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Showing 81 to 100 of 233 Records
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1982 (2) TMI 166 - ITAT NAGPUR
Assessment, Limitation Period For Commencing ... ... ... ... ..... ntable person. 4. However, the crucial point in this case is whether the return has been filed by the accountable person voluntarily. The meaning of the word voluntary is quite clear. The Chamber s Twentieth Century Dictionary gives the following meaning for the word voluntary Voluntary acting by choice, able to will proceeding from the will spontaneous, free done or made without compulsion or legal obligation designed, intentional freely given, or supported by contributions freely given free from State control. Thus although the notice issued by the Assistant Controller was ab initio void, it still had the effect of forcing the accountable person to submit an estate duty return. Therefore, the return submitted is not voluntary. It cannot be equated with the return filed by the accountable person for some purpose, say, obtaining grant of representation, etc. In this view of the matter, we agree with the learned Appellate Controller and dismiss the appeal filed by the revenue.
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1982 (2) TMI 162 - ITAT MADRAS-D
Business, Adventure In The Nature Of Trade ... ... ... ... ..... for purposes of assessee s business activity by providing service to them in advisory and other capacity unlike the assessee s case, where there is no such business nexus. Similarly the decision of the Allahabad High Court in the case of ITO v. Rani Ratnesh Kumari 1980 123 ITR 343 cannot also help the revenue because there were subsequent events to justify business intent in that case though there was no original intent to resell at the time of purchase, unlike the assessee s case where business intent is not decipherable either at the time of purchase or sale. There is, therefore, no material for either holding that there has been adventure in the nature of trade as originally concluded by the ITO or that there has been business in respect of these shares as held by the AAC before the matter was reconsidered by the Commissioner (Appeals). The order of first appellate authority Commissioner (Appeals) has, therefore, to be confirmed. 6. In the result, the appeal is dismissed.
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1982 (2) TMI 161 - ITAT MADRAS-D
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... ... ..... he Central Board of Direct Taxes in its circular dated 5-1-1960, a circular which was undisputably in force during the accounting year. The proposition that a benevolent Board s Circular is binding on the ITO is now too well-established by several decisions of the Supreme Court to need any citation. The Kerala High Court in CIT v. B. M. Edward, India Sea Foods 1979 119 ITR 334 (FB) has held that if the circular had been in force on the first day of the assessment year, it should be applied even if such circular is subsequently withdrawn. The assessee is, therefore, entitled to succeed on the basis of circular alone. It is in this view that we consider it unnecessary to deal with the arguments of authorities or the other arguments of the learned counsel questioning the conclusion that there had been no gifts and that, at any rate, such gifts even if they could be so treated, are exempt either under section 5(1)(v) or (xiv). 4. The appeal is allowed and the assessment annulled.
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1982 (2) TMI 158 - ITAT MADRAS-D
Concessional Rate, Provident Fund ... ... ... ... ..... s, the Allahabad High Court decision directly supports the assessee s claim in this connection. We have not been referred to by the department to any contrary decision. It has been held by the Bombay High Court in CIT v. Smt. Godavaridevi Saraf 1978 113 ITR 589 that an authority like the Tribunal acting anywhere in the country has to respect the law laid down by the High Court though of a different State so long as there is no contrary decision of any other High Court on the question. It is also well established that when two views on a question of law are possible, one which favours the assessee and leaves him with a lesser burden of tax, the view that favours the assessee, should be applied. In these circumstances, we are satisfied that the Full Bench decision of the Tribunal must give way to the law declared by the Allahabad High Court. We, therefore, accept the assessee s contention on this point also and direct relief accordingly. 8. In the result, the appeal is allowed.
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1982 (2) TMI 156 - ITAT MADRAS-C
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... ... ..... e daily product basis. The amounts of the directors are lying with the company even from the inception, namely, from 1967 onwards and most of the interest payments are only interest on interest. In view of our finding on the main question, no elaboration is necessary on this point. However, we find that the interest on interest cannot be treated either as deposit with or a borrowing by the company from its directors. The ld. Counsel for the assessee also relied on the reply in the Readers rsquo Forum of The Chartered Accountant , Vol XXX, No.6, Dec. 1981 wherein it is pointed out that since the interest not paid is the interest accrued on the deposit, it cannot be said as a further deposit under the Companies (Acceptance of Deposits) Rules, 1975. In view of the finding given above, the interest disallowance u/s 40A(8) of the Act is not proper and correct and such disallowance in the three years are deleted. 10. In the result, all the three appeals of the assessee are allowed.
