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Case Laws
Showing 21 to 40 of 135 Records
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1980 (11) TMI 153 - APPELLATE COLLECTOR OF CUSTOMS, BOMBAY
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... ... ..... yond freight, is certainly the place of importation. In other words, with collection of freight the Steamer Agents deliver the cargo not free on board the ship but free along side ship at the Port of destination. Expenses of landing cargo from ship’s hatches on to wharf are borne by them and are met out of freight collection without any extra fee. What is known by the name of landing charges are not properly landing charges at all but a specific fee for certain post-landing and post-importation services. 18. In the circumstances, I allow this appeal. In my opinion, there is no authority of law to levy duty on this notional addition of landing charges. Whatever expenses are incurred for effecting the delivery at the place of importation are always included in the element of freight in c.i.f. quotation. The assessable value of appellant’s goods shall be reduced by the amount of addition made on account of landing charges and consequential refund shall be paid.
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1980 (11) TMI 152 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ion, the service of the grounds of detention on the detenu can be complete only if they are accompained by the documents or materials on which the order of detention is based for then alone will the detenu be able to make an effective representation. In other words, the documents which form the basis of the order of detention are not served on the detenu along with the grounds of detention, in the eye of law there will be no service of the grounds of detention and that circumstance would vitiate his detention and make it void ab initio. 3. In the instant case, it is not disputed that when the grounds of detention were served on the petitioner, on 13-5-1980, they were not accompanied by the documents forming the basis thereof. His case, therefore, falls within the four corners of the ratio laid down by the cases referred to above and his detention must be held to be without jurisdiction. The petition is therefore allowed and the petitioner is directed to be released forthwith.
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1980 (11) TMI 151 - MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... . 4.. Now, it was not disputed before us that garam masala is made by mixing different condiments in certain proportion. The mixing may take place either before or after grinding of the condiments which go to make the product garam masala . But mixing of condiments has to take place because the product garam masala is not obtained merely by grinding of a condiment. It is thus clear that the process of obtaining the product garam masala is not confined to merely grinding of condiments. It involves something more than grinding to bring into existence a product different from those which are mixed. The conclusion is inescapable that the process of obtaining the product garam masala is not excluded by the Rules from the definition of manufacture contained in section 2(j) of the Act. 5.. For these reasons, our answer to the question referred to us is in the affirmative and against the assessee. In the circumstances of the case parties shall bear their own costs of this reference.
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1980 (11) TMI 150 - SUPREME COURT
What are the "other authorities" contemplated in the definition of 'State' in Art. 13? - Held that:- Writ petitions are dismissed.
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1980 (11) TMI 149 - KERALA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... rvations contained in this judgment. The parties will bear their respective costs in all these tax revision cases, November 26, 1980 At the time when, the judgment in these tax revision cases was pronounced on 14th November, 1980, the learned Government Pleader appearing on behalf of the State orally prayed under article 134-A for the grant of certificates under article 133(1) of the Constitution to enable the State Government to carry these matters in appeal before the Supreme Court. The consideration of the said request was deferred to this day. After hearing both sides we have come to the conclusion that these are not fit cases for the grant of the certificates since they do not involve a substantial question of law of general importance on which a pronouncement by the Supreme Court can be said to be needed. Accordingly, we reject the request made on behalf of the State Government for the grant of certificates under article 133(1) of the Constitution. Ordered accordingly.
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1980 (11) TMI 148 - MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ned counsel for the assessee contended that the aforesaid decision did not take into account the distinction between the expressions disposal and disposed of . We are, however, not impressed with the argument. The learned counsel for the assessee has not been able to satisfy us that the decision of this Court in Khushal Chand Laxmichand v. Commissioner of Sales Tax (M.C.C. No. 117 of 1978) 1981 48 STC 567 requires reconsideration. It has not been shown to have been overruled by any Full Bench decision of this Court or by a decision of the Supreme Court. We, therefore, see no cogent reason to take a view different from that taken by the Division Bench of this Court in Khushal Chand Laxmichand v. Commissioner of Sales Tax (M.C.C. No. 117 of 1978) 1981 48 STC 567. Agreeing with the decision, our answer to the question referred to us is in the affirmative and in favour of the department. Parties shall bear their own costs of this reference. Reference answered in the affirmative.
