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Case Laws
Showing 41 to 60 of 236 Records
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1981 (1) TMI 255 - CENTRAL BOARD OF EXCISE AND CUSTOMS
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... ... ..... trospectively. But even such retrospective operation will not change the nature of the tax and it will be payable according to the provisions enacted in the charging section of the relevant statutes. Therefore, interpreting Section of the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944, we are of the opinion that the liability for tax, namely the excise duty would arise no sooner the manufacture of the production is completed and it is immaterial as to what machinery may be devised by the Central Government under the rule making powers for recovery of a tax. The point of recovery or any restrictions on removal will not be the determining factor for grant of exemption in respect of goods manufactured during the duty-free period.” The case decided by the Court being on similar factors, is applicable here also. 4. Since the aforementioned observations are also valid in the instant case, the Collector’s order in appeal is set aside and in ordering so the Board, allows the appeal.
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1981 (1) TMI 254 - APPELLATE COLLECTOR OF CENTRAL EXCISE, MADRAS
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... ... ..... 12/78 and 713/78, dated 29-4-1978. I have carefully examined the appellants’ case vis-a-vis the impugned order, Apart from the decision of the Appellate Collector in A. Nos. 712/78 and 713/78 cited there, is an order of the Government of India in revision bearing No. 925/80 and dated 12-9-80 1980 E.L.T. 788 to the effect that Hessian-sandwitch paper is classifiable under Tariff Item 22(A) and that such goods as have Hessian predominantly by weight are to be classified as jute products only. Going by this decision of the Government, I am of the opinion that the appellants’ case deserves reconsideration. Accordingly, I vacate the impugned order and remand the case, so that it may be reopened and decided afresh by the lower authority in the light of my observations herein and in the light of any material which the appellants may like to place before him. Copy of the Government’s order in revision is to be enclosed to this order). Thus, I dispose of the appeal.
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1981 (1) TMI 253 - CENTRAL BOARD OF EXCISE & CUSTOMS
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... ... ..... at Delhi on 6-1-1981 through his Advocate. 2. The Board has considered the defence contensions. Even if it is conceded that the newspapers recovered along with the currency indicated that these were used for wrapping gold, the question would still remain whether the gold was smuggled gold and the currency in question was the sale proceeds of such gold. It appears to the Board that it will be too hypothetical to presume all these factors and in the absence of sufficient evidence to attract the provisions of Section 121 of the Customs Act and ordering confiscation of the currency in question, the Board set aside the Collector’s orders and directs that the currency be released.
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1981 (1) TMI 252 - CENTRAL BOARD OF EXCISE & CUSTOMS, NEW DELHI
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... ... ..... rial on record. 28. The Board also agrees with the pleas of the appellant that in the absence of any corroborative/collateral and satisfactory evidence, the demand of duty for the period earlier to the results of samples drawn in the year 1973 or later is not sustainable in law. 29. In such circumstances, the Board allows the appeal in regard to the demand of duty. 30. The Board is also concerned about the massive penalty of ₹ 15 lakhs imposed on the appellants. The Board is constrained to observe that Rule 173-Q confers enormous powers on the Adjudicating Authority and is like a steam hammer that has to be used not with enormity but with circumspection and great caution. It is not intended to be used indiscriminately, and in any event not to swat conjectoral and inferential files, however, real they may seem to appear. 31. The penalty in this case utterly unwarranted and is accordingly set aside. 32. In the result the appeal succeeds in full.
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1981 (1) TMI 251 - SUPREME COURT
Whether or not the documents demanded by the detenu were relevant was decided not by the Minister who was the detaining authority but by the Secretary?
Held that:- it is absolutely clear to us that whether the documents concerned are referred to, relied upon or taken into consideration by the detaining authority they have to be supplied to the detenu as part of the grounds so as to enable the detenu to make an effective representation immediately on receiving the grounds of detention. This not having been done in the present case the continued detention of the petitioner must be held to be void.