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1982 (2) TMI 154 - ITAT MADRAS-B
Taxable Event, Total Income ... ... ... ... ..... sessee is entitled to agitate the assessment thereof notwithstanding that it had itself, under an erroneous or mistaken view of law, declared it as its income as held by the Allahabad High Court. This is not to say that on the facts of this case, the amount returned and assessed is not taxable, which has got to be examined. An that we have stated above is only to emphasise the fact that an assessee, if he considers himself to be aggrieved by the total income assessed or tax determined on account of some amount of income having been taxed which he believes is not taxable even though he has returned it as his income under an erroneous or mistaken view of the law, is competent to file an appeal and such appeal must be disposed of on merits. 7. In the circumstances stated above, we set aside the order of the AAC and direct him to consider the assessee s grounds of appeal on merits and then dispose of the appeal according to law. 8. In the result, the appeal is treated as allowed.
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1982 (2) TMI 151 - ITAT MADRAS`
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... ... ..... ow depreciation and extra shift allowance in the reassessment proceedings. Secondly, the ITO dealt with the question of allowance of depreciation in the original assessment proceedings and he accepted the assessee rsquo s plea that the depreciation need not be allowed. He, therefore, cannot start reassessment proceedings under s. 147(b) on the same set of facts. This was clearly a change of opinion which is not permissible for the purpose of reopening under s. 147(b). We accordingly hold that both on merits and on jurisdiction the reassessment proceedings cannot sustain. 2. Mr. Devdas appearing for the respondent also pointed out that the reassessment has been made for reducing the income and that is not permissible. There appears to be much force in the submission but we need not deal with it at length in the view we have taken both on the jurisdiction and on merits. We accordingly uphold the order of the CIT (Appeals) cancelling the reassessment. 3. The appeal is dismissed.
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1982 (2) TMI 150 - ITAT MADRAS
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... ... ..... income determined after taking into account the past business losses. 2. The above order of the ITO was cancelled by the AAC for the reasons which prompted the Tribunal to cancel earlier order passed by the ITO under s. 154 whereby depreciation was granted. 3. From the above, it is clear that the subsequent order dt. 22nd July, 1978 under s. 154 cannot stand for the reasons mentioned by the Tribunal which cancelled the earlier order dt. 21st March, 1977 passed under s. 154. On the same parity of reasoning the second order under s. 154 cannot stand. Further, the first original order under s. 154 has not been upheld. The subsequent order under s. 154 also should fall. We entirely agree with the Tribunal cancelling the first order under s. 154 that the matter is highly debatable and it cannot be said that there was any mistake apparent from record. The CIT (Appeals) rightly cancelled the order of the ITO dt. 22nd July, 1978. Consequently the appeal filed by the ITO is dismissed.
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1982 (2) TMI 147 - ITAT MADRAS
Transfer Of Assets, For Benefit Of Spouse Or Minor Child ... ... ... ... ..... fe that the question of deduction in her hands under section 80L will arise, but by virtue or section 64 any income arising to her from assets transferred by her husband requires to be treated as income of the husband only for computing his total income and does not require to be considered in the hands of the wife at all. The question of separate deduction out of such income before its inclusion in the husband s total income, therefore, does not arise. Another point to be noted is that the deduction under section 80L is not allowed in arriving at the income under any particular head or source but after computing the total income and though the measure of the allowance is fixed with reference to the income arising from any particular source it does not go to reduce the income chargeable from that source or under that head but only goes to reduce the total income as a whole. For this reason also, I consider the concept of real income from any particular source is not violated.
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1982 (2) TMI 145 - ITAT JAIPUR
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... ... ..... for being referred to the third Member Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, Smt. Koshalya Bai was the Benamidar of another partner in the firm and consequently the firm was not entitled to registration u/s 185 of the IT Act. 2. The Hon rsquo ble President in turn referred the same to Shri B.B. Palekar, Vice President (W.Z.), Bombay who has since disposed of the reference by his order dt. 10th Dec., 1981 in ITA Nos. 1715 and 1716/JP/80. In accordance with the majority opinion, we hold that Smt. Koshalaya Bai was not the Benamidar of another partner in the firm and, therefore, it cannot be held that the firm was not entitled to registration under section 185 of the IT Act on the ground that one partner was a Benamidar of another. We, therefore, hold that the assessee was entitled to registration for both of assessment years under appeal. We, accordingly, sustain the order of the ld. AAC of IT. 3. In the result, both the departmental appeals are dismissed.
