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Case Laws
Showing 61 to 80 of 216 Records
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1983 (7) TMI 283 - KARNATAKA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... of the proceedings taken by the assessing authority. The exercise of this power is, however, subject to the condition that the assessment order was not subject to an appeal. Section 20 confers a right of appeal to any person objecting to an order passed under the provisions of the Act. That section states that such an appeal must be preferred within 30 days. When section 21(2) refers to an appeal preferred under section 20, it must be in the context, an appeal in conformity with section 20, and not an appeal in contravention thereof. The time barred appeal preferred by the assessee is certainly not an appeal that falls under section 20 and cannot, therefore, operate as a bar for the revising authority to entertain the revision petition. 5.. The view taken by us receive support from the decision of the Supreme Court in Board of Revenue, Madras v. Raj Brothers Agencies 1973 31 STC 434 (SC). 6.. In the result, these petitions fail and are dismissed without an order as to costs.
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1983 (7) TMI 282 - MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... sessment. The question of limitation did not arise directly or indirectly in that case. That question directly arose in Jeewakkhan s case (1970) 3 VKN 51 and no decision taking a view contrary to that taken in Jeewakkhan s case (1970) 3 VKN 51 was brought to our notice. It must, therefore, be held that for initiating reassessment proceedings for the second time, time commences to run from the date of the order of assessment and not from the date of order of reassessment. In this view of the matter, the reassessment proceedings in this case iniciated by notice (annexure G) dated 26th December, 1981, must be held to be without jurisdiction. 6.. For all these reasons, this petition is allowed. The notice dated 26th December, 1981 (annexure G), the proceedings for reassessment commenced thereafter and the order of reassessment passed in that behalf, are all quashed. Parties shall bear their own costs of this petition. Security amount, if any, shall be refunded to the petitioner.
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1983 (7) TMI 281 - KARNATAKA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... mist in the understanding of the nature of an article the components and classification of which are not plain as plain could be. 10.. Apart from that, we find that there is no justification for the Tribunal to depart from the view consistently taken in the previous assessment years up to 1974-75 in the case of the same assessee. Consistency in the judicial administration should not ordinarily be sacrificed unless there is compelling reason. The Tribunal, while taking a different view, has not given any justifiable reason except stating that the circular of the Commissioner was not applicable to the case. That could hardly be said to be a reason to be given by a quasi-judicial authority. 11.. In the result, this petition is allowed, the orders of the authorities are set aside and the matter stands remitted to the assessing authority to modify the assessment order by taxing the turnover relating to the sale of the pickle jars under entry 118 of the Second Schedule to the Act.
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1983 (7) TMI 280 - KERALA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... unreasonable period will be vitiated and bad in law. If proceedings are initiated beyond four years after the order rendered in the appeal or revision, the exercise of power in such cases is prima facie unreasonable and improper and it is for the assessing authority to show or demonstrate that there are valid and proper grounds for the delay so caused and in the absence of cogent and acceptable reasons explaining the delay, the exercise of power will be held to be unreasonable and improper. Long lapse of time has brought about a situation whereby the assessee is not obliged nor will he be in a position to preserve the accounts and other documents mentioned in rule 32(21). In fact, in this case, he has stated so in exhibit P3. There is no material to contradict or disbelieve it. In the light of the above, I declare that exhibits P4 and P5 assessment orders are unreasonable and unsustainable. Therefore exhibits P4 and P5 orders are quashed. There will be no order as to costs.
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1983 (7) TMI 279 - MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... e finding having been given about the furnishing of a false return, it could not be said that the order is not justified under section 43. 21.. As regards scope of jurisdiction under section 38(5), we have already come to a conclusion that the appellate authority exercising jurisdiction under section 38(5) in the present case, could not have imposed a penalty but as discussed above, it is clear that the appellate authority had jurisdiction under section 43 to impose penalty for the first time after giving an opportunity to the assessee of being heard and it is not disputed that that opportunity was afforded and notice was issued before the final orders were passed by the appellate authority. 22.. In the light of the discussion above, therefore, our answer to the second question is in the affirmative that the penalty imposed under section 43 read with section 9(2) of the Central Act was justified. In the circumstances of the case, parties are directed to bear their own costs.
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1983 (7) TMI 278 - KARNATAKA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... the question as to the amount to be levied as penalty. Section 12-B(3) provides for the levy of maximum penalty. In the very nature of the power conferred, there cannot be any set formula to govern every case. Nor there could be any such formula to cover the defaults in different months of a single case. The power must be exercised reasonably depending upon the circumstances of each case. 6.. The reason given by the Tribunal in this case was that in the relevant year, there was slump in the tea market and the company was, therefore, unable to pay punctually the advance tax payable. If that was the reason, there ought not to be any penalty at all. That means, the company did not deliberately delay the payment of advance tax and it was not guilty of dishonest conduct or acted in conscious disregard of its obligation. The levy of penalty was, therefore, unjustified and illegal. 7.. We, therefore, allow the revision petition and set aside the orders of all the authorities below.