The representation made by the detenu on 3-10-1980 has been rejected on 14-10-1980 not by the Home Minister but by the Secretary, thus, the representation has been rejected by an authority which had no jurisdiction at all to consider or pass any orders on the representation of the detenu. Allow this petition and direct the detenu to be released
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1981 (1) TMI 250 - SUPREME COURT
Whether Sec. 18-AA excludes natural justice by necessary implication?
Held that:- Appeal allowed. Neither Sec. 18-F of the Industries (Development and Regulation) Act nor Sec. 21 of the General Clauses Act, by itself, excludes natural justice. The exclusion of natural justice, where such exclusion is not express, has to be implied by reference to the subject, the statute and the statutory situation. Where an express provision in the statute itself provides for a post decisional hearing the other provisions of the statute will have to be read in the light of such provision and the provision for post decisional hearing may then clinch the issue where pre-decisional natural justice appears to be excluded on the other terms of the statute. That a post-decisional hearing may also be had by the terms of Sec. 21 of the General Clauses Act may not necessarily help in the interpretation of the provisions of the statute concerned. On the other hand even the general provision contained in Sec. 21 of the General Clauses Act may be sufficient to so interpret the terms of a given statute as to exclude natural justice. As I said it depends on the subject, statute and the statutory situation.
Therefore, satisfied that the principles of natural justice are not attracted to the situations contemplated by Sec. 18-AA of the Industries (Development and Regulation) Act.
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1981 (1) TMI 249 - SUPREME COURT
Orders of acquittal - allegation of murder.
Held that:- Partly allow this appeal by the State, set aside the acquittal of Wassan Singh and Mukhtar Singh accused (respondents) and convict them under Section 302 read with Section 34, Penal Code for the murder of Hazara Singh deceased and sentence each of them to imprisonment for life. We would, however, accord the benefit of doubt to the rest of the accused (respondents) and maintain their acquittal on all the counts. Wasson Singh and Mukhtar Singh shall surrender to their bail-bonds to serve out the sentences inflicted on them.
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1981 (1) TMI 248 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ds including preparations of vegetables, fruits, milk, cereals, flour, starch, birds eggs, meat and meat offals, animal blood, fish crustaceans and molluses which- (a) are sold under any brand name registered under the Trade and Merchandise Marks Act, 1958 (Central Act 43 of 1958) and (b) do not fall under item 24. Item 24 relates to milk foods (excluding milk but including milk powder) . It is not in dispute that appalams are made out of blackgram flour. Thus, the goods fall within item 103(viii) as preparations out of cereals. We do not see any error of law in the judgment of the Tribunal. The tax revision case fails and the same is dismissed.
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1981 (1) TMI 247 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... anufacturing processes. Therefore, item 2 of the Second Schedule cannot apply. The other question is whether it comes under item 95 of the First Schedule to the Act or not. We have already extracted that item, and the relevant expression is including surgical dressing , and therefore, the question to be considered is whether the product of the petitioner can be said to be surgical dressing or not. It is admitted that the product has been described as absorbent cotton wool I.P. and it has been packed in 100 grams for being used as surgical dressing and the label also mentions that it has to be sterilised before use. The use of the expression I.P. in the very name itself as well as the requirement of its being sterilised before use clearly show that the product of the petitioner will fall within the classification of surgical dressing and consequently, the order of Tribunal holding to that effect cannot be said to be erroneous in law. Hence, the tax revision case is dismissed.
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1981 (1) TMI 246 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ons make it clear that when once the registration has been granted on a proper application made by a dealer and on payment of the required fee, the registration continues till it is cancelled, subject to the obligation of the dealer applying for renewal each year by paying the renewal fee, and this application was not intended to be in any technical form and even the mere writing of a letter would be sufficient. As a matter of fact, the language of rule 24(9) is completely in accordance with section 21(7) of the Act, and therefore when once as in the present case the department had accepted the fees for renewal for four years paid by the respondent herein, the department had no right to treat the respondent as an unregistered dealer having regard to the provisions referred to above and levy a penalty under section 22 of the Act. The result is that the Tribunal cannot be said to have decided a question of law erroneously. The tax revision case fails and the same is dismissed.
