commercial consideration has cropped up in the writing off. It is out of sheer necessity and genuine and bonafide belief that these amounts cannot be recovered. So it has to be allowed either as a bad debt or as a loss incidental to the trade. We find accordingly. Allow this as a deduction. (iv) Appeal is allowed in part.
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1978 (4) TMI 112 - ITAT CHANDIGARH
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... ... ..... the same breath the ITO rejects this explanation as not plausible without any reasons of his own. 6. Coming to the order of the AAC, we do not find any improvement upon what the ITO had done. The AAC has considered the application of s. 145 (1) proviso as justified because the cft. account of the log had been maintained according to him. Here again maintained the AAC does not find anything wrong either with the books of account, or with the method of accounting or any other defects which would justify the invocation of the section on the basis that the books of the assessee are so maintained that true profits and gains of the business cannot be deduced therefrom. Therefore, there is nothing to justify the application of Proviso to s. 145 (1). We have not been shown that this is a case where the Proviso to s. 145 (1) was applied in any of the earlier years. We have, therefore, no option but to allow the appeal of the assessee in full. 7. In the result, the appeal is allowed.
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1978 (4) TMI 111 - ITAT CHANDIGARH
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... ... ..... from which an inference can be drawn that the investment in the property made by Smt. Bhagwanti belongs to the assessee HUF. Actually, Smt. Bhagwanti had purchased from a party constructed property at Malerkotla near Moti Talkies on 4th May, 1965 for a consideration of Rs. 6,000. In the sale deed itself, the payment of Rs. 6,000 is shown as under 3-8-59 (date of agreement to sell) 200 3-9-59 1000 20-4-60 500 17-4-62 1000 1-5-62 500 20-3-63 1200 1-4-63 1000 29-5-64 600 . 6000 According to the learned counsel for the assessee, this investment has been accepted as the lady s investment. This fact is not controverted by the learned Departmental Representative. The mere fact that some property stands in the name of Smt. Bhagwanti would not automatically lead to the inference that the investment in the property must be considered as the investment of the HUF. 6. For the aforesaid reasons, the reassessment made on 30th Nov., 1974 is quashed. 7. In the result, the appeal is allowed.
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1978 (4) TMI 110 - ITAT CHANDIGARH
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... ... ..... er-book and find that there are at least 10 other persons whose share holding is more than the share holding of Ambikha Parshad Biyani. After considering the principle laid down by the Supreme Court in the case of Raj Kumar Singh Hukam Chandji vs CIT (15) we do not have the slightest doubt that the salary income of Ambikha Parshad from Amar Flour Mills (P) Ltd is not the income of his HUF but is his personal income. We have seen the resolutions of Amar Flour Mills(P)Ltd., dt. 7th July 1964, 3rd Sept.,1964 and 30th Sept., 1964 and also the affidavit filed by Ambikha Parshad and are clearly of the view that the remuneration paid to Ambika Parshad is because of personal qualifications. It should be noted that Ambikha Parshad had resigned for a period of one month from 1st Sept., 1964 but he was re appointed from 1st Oct., 1964 and he continues in that position till now. For the aforesaid reasons, we would confirm the order of the AAC. 14. In the result, the appeal is dismissed.
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1978 (4) TMI 109 - ITAT BOMBAY-B
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... ... ..... ernative contention that the penalty may be reduced. We have referred to the conduct of the assessee earlier. In our opinion, it is a mitigating factor. It appears that the AAC also was of the same opinion. He did not reduce the penalty, however, observing that the ITO had imposed the minimum penalty as stated by the ITO in his order. As a matter of fact, the ITO has stated in his order that the minimum penalty leviable is Rs. 6,470 and that the maximum penalty leviable is Rs. 12,940. Therefore, it appears that the ITO had imposed a penalty which is more than the minimum. Having regard to the conduct of the assessee and as there is nothing to show that any such penalty had been imposed on the assessee in respect of any earlier assessment year, we are of opinion that the minimum penalty will suffice. We direct that the penalty is reduced accordingly. 15. No other point was raised or pressed before us at the time of the hearing of this appeal. 16. The appeal is partly allowed.
