|
Advanced Search Options
Case Laws
Showing 181 to 200 of 278 Records
-
1987 (4) TMI 98 - ITAT BOMBAY-B
Minor Child, Total Income ... ... ... ... ..... val. The duty to grant previous approval cannot be abdicated by that authority in favour of any other authority although the other authority was superior in rank. Consequently, even if we hold that the Commissioner of Wealth-tax had granted previous approval for the assessment years 1970-71, 1971-72 and 1973-74 and further that the provisions of section 18(3) as they stood after 1-4-1976 were applicable, the orders of the WTO would still be without jurisdiction because the previous approval of the IAC as required by sub-section (3) of section 18 had not been obtained. Looked from any angle, the orders imposing penalties by the WTO in the present cases, are without jurisdiction and as such, were rightly cancelled by the AAC. Since other grounds which had been raised by the assessee before the AAC were not considered by the AAC, we do not express any opinion on those grounds. We confirm the orders of the AAC cancelling the penalties. 8. In the result, the appeals are dismissed.
-
1987 (4) TMI 97 - ITAT BOMBAY-B
Minor Child, Total Income ... ... ... ... ..... Income-tax Act, 1961 and these incomes were includible in the assessee s total income. It is also necessary here to point out that since the provisions of clauses (iv) and (v) of sub-section (1) of section 64 are very clear and unambiguous, there is no question of giving it an interpretation other than what appears from the plain and unambiguous expression used therein on the ground of any notions which may be entertained about what is just and expedient or on the ground of a deeming provision being strictly construed. Considering all this, we have no hesitation in holding that the income arising to the wife for all the three assessment years and income arising to the minor son for the assessment years 1981-82 and 1982-83 from assets transferred by the assessee was rightly included in the assessee s total income. On this issue, therefore, the orders of the revenue authorities, in our view, were perfectly justified and are upheld. 6. The appeals fail and are hereby dismissed.
-
1987 (4) TMI 96 - ITAT BOMBAY-A
... ...
... ... ..... rch, 1978 after the last instalment of advance tax had become due on 15th Dec., 1978 and paid a tax of Rs. 6,882 based thereon, what the assessee did was in excess of its requirement under the law. This cannot, in our view, under any circumstances, attract penalty. In this connection it might perhaps not be out of place to mention here that as laid down by the Hon ble Supreme Court in the case of Hindustan Steel Ltd. vs. State of Orissa (1972) 83 ITR 29 (SC), penalty for failure to comply with a statutory obligation is the result of a quasi-criminal proceeding and, therefore, whether penalty should be imposed is a matter of discretion to be exercised judicially and on a consideration of all the relevant circumstances. Viewed in this context, we have no hesitation in holding that this is not a fit case for imposition of penalty under s. 273(2)(a). The penalty under s. 273(2)(a) imposed by the ITO was, therefore, not Justified and is hereby cancelled. 6. The appeal is allowed.
-
1987 (4) TMI 95 - ITAT BOMBAY-A
Exemption, Death Cum Retirement Gratuity ... ... ... ... ..... emoluments received by him was salary. The nature of work of the treasurer and the control and supervision of the Bank indicated relationship of master and servant such is not present in our case. The second decision relates to salesman who was paid commission in addition to salary. On those facts, there could be no doubt that relationship of master and servant existed. In the present case there is, no doubt, some control of the LIC over the assessee, but employee and employer within the meaning of section 10(10) when all the terms and conditions are considered in their proper perspective as indicated above. We, therefore, hold that the assessee was not employee of LIC within the meaning of section 10(10) of the Act and that those provisions did not apply to amount received by the assessee as gratuity for the reasons already given. We set aside the order of the AAC and restore the order of the ITO rejecting the claim of exclusion from total income. 11. The appeal is allowed.
