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Showing 21 to 40 of 276 Records
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1989 (3) TMI 384 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... art, the High Court has directed the appellants to frame rules adopting certain alternative methods for dismission in the post- graduate M.D. Course for the next year, as stated in the judgment. The said directions appear to be in the nature of suggestions by the High Court, and the appellants will be free to frame rules for admission in the post-graduate M.D. Course in the said four colleges in the city of Bombay in conformity with the provision of Article 14 of the Constitution and in the light of the judgment of this Court and in framing the rules, the appellants may take into considera- tion the suggestions of the High Court. In the result, Subject to the directions given above, the appeals are dismissed. There will, however, be no order as to costs. SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (CML) NO. 8883 OF 1988 WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) NO. 1253 OF 1988 For the reasons aforesaid, Special Leave Petition and Writ Petition fail and are dismissed without any order as to costs. Apeals dismissed.
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1989 (3) TMI 383 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... f the basic price could not be expected to be eaten up by the development of the land to the standard contemplated by the vendor and purchaser. When the willing vendor has agreed to sell land at 14 annas per sq. ft. after development and the development charge was to be paid by the willing purchaser, it could be reasonable to deduct only 50 on account of the land to be set apart for roads, drains etc. and not beyond that. Considering this aspect of the matter and the potential value of the land as urban developed area we are of the view that the compensation may justly be enhanced by 1/6th to ₹ 14,000 per acre and we do so. We maintain 15 solatium but raise the rate of interest to 9 on the enhanced compensation from today till payment. We leave it open for the appellant to move for higher interest and solatium if entitled by virtue of subsequent judgment of this Court, if any. In the result, this appeal is allowed as above. We make no order as to costs. Appeal allowed.
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1989 (3) TMI 382 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... claim adversely to his landlord or not. Indeed, in such a case it may be thought that the adverse character of the possession is placed beyond controversy." We are, therefore, of the view that the defendant No. 6 was in adverse possession from the period 1946 to 1952 through her agent defendant No. 1 and thereafter through her husband, Jayantilal and son, defendant No. 7 till 1960 when the suit was filed, the total period being more than 12 years. 21. For the reasons mentioned above, the decision of the High Court must be held to be erroneous. Consequently the decrees for accounts against the defendants No. 6 and 7 must also go. Accordingly, the appeals are allowed, the decision of the High Court, so far the subject matter of the present appeals is concerned, is set aside and that of the trial court restored. In view of the close relationship of the parties and the other circumstances, the parties are directed to bear their own costs throughout. N.V.K. Appeals allowed.
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1989 (3) TMI 381 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... The petitioners are also entitled to get their present salary re-fixed after giving them notional seniority so that the same is not lower than those who are immediately below them." In our opinion, therefore, the appellants in Civil Appeal No. 441 of 1981 deserve to be granted the same limited relief. We are further of the opinion that it is not a fit case for initiating any proceedings for contempt against the respondents. In the result, the writ petitions fail and are dismissed. The Civil Miscellaneous Petitions in Civil Appeal No. 441 of 1981 are disposed of by issuing a direction to the respondents to give the appellants in the said Civil Appeal the same benefits as were given by the Madhya Pradesh High Court to such of the petitioners before that Court who were Supervisors 'A' and were granted promotion as Chargeman II by its judgment dated 4th April, 1983. In the circumstances of the case, however, there shall be no order as to costs. Petitions dismissed.
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1989 (3) TMI 380 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ng that appellant No. 1 had the power to cancel the notice convening the meeting, that power was exercised bonafide for a purpose within the scope of the said Act or whether it w as exercised for collateral or impermissible purposes. We remand the matter to the Gujarat High Court for the determination of that question. In view of the urgency of t he matter, we would request the Gujarat High Court to dispose of the writ petition latest by 30th April, 1989 as far as possible. The interim order granted by this Court on November 16, 1988 shall continue upto 5th May, 1989, subject to any orders which may be passed hereafter by the Gujarat High Court. From that date, it will be for the parties to apply for appropriate interim orders to the Gujarat High Court till the case is finally disposed of by that Court. The Appeal is allowed to the extent aforesaid. Taking into account the facts and circumstances of the case, t he parties shall bear and pay their own costs. . Appeal allowed.