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1978 (4) TMI 108 - ITAT AHMEDABAD-D
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... ... ..... of Addl. CIT vs. Patel Bros. and Co. (3), the AAC held that the said expenditure was not in the nature of entertainment within the meaning of s.37(2B) of the Act. He, however, restricted disallowance to Rs. 400 to cover expenses of personal nature incurred by the partners towards tea expenses. 7. Being aggrieved, Revenue is in appeal before us. No material was placed before us to depart from the view taken by the AAC that the impugned expenditure was incurred to meet customary hospitality towards the customers, and constituents as well as staff which according to the principle laid down by their Lordships of the Gujarat High Court in the above cited case cannot be treated as expenditure in the nature of entertainment within the meaning of s. 37 (2b) of the Act. In our opinion, therefore, the AAC has rightly applied the principles laid down in the case of Patel Bros.(3). In the result, we decline to interfere with the decision of the AAC. 8. The appeal fails and is dismissed.
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1978 (4) TMI 107 - ITAT AHMEDABAD-B
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... ... ..... t was for this reason that in the past the deduction was claimed on actual payment basis i.e., as and when paid. But, in our view, the assessee cannot be said to have forfeited its claim for deduction when it admittedly follows mercantile system of accounting by ascertaining its liability on actuarial basis and making the claim for the first time. The claim made by assessee on basis of the actuarial valuation cannot be said to be inconsistent with the mercantile system of accounting which it has been following. The liability for payment of gratuity was a statutory liability under the Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972 and the said liability accrued to the assessee when it followed mercantile system of accounting. The decision in Tata Iron and Steel Co. s case cited supra also supports this view. In the light of this discussion, therefore, we are inclined to hold that the assessee s claim for deduction for gratuity liability should be allowed. In the result, the appeal is allowed.
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1978 (4) TMI 106 - ITAT AHMEDABAD-A
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... ... ..... in a cuvalier manner in utter disregard of the accepted principles. We have, therefore, no alternative but to remit the matter to the Appellate Assistant Commissioner with a direction that he should re-examine the entire question of assessability of the amounts in respect of which the assessee s explanation is not found satisfactory should bring to tax the amount in question in respect of which the explanation is not satisfactorily either in the hands of the firm or in the hands of the partner depending upon his finding which he may reach on the basis of proper inquiries. We accordingly set aside the order of the Appellate Assistant Commissioner so far as the ground relating to addition of cash credits in the hands of the firm is concerned. We also set aside his order in the case of partner Shri Gurcharan for the same reasons. In the result appeal filed by the firm is treated as partly allowed and that of the partner, Gurcharan is fully allowed for the purpose of statistics.
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1978 (4) TMI 105 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
Warehoused goods - Transfer of for rewarehousing at another place - Liability to duty ... ... ... ... ..... the commodity has not been duty-paid, his duty extends to the rewarehousing of the goods in another non duty paid warehouse. In this case, admittedly, the consignor applied for transport, executed the bond, obtained permits and allowed the removal of the goods from his warehouse. It is also admitted that the consignor that is the plaintiff-herein, failed to produce the rewarehousing certificate either within the time prescribed by Rule 156-A (4) or at any time. It is also admitted that the goods in question were not rewarehoused but were disposed of before such warehousing. In such circumstances, the consignor has been rightly made liable under Rule 156-A (3) read with 156-B and Rule 153. In the above circumstances, I do not see any error in the levy of excise duty on the plaintiff and the suit has rightly been dismissed by the Court below. The appeal accordingly fails and is dismissed, but in the circumstances of the case, there shall be no order as to costs in this appeal.
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1978 (4) TMI 104 - GOVERNMENT OF INDIA
Speaking order ... ... ... ... ..... l the points of facts and law raised both in the memorandum of appeal and at the time of hearing of the appeal. They, therefore, remand the case to the Collector for de novo decision of the appeal in accordance with law and after giving a personal hearing to the applicant.
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1978 (4) TMI 103 - GOVERNMENT OF INDIA
Plant and machinery ... ... ... ... ..... sional assessment. In this case the petitioners have produced a certificate from the Office of Distt. Industries Officer, Pali-Marwar (Raj.) to the effect that the capital investment of plant and machinery as on the date of initial installation is to the tune of Rs. 4,27,804.71. In view of the above the petitioners are entitled to the benefit of lower rate of duty in terms of Notification 91/72. However, it is noted that in one case O/O No. V18/ 35/72/2035-57, dated 8-8-1973 part of the refund claim was rejected as time-barred. The claim was preferred in Sept. 72 for the period from April, 71 to March, 72, therefore, the claim for clearances from April, 71 to Sept., 71 was rejected on the ground of limitation under Rule 11, C.E.R., 1944. While allowing the revision application Government of India order that in the above case the refund claim for Sept., 71 to Sept., 72 is allowed and the rest rejected on ground of limitation under Rule 11, read with Rule 173J of C.E.R., 1944.