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1983 (7) TMI 277 - HIGH COURT OF KERALA
Company when deemed unable to pay its debts, Winding up – Company when deemed unable to pay its debts, Powers of tribunal on hearing petition
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1983 (7) TMI 276 - HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA
Winding-up of unregistered companies ... ... ... ... ..... ed Part X of the Companies Act. I have already stated that the first respondent is undisputedly an unregistered company within the meaning of that expression occurring in section 583 of the Companies Act. If that requirement is satisfied, the circumstances in which an unregistered company may be wound up is enumerated under sub-section (4) of section 583 of the Act. In clause ( a) of that sub-section, if the company is dissolved, then it is liable to be wound up under that part. If there is no dispute that the company has been unregistered and has been dissolved, then this court on the motion of a person who is entitled to move this court is bound to wind up the company. There cannot be a bar. In that circumstance, I do not see any impediment to proceed further with the winding-up of the first respondent company and direct advertisement of the petition in Deccan Herald of Bangalore on or before 31st July, 1983. The date of hearing of the petition is fixed for August 26, 1983.
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1983 (7) TMI 275 - HIGH COURT OF ALLAHABAD
Admission of petition and directions as to advertisement, Advertisement of petition ... ... ... ... ..... not appear, however, that this has a bearing in so far as the scope of this appeal is concerned. The appellant is not precluded from raising appropriate pleas on merits in opposition to the winding-up petition. Suffice it to say, that appearance for the appellant company was put in this case on August 17, 1982, through counsel. This was just a day after the impugned order was passed. The advertisement of the petition took place long afterwards. If the appellant company was genuinely interested in preventing advertisement of the petition lest this causes loss or injury and not so much in delaying the proceedings, there appears no satisfactory ground why objection against the issue of advertisement should not have been made at the earlier opportunity on the 17th aforesaid or immediately thereafter. The appeal, in our opinion, is devoid of force and is dismissed with costs to the respondent which we assess at Rs. 300 only. The interim order dated September 28, 1982, is vacated.
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1983 (7) TMI 256 - HIGH COURT OF MADRAS
Shares warrants and entries in register of members ... ... ... ... ..... e Revenue that till the shares are actually registered by the company in the name of the transferee, the transferee cannot be taken to have acquired certain equitable rights in relation to his shares and that he cannot be taken to have become the transferee of the shares. As a matter of fact, in the present case, the transfer forms duly signed by the transferor along with the share certificates have been handed over to the transferee and the transferee has sought registration of the transfer in the books of the company. The company has not refused to recognise the transfer, but it has stated that the registers are not immediately available to record the transfer of shares. In these circumstances, the aforesaid decision of the Supreme Court in Shelat v. Thakar 1975 45 Comp. Cas. 43 , directly applies to the facts of this case and, therefore, the decision of the Tribunal cannot be said to be erroneous. In this view, the petition is dismissed. There will be no order as to costs.
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1983 (7) TMI 255 - HIGH COURT OF GAUHATI
Winding up - Power of registrar to strike defunct company off register ... ... ... ... ..... apart from quashing of the order dated August 16, 1978, to pass such further or other orders as may be deemed fit and proper. In State of Haryana v. Haryana Co-operative Transport Limited, AIR 1977 SC 237, the mere circumstance of the petitioner not asking for a writ of quo warran to in so many words was not regarded as sufficient not to entertain that question, as facts necessary for challenging the appointment had been clearly stated in the petition. It was stated that the petitioner had invited the court to issue such other suitable writs, order or direction (apart from the writ of certiorari which was thought inappropriate) as the court deemed fit and proper. It was also observed that there was no magic in the use of a formula. B. R. Rama-Bhadriah v. Secretary, Food and Agricultural Department, AIR 1981 SC 1653, saw the Supreme Court again stating that relief may be moulded to mete out justice and it should not be denied on purely technical and narrow procedural grounds.
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1983 (7) TMI 254 - HIGH COURT OF RAJASTHAN
Court – Jurisdiction of, Accounts - To be kept by company ... ... ... ... ..... has been urged that the Companies (Court) Rules, 1959, do not envisage any such petition and what petitions lie, are specified. Petitions provided under the Rules are exhaustive. I am unable to agree with this submission as well. As already stated, when sub-section (4) of section 209 of the Act envisages conferment of right of inspection on the director, then the director can seek a remedy by moving a petition to this court. Thus, I hold that the petition is maintainable under section 209(4) of the Act and the company is under an obligation to allow inspection to the petitioner of all the books of account and other books and papers. Accordingly, the petition is partly allowed. The petition under section 163 of the Act is dismissed as not maintainable. However, the petition under section 209(4) of the Act is allowed and the respondents are directed to allow the petitioner to inspect all books of account and other books and papers during business hours within a week from today.
