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Showing 181 to 200 of 214 Records
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1987 (5) TMI 34 - HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA AT CHANDIGARH
Refund arising out of appellate or revisionary authority - Duty paid under mistake of law ... ... ... ... ..... aring of the arguments on the adjourned date, learned counsel for the petitioner informed me that an application had been made for withdrawal of the appeal. Therefore, this objection also does not survive. 49. For the foregoing reasons, 1 hold that in view of the clear and plain language of Section 11-B of the Act, there is no scope for importing the doctrine of unjust enrichment to deny refund of excise duty paid by the petitioner under a mistake of law. The order, dated May 10, 1985 (Annexure IX ) passed by the Assistant Collector and the appellate order dated, April 29, 1986 (Annexure X ) passed by the Collector (Appeals) are unsustainable in law and are quashed. The Revenue authorities are directed to refund the excise duty to the tune of Rs. 1,31,04,811.89 to the petitioner latest by 20th June, 1987. The Revenue should bear the cost of this petition, which are assessed at Rs. 1,000/-. Copy of this judgment be delivered to Shri H.S. Brar, learned counsel for the Revenue.
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1987 (5) TMI 33 - HIGH COURT AT CALCUTTA
Footwear - Question of fact ... ... ... ... ..... y the Supreme Court that We find it difficult that the elementary and unfinished form in which they exist immediately after extrusion suffices to attract market . 14. It will be clear that that decision was based on the facts of that case. If in this case the Department finds that the uppers on which excise duty is sought to be levied are not sold by the petitioner and have no market, there cannot be any question of levying excise duty. But that is a finding of fact which will have to be examined by the Department. It is for the assessee to produce evidence to show that it does not sell any uppers and that there is no market for the uppers . 15. Therefore, this writ petition must fail. All the questions are left open to be agitated on merit by the petitioners before the respondents. The respondents are directed to act in accordance with law. 16. There will be no order as to costs 17. Oral prayer for stay of operation of the order made on behalf of the petitioners is refused.
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1987 (5) TMI 32 - SUPREME COURT
whether a gift by a coparcener of his undivided coparcenary interest to another coparcener is void or not?
Held that:- Rami Reddy made the gift for the common benefit of the donee as well as his sons as held by the High Court. Assuming that it is a renunciation in favour of one of the coparceners, namely, Veera Reddy, such renunciation enures for the benefit of all other coparceners and not for the sole benefit of the coparcener in whose favour the renunciation was made. In our view, the gift made by Rami Reddy to Veera Reddy should be construed as renunciation of his undivided interest in the coparcenary in favour of Veera Reddy and his sons who were the remaining coparceners. The gift was, therefore, valid construing the same as renunciation or relinquishment by Rami Reddy of his interest in the coparcenary and, accordingly, the consent of other coparceners was immaterial. The conclusion arrived at by the High Court is affirmed though on a different ground. The appeal is dismissed.
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1987 (5) TMI 31 - PATNA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... it was laid down that the penalty would be imposed in accordance with the law which was in force on the date when the proceedings for imposition of penalty were initiated. Thus, I find that the Income-tax Officer was justified in imposing penalty in accordance with the law which was in force from April 1, 1968, and the Appellate Assistant Commissioner and the Tribunal were not justified in holding that penalty would be levied in accordance with the law which was prevailing prior to April 1, 1968. The question referred to this court in these two references is answered in the negative, i.e., in favour of the Revenue and against the assessee. The references are accordingly disposed of but there would be no order as to costs, in view of the fact that there has been no appearance on behalf of the assessee. Let a copy of this judgment be transmitted to the Assistant Registrar, Income-tax Appellate Tribunal, A Bench, Patna, in terms of section 260 of the Act. UDAY SINHA J.-I agree.
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1987 (5) TMI 30 - PATNA HIGH COURT
Penalty, Wealth Tax ... ... ... ... ..... fficer was arrived at for imposing penalty. The decision of the Supreme Court had been affirmed by the Supreme Court in the case of Maya Rani Punj 1986 157 ITR 330. Following those decisions, the Full Bench held that the penalty would be levied in accordance with the law prevailing on the day of satisfaction to initiate penalty proceeding. Since the proceedings in this case were initiated in 1971, the penalty would be levied in terms of the Finance Act, 1969. The second question also must, therefore, be answered in favour of the Revenue and against the assessee. For the reasons stated above, the Tribunal was right on both the points and both the questions are thus answered in favour of the Revenue and against the assessee. Since no one has appeared on behalf of the assessee, there shall be no order as to costs. Let a copy of this judgment be transmitted to the Assistant Registrar, Income-tax Appellate Tribunal, A Bench, Patna, in terms of section 27(6) of the Wealth-tax Act.