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1981 (1) TMI 245 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... held to be invalid and set aside by the Appellate Assistant Commissioner resulting in the original proceedings being left at large. The argument that the notice dated 19th February, 1974, sought to revise the original assessment order dated 7th December, 1964, and therefore it is beyond the period of limitation, cannot be accepted. The notice dated 28th February, 1968, had already reopened the original assessment and that proceeding had not rendered the finality. In a number of cases it has been held that the limitation will have to be reckoned only with reference to the notice for reopening the assessment vide Lakshmanaswami Chettiar and Sons v. State of Tamil Nadu 1980 46 STC 327 and other cases cited therein. In the result, therefore, the reassessment order was within time and therefore there is no need to interfere with the order of the Tribunal. No other points are argued in this petition. The revision accordingly fails and is dismissed withcosts. Counsel s fee Rs. 250.
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1981 (1) TMI 244 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... icult to hold that there were no earlier taxable sales in the State and that the respondent herein who had come into possession of the goods after two or three stages had become the first seller in the State, and that there was no sufficient material for the assessing officer to make the assessment under section 16 in respect of an escaped turnover. By making these observations and reaching this conclusion, the Tribunal cannot be said to have committed any error of law so as to entitle this Court to interfere in revision. The tax revision case is therefore dismissed.
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1981 (1) TMI 243 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... xamined is whether the Appellate Assistant Commissioner was justified in remanding the matter back to the assessing officer. The pre-assessment notice in the present case was dated 27th October, 1978, and the matter was adjourned from time to time and ultimately on 18th January, 1979, the assessing officer intimated the assessees that further extension of time would be granted up to 25th January, 1979, and if they failed to furnish the C form, orders would be passed without any further notice. Orders were passed on 29th January, 1979. This is a case in which the assessees had nearly three months within which they could have produced all the relevant forms. As they did not do so, the Board came to the conclusion that the Appellate Assistant Commissioner was not justified in saying that sufficient time was not given to the assessees by the assessing officer. In the circumstances, the order of the Board cannot be said to suffer from any error. The appeal is therefore dismissed.
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1981 (1) TMI 242 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... onfirmed while in regard to a particular question the case was remanded with a direction to decide it afresh after giving an opportunity to the assessee to establish its case. Therefore, after remand the jurisdiction of the assessing authority was confined only to the subject-matter which was remanded to it. Since the assessee did not challenge the order of the appellate authority by way of a revision, that order became final and that being so the assessee could not have reagitated that part of the case which had become final, in proceedings after remand. The Sales Tax Officer as well as the appellate authority, therefore, were right in repelling the attempt of the assessee to reagitate the question of the liability to tax under the Central Act of the disputed turnover while the Additional Judge (Revisions) erred in law in taking a contrary view. The revision hence succeeds and is allowed. The Commissioner is entitled to costs which are assessed at Rs. 200. Petition allowed.
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1981 (1) TMI 241 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... revising authority is not precluded from going into and pronouncing upon such a question when raised before it. In fact, it is the duty of the revising authority to decide all questions raised before it . In view of this pronouncement it is clear that it was the duty of the revising authority to decide all questions of fact and law raised before it. The fact that there were concurrent findings recorded on a question of fact by the two lower authorities would not preclude him from going into and pronouncing upon such a question itself. Since the revising authority did not do so, the case, in so far as the business of brick kiln is concerned, will have to be remanded for fresh consideration. The revisions are hence allowed in part and the cases for both the years under consideration are remanded to the Sales Tax Tribunal for decision afresh in so far as the business of brick kiln is concerned. In the circumstances, there will be no order as to costs. Petitions partly allowed.
