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Case Laws
Showing 21 to 40 of 233 Records
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1982 (2) TMI 308 - GOVERNMENT OF INDIA
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... ... ..... f poor quality. Rather, it is observed to be of the same quality as those used for corrective lenses inasmuch as they are said to be Opthalmic Crown type, although the subject glass cannot be used for corrective lenses because the thickness of the subject glass is less than that which is required for making corrective lenses. 5. Thus having regard to the above said findings and also in view of the fact that there is no ISI specification yet for coloured optical glass, the Government see no reason not to accept the suppliers’ certificate and the certificate from Dr. M.R. Padhye, professor in the University of Bombay and hold that because of their superior quality and use the subject goods do fall within the purview of optical glass classifiable under Heading 70.17/18 of CTA 1975. 6. In view of the foregoing, the Government, set aside the appellate order and allow the revision application with direction to re-assess the goods under Heading 70.17/18 of CTA 1975.
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1982 (2) TMI 307 - GOVERNMENT OF INDIA
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... ... ..... ustoms or Central Excise, as the case may be, will have complete jurisdiction to decide as to the quantum of duty chargeable on the goods. In fact there is not a single good reason that has been adduced by the petitioners in support of their contention that their claims which were hit by limitation under Section 27(1) of the Customs Act should still be considered on merits. 16. In view of the above, the Government of India hold that such claims of the importers as were hit by limitation under Section 27(1) of the Customs Act, 1962 have been rightly rejected by the original authority and accordingly the Government direct that to this extent the orders of the appellate authority shall be set aside and the orders of the original authority restored. Barring such claims as were hit by limitation under Section 27(1) of the Customs Act, the remaining claims of the petitioners are, however, allowed by way of benefit of doubt. The order-in-appeal is modified to the above extent.
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1982 (2) TMI 306 - DEPUTY COLLECTOR OF CUSTOMS (PREV.). GOLD CONTROL, BOMBAY
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... ... ..... . It would be gross injustice to deny a licence simply because norms fixed by the Govt. are not satisfied even though the requirements of law are satisfied. I am stressing on this point to plead the inability of the licensing authority to take into consideration the norms fixed by the Govt. to decide an issue either way unless such norms have been incorporated in the statute itself. Having regard to the reasons given in my order dated 5th September, 1981 which was the subject matter of the appeal and reconsideration now, I reject the application. No fresh opportunity to put forth the applicant’s case again before me is given as I am not relying on any fresh evidence against the applicant. The principles of natural justice are satisfied so long as nothing is hidden from the applicant while deciding his application for licence. ORDER 5. I reject the application for dealer’s licence with the direction to the applicant to claim refund of licence fee paid by him.
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1982 (2) TMI 305 - CENTRAL BOARD OF EXCISE AND CUSTOMS
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... ... ..... concessional rate of duty where such concession is subject to the use of the material in the use of fertilizers. As the ammonia in question has been clearly sold for use as chemicals, the feedstock used in their production cannot be accepted as use in the manufacture of fertilizers. 10. The Board accordingly sets aside the orders of the Collector and directs that the question of recovery of duty be reconsidered with reference to the quantity of feedstock used in the manufacture of ammonia which has been sold as chemicals. The orders demanding duty in regard to the feedstock used during the trial run and that used in the generation of steam are set aside as legally untenable. In the facts of the case, the Board also does not find any justification for penalty, but the Board would emphasise on the appellants the need for scrupulously following the departmental procedure in regard to the use and storage of duty paid and other material. The orders of penalty are set aside.
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1982 (2) TMI 304 - APPELLATE COLLECTOR OF CENTRAL EXCISE, CALCUTTA
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... ... ..... d Trade Notice issued by the Collector. This executive instruction for reducing the amount of exemption on the ground that this exemption has not been passed to the customers has been quashed by the Delhi High Court and therefore they are no longer existent and cannot be acted upon. 3. I accept the above submissions of Mr. N.C. Sen. For the purpose of granting the set-off under Notification No. 198/76 the ex-factory price should be taken as the basis of calculation because that is the correct assessable value. The marginal deduction in the rate of exemption under the Executive Instructions issued by the Central Board of Excise and Customs cannot be acted upon inasmuch as the same has been quashed by the High Court at Delhi. The appellants are entitled to the rebate at the full rate as given in the Notification. I, therefore, allow the appeal and set aside the order of the Assistant Collector with direction to grant the refund according to the principles mentioned above.