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1987 (5) TMI 29 - PATNA HIGH COURT
Exemptions, Wealth Tax ... ... ... ... ..... processes, it must be held that the firm was an industrial undertaking . That being so, the interest of the assessee in the firm had to be exempted. The Appellate Assistant Commissioner and the Tribunal were justified in holding that the interest of the assessee was exempted in terms of section 5(1)(xxxi) and (xxxii) of the Act in the net wealth of the assessee. For the reasons stated above, we are of the view that the Tribunal was right in holding that the business of the firm, M/s. Bharat Stone Works, Bokaro Steel City, was an industrial undertaking and that its partners entitled to the benefit of the provision under section 5(1)(xxxii) of the Act. The question referred to us is thus answered in favour of the assessee and against the Revenue. Since no one has appeared on behalf of the assessee, there will be no order as to costs. Let a copy of this judgment be transmitted to the Assistant Registrar, Income-tax Appellate Tribunal, Patna, in terms of section 27(6) of the Act.
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1987 (5) TMI 28 - PATNA HIGH COURT
Exemptions, Wealth Tax ... ... ... ... ..... processes, it must be held that the firm was an industrial undertaking . That being so, the interest of the assessee in the firm had to be exempted. The Appellate Assistant Commissioner and the Tribunal were justified in holding that the interest of the assessee was exempted in terms of section 5(1)(xxxi) and (xxxii) of the Act in the net wealth of the assessee. For the reasons stated above, we are of the view that the Tribunal was right in holding that the business of the firm, M/s. Bharat Stone Works, Bokaro Steel City, was an industrial undertaking and that its partners entitled to the benefit of the provision under section 5(1)(xxxii) of the Act. The question referred to us is thus answered in favour of the assessee and against the Revenue. Since no one has appeared on behalf of the assessee, there will be no order as to costs. Let a copy of this judgment be transmitted to the Assistant Registrar, Income-tax Appellate Tribunal, Patna, in terms of section 27(6) of the Act.
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1987 (5) TMI 27 - RAJASTHAN HIGH COURT
Business Expenditure ... ... ... ... ..... nal was not right in holding that the payment of Rs. 4,000 to M/s. Suresh Oil Industries, Kota, and the payment of Rs. 2,602.49 to M/s. Shivnath Motilal, Kota, were liable to be disallowed under section 40A(3) of the Act. The questions referred are, therefore, answered as under Question No.1.-The payments made for the purchase of goods is expenditure within the meaning of section 40A(3) of the Act. Question 2.-On the facts and in the circumstances of the case and having regard to the provisions of rule 6DD(j) of the Income-tax Rules, 1962, the Tribunal was right in holding that the payment of Rs. 10,028.30 to M/s. Rajani Oil Industries, Kota, was liable to be disallowed under section 40A(3) of the Income-tax Act, 1961, but the Tribunal was not right in holding that the payment of Rs. 4,000 to M/s. Suresh Oil Industries, Kota, and Rs. 2,602.49 to M/s. Shivnath Motilal, Kota, were liable to be disallowed under section 40(A)(3) of the Income-tax Act, 1961. No order as to costs.
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1987 (5) TMI 26 - KERALA HIGH COURT
Agricultural Land, Assessment Order, Income Tax, Recovery Proceedings ... ... ... ... ..... agricultural income is on the person deriving it, The agent derives it on behalf of the principal. It is as if the income is derived by the principal himself through the medium of the agent. If such be the case, the liability of the principal under the statute continues and is not in any manner taken away by the provisions of section 1l(1). What the section provides is only to make the agent also liable for the tax, in addition to the owner. Any other interpretation will also make the charge created by section 40(2) unavailable so far as the principal s lands are concerned, which could not have been the intention of the Legislature. This, according to me, is the only reasonable way of interpreting section 11(I). If so,, the proceedings for recovery as against the petitioner are proper and valid and the petitioner cannot challenge the same for any reason. No other grounds are urged in this original petition. It is accordingly dismissed without, however, any order as to costs.
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1987 (5) TMI 25 - PATNA HIGH COURT
Offences And Prosecution ... ... ... ... ..... e offence under section 277 and that of section 276C. For the reasons stated above, I am of the view that the prosecution of the petitioners in respect of the offence alleged under section 276C is misconceived and it is hereby quashed. So far as the prosecution of the petitioners under section 277 of the Income-tax Act is concerned, I find and hold that they are liable to be prosecuted under that section, because of the reasons set forth in the foregoing paragraphs. In the result, this application is allowed in part and as stated above, the prosecution launched against the petitioners under section 276C of the Income-tax Act is hereby quashed but since they have been found liable under section 277 of the Income-tax Act, the prosecution under this section shall proceed against them in accordance with law. However, it must be made clear that any observation made in this judgment, one way or the other, shall not prejudice the case of either party during the course of the trial.