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1980 (11) TMI 147 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ference so long as it is collected by the seller for parting with the property in the goods sold by him. We, therefore, see no merit in these writ petitions and tax revision case and accordingly dismiss the same, but in the circumstances, without costs. Advocate s fee Rs. 250 in each of these cases. Leave rejected. As we have only followed the Full Bench decision of our Court and the decisions of the Supreme Court in regard to the several contentions raised in the writ petitions and the T.R.C., we are unable to certify that these matters raise such questions of general importance and require the consideration by the Supreme Court. However, as the petitioners seek to move to the Supreme Court by special leave, in the circumstances of the case, while rejecting the request for granting leave to appeal to the Supreme Court, we direct the stay of the recovery of tax involved in these matters for a period of two months from the date of receipt of the judgment. Petitions dismissed.
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1980 (11) TMI 146 - KERALA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... is directly applicable to it, and that the decision of the Supreme Court in Mod. Serajuddin v. State of Orissa 1975 36 S.T.C. 136 (S.C.). could be clearly distinguished. As is the case in Mod. Serajuddin v. State of Orissa 1975 36 S.T.C. 136 (S.C.). , there were no two sales involved either in the present case or in the earlier case of the assessee reported in Deputy Commissioner v. I.C.I. (India) P. Ltd. 1973 32 S.T.C. 392. In the present case the Tribunal has found that the sale was in the course of import and that in importing the goods the assessee was only acting as the agent of its customers. Our view, therefore, is that no ground has been made out for reconsidering the ruling given by this Court in Deputy Commissioner v. I.C.I. (India) P. Ltd.(3), and that it is squarely applicable to the facts of the present case. In the result, we dismiss the revision however, in the circumstances of the case, we direct the parties to bear their respective costs. Petition dismissed.
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1980 (11) TMI 145 - DELHI HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... 65 16 S.T.C. 318 (S.C.)., also decided by the Supreme Court. He has also brought to our notice that a similar view has also been taken in an unreported case decided by a Bench of this Court in Commissioner of Sales Tax, Delhi Administration v. Venus Card Manufacturing Co., Delhi(1). We agree with this view and answer the question referred to us in the affirmative in favour of the Commissioner of Sales Tax and against the assessee. As the assessee is absent, there will be no order as to costs. We would also like to mention that under section 11(3a) the penalty cannot exceed the amount of the tax and as the quantum of penalty which was quashed by the Financial Commissioner was Rs. 3,000, it will be necessary for the revisional authority to determine the proper penalty chargeable in this case in the light of the provisions of section 11(3a) of the Act. Reference answered in the affirmative. (1) Sales Tax Reference No. 20 of 1974 decided on 16th October, 1979 (Delhi High Court).
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1980 (11) TMI 144 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ose slips can form the nexus only for the period earlier than the detection and it cannot be considered to give any nexus for a future transaction. The decision of the Kerala High Court, therefore, depended on the facts of that case and is not an authority for the learned counsel s contention that for the determination of the turnover suppressed also there should be some material. The learned counsel for the assessee then contended that since this is a regular appeal under section 37 of the Act, this Court could redetermine the escaped turnover and then invited us to estimate the suppressed turnover afresh. But we have no material on the basis of which either we could determine the turnover or we could say that the estimate made by the assessing officer was incorrect. We are, therefore, unable to redetermine the estimated suppressed turnover. The tax case (appeal) is accordingly dismissed. The respondent will be entitled to its costs, counsel s fee Rs. 250. Appeal dismissed.