-
1987 (4) TMI 94 - ITAT BANGALORE
Charitable Institution, Total Income ... ... ... ... ..... tion has since been amended by the substitution of sub-clause (iv) by the Finance (No. 2) Act of 1980 with effect from 1-4-1981 which provides that if the aggregate of the sums namely, the donations eligible for deduction, exceeds 10 of the gross total income, the amount by which the aggregate exceeds shall be ignored for the purpose of computing the deduction. The memorandum explaining this change clearly indicates that the amendment was brought to get over the decision of the Andhra Pradesh High Court and makes the intention clear that it is the donations that should not exceed 10 of the total income and not the amount of deduction. In view of this statutory change, it is clear that the computation made by the Income-tax Officer was correct and the relief granted by the Commissioner (Appeals) without noticing the change in law was incorrect. We, therefore, reverse the order of the Commissioner (Appeals) and restore the order of the Income-tax Officer. The appeal is allowed.
-
1987 (4) TMI 93 - ITAT BANGALORE
Investment Allowance ... ... ... ... ..... ture see Singh Engg. Works (P.) Ltd. v. CIT 1979 119 ITR 891 (All.) . It is not in dispute that the data given by the customers is processed and printed by the computer and therefore, it cannot be denied that such print-outs are things produced by the assessee. We may refer to the case of CIT v. Ajay Printery (P.) Ltd. 1965 58 ITR 811 (Guj.) where it was held that printing of balance sheets by itself would constitute a manufacturing activity. In that background, the data processed and printed-out would certainly be a thing produced by the assessee even if not a thing manufactured by the assessee. In the circumstances, we are convinced that the assessee had fulfilled the conditions prescribed and was, therefore, entitled to the deduction under s. 32A. We direct the Income-tax Officer to recompute the total income by granting the deduction claimed and we also authorise the Income-tax Officer to amend the assessments of the members of AOP as a consequence. The appeal is allowed.
-
1987 (4) TMI 92 - ITAT ALLAHABAD-B
Capital Gains, General Principles, Computation Of Capital Gains ... ... ... ... ..... to the transfer but excluding those occasioned by the transfer or as a consequence of the transfer. Here in the case before me the damages were awarded not for the transfer of the land but as a consequence of the transfer. Thus, I am inclined to agree, following respectfully the decision of the Kerala High Court in the case of Smt. N. Subaida Beevi that the capital gains in this case should be computed at Rs. 1,47,612 as determined by the learned Judicial Member and not at Rs. 3,35,135 computed by the learned Accountant Member. 10. Certain other points were raised before me, which I have deliberately refrained from dealing. Now that the matter is going back before the regular Bench for disposal of the appeal in accordance with the majority view, the parties are free to raise those questions before the regular Bench for adjudication over them. 11. The case will now go back to the regular Bench, which heard the appeal for disposal in accordance with the opinion of the majority.
-
1987 (4) TMI 91 - ITAT ALLAHABAD-A
... ...
... ... ..... he claim of the assessee for exemption under s. 10(20A) also was considered by the Tribunal. The Tribunal noted that it considered the submissions of the assessee in respect of this section. It is pointed out that since it had considered the submission of the assessee in respect of the applicability of s. 10(26B), it did not think necessary to deal with the applicability of s. 10(20A) of the IT Act and, therefore, in view of the finding given by it, as mentioned earlier, the grounds relating to the exemption under s. 10(20A) has become infructuous and no finding was necessary. 8. Since the facts of the said case are admittedly the same as relevant to the asst. yr. 1979-80, we, following the decision of the Tribunal mentioned earlier, allow the claim of the assessee under s. 10(26B) and on the same reasons, the claim for exemption under s. 10(20A) had become infructuous. 9. In the result, the appeal by the Revenue is dismissed and the appeal by the assessee is partly allowed.
-
1987 (4) TMI 90 - ITAT AHMEDABAD-B
... ...
