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Case Laws
Showing 161 to 180 of 236 Records
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1985 (8) TMI 78 - HIGH COURT OF RA3ASTHAN AT JODHPUR
Refund - Limitation - Payment made under mistake of Law ... ... ... ... ..... 4), and R.J. Engineering s case 1985 (22) ELT 782 (Raj) , the order annexure 6 dated April 6, 1978, cannot be sustained to the extent that the petitioner s claim for refund for the period from June 1, 1970 to March 31, 1971, has wrongly been disallowed. The petitioner is entitled to the refund of the amount, which is said to be Rs. 50,900.78 being the difference in the rate of duty, i.e., between 5 and 4 . 9. The result is that the writ petition is allowed and the orders annexures 3, 4, 5 and 6, declining the refund to the petitioner under rule 11, read with rule 173J of the Rules are quashed. The non-petitioners are directed to refund the amount relating to the difference in excise duty from 5 to 4 paid by the petitioner. It is further ordered that the payment should be made to the petitioner within six months from today, or it may be adjusted to the future duties, payable by the petitioner. 10. In the circumstances of the case, the parties are left to bear their own costs.
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1985 (8) TMI 77 - HIGH COURT OF ALLAHABAD
Recovery of excise duty and penalty during pendency of revision petition not admissible ... ... ... ... ..... .C. Sinha, learned Additional Standing Counsel appearing for the Union of India, stated that the revision filed by the petitioner has not been finally disposed of till today. Since there is a statutory duty cast on the Government of India to dispose of the revision under Section 36 of the Act which it is not performing, it would be desirable that a mandamus be issued to the respondent to discharge its duty. 3. In the result the writ petition succeeds in part and is allowed to that extent. Let a mandamus be issued commanding respondent No. 1 Government of India, Ministry of Finance, Department of Revenue, New Delhi to dispose of the revision dated May 27, 1980 filed by the petitioner within a period of three months from the date of the presentation of a certified copy of this order. The respondents are also restrained from realising the excise duty and the penalty imposed upon the petitioner during the pendency of the revision. However, the parties shall bear their own costs.
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1985 (8) TMI 76 - HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS
Cotton fabrics ... ... ... ... ..... excise duty, it is now well settled that the description by which the goods are known in the commercial world will be relevant for deciding whether they fall in one category of goods or another. Apart from the fact that fabrics woven out of bleached and/or dyed yarn need not necessarily be subjected to bleaching or dyeing process and must therefore be treated on the same footing as fabrics which have been bleached or dyed, there is the statement made before us by a person who appears to be qualified as the Processing Manager in a Processing Mill, that such fabrics are known as fabrics bleached and/or dyed. We are, therefore, not inclined to accept the contention raised on behalf of the Revenue that the goods which are processed by the respondent fall under Items 5(a) and (b) of the Notification. In this view of the matter we do not see any reason to interfere with the order of the learned Single Judge. The writ appeal fails and is dismissed with costs. Counsel s fee Rs. 500.
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1985 (8) TMI 75 - HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS
Sugar - Excess production rebate - Short - levy ... ... ... ... ..... aim cannot be denied by the respondents, we do not think it necessary to deal with the question of promissory estoppel. An argument was advanced before us on behalf of the department that the finding that the demand made by the department in respect of the petitioner in W.P. 1625 of 1978 is barred by Rule 10 is incorrect and must be set aside. It is difficult for us to see how the finding recorded by the learned Judge that the case must be considered as one of short-levy can be said to be wrong. When the case of the department is that the petitioner is not entitled to rebate, it obviously means that the excise duty which is paid by the petitioner is less. It is clearly therefore a case of short-levy and in our view such a demand will be governed by Rule 10. In the view which we are taking, we must dismiss both the appeals. Accordingly, the writ appeals are dismissed with costs one set. Counsel s fee Rs. 1,000. Oral application for leave to appeal to Supreme Court is rejected.
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1985 (8) TMI 74 - HIGH COURT AT MADRAS
Valuation - Patent or proprietary medicines ... ... ... ... ..... y was levied, clearly indicates that no element of excise duty is added to the price of the medicinal ointment. 7. In our view, the stand taken by the department is wholly unsustainable. The appellant is, therefore, entitled to a deduction of 25 per cent of the price specified in the price list for the purposes of levy of excise duty in accordance with the Notification dated 8th October, 1966. 8. The other point, as to whether the sales tax is to be excluded for the purpose of discount, which was argued before the learned Single Judge, has not been argued before us, by the appellant. Hence, we- are not interfering with the finding of the learned Judge with regard to this point. 9. The departmental authorities will now determine, if necessary, the exact amount of excise duty payable on the footing that 25 per cent discount has to be deducted out of the price shown in the price list. 10. Accordingly, the writ appeal is allowed to the extent indicated above, with costs, Rs. 500.