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1987 (5) TMI 24 - PUNJAB AND HARYANA HIGH COURT
Offences And Prosecution, Settlement Commission ... ... ... ... ..... ue to exercise their jurisdiction under the Act with regard to any matters other than those which are before the Settlement Commission but that too is subject to any direction by the Commission to the contrary. In the face of the above-noted provision of law, i.e., section 245F of the Act, the Settlement Commission alone had the exclusive jurisdiction to launch or not to launch any prosecution of the petitioners. If the Income-tax Commissioner is also held entitled to initiate these criminal proceedings in exercise of his jurisdiction under section 279 of the Act, then the exclusive jurisdiction of the Settlement Commission hardly has any meaning. To permit the Income-tax Commissioner to do so would be a complete negation of sub-section (2) of section 245F. In the light of the discussion above, I allow this petition and quash the impugned complaint, P-1, and the resultant proceedings now pending against the petitioners in the Court of the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Ludhiana.
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1987 (5) TMI 23 - RAJASTHAN HIGH COURT
Charitable Trust, Exemptions ... ... ... ... ..... nces, we do not consider it necessary to deal with questions Nos. 2, 3 and 4 and the said questions are returned unanswered. Questions Nos. 1 and 5 are answered as under Question No. 1 On the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Tribunal was not justified in holding that the trust could not be granted exemption under section 11/12 for the assessment years 1972-73, 1973-74 and 1974-75. Question No 5 On the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Tribunal was not justified in holding that any part of the income or property of the appellant-trust was lent to any person referred to in sub-section (3) of section 13 for any period during the relevant previous years without either adequate security or adequate interest or both within the meaning of clause (a) of sub-section (2) of section 13 and was, therefore, for the purpose of clause (a) of section 13(1) deemed to have been used or applied for the benefit of any such person. There will be no order as to costs.
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1987 (5) TMI 22 - PATNA HIGH COURT
Offences And Prosecution, Settlement Commission ... ... ... ... ..... ry outset is rendered in the negative and it is held that the proprietor of the colliery, by abdicating all control of its business in favour of its managing contractor by a renewable fixed term lease of ten years on the terms of an annual minimum guaranteed amount and royalty on the quantum of coal raised and manufactured, cannot be said to be carrying on the business of the said colliery within the meaning of section 28(i). In the light of the above, the common question referred to the High Court for all the three assessment years in all these cases is answered in the negative and it is held that, on the facts and circumstances of the cases, the income of the assessees received from the managing contractor was not income from business, i. e., in favour of the Revenue and against the assessees. In view of the intricacies of the question and the conflict of precedent involved, there will be no order as to costs. UDAY SINHA J.-I entirely agree. ASHWINI KUMAR SINHA J.-I agree.
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1987 (5) TMI 21 - PATNA HIGH COURT
Accrual, Income ... ... ... ... ..... he sums. The assessee did not give up its claim, but pursued it by filing a money suit and making an entry in respect of the sum of Rs. 1,63,160. In my view, therefore, that sum did accrue to the assessee during the assessment year especially when the purchaser had not raised any objection to the payments during the assessment year. For all the reasons stated above and considering the fact that the assessee was following the mercantile system of accounting, I am of the view that the sum of Rs. 1,63,160 had accrued as the income of the assessee. The question referred to us for our opinion must, therefore, be answered in the affirmative, in favour of the Revenue and against the assessee. The Tribunal was correct in holding that the claim of the assessee to the extent of Rs. 1,63,160 by way of reduction in sales could not be allowed in the assessment year 1972-73. The reference is discharged with costs of Rs. 500 payable by the assessee to the Revenue. B. N. AGRAWAL J.-I agree.
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1987 (5) TMI 20 - KERALA HIGH COURT
Mistake Apparent From Record, Rectification
... ... ... ... ..... ty the said income was not business income In this view of the matter, we hold that the Income-tax Officer was justified in invoking section 154 of the Income-tax Act in these cases. We answer the question in the negative, against the assessees and in favour of the Revenue. In paragraph 12 of the judgment in the appeals (annexure D), the Appellate Tribunal has stated that the plea taken before them that the respondents (assessees) were not given notices before the rectification proceedings, was not adjudicated. It is left open. For the purpose of this reference, we have proceeded on the basis that proper notices were served on the assessees before the rectification proceedings. But this will not fetter or in any way preclude the Appellate Tribunal from deciding the point left open specifically in paragraph 12 of the appellate judgment. A copy of this judgment under the seal of this court and the signature of the Registrar will be forwarded to the Tribunal as required by law.