... ... ..... rdian under the General Hindu Law and this also includes the power to carry on the business on behalf of the minors where the assessee belonging to the minor are invested in the business and therefore, open to the vagaries of the business. Once it is accepted that the father has such power or duty to put the assets belonging to the minor in the best interest of the minor one cannot assume on hypothesis that the minor has been made to suffer the losses which the father and natural guardian could not under the law of guardianship. Therefore, this step taken by the ITO is also not acceptable to us. There is no further finding given by the CIT(A) requiring adjudication by us. We, therefore, set aside the order passed by CIT(A) and direct the ITO to accept the claim after proper inquiries if necessary regarding partial partition effected as per the facts stated in the assessment order and pass the appropriate orders in accordance with law. 7. In the result, the appeal is allowed.
-
1987 (4) TMI 89 - HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH AT JABALPUR
Manufacture ... ... ... ... ..... s the dolomite lumps, chips and powder are the same commodities, there is no manufacture by crushing lumps into chips and powder. So the respondents erred in holding that there is manufacture by breaking lumps into chips and powder and by levying tax over again in respect of the same tax-paid goods. So the petitioner is justified in deducting from his taxable turnover, the sale price of dolomite lumps purchased from registered dealers on payment of full sales tax under Section 2(r)(ii) of the State Act and under the notification dated October 17,1977, under the Central Act. 11. With the result, the petition is allowed with costs. The order in revision by the Divisional Deputy Commissioner of Sales Tax and the order of assessment by the Sales Tax Officer are quashed and the respondents are directed to refund the excess amount to the petitioner, which has been recovered from it. Counsel s fee Rs. 200, if certified. The outstanding security amount be refunded to the petitioner.
-
1987 (4) TMI 88 - HIGH COURT AT CALCUTTA
Import - Of complete systems of Jute Drawing Frames ... ... ... ... ..... ught namely for increasing production for the purpose of increasing exports and thereby earning a good amount of foreign exchange. This is not a simple case of importing any contraband goods. The position of the petitioner as it appears was not properly appreciated by the Collector of Customs who had been acting as an instrumentality for the purpose of earning foreign exchange. 4. In my view the petitioner has made a strong prima facie case and it is a fit and a proper case where I should exercise my discretionary power in the matter in public interest. Accordingly let a rule be issued in terms of prayer (a), (b) and (c) and an interim order directing the respondents to allow clearance of the said machines details whereof are contained in Annexure D and E to the petition without levying and/or realising any customs duties or fine forthwith and also stay the operation of the impugned order passed by the said Shri G. Sarengi dated 16-2-1987 which is Annexure N to the petition.
-
1987 (4) TMI 87 - HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS
Customs - Rate of duty - Pulses ... ... ... ... ..... firmity. What duty is to be imposed are matters of administrative policy with which the courts have no concern for the simple reason that they do not have the expertise nor possess all relevant information. Therefore, there is no question of anomaly for the petitioner to invoke Stock v. Frank Jones (Tipton) Ltd. (1978) 1 All. ER 948 . 12. Thus, looked at from any point of view, I find that the writ petition carries no merit. 13. W.P. Nos. 2952,3467 and 3469 of 1987 As already stated, these writ petitions raise the same points as W.P. No. 2951 of 1987. The bill of entry in respect of W.P. No. 2952 of 1987 was presented on 3-3-1987. The bill of entry concerned with W.P. No. 3467 of 1987 was, admittedly, presented after 17-2-1987. As for W.P. No. 3469 of 1987, the bill of entry was presented on 27-3-1987. Applying the principles laid down in W.P. No. 2951 of 1987,I see no merit in these writ petitions also. 14. In the result, all the four writ petitions are dismissed. No costs.