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1982 (2) TMI 144 - ITAT JAIPUR
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... ... ..... financing between Rs. 18,172 and Rs. 37,817. This the total finances provided for the three years ranged between 29,36,489 and 33,66,575. Taking the over all position account, it cannot be said that the commission of 1 with reference to the sales was unreasonable. We also agree with the ld. Counsel of the assessee that turnover has direct link with the finances and, therefore, it would not be unreasonable to link the guarantee commission with the turnover. We also notice that the rate of interest and guarantee commission put together fall below the market rate of interest. By guaranteed loans, the assessee had free inflow of funds and uninterrupted business. Considering all this, in our opinion, the guarantee commission claimed by the assessee could not be said to be unreasonable, consequently, we sustain the order of the CIT (Appeals) deleting the additions made by the ITO for all the three assessment years under appeal. 8. In the result, all the three appeals are dismissed.
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1982 (2) TMI 143 - ITAT JAIPUR
Valuation Of Property ... ... ... ... ..... nable if the value adopted for wealth-tax purposes for the assessment year 1975-76, is also adopted for the purpose of the Estate Duty Act. We, therefore, direct the Assistant Controller to adopt the value of this property at Rs. 40,000. The order of the Appellate Controller is modified accordingly. 6. The last ground or appeal is that the Appellate Controller has erred in taking the value of agricultural land at Rs. 3,00,000 as against Rs. 2,76,000 declared by the assessee. This issue also does not require much discussion. Under the Wealth-tax Act, this property has been valued by the WTO for the assessment year 1975-76 at Rs. 3,00,000. It would, therefore, be reasonable to value this property at Rs. 3,00,000 for estate duty purposes as well. The Appellate Controller has valued it at Rs. 3,00,000 only. We, therefore, do not find any infirmity in the order of the Appellate Controller so far as this ground of appeal is concerned. 7. In the result, the appeal is partly allowed.
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1982 (2) TMI 142 - ITAT JAIPUR
Reassessment, Non-Disclosure Of Primary Facts ... ... ... ... ..... ccord. The ITO was not helpless at the stage of the original assessments in estimating or in determining the actual investment in any other way, when the assessee failed to disclose the precise amount of investment. The ITO is fully armed under the Income-tax Act to exercise his best judgment, when an income is not precisely disclosed by the assessee. Once it is known to the ITO that the investment was made by the assessee on the construction, then it is his duty to determine the investment and add the unexplained investment and such duty cannot be postponed to a future date. So, neither under section 147(a) nor under section 147(b) can the re-opening be upheld. 6. The assessee having succeeded on the legal objections, there is no need to go into the merits of the case and, therefore, the cross-objections of the assessee are infructuous. 7. In the result, both the appeals of the revenue are dismissed and the cross-objections of the assessee stand disallowed being infructuous.
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1982 (2) TMI 141 - ITAT JABALPUR
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... ... ..... vs. CIT (1943) 47 ITR 756 (MP). However, it has been held by the Gujarat High Court in the case of Laxmichand Hirji Bhai vs. CIT (1981) 212 CTR (Guj) 181 (1981) 128 ITR 747 (Guj) that benevolent circulars issued by the CBDT, even if they deviate from the legal position, are required to be followed by the ITO since the circulars would go to the assistance of the assessee. In the circumstances, even if the order of the AAC could be said to be in conformity with the decision of the Madhya Pradesh High Court, the assessee cannot be deprived of the benefit conferred by the circular of the CBDT. We must, therefore, set aside the order of the AAC on this point and restore the order of the ITO. 2. The appeal is allowed.
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1982 (2) TMI 140 - ITAT JABALPUR
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... ... ..... or incomplete. 2. On behalf of the Revenue it was pointed out that the very fact that the expenses incurred by the assessee for purchase were excessive and the fact that the documents for proving the expenses were not produced before the Commr. (Appeals) were sufficient to justify the addition. But we cannot accept the absence of accounts at the appellate stage to be a justification for applying the proviso to s. 145(1) when it is not in dispute that the relevant documents are available for verification at the time of assessment. In the circumstances, the interest of justice requires that it must first be found whether the expenses claimed to have been proved by the assessee and only thereafter the question of reasonableness of the expenses arises for consideration. We, therefore, deem it fit to set aside the orders of the authorities below and restore the matter to the file of the ITO for making a fresh assessment in accordance with law. 3. The appeal is treated as allowed.