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1985 (8) TMI 73 - HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
Valuation when goods are produced according to customers orders ... ... ... ... ..... ction 4(a) the value must be determined as the price at which the excisable article or an article of the like kind and quality is capable of being sold in wholesale trade at the time and place of removal. 17. Both the decisions of the Assistant Collector of Central Excise as well as the Appellate Collector Central Excise are, on the face of them, contrary to the aforesaid dicta in the cases A.K. Roy and another v. Voltas Limited (supra) and Union of India and others v. Atic Industries Ltd. (supra). 18. There was no question of any short levy in the circumstances and therefore, the notices issued under Rule 10 of the Central Excise Rules, 1944 were without jurisdiction and the demands were totally unauthorised. 19. I would accordingly quash the impugned orders, noticed earlier, of the Assistant Collector of Central Excise and the Appellate Collector Central Excise. 20. The petitioners would be entitled to their costs of the present proceedings which are assessed at Rs. 2,000.
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1985 (8) TMI 72 - SUPREME COURT
Whether the sales effected by the respondent-assessee in the three concerned years of goods imported and supplied to customers on the strength of Actual Users' Import Licences of the customers were exempt from sales tax under the Kerala General Sales Tax Act, 1950, on the ground that these were sales "in the course of import of the goods into the territory of India"?
Held that:- Having regard to the terms and conditions on which the respondent-assessee imported the goods and the manner in which the transactions were put through, it cannot be disputed that there was an integral connection between the sale to the local purchaser and the actual import of the goods from the foreign supplier. In other words it is clear that the movement of the goods from the foreign country (here the United States) to India was in pursuance of the conditions of the pre-existing contract of sale between the respondent-assessee and the local purchaser. If that be so the view of the Tribunal and the High Court that the sales in question were in the course of import will have to be upheld. Appeal dismissed.
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1985 (8) TMI 71 - SUPREME COURT
Metallized yarn produced by slitting metallized laminated plastic sheets classifiable ... ... ... ... ..... s, including tubes, rods, sheets, foils, sticks, other rectangular or profile shapes whether laminated or not, and whether rigid or flexible, including layout and polyvinyl chloride sheets . The contention of Shri B. Datta, learned Additional Solicitor General that the article manufactured comes within the ambit of the general Tariff Entry 18 relating to rayon and synthetic fibres and yarn can hardly be accepted. Where an article falls within a specific entry like Entry 15A(2) which covers plastic articles of all sorts, in different shapes or even of strips, whether laminated or not, they must necessarily be excluded from the general Entry 18 which relates to rayon and synthetic fibres and yarn i.e. man-made fibres. We agree with the reasoning and conclusion reached by the High Court. 2. The appeals therefore fail and are dismissed with costs. We quantify the costs of Rs. 500/- in each of these appeals. The bank guarantees furnished by the respondents shall stand discharged.
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1985 (8) TMI 70 - SUPREME COURT
Fabrics - Classification of goods - Dutiability - Excise Duty - Intermediate stage of production irrelevant
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1985 (8) TMI 68 - RAJASTHAN HIGH COURT
Reassessment ... ... ... ... ..... of the assessee and against the Revenue respectively shall be added. After correction, the para above the penultimate para of the judgment will read as under We, therefore, answer questions Nos. 1 and 4, in the negative, i.e., in favour of the Revenue and against the assessee and in favour of the assessee and against the Revenue respectively. Questions Nos. 2 and 3 are answered in the affirmative, in favour of the assessee and against the Revenue. It is not necessary to answer question No. 5. Let the aforesaid correction be made in the judgment and the Tribunal be informed accordingly.