-
1987 (4) TMI 86 - HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS
Customs House Agent's Licence - Cancellation of ... ... ... ... ..... nd the case was decided on merits. It is also pertinent to note that the Indian representative of the foreign supplier never complained about any misappropriation or for non-submission of accounts to them to the Collector, though in the oral hearing a representative of that company seems to have been also examined and he has opined that this may amount to non-submission of accounts to N.L.C. That was his personal opinion, but that would not advance the position any further. In the circumstances, therefore, the order of the Collector finding the petitioner guilty of misappropriation of the funds and also guilty of non-submission of accounts to the N.L.C. and thereby misconducted themselves within the meaning of Regulation 21 (c) of the Regulations is unsustainable and the impugned order of the Collector is liable to be set aside and it is accordingly set aside. The writ petition is allowed and the rule nisi is made absolute. There will be no order as to costs in this petition
-
1987 (4) TMI 85 - HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
Drawback - Re-fixation at reduced rate - Stainless steel ... ... ... ... ..... s. Therefore, when the price is less than the duty paid, that factor cannot be ignored. 8. It was next argued that the rate of Rs. 60.30/Rs. 60.80 had been fixed after a verification, and, that in any case there was no provision for a review thereof. This contention is at variance with the amplitude of the power conferred under rule 14. That power can be invoked where the amount so paid is the result of an error or in excess of the claimant s entitlement. That there can be a demand for repayment of a drawback paid wrongly or in excess of the entitlement, presupposes the existence of a power to reconsider the amount determined upon an application made under rule 7. Therefore, it is not correct to say that refixation of the drawback was illegal. Once this conclusion is reached, it follows that the order for adjustment fits into the purview of rule 14. The petitions fail and hence the order - 9. Rule in both petitions, discharged with parties being left to bear their own costs.
-
1987 (4) TMI 84 - HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
Writ jurisdiction - Alternative remedy - Advance Licence ... ... ... ... ..... an attempt to prevent this court from relegating the appellant to an appeal. 3. It was stated that pursuant to representations that had been made, the notification had been amended so that the previous permission of the committee was not required when the export obligation imposed upon the licence-holder had been fulfilled in advance. It was submitted that the notification, as amended, was the applicable law at the time of the adjudication. This is an argument upon which we will not comment. It will be open to the appellant to advance it in the appeal. 4. It was also submitted that the Tribunal which would hear the appeal had no power to order the return of the confiscated material pending the disposal of the appeal. Assuming that to be so, it is hardly conceiveable, in the circumstances, that the Tribunal would make such an order even if it had such powers. 5. There is no reason, therefore, why the learned Single Judge s order should not be upheld. The appeal is dismissed.
-
1987 (4) TMI 83 - HIGH COURT AT CALCUTTA
Refund - Writ jurisdiction ... ... ... ... ..... l Officer/ Receiver for preliminary expenses of publicity and other incidental expenses for the implementation of the directions given herein. Any unexpended amount at the end of the disposal of claim will be paid back to the respondents or otherwise dealt with as may be directed by this Court. For this purpose, Mr. Pradip Kumar Ghosh, Barrister-at-Law of 25, Harish Mukherjee Road, Calcutta-25 is appointed Special Officer/Receiver. Let it be recorded that we are appointing a Special Officer in this matter in order to expedite the proceeding. The remuneration of the Special Officer/ Receiver is to be fixed later. 20. The appeal is disposed of accordingly. Interim order if any is vacated. There will be no order as to costs. Liberty to apply. 21. All parties concerned, including the Receiver/Special Officer, to act on a signed copy of the operative portion of the judgment and order made herein on the usual undertaking. Satya Brata Mitra, J. I agree. B.C. Basak Satyabrata Mitra.
-
1987 (4) TMI 82 - SUPREME COURT
Whether the High court was justified in holding that in the absence of a notification withdrawing the earlier Notification dated 25-11-1958 made in exercise of power vested under Section 4 of the U.P. Sales Tax Act, 1948, Sales, tax would not be exigible in terms of the Notification dated 1-12-1973 issued under Section 3A of that Act?