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1980 (11) TMI 143 - MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... er of Sales Tax v. Regal Dairy, Mhow 1981 47 S.T.C. 374., a Division Bench of this Court has taken the view that mawa is a cooked food and is covered by entry 8 of Part I of Schedule II to the Act. This Court held that the entry in question is meant to cover those articles which are made fit for eating by a heating process as boiling, roasting or baking. It is common knowledge that in the preparation of ice-cream a heating process, i.e., boiling of the milk, is involved. We are in respectful agreement with the view taken by the Division Bench of this Court in the aforesaid decision. We are, therefore, of the opinion that the Board of Revenue was right in holding that ice-cream is a cooked food and is covered by entry 8 of Part I of Schedule II to the Act. 4.. Our answer therefore to the question referred to us is in the affirmative and against the department. In the circumstances the parties shall bear their own costs of this reference. Reference answered in the affirmative.
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1980 (11) TMI 142 - KERALA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... or perverse. What the assessing authority had done was to estimate the taxable turnover of the assessee by taking it as three times the running stock for the relevant period of account. We are unable to discern any error of law in the view expressed by the Tribunal that the said mode adopted by the assessing authority for arriving at the taxable turnover was reasonable and proper having regard to the whole facts and circumstances of the case. 7.. In the result, T.R.C. No. 175 of 1979 will stand dismissed. T.R.C. Nos. 161 and 162 of 1979 will stand allowed and in supersession of the direction given by the Tribunal in its order regarding the rate to be applied by the assessing authority in bringing the purchase turnover to tax, we hold that the said turnover will not fall within the scope of item No. 56 of the First Schedule to the Act and that it is taxable only at the general rate. We direct the parties to bear their respective costs in all these cases. Ordered accordingly.
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1980 (11) TMI 141 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... that raw hides and skins and dressed hides and skins are different commodities commercially and this view has been followed by this Court in more than one case. But even so, from the standpoint of declared goods, hides and skins, whether in a raw or dressed state, can suffer tax at only one stage. While, therefore, the two commodities are distinct and different, viewed as declared goods and because of the restriction on the local legislature forged by section 15 of the Central Act, it cannot be said that there is any discrimination such as inhibited by article 304(a). We see nothing in the above observations of the Bench in M.M. Anwaraulla AM. Ghouse and Company v. State of Tamil Nadu 1971 28 S.T.C. 610. which run counter to the decision of the Bench in Gordon Woodroffe and Company (Madras) Private Limited v. State of Tamil Nadu 1977 40 S.T.C. 130. Consequently we see no error of law in the order of the Tribunal. Hence the tax revision case is dismissed. Petition dismissed.
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1980 (11) TMI 140 - MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... Board did not bring out the real issue involved in this case. The question is, therefore, reframed as under Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Board was right in holding that imposition of penalty under section 43(1) of the Act was not justified? 4.. Now, the finding of the Board that the assessee had not concealed its turnover or had not filed a false return with dishonest intention is a finding based on the material on record. The Board took into consideration the fact that revised return showing the additional turnover was voluntarily filed by the assessee before the assessment was finalised. Learned counsel for the department was unable to satisfy us that the finding of the Board was based on no evidence or was based on surmises. Under the circumstances, our answer to the question reframed by us is in the affirmative and against the department. 5. Reference answered accordingly. Parties to bear their own costs. Reference answered accordingly.
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1980 (11) TMI 139 - DELHI HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ided on 17th March, 1970, by the Additional District Judge, it was held that dahi bhala, dahi pakori, etc., were also halwai preparations. It was also contended that in previous years, the assessee, we are now dealing with, has been assessed as a halwai at the lower rate of tax without any objection. Keeping in view the circumstances of this case, we agree that chaat preparations of the dealer can be treated as preparations ordinarily prepared by halwais. We would accordingly answer the two questions referred to us as follows We would answer the first question in the affirmative holding that the notification does apply and the second question also in the affirmative holding that the Additional District Judge had correctly held that the taxable turnover was subject to tax at the rate of two per cent and not five per cent. We would, however, leave the parties to bear their own costs as the case is not covered by any previously reported decision. Reference answered accordingly.