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1985 (8) TMI 67 - PATNA HIGH COURT
Reassessment Notice ... ... ... ... ..... , therefore, to be overruled. To finally conclude, the answer to the question posed it the very outset is rendered in terms that the limitation provisions of section 149 of the Income-tax Act, 1961, envisage only the issuance of a notice to the assessee and not its actual service subsequently on him as well. In the light of the above, the answer to question No. (1) referred to the High Court is rendered in the negative and it is held that the Tribunal was not correct in law in holding that the assessment for the assessment year 1961-62 was barred by limitation, that is, in favour of the Revenue and against the assessee. Equally, the answer to question No. (2) is rendered in the negative and it is held that the Tribunal was not justified in cancelling the penalty under section 271(1)(a) for the assessment year 1961-62, i.e., in favour of the Revenue and against the assessee. The Revenue will be entitled to costs of this reference. UDAY SINHA J.-I agree. NAZIR AHMAD J.-I agree.
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1985 (8) TMI 66 - RAJASTHAN HIGH COURT
Appeal To Tribunal, Question Of Law ... ... ... ... ..... es of natural justice or the provisions of the Income-tax Act or the Rules made thereunder. Learned counsel was unable to show as to how the assessee was prejudiced by the fact that the Tribunal referred to the decision in Sardar Bahadur S. Indra Singh Trust s case 1971 82 ITR 561, in its order dated March 31, 1978. There is nothing illegal in the procedure adopted by the Tribunal in referring to a decision of the Supreme Court, though the same may not have been cited before it by learned counsel for either party, when the Tribunal thought that it was relevant to the subject-matter of decision. No other point was argued before us. In view of the aforesaid discussion, we are of the view that it is not at all necessary to call for a reference in this matter as no question of law, which deserves to be referred, arises out of the order passed by the Tribunal dated March 31, 1978. The application for calling a reference consequently is dismissed, but without any order as to costs.
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1985 (8) TMI 65 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
Business Expenditure ... ... ... ... ..... ions were successful. Later, the assessee also came to acquire certain shares of its principal. It has been found by the Tribunal that the legal expenses incurred was to secure recovery of the debt of the assessee and that the shares when ultimately acquired had little value. The findings of the Tribunal on facts have not been challenged and have become final. It is also to be noted that in Income-tax Reference No. 88 of 1978 and Income-tax Reference No. 98 of 1981 (Macneill and Barry Ltd. v. CIT 1986 158 ITR 374) a judgment has been delivered on August 16, 1985, in the case of the same assessee where it has been held that the assessee was ultimately allotted the said shares of the company under an order of a court and not under the said agreement by and amongst the assessee, the Government of India and the other companies. For the above reasons, we answer the question in the affirmative and in favour of the assessee. There will be no order as to costs. G. N. RAY J.-I agree.
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1985 (8) TMI 64 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
Business Loss ... ... ... ... ..... or agreed to be accepted by the assessee. The matter stood concluded by the order of the court. For the reasons above, we hold that the assessee suffered a trading loss of Rs. 28,52,010. The questions referred are answered as follows Income-tax Reference No. 88 of 1978 Question No. 1 answered in the affirmative and in favour of the assessee. In view of the answer to question No. 1, question No. 2 does not call for any answer. Income-tax Reference No. 98 of 1981 In view of the answer given to question No. 1 in Income-tax Reference No. 88 of 1978 no answer is required to be given to any of the questions in this reference. We make it clear that the shares of the company ultimately allotted to the assessee may be capital and may or may not be of any value but the acquisition of the same has no nexus with the extinguishment of the debt of the Rivers Steam Navigation Co. Ltd. to the assessee. In the facts and circumstances, there will be no order as to costs. G. N. RAY J.-I agree.
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1985 (8) TMI 63 - RAJASTHAN HIGH COURT
Rectification, Wealth Tax ... ... ... ... ..... ssor Income-tax Officer has rectified the so-called mistake in respect of capital gain on the basis of the principles laid down in CIT v. Dalmia Investment Co. 1964 52 ITR 567. It was observed that no substantial question of law arises after the order of the Appellate Tribunal and the Tribunal was right in rejecting the application under section 256(1) of the Act as there was no obvious and patent mistake committed by he Income-tax Officer in the original order. In view of the decision of the Supreme Court and in view of the other decisions referred to above, in our opinion, no case for initiating proceedings under section 35 of the Wealth-tax Act has arisen as the original assessment does not disclose any mistake apparent from the record and we decline to direct the Tribunal to state the case on the question stated by the petitioner calling upon the Tribunal to make a reference on the said question. The petitions are, therefore, dismissed. Costs will be borne by the parties.