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1982 (2) TMI 303 - KERALA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... 53 of the Customs Act, and that the date of actual receipt of by the party was not relevant. 9. The next contention of the petitioner is that in view of the proviso to Section 71, and in view of the evidence before the authorities that the gold in question belonged to the petitioner’s son-in-law and another, the confiscation could not have been ordered. But the language of the proviso to Section 71 is very guarded. It requires that the party should establish to the satisfaction of the adjudicating officer that the conditions prescribed therein were there. What matters is the satisfaction of the adjudicating officer, and the concerned officer in this case was not satisfied. The appellate and the revisional authorities were also not satisfied. It is essentially a question of fact, not ordinarily open for review under Article. 226. 10. No other points are raised. The confiscation order should therefore stand. The O.P. is dismissed without any orders as to costs.
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1982 (2) TMI 302 - SUPREME COURT
Whether the appellant who was recruited as casual labour continued to be the same or he had acquired the status of temporary railway servant at the time of termination of his service?
Held that:- There is no dispute that the appellant would be a workman within the meaning of the expression in s. 2(s) of the Act. Further, it is incontrovertible that he has rendered continuous service for a period over twenty years. Therefore, the first condition of s. 25F that appellant is a workman who has rendered service for not less than one year under the Railway administration, an employer carrying on an industry, and that his service is terminated which for the reason hereinbefore given would constitute retrenchment. It is immaterial that he is a daily rated worker. He is either doing manual or technical work and his salary was less than ₹ 500/- and the termination of his service does not fall in any of the excepted categories. Therefore, assuming that he was a daily rated worker, once he has rendered continuous uninterrupted service for a period of one year or more within the meaning of s. 25F of the Act and his service is terminated for any reason whatsoever and the case does not fall in any of the excepted categories notwithstanding the fact that Rule 2505 would be attracted, it would have to be read subject to the provisions of the Act. Accordingly the termination of service in this case would constitute retrenchment and for not complying with pre-conditions to valid retrenchment, the order of termination would be illegal and invalid.
Accordingly, we allow this appeal, set aside the order of the High Court and declare that the termination of service of the appellant was illegal and invalid and the appellant continues to be in service and he would be entitled to full back wages and costs quantified at ₹ 2,000.
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1982 (2) TMI 301 - SUPREME COURT
Whether the F.I.R.. Lodged by the commercial Tax officer,Bureau of Investigation, against the firm and its partners discloses an offence under section 3 of "The Prize Chits and Money Circulation Schemes (Banning) Act", 43 of 1978?
Held that:- Appeal dismissed. As no offence under the Act is at all disclosed, it will be manifestly unjust to allow the process of criminal code to be issued or continued against the firm and to allow any investigation which will be clearly without any authority.
In the view that I have taken, I do not consider it necessary to deal with other aspects namely, as to whether the searches and seizures were lawfully and properly done. I, therefore, hold that the proceedings against the firm and its partners arising out of the F.I.R. must be quashed as the F.I.R. and the other materials do not disclose any offence under the Act and as such no investigation into the affairs of the firm under the Act can be permitted or allowed to be continued. I, accordingly, quash the proceedings against that firm and its partners and order that no investigation under the Act into affairs of the firm is to be carried on or continued. I agree with the final order proposed by the learned Chief Justice in regard to the return of the documents, books and cash.
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1982 (2) TMI 300 - KARNATAKA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... rs relating to the challenge to section 6B of the Karnataka Sales Tax Act, 1957, we direct the office, in relaxation of the rules regarding issue of writs, that a common writ with short cause title of the first case in the batch, shall be issued to the State and the Commissioner of Commercial Taxes. It shall not be necessary to issue individual writs. A copy of the writ shall also be furnished to Sri M.R. Achar, the learned Government Advocate. (6) In the circumstances of the case, the parties are left to bear and pay their own costs in all these petitions. At the conclusion of the above order, the learned counsel for the petitioners made oral applications under article 134-A of the Constitution for certificates of fitness under article 133 to appeal to the Supreme Court from this order. The case, in our opinion, does involve substantial questions of law of general importance needing to be decided by the Supreme Court. We accordingly grant certificates of fitness prayed for.