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1983 (7) TMI 253 - HIGH COURT OF MADRAS
Restriction on acquisition of certain shares, Meetings and Proceedings – Declaration By person not holding beneficial interest in any share, Duty of directors and persons deemed to be directors to make disclosure of shareholdings
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1983 (7) TMI 224 - HIGH COURT OF GUJARAT
Meetings and Proceedings – Ordinary and special resolutions, Power to compromise or make arrangements with creditors and members, Amalgamation, Amalgamation of companies in national interest – Power of Central Government to provide for
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1983 (7) TMI 223 - HIGH COURT OF DELHI
Directors – Power of, Director – Disclosure of interest by, Appointment of sole selling agent
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1983 (7) TMI 205 - SUPREME COURT
Constitutional validity of rule 3A of the Companies (Acceptance of Deposits) Rules, 1975 ("Deposits Rules" for short), introduced by the Companies (Acceptance of Deposits) Amendment Rules, 1978, which became operative from April 1, 1978, and incidentally of section 58 A of the Companies Act, 1956 inserted by the Companies (Amendment) Act, 1974, which came into force on February 1, 1975 challenged?
Held that:- Appeal dismissed. Not a single contention canvassed on behalf of the petitioners, individually or collectively, bears scrutiny and, therefore, the petitions and the appeals must fail and are dismissed with costs in each matter. A detailed analysis of the provisions, in the light of the submissions, would clearly negative any contention of the violation of articles 14 and 19(1)(g) and we must reject the challenge to the constitutionality of section 58A and the rules made thereunder.
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1983 (7) TMI 197 - CEGAT, CALCUTTA
Transit losses or gains ... ... ... ... ..... n only the losses and not the gains particularly in the absence of allegations of malafide or wanton negligence on the part of the appellants or their agents. rdquo The ratio of the decision in that appeal is equally applicable in these appeals. 11. The proper approach, therefore, should have been to consider the losses or gains on a monthly or quarterly or half-yearly or yearly basis and after allowing condonation upto the permissible limits and on net losses alone duty should be demanded. I, however, leave it to the discretion of the Collector (Appeals) as to whether this set off should be on monthly or quarterly or half-yearly basis. 12. In the result, these appeals are allowed and the orders passed by the Collector (Appeals) are set aside and the matters are remanded to the Collector (Appeals) for disposal in accordance with law and in the light of the observations contained in this order. I also permit the parties to the appeal to adduce fresh evidence if they so choose.
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1983 (7) TMI 196 - CEGAT, BOMBAY
Demand - Show cause notice ... ... ... ... ..... ditated action and therefore, the case of theft will not be governed under Rule 147. If at all, such case would more appropriately lie within the terms of Rule 160. It is also seen that the Assistant Collector has written a finding in his order that the Superintendent issued the demand in terms of Rule 9(2) and not under Rule 160 or 147 as claimed by the appellants. This rule has been properly quoted in the circumstances of the case and we find that the Assistant Collector rsquo s order dated 21 -8-1978 is correct and legal. Even if there had been any error in quoting the provisions of a wrong rule, it would not have vitiated the demand if the duty had been leviable in terms of Supreme Court rsquo s decision in the case of N.B. Sanjana v. Ephinstone Spinning and Weaving Co. Ltd., A.I.R. 1971 SC 2039 1978 (2) E.L.T. (J 399) (SC). In view of the aforesaid circumstances, we find that the orders of the lower authorities are correct. The same confirmed and the appeal is dismissed.
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1983 (7) TMI 195 - CEGAT, BOMBAY
Remission of duty ... ... ... ... ..... a valid argument by the appellants that in identical cases remission of Central Excise duty is given and the same benefit should be extended to the goods warehoused under the Customs Act. Unlike on the excise side, under Section 23 of the Customs Act, it is mandatory for the Asstt. Collector to remit the duty on the losses provided he is satisfied that the losses are genuine. In the present cases, there are no allegations that the losses are not genuine. The warehoused goods remained under the Customs control. Therefore, there is no doubt that the losses quality for remission of duty under Section 23. Considering these facts, we are of the opinion that remission is permissible on the losses in terms of Section 23 of the Customs Act. Accordingly, we set aside the orders of the lower authorities and allow remission of duty in terms of Section 23 of the Customs Act. The amounts of duty paid by the appellants are directed to be refunded to appellants. The appeal is thus allowed.
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1983 (7) TMI 194 - CEGAT, MADRAS
Shortlanding ... ... ... ... ..... e cargo brought by him. Having described the quantity brought in the vessel in terms of Section 30 of the Act it is not open to the carrier to claim that because of a clause in the Bill of Lading, he is not liable to account for the carrier claim to have been brought by him in the vessel. The ullage reports show the quantities found on board the vessel at the time of arrival and not the quantity actually discharged. The only information available in respect of discharged quantity is the one obtained by tank measurement though the tanks are situated at a distance from the wharf and connected by a long pipe, in the absence of any allegation that there was an actual pilferage or leakage in the pipeline that is the next best information available regarding the quantity of oil actually discharged. In this view of the matter we find that the order of the Deputy Collector, as upheld by the Appellate Collector, is maintainable on facts and in law. Accordingly the appeal is dismissed.
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