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1985 (8) TMI 62 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... the suit. There is no indication in subsection (2) of section 281A that the plaintiff has to procure the certified copy of the documents as mentioned in sub-section (2) before the institution of the suit. All that is required to be done is the fulfilment of the conditions or such of them, as are applicable, before the institution of the suit. We are unable to accept the contention of Mr. Bhattacharya that sub-section (1) controls sub-section (2) of section 281A. We are also unable to accept the contention that sub-section (2) should be treated as a proviso to sub-section (1). No other point has been raised in this appeal. For the reasons aforesaid, the judgment of the learned Additional District judge is affirmed and this appeal is dismissed with costs. Let the records be sent down to the court below as soon as possible. The prayer for stay of operation of this order, as made by Mr. Bhattacharyya on behalf of the appellant, is disallowed. JITENDRA NATH CHAUDHURI J.-I agree.
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1985 (8) TMI 61 - DELHI HIGH COURT
Vires, Wealth Tax ... ... ... ... ..... tances of this case, should not exercise its jurisdiction under article 226 of the Constitution. In the instant case, the valuation date of the petitioner and the last date of the accounting year of the company were different. Therefore, the applicability of rule ID was not mandatory. Moreover, when, as in this case, the petitioner had disputed the valuation proposed to be arrived at by the Wealth-tax Officer, it was incumbent upon him to have referred the question of valuation to the Valuation Officer under section 16A of the Act. For the aforesaid reasons, the petition is allowed. The impugned order dated September 29, 1984, passed under section 25(2) of the Wealth-tax Act, 1957, by the Commissioner of Wealth-tax, Delhi-VII, is quashed. The Commissioner of Wealth-tax will be at liberty to pass a fresh order after notice to the petitioner, in the light of the observations made in this judgment. The petitioner will be entitled to costs. Counsel fee Rs. 500. Petition allowed.
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1985 (8) TMI 60 - RAJASTHAN HIGH COURT
Business Expenditure ... ... ... ... ..... e Assistant Commissioner, there is admittedly no such evidence on record. In the circumstances, we are more than satisfied that the Income-tax Officer could not be said to be wrong in disallowing 2/3rds of the said expense as revenue expenditure. The decision in this case was rendered on its peculiar facts. The four decisions relied on by the learned counsel for the Revenue are not applicable to this case. For the reasons aforesaid, the view taken by the Tribunal in its order dated December 10, 1979, that the sum of Rs. 11,039 spent on the foreign tour of the managing director of the assessee is a business expenditure and as such should be allowed is correct. In our opinion, the Tribunal was right in holding it as an allowable revenue expenditure. The question referred to us is answered in the affirmative, i.e., in favour of the assessee and against the Revenue. The parties shall bear their own costs of this reference. The Tribunal be informed under section 260(1) of the Act.
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1985 (8) TMI 59 - RAJASTHAN HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ccordance with the provisions of the Land Ceiling Act, then the computation of valuation thereof in accordance with section 11(b)(ii), at the rate of Rs. 5 per square metre, does not involve any question of law. We are of the view that the question sought to be referred should be refrained in order to bring out clearly the question which requires to be decided by this court. We, therefore, direct the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal, Jaipur Bench, Jaipur, to state the case and refer the following question of law, arising out of its order dated July 17, 1980, to this court for its opinion Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal was justified in holding that for the purposes of determining the market value of the vacant land held by the assessee in excess of the ceiling limit, the provisions of the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976, and particularly section 11(b)(ii) thereof, would be applicable in the present case.
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1985 (8) TMI 58 - PATNA HIGH COURT
Change Of Law, Income From Other Sources ... ... ... ... ..... o produce the lease deed to show that the assessee had leased out the factory as a commercial asset and not the whole business. In the absence of the lease deed from the record, it is not possible to hold that the assessee had leased out the entire business. This submission, however, loses all significance in view of my conclusion above that in terms of sections 14 and 56, the income received by the assessee during the relevant years would be income from other sources. For the reasons stated above, I am of the view that the Tribunal was not justified in excluding the sums of Rs. 75,000 and Rs. 50,000 from the total income of the assessee for the assessment years 1965-66 and 1966-67, respectively. This question, therefore, is answered in favour of the Revenue and against the assessee. Question No. 2, however, is answered in favour of the assessee and against the Revenue. Since the company has gone under liquidation, there shall be no order as to costs. NAZIR AHMAD J.-I agree.
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