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1980 (11) TMI 138 - MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ssessing authority were defective. It, therefore, follows that even after the coming into force of the amending Act No. 20 of 1961, which is not retrospective, the assessing authority would have no jurisdiction to reopen the assessment of the assessee for the assessment year 1959-60 on the ground that the C forms on the basis of which concessional rates were allowed to the assessee were defective. The Tribunal, in our opinion, was therefore justified in holding that the assessing authority could not in the instant case lawfully reopen the assessment of the assessee for the assessment year 1959-60. 5.. For all these reasons, our answer to the question reframed by us is in the negative and in favour of the assessee. In the circumstances of the case, parties shall bear their own costs of this reference. We would like to place on record that valuable assistance was rendered to us by Shri M.S. Choudhry, Advocate, who agreed to act as amicus curiae. Reference answered accordingly.
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1980 (11) TMI 137 - MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... cided on 7th February, 1980), following the decision of the Supreme Court in Deputy Commissioner of Sales Tax v. Pai and Co. 1980 45 S.T.C. 58 (S.C.). It is not the case of the revenue that the turpentine oil sold by the assessee had anything to do with dyes, paints, varnishes, etc., and as stated above it is not disputed that the turpentine oil produced and sold by the assessee is a by-product arising out of the refined crude oil and its origin is mineral oil. In the circumstances we are of the opinion that the Board of Revenue has rightly held that the mineral oil sold by the assessee was taxable under entry No. 39 of Part II of Schedule II to the Act. 7.. Our answer, therefore, to the question referred to us is that, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the mineral turpentine comes under entry No. 39 of Part II of Schedule II to the Act. In the circumstances of the case the parties shall bear their own costs of this reference. Reference answered accordingly.
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1980 (11) TMI 136 - HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA
Winding up – Suits stayed on winding-up order ... ... ... ... ..... he High Court with jurisdiction to entertain and dispose of any suit or proceeding by or against the company. Reference may also be made to the provisions of r. 9 of the Companies (Court) Rules, 1959, wherein it has been provided that nothing in the Rules shall be deemed to limit or otherwise affect the inherent powers of the court to give such directions or pass such orders as may be necessary for the ends of justice or to prevent abuse of the process of the court. This rule also saves the inherent power of the court to pass appropriate orders which may be necessary for the ends of justice or to prevent the abuse of the process of the court. We are, therefore, inclined to hold that the High Court can exercise jurisdiction in suits and proceedings, including criminal proceedings in appropriate cases, by or against the company. The question of law referred to this Bench is answered accordingly and the case may now be listed before a learned single judge for appropriate orders.
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1980 (11) TMI 133 - HIGH COURT OF CALCUTTA
Amalgamation ... ... ... ... ..... directed the grant of police help for the purpose of executing the writ of delivery of possession. In view of the said facts, we are of the view that the direction for police help is not unreasonable. Before we part with these appeals, it may be stated that it is desirable that the tabular statement should be amended by deleting the name of Binani Properties (P.) Ltd. and substituting in its place the name of the respondent, Metal Distributors Ltd., so as to obviate all future difficulties in executing the decree. For the reasons aforesaid, we affirm the judgment and order of Salil Kumar Roy Chowdhury J., and dismiss these appeals. The respondent will be entitled to amend the tabular statement by deleting the name of the decree-holder, Binani Properties (P.) Ltd., and, in its place, substituting the name of the respondent, Metal Distributors Ltd. In view of the facts and circumstances of the case, there will be no order for costs in any of the appeals. Sen, CJ. mdash I agree.
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1980 (11) TMI 122 - HIGH COURT OF MADRAS
Meeting and proceedings – Power of Company Law Board to order meeting to be called ... ... ... ... ..... rver in a great predicament, if what is claimed or observed by him is ultimately found to be not correct, or that himself being not very much conversant with the affairs of the company he had not properly understood the situation, etc., it would result in the court having appointed a person who could be of no assistance either to the court or to the company or even to the applicant. When such are the possibilities, a court would not come forward to exercise its inherent powers to bring about such a piquant situation for an observer to be appointed by it and who would have no right to be present in a company meeting convened by the company. When the applicant has got remedies available to him under the Companies Act if improprieties or illegalities are committed in the said meeting, the invocation of rule 9 to satisfy his requirements cannot be acceded to, and the purport of rule 9 is not for sub-serving such interests. Hence, this application is dismissed as not maintainable.
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