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1981 (1) TMI 240 - DELHI HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... oduced before us as an example of the type of stapling that had been done by this dealer during the relevant period. Mr. Chawla, for the Commissioner of Sales Tax, does not dispute this sample, but submits that normally a person would break the stapling even in such a case in order to extract the pop corn easily. Mr. Chawla may be correct and it is probable that a person greedily anxious to get at the contents would break the staples to do so, yet it is possible to get at the pop corn without breaking the staples. As such, in the facts and circumstances of this case, we feel that the stapled polythene bags are not sealed containers, especially as the Supreme Court in G.G. Industries 1968 21 STC 63 (SC) held that access should be impossible without breaking the fastening. In the result, the answer to the question is in the affirmative and in favour of the respondent-dealer. The respondent will be entitled to costs. Counsel s fee Rs. 150. Reference answered in the affirmative.
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1981 (1) TMI 239 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... o the sales tax department, the balance of that amount would be the revenue income in the hands of the assessee-dealer chargeable to income-tax and it was further held that as and when this amount was paid to the Government it would be allowed to the assessee as deduction. The Calcutta High Court in its decision in the case of Ikrahnandi Coal Co. v. Commissioner of Income-tax 1968 69 ITR 488 has proceeded on the same principle. The Gujarat High Court applied the same principle in the case of Motilal Ambaidas v. Commissioner of Income-tax, Gujarat II 1977 108 ITR 136. In view of the ratio of the aforesaid decisions, we are of the view that the Tribunal was in error in holding that the amount in question did not represent the assessee s taxable income in the facts found by the Tribunal. In the premises, the question is answered in the negative and in favour of the revenue. There will be no order as to costs. SUDHINDRA MOHAN GUHA, J.-I agree. Reference answered in the negative.
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1981 (1) TMI 238 - MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... t competent to levy tax on the sales in question on the facts and in the circumstances of the case. 8.. As regards question No. (3) the assessee did not include the sales in question in his return because according to him the State of Madhya Pradesh was not competent to tax such sales. In the circumstances, it cannot be said that the filing of the inaccurate return was accompanied by a guilty mind and therefore, as held by the Supreme Court in Cement Marketing Co. of India Ltd. v. Assistant Commissioner of Sales Tax, Indore 1980 45 STC 197 (SC), the imposition of penalty on the assessee under section 43(1) of the Act read with section 9(2) of the Central Act was not justified on the facts and in the circumstances of the case. Our answer to question No. (3) therefore is in the negative and against the department. 9.. The reference is answered accordingly. In the circumstances of the case the parties shall bear their own costs of this reference. Reference answered accordingly.
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1981 (1) TMI 237 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... for the purpose of complying with the agreement or order for or in relation to such export of sea foods. In these cases the Tribunal records the following findings The packing cases were not the subject-matters of the contracts for export. The commodity mentioned in the order placed by the foreign importers and in the import purchase confirmation given by them and in the invoices raised by the exporters is Indian frozen shrimps . The goods referred to in section 5(3) are the goods contracted for export and cannot include the packing materials. In view of this finding, the sale of packing materials effected by the petitioners herein cannot be said to have been made after and for the purpose of complying with the agreement or order for or in relation to such export of Indian frozen shrimps. Hence, we cannot hold that the Tribunal has committed any error of law so as to warrant interference by this Court. The tax revision cases fail and they are dismissed. Petitions dismissed.
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1981 (1) TMI 236 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... considered to be electrical goods in respect of which an inquiry can be made with dealers in electrical goods and further that the dealers in electrical goods are expected to know about the goods in question. In fact, both from a commonsense point of view and a trade point of view also, the rectifiers are required to be classified as electrical goods falling under entry 20 in Schedule C. 10.. In the premises, we answer the question which is raised in each of the above references in the affirmative, that is to say, in favour of the department and against the applicants. The applicants will pay to the respondents costs of the reference in Sales Tax Reference No. 31 of 1976 fixed at Rs. 300. There will be no order as to costs in the rest of the references. The fees of Rs. 100 deposited by the applicants in each of the above references to be adjusted against the above order of costs and the balance amount to be refunded to the applicants. References answered in the affirmative.
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