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1982 (2) TMI 139 - ITAT JABALPUR
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... ... ..... t justified, because of the large time gap and the universal feature of raising prices during the said gap. In any case, even if such comparison was warranted in law and the G.P. rate as declared by assessee was considered to be comparatively low, only option available to the ITO in law was to make a probe to find out whether there has been made any transaction outside the assessee rsquo s books, or whether any entries in those books were incorrect. Assessee also produced before us copy of assessment order dt. 29th December, 1977 in the case of another assessee, namely, Hindustan Sewing Machine, carrying on business similar to that of assessee firm for asst. yr. 1977-78. The ITO in that case accepted the declared G.P. rate of 28 . Department does not suggest that there was any feature to distinguish the two comparative cases. That being the position and for other reasons mentioned above, the G.P. addition cannot be sustained. The same is hereby deleted. The Appeal is allowed.
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1982 (2) TMI 138 - ITAT JABALPUR
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... ... ..... s deleted. 5. The other cash credit is in the name of Shri Anand Kumar Bijjan. No evidence was led before the assessing officer. Shri Bijjan subsequently filed returns and consequently, the assessments were made on him. The particulars regarding the assessments were filed before the AAC. The counsel had laid emphasis on the assessment of Shri Bijjan and accordingly had urged that the addition should be deleted. It is evidently clear that the evidence in the shape of assessment of Shri Bijjan were created later on, and no evidence or explanation was offered at the stage of ITO. Shri Anand Kumar Bijjan was neither produced before the ITO, nor before the AAC. Under the above circumstances, the reliance could not be placed on the assessments, which were completed on the basis of the filing on the returns later on. As the credit in the name of Shri Anand Kumar Bijjan remained unexplained, the AAC was justified in confirming the same. 6. In the result, the appeal is allowed partly.
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1982 (2) TMI 137 - ITAT JABALPUR
Exemption From Wealth Tax ... ... ... ... ..... s prescribed under rule 4 of the Voluntary Disclosure of Income and Wealth Rules, 1975, show that the income disclosed by the declarant firm included any assets, whether represented by cash, bank deposits, bullion, investment in shares, debts due from other persons, commodities or any other assets, the same had to be detailed by the declarant firm and consequence of the aforesaid Explanation would be that even in the hands of the partner of the firm such assets would be exempt from wealth-tax. If, on the other hand, the income disclosed by the declarant firm was not represented by any assets as aforesaid, then there would be no room for including the impugned sum in the computation of assessee-individual partner s net wealth even by virtue of section 4(1)(b) of the Wealth-tax Act, 1957 read with rule 2 of the Wealth-tax Rules. In conclusion, we see no merit in the revenue s appeals and no justification to disturb the AAC s finding. The revenue fails. 7. Appeals are dismissed.
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1982 (2) TMI 136 - ITAT INDORE
Net Wealth, Outstanding Tax Liability ... ... ... ... ..... ioned that the ratio in the case of Kesoram Industries and Cotton Mills Ltd. is well considered by their Lordships of the Gujarat High Court in Kantilal Manilal s case. Now, we take up the case of V.C. Handi. On the basis of dates, the facts appears to be distinguishable and in the case of the assessee before us, there was no liability on the valuation dates and, therefore, the ratio does not appear to help the assessee. 12. In view of our preceding discussions, we are of the considered view that the claims of the assessee were rightly negatived by the WTO and such action of the WTO was correctly confirmed by the learned AAC. 13. On the provision aspect of the matter discussed by the learned AAC, we do not want to comment upon, since we are in a position to confirm the impugned order on the basis that there was no outstanding liability on the various valuation dates. With these observations, we confirm the impugned order. 14. In the result, the assessee s appeal is dismissed.
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1982 (2) TMI 135 - ITAT INDORE
Income, Winnings From Lotteries ... ... ... ... ..... the assessee. It is now well settled as a result of two decisions of the Supreme Court in the cases of Navnitlal C. Javeri v. K.K. Sen 1965 56 ITR 198 and Ellerman Lines Ltd. v. CIT 1971 82 ITR 913 that a circular issued by the Board would be binding on all officers and persons employed in the execution of the Act even if it deviates from the provisions of the Act. A similar view was taken by the Supreme Court in the case of K.P. Varghese v. ITO 1981 131 ITR 597. 14. Looking to the aforesaid facts, evidence on record and entirety of circumstances it is clear that the receipt in question is neither casual nor of non-recurring nature. As a matter of fact it is not income at all. At the most it can be called as a capital receipt. Thus, the learned AAC was wrong in holding that the receipt of the car comes within the definition of winnings used in section 2(24)(ix). Thus, the addition of Rs. 29,000 is uncalled for and the same is deleted. 15. In the result the appeal is allowed.
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