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1982 (2) TMI 299 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... atement made by Devabhai M. Patel and Thakorebhai and on the finding arrived at by the Tribunal that the recovery of 221.43 carats of diamonds, 19 slips of paper and a pocket note book from Devabhai M. Patel related only to the dealer and not to Devabhai M. Patel in his individual capacity. Therefore, in any event, on the facts and circumstances of the case, section 55 of the Act is not attracted at all. In the circumstances, the order dated 16th August, 1978, passed by the Tribunal allowing the Review Applications Nos. 2 and 3 of 1978 has to be and is set aside. The result is that the subsequent order passed by the Tribunal on 30th November, 1978, disposing of Appeals Nos. 1331 and 1332 of 1978 setting aside the orders of the Appellate Assistant Commissioner and remanding the matter for fresh disposal have also to be set aside and are set aside. In the result, both the tax revision cases and the writ petitions are allowed, but in the circumstances of the case without costs.
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1982 (2) TMI 298 - ORISSA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... cient to indicate that there would be no liability under the Additional Sales Tax Act in respect of inter-State and export sales. 5.. As regards the fourth and last point, challenge is to rule 4(2) of the Rules made under the 1975 Act which authorises imposition of penalty in the event of default. It has been contended that in the absence of statutory provision for levy of penalty, under delegated legislation no rule could be made for such imposition. The learned standing counsel concedes in view of the pronounced authorities of the Supreme Court on this score, that the State Government as delegated legislating authority could not, without appropriate statutory function, authorise imposition of penalty. In view of this concession, which we accept as fair, the rule which authorised imposition of penalty must be struck down as ultra vires the Act. 6.. The writ application is disposed of with the aforesaid direction. No costs. BEHERA, J.-I agree with my Lord, the Chief justice.
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1982 (2) TMI 297 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... it sent the goods to the Bombay branch from where the goods ultimately found their way to the purchaser. We do not, however, think that this makes any difference to the application of section 3(a) of the Act. In our judgment, it does not matter how many stopovers there are in the delivery State before the goods reach the purchaser s hands. All that matters is that the movement of the goods is in pursuance of the contract of sale or as a necessary incident to the sale itself. For all these reasons, we hold that that the impugned assessment was correctly made and both the assessing authorities and the Tribunal were justified in dealing with these transactions as sales in the course of inter-State trade and in bringing them to charge under the Central Sales Tax Act. Accordingly, all these revision petitions are dismissed. Since the assessee has failed in all these revisions, it will pay the costs to the State Government. Counsel s fee Rs. 250 one set. (In T.C. No. 707 of 1977).
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1982 (2) TMI 296 - ORISSA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... one hand it would workout hardship and injustice and on the other it would give a premium to the defaulting assessee. All the three questions which have been referred to us can be conveniently put into one. We would accordingly reframe the question thus Whether, in the facts and circumstances of the case, the Member, Additional Sales Tax Tribunal, was justified in law in confining the consideration in second appeal to the question of dismissal of the first appeal on ground of limitation or was he entitled, and therefore, was required to examine the matter on merits? Our answer to the question as reframed by us must be against the assessee, i.e. In the facts and circumstances of the case, the Member, Additional Sales Tax Tribunal, was justified in law in confining the consideration in second appeal to the question of dismissal of the first appeal on ground of limitation and he was not entitled to examine the merits of the matter. We make no order as to costs. DAS, J.-I agree.
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1982 (2) TMI 295 - ORISSA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... eptance of additional evidence within the meaning of the relevant rules under the Orissa Sales Tax Rules of 1947. No application for receiving such additional evidence in the facts of the case was warranted. 6.. We would, answer both the questions against the revenue by saying (1) On the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Member, Additional Sales Tax Tribunal, was right in holding that declarations in form C were produced before the Assistant Commissioner of Sales Tax and the State is precluded from disputing this question at this stage. (2) On the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Member, Additional Sales Tax Tribunal, was correct in law in directing entertainment of the C forms and disposal thereof in accordance with law. It is not correct that the Additional Sales Tax Tribunal has directed acceptance of the C forms as envisaged in the question. The assessee shall have costs. Hearing fee is assessed at rupees one hundred only. BEHERA, J.-I agree.