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1978 (4) TMI 102 - HIGH COURT OF DELHI
Seizure and confiscation - Formalities after seizure - Handing over or seized property ... ... ... ... ..... zure was made by Mr. M.R. Kathuria, Customs Inspector (Preventive). There was no plea before the Magistrate that the application was not by a duly authorised officer. This contention of Mr. Prem is without merit. 9. Mr. Prem lastly contended that the car was given by the petitioner to Mukhtiar Singh and others for use in a wedding and that if the car is not given on superdari to the petitioner it will be reduced to a junk after few years and the petitioner would be put to serious loss. This apprehension of the petitioner is not correct. As already stated, the customs authorities are under a legal obligation to take proceedings for confiscation within six months, failing which the seized goods have to be returned to the person from whose possession they were seized. The measure contemplated under the Act are stringent and obviously they have been introduced with the object of preventing smuggling. 10. For the reasons stated I find no merit in the petition and it is dismissed.
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1978 (4) TMI 100 - HIGH COURT OF CALCUTTA
Customs Tariff Act, 1934 - Residuary entry - Scope of. - Precedents - Applicability of. ... ... ... ... ..... transmitted on them by road traffic . He describes that allegation by Assistant Collector of Customs for Appraisement. B.N. Dutt, as wrongly made and may have been inspired by Dutt s own personal note which he might have made at the interview between Mr. Barua and the Customs Officials. Finally Indias Standard Specifications as laid down by the Indian Road Congress, which I have quoted above defines culvert as a structure. 10. On fact and law, therefore, this order of appraisement and assessment cannot be sustained and I set aside such assessment. I, therefore, make the Rule for Certiorari and Mandamus absolute in terms of prayers (a) and (b) of the petition and I direct the Customs Authorities to proceed according to the law laid down in this judgment and to assess these goods under Item 63 (9) of the Customs Tariff. If by such assessment any money becomes refundable to the applicant, the same should be refunded to the applicant after such fresh assessment according to law.
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1978 (4) TMI 99 - HIGH COURT OF MADRAS
Notification issued under a repealed Act - General Clauses Act - Section 24 - Scope of. ... ... ... ... ..... d) of the 1952 Act. In Neel v. State of West Bengal, A.I.R. 1972 S.C. 2066, a notification of 1923 issued under Section 15 of the Arms Act of 1878 was held to be in force after the Arms Act has been repealed and re-enacted by Arms Act of 1959, as one issued under Section 4 of the new Act by virtue of the combined effect of section 6 and 24 of the General Clauses Act. 10. Though the Tariff Rate in relation to the hard waste was changed under the Finance Act, the exemption notification issued as regards the duty payable under the unamended provision shall be deemed to continue in force after the Finance Act of 1972 till a fresh notification was issued after it came into force. In my view, therefore, since the exemption notification of the year 1955 continued to be in force till 24-7-1972, when the new exemption notification was issued, the demand in question cannot be sustained. The writ petition is therefore allowed, and the demand quashed. There will be no order as to costs.
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1978 (4) TMI 98 - SUPREME COURT
Whether suit properties belonged to the joint family, that there was no prior partition and that the plaintiff Is entitled to a 7/24th share?
Held that:- We see no justification for limiting the plaintiff's share to 1/24th by ignoring the 1/4th share which she would have obtained had there been partition during her husband's lifetime between him and his two sons. We think that in overlooking that 1/4th share, one unwittingly permits one's imagination to boggle under the oppression of the reality that there was in fact no partition between the plaintiff's husband and his sons. Whether a partition had actually taken place between the plaintiff's husband and his sons is beside the point for the purposes of Expln. 1. That Explanation compels the assumption of a fiction that in fact " a partition of the property had taken place " the point of time of the partition being the one immediately before the death of the person in whose property the heirs claim a share - we confirm the judgment of the High Court and dismiss the appeal
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