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1987 (5) TMI 19 - KERALA HIGH COURT
Agricultural Income Tax, Deduction ... ... ... ... ..... karan 1988 169 ITR 395 and in ITR No. 107 of 1977-CIT (Agrl.) v. Malabar Industries Co. Ltd. 1988 169 ITR 390 and in ITR No. 50 of 1977-CIT (Agrl.) v. Kartikolam and Alathur Estates Limited 1988 169 ITR 393 it is too late in the day to contend that the legal expenses incurred and classified as professional fee for taxation work is not an admissible expenditure in computing the agricultural income under section 5(j) of the Kerala Agricultural Income-tax Act. We are of the view that the Appellate Tribunal was justified in holding that the legal expenses incurred for taxation work is an admissible expenditure. The Division Bench decision of this court in Malayalam Plantations case 1978 115 ITR 624 (Ker) was followed in the later unreported decisions mentioned above. In the light of the above reasoning, we hold that no referable question of law arises for consideration from the order of the Appellate Tribunal. There is no merit in these two original petitions. They are dismissed.
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1987 (5) TMI 18 - PATNA HIGH COURT
Appeal To AAC, Firm ... ... ... ... ..... CIT v. Gyanchand Bedi 1987 163 ITR 693. The relevant assessment year is 1975-76. The question is whether the order refusing continuation of registration by the Income-tax Officer was appealable to the Appellate Assistant Commissioner. The matter has been considered by this court and no detailed judgment is called for. In agreement with the two earlier Division Bench decisions of this court, referred to above we are of the view that the order was appealable. The question thus referred to us must, therefore, be answered in the affirmative. We hold that the Tribunal was right in holding that the order of the Income-tax Officer refusing to continue the registration of the firm under section 184(7) of the Act is appealable. The reference is thus answered in favour of the assessee and against the Revenue. There will be no order as to costs. Let a copy of this order be transmitted to the Assistant Registrar, Income-tax Appellate Tribunal, Patna, in terms of section 260 of the Act.
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1987 (5) TMI 17 - PATNA HIGH COURT
Appeal To AAC, Firm ... ... ... ... ..... tant Commissioner, who allowed the appeal. The Revenue contested the matter before the Appellate Tribunal but without any success. Hence this reference to us. The question referred to us for our opinion is concluded by two decisions of this court in the cases of CIT v. Manuram Babulal 1986 158 ITR 5 and CIT v. Gyanchand Bedi 1987 163 ITR 693, in which it was held that any order rejecting the continuation of registration under section 184(7) of the Act is appealable. We, therefore, in consonance with the two Division Bench decisions of this court, referred to above, hold that the, Tribunal was correct in law in holding that the order passed under section 184(7) of the Act by the Income-tax Officer was appealable. The reference is thus answered in favour of the assessee and against the Revenue. However, there will be no order as to costs. Let a copy of this order be transmitted to the Assistant Registrar, Income-tax Appellate Tribunal, Patna, in terms of section 260 of the Act.
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1987 (5) TMI 16 - PATNA HIGH COURT
Income, Real Income ... ... ... ... ..... the case, the Tribunal was correct in holding that the amount representing the contingency reserve does not form part of the commercial profit or real income of the assessee and is not includible in the total assessable income of the assessee relating to the assessment years 1971-72 and 1972-73 ? In view of the earlier Division Bench decisions of this court, these references must be answered against the Revenue and in favour of the assessee. We, therefore, hold that the Tribunal was correct in holding that the amount representing the contingency reserve did not form part of the commercial profit and real income of the assessee and was not includible in the total assessable income of the assessee relating to the assessment years 1971-72 and 1972-73. The references are answered accordingly. However, there will be no order as to costs. Let a copy of this judgment be transmitted to the Assistant Registrar, Income-tax Appellate Tribunal, Patna, in terms of section 260 of the Act.
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1987 (5) TMI 15 - RAJASTHAN HIGH COURT
Education, Educational Institutions, Exemptions ... ... ... ... ..... ng in section 10(22) of the Act. According to their Lordships of the Supreme Court, visiting a museum is one way of education in the great school of life but that is not the sense in which the word education is used in clause (15) of section 2 of the Act. According to their Lordships, education connotes the process of training and developing the knowledge, etc., of students by normal schooling. In this view of the matter, the museum cannot be taken to be an educational institution existing solely for educational purposes. Section 2(15) is wider in terms than section 10(22) of the Act. If the assessee s case does not fall within section 2(15), it is difficult to put it in section 10(22) of the Act. We, therefore, hold that the assessee (trust) is not an educational institution within the meaning of section 10(22) of the Income-tax Act, 1961. It is, therefore, liable to be assessed under the Act. The reference is thus answered against the assessee and in favour of the Revenue.
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