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1982 (2) TMI 294 - PUNJAB AND HARYANA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... l authority was yet to decide what bit of information it was going to rely upon if at all it decides to revise the earlier order of assessment passed against the petitioner-firm. This, to my mind, is no satisfactory answer to the legal objection raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner-firm. The learned counsel appearing before the revisional authority are not supposed to argue at random. When suo motu notice is issued on the basis of some information, whether it relates to a point of fact or a question of law, then the arguments have to be advanced on the point whether the authority concerned should take action or not. In such a case, an assessee has a right to be told in advance why the case was being reopened to his disadvantage. I would, therefore, accept this petition, quash the notice dated 9th June, 1972, and leave it to the respondent to take further action if he is so advised after issuing a fresh notice in accordance with law. There is no order as to costs.
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1982 (2) TMI 293 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... appears in the form of an inference from the failure of the dealer to maintain proper accounts from which the purchases made by him could be held verifiable. Also on the fact that during the relevant period, there were no check posts through which the entry of the goods could have been checked. Before the turnover of sale, even as estimated, could be subjected to tax in the hands of the applicant-dealer it had to be found, as a fact, that what had been sold by him were tyres imported by him from outside the State. Further, this finding had to be based on positive material to which reference should have been contained in the orders passed. Since, in this case, no positive finding has been recorded that the applicant had made sale of tyres to the extent aforesaid after importing them, it is obvious that the liability fastened upon him cannot be upheld. The revisions succeed and are allowed. The orders passed by the authorities are set aside. Parties shall bear their own costs.
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1982 (2) TMI 292 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... commodity after importing it. It was observed in that case Before the turnover of sale, even as estimated, could be subjected to tax in the hands of the applicantdealer it had to be found, as a fact, that what had been sold by him were tyres imported by him from outside the State. Further, this finding had to be based on positive material to which reference should have been contained in the orders passed. The dictum of that case fully covers the present one. Since the Tribunal was under an erroneous impression that some exemption was being claimed by the applicant-dealer, and it proceeded to consider the dealer s case in that light, it has become necessary to require the Tribunal to go into the matter again in accordance with law. Its order is, therefore, set aside. The revision succeeds. The case is remanded to the Tribunal for reconsideration. A copy of the decision shall be forwarded to the Tribunal in terms of section 11(8) of the Act. Parties shall bear their own costs.
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1982 (2) TMI 291 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... issioner of Sales Tax v. Berar Oil Industries 1975 36 STC 473 and held that in that case a Pro rata formula was applied because the sales of notified goods were less than what it should have been. That decision is of no application to a case where the sale of notified goods is more than what could have been. Here out of a total production of 6 1/2 crores worth vegetable oil sales worth only Rs. 22,69,015 were outside the State. The rest of the entire production was admittedly sold within the State or in the course of inter-State trade. Hence the sale of notified goods was in accordance with the provisions and not in violation of it, looked at from any point of view. Consequently the decision of this Court in Chittarmal Ram Dayal 1983 52 STC 18 1980 UPTC 274 is fully applicable on facts. The Bombay decision is distinguishable on facts. The Tribunal took a correct view of the law. The revision has no merits and is accordingly dismissed with costs which are assessed at Rs. 200.
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1982 (2) TMI 290 - ORISSA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... question for want of notice to the assessee that such material was going to be utilised against him. The Tribunal clearly went wrong in culling out from the reported decisions such a requirement. Once the rules of natural justice were found to have been satisfied, the accounts were liable to rejection and the assessing officer was entitled to make a best judgment assessment. The first question has, therefore, to be answered against the assessee and we would hold that, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Member, Additional Sales Tax Tribunal, was wrong in law to have held that the confronted facts became untested material for want of warning to the assessee that they were going to be used in the assessment. 4.. Once the answer in respect of the first question is against the assessee, the second question does not arise for consideration. The parties are directed to bear their own costs of these references. BEHERA, J.-I agree with my Lord, the Chief Justice.
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1982 (2) TMI 289 - ORISSA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... eriod of 14 days which may be comprised in one session or in two or more successive sessions and if during the said period the State Legislature makes modifications, if any, therein the rules shall thereafter have effect only in such modified form so, however, that such modificiations shall be without prejudice to the validity of anything previously done under the Rules. When this point was pressed, we directed the learned standing counsel by order dated 14th January, 1982, to file an additional affidavit indicating clearly if the requirements of section 4(2) of the 1975 Act had been satisfied. An affidavit has now been filed which shows that the requirements of the sub-section were completely satisfied. Therefore, there is no force in that contention. 11.. All the points advanced by Mr. Agarwala on behalf of the petitioners fail. This writ application is accordingly dismissed. We direct the parties to bear their own costs. BEHERA, J.-I agree with my Lord, the Chief Justice.
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