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1989 (3) TMI 379 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... an investigation in respect of a right and an investigation which is to decide whether so me right should be or should not be given. On a repeal the former is preserved by the Interpretation Act. The latter is not." The above passage was referred to with approval in M. S. Shivananda v. K.S.R.T. Corpn., AIR 1980 SC 77 at 81. 18. We agree with the High Court that the right of the State to the excess land was not merely an inchoate right under the Act, but a right "accrued" within the meaning of sec. 6 (c) of the Rajasthan General Clauses Act, 1955, and the liability of the land-owner to surrender the excess la nd as on 1.4.1986 was a liability "incurred" also within the meaning of the said provision. There is no substance in contention (b) either. 19. These Appeals, Special Leave Petitions and the Writ Petition, accordingly, fail and are dismissed. In the circumstances of the case, there will be no order as to costs. Appeals & Petitions dismissed.
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1989 (3) TMI 378 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... disci- plinary action should not be taken against him. The respond- ent acted in an irresponsible manner in not complying with the order of transfer which led to his discharge from serv- ice in accordance with the Service Regulation No. 113. The learned Single Judge as well as the Division Bench both erred in law in setting aside the order of discharge. We, accordingly, allow the appeal, set aside the order of the Single Judge as well as Division Bench and dismiss the respondent's petition. There would be no order as to costs. The respondent has been paid a sum of ₹ 1,04,170 towards salary under the interim orders of this Court. Now, since the order of discharge is held to be valid the amount paid to the re- spondent is liable to be recovered from him, but having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case and the hardship which could be caused to the respondent, we direct the appellant not to recover the amount already paid to the respondent. Appeal allowed.
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1989 (3) TMI 377 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... in such circumstances it is not possible for independent witnesses to have been present there or to have witnessed the arrest of the appellant. As regards the appellant's plea that the case has been foisted on him at the instance of an MLA by name Azmat Khan, it is inconceivable that the police officers would have obliged Azmat Khan by foisting a false case against the appellant. 8. Lastly, the appellant's counsel submitted that in any event the appellant may be shown some leniency in the matter sentence. He stated the appellant is an aged person and has a large family to support. Taking into consideration these factors, we think that the ends of justice would be met if the substantive sentence of RI for two years awarded to the appellant is reduced to a period of RI for one year. The sentence of fine of ₹ 500 is confirmed. 9. In the result, the appeal is partly allowed to the extent the substantive sentence is modified from RI for two years to RI for one year.
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1989 (3) TMI 376 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... would be detrimental to the interest of the service itself." The argument based on Rule 27 was never raised before the High Court/Tribunal. There is neither any material on the record nor any justification before us to direct the appellant authorities to act under Rule 27 of the Fundamen- tal Rules. The respondents may if so advised approach the appropriate authorities for any such relief. The appeals are accepted. Judgments of the Andhra Pra- desh High Court and the Andhra Pradesh Tribunal are set aside and the writ petitions/petitions/applications of the respondents before the High Court/Tribunal are dismissed. There will be no order as to costs. The respondents are white-collared salaried persons and it may be too harsh for them to refund the salary already paid to them. Therefore, in the interest of justice, we direct that the additional salary paid to them as a result of High Court/Tribunal judgments upto 31-3-1989 shall not be recovered from them. Appeals allowed.
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1989 (3) TMI 375 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ffered to that extent. We are of the opinion that the arbitrator had taken a view which is plausible view. Beyond this, the court has nothing to examine. It is not necessary for a court to examine the merits of the award with reference to the materials produced before the arbitrator. The Court cannot sit in appeal over the views of the arbitrator by re-examining and re-assessing the materials. See the observations of this Court in Puri Construction Pvt. Ltd. v. Union of India, 1989 1 SCC 411. In the aforesaid view of the-matter, it appears to us that the learned Additional District Judge was right in the view it took and the High Court, therefore, was justified in dismissing the revision. The appeal, therefore, fails and is accordingly dismissed. No order as to costs. Special leave granted. In view of the fact that the facts of this appeal are more or less identical to the Appeal arising out of S.L.P. (C) No. 3392 of 1985, this appeal is also dismissed. No order as to costs.
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1989 (3) TMI 374 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... e appellant was right in getting this document registered in the manner it has been done by making certain representation, which was not correct, to the Sub-Registrar. Learned Counsel for the respondent drew our attention to certain observations of this court in Raj Kumar Dey and Others v. Tarapada Dey and Others, 1987 4 SCC 398 where registration was permitted by the Court after the lapse of four months as enjoined by s. 23 of the Act. But the facts and the circumstances and the grounds upon which registration was permitted, were entirely different from the present case. In the premises, the observations made in the said decision are not relevant or germane for the present controversy. In the aforesaid view of the matter, the decision of the High Court cannot be sustained. The appeal is, therefore, allowed. The judgment and/or order of the High Court are set aside. But in the facts and circumstances of the case, the parties will pay and bear their own costs. Appeal allowed.