Held that:- Section 3 is the charging provision; Section 3 A authorises variation of the rate of tax and Section 4 provides for exemption from tax. All the three sections are parts of the taxing scheme incorporated in the Act and the power both under Section 3A as also under Section 4 is exercisable by the State Government only. When after a notification under Section 4 granting exemption from liability, a subsequent notification under Section 3A prescribes the rate of tax, it is beyond doubt that the intention is to withdraw the exemption and make the sale liable to tax at the rate prescribed in the notification. As the power both for the grant of exemption and the variation of the rate of tax vests in the State Government and it is not the requirement of the statute that a notification of recall of exemption is a condition precedent to imposing tax at any prescribed rate by a valid notification under Section 3A, we see no force in the contention of the assessee which has been upheld by the High Court. In fact, the second notification can easily be treated as a combined notification - both for withdrawal of exemption and also for providing higher tax. When power for both the operations vests in the State arid the intention to levy the tax is clear we see no justification for not giving effect to the 2nd notification. We would like to point out that the exemption was in regard to a class of goods and while the exemption continues, a specific item has now been notified under Section 3A of the Act. The appeal is allowed.
-
1987 (4) TMI 81 - HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE ANDHRA PRADESH AT HYDERAB
Proforma credit procedure ... ... ... ... ..... ot, therefore, possible to accept the contention of Sri Srinivasa Murthy that the proviso to sub-rule (2) of Rule 56A cannot be held to be an exception to the main provision. 11. We find that an identical question has come up for consideration before the Gujarat High Court in Digvijay Cement Company Limited v. Union of India (3) 1986(25) Excise Law Times 879 (Gujarat). The Gujarat High Court rejected identical contentions and held that the proforma credit procedure specified in Rule 56A(1) does not ensure to the benefit of a manufacturer of finished excisable goods unless the excise duty under the same Tariff Item on the finished excisable goods on the one hand and the raw materials and the component parts used in the manufacture of finished excisable goods on the other is paid under the same Tariff Item. We are in respectful agreement with the decision of the Gujarat High Court. 12. In the circumstances, we dismiss this writ petition, but in the circumstances without costs.
-
1987 (4) TMI 80 - HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS
Valuation of goods sold under agreement ... ... ... ... ..... e been charged, because of extra-commercial consideration. In my view, there has been a wrong approach by respondents 1 to 3 to the question in issue, and in the interests of justice, the matter requires re-investigation, review and re-adjudication by the first authority, namely, the first-respondent, who can appropriately deal with the matter, taking note of and applying the principles discussed above. Accordingly, the orders of respondents 1 to 3 impugned in this Writ Petition are quashed and the matter is remitted to the file of the first-respondent for him to re-consider and dispose of the same on merits, as directed above, after affording adequate opportunity to the petitioner to make its say in the matter. No costs. I will be in the interests of both revenue and the petitioner that an expeditious disposal is given by the first-respondent. Hence, he is directed to dispose of the matter within a period of three months from the date of the receipt of a copy of this order.
-
1987 (4) TMI 79 - HIGH COURT OF DELHI
Exemption based on number of workers employed in the unit valid ... ... ... ... ..... arned counsel for the petitioner that by referring to the number of workers in the preceding twelve months the effect is that there is a levy of excise duty with retrospective effect. There is no force in this contention. The levy of excise duty is not by virtue of the notification. The levy of excise duty is by virtue of the insertion of Item 68 in the First Schedule to the Act. The notification grants exemption. Furthermore, the exemption is not granted with retrospective effect. The levy and exemption is w.e.f. 1st of March, 1975. A levy would have been regarded as retrospective if it had been sought to be levied from the date earlier than the first of March, 1975. That is not the case here. The levy in the present case is w.e.f. 1st of March, 1975 and the same cannot be regarded as a retrospective levy. 10. No other contentions have been raised before me. For the aforesaid reasons I do not find any merit in the writ petition. The same is accordingly dismissed with costs.
....
|