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1989 (3) TMI 373 - SUPREME COURT
Whether the dispute mentioned in the contractor's application could have been referred to arbitration at all?
Held that:- In the light as read from the facts, unable to accept the position that the claim raised by the plaintiff in this application before the High Court was not covered by the arbitration clause. The clause as read gave the respondent a right to be considered. The respondent's grievance was, if properly considered his performance being 300% achievement he was entitled in the facts and circumstances set out hereinbefore to the grant of the contract and further similarly placed persons had been so given. That right had not been duly considered. That is the dispute in the present case and that dispute is clearly referable to the arbitration clause as mentioned hereinbefore, therefore, unable to accept the position that the order of reference passed by the High Court is bad.
Rhe interim directions given by the High Court that the "contractor be allowed to do the remaining work of extraction of timber of standing marked trees in compartment No. 59, Marwah" was beyond the competence of the Court. In this respect we agree with High Court.
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1989 (3) TMI 372 - SUPREME COURT
Whether the High Court has ignored to note that the statutory obligation cast on the Rent Controller as per the proviso attached to Section 13(2)(i) of the Act requiring him to calculate and determine the quantum of arrears of rent even at the first instance has not been complied with?
Whether that the application for ejectment was not in accordance with the mandatory provisions of Rule 4(c), 5(1) and 6 of the Rules framed under the Act and as such the impugned judgment is liable to be set aside on both the grounds.
Held that:- After a careful scrutiny of the Section 13(2)(i) and the first proviso annexed thereto, no force in the submissions of the learned counsel that there is any statutory duty cast on the Rent Controller even in the first instance to determine and calculate the arrears of rent and the interest but on the contrary the proviso requires the tenant to pay or tender the actual arrears of rent within 15 days of the first hearing of the application for ejectment after due service alongwith the interest to be calculated by the Controller at 8 per cent per annum on such arrears together with such costs of the application, if any, as may be allowed by the Controller. What the proviso requires is that the Controller has to calculate the interest at 8 per cent per annum on such arrears of rent and determine the costs of the application, if any. If the argument of the learned counsel is to be accepted then in every case the Rent Controller has to hold an enquiry at the first instance and determine the arrears of rent even on the first date of hearing which is in the nature of things not possible without any evidence, nor is it contemplated under the scheme of the Act.Hence we hold that this argument advanced on behalf of the appellant is misconceived and fallacious.
The rules 4(c), 5(1) and 6 are not mandatory but only directory. In that view, we see no force in the contention of the learned counsel that the non-mentioning of the amount of arrears of rent due in the application for ejectment has adversely affected the proceedings of this case and as such the application for ejectment is liable to be dismissed on that score. Appeal dismissed.
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1989 (3) TMI 371 - KERALA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... e respondent-assessee is not an item of milk product coming within entry No. 3 of the First Schedule to the Act. The Revenue has come up in revision. 2.. We heard counsel for the Revenue. In T.R.C. No. 148 of 1987 a Bench of this Court by judgment dated November 11, 1987 has taken the view that kattimore is certainly a product of milk. By holding that it is a product of milk under entry No. 3 of the First Schedule to the Act, the court allowed the revision filed by the Revenue. In the light of the earlier decision in T.R.C. No. 148 of 1987 we are of the view that the decision of the Appellate Tribunal, dated September 9, 1987, is plainly erroneous in law in so far as it holds that kattimore is not an item of milk product coming under entry No. 3 of the First Schedule to the Act. 3.. We set aside the judgment of the Tribunal dated September 9, 1987, and hold that kattimore is taxable under entry No. 3 of the First Schedule to the Act. The revision is allowed. Petition allowed.
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1989 (3) TMI 370 - SUPREME COURT
Whether Clause 11 of the agreement having provided that any dispute arising out of this sale shall be subject to Kaira jurisdiction formed part of. the agreement?
Held that:- Coming to clause 11 as already found that this clause was included in the general terms and conditions of sale and the order or confirmation No. 68/59 dated 2.10.1974 with the general terms and conditions was sent from Udyognagar, Mohmadabad, Gujarat to the respondent's address at 12 Suramangalam Road Salem, Tamilnadu. The statement made in the Special Leave Petition that Udyognagar, Mohamadabad, Gujarat is within the jurisdiction of the Civil Court of Kaira has not been controverted. As seen that making of the contract was a part of the cause of action and a suit on a contract therefore could be filed at the place where it was made. Thus Kaira court would even otherwise have had jurisdiction.
Under the facts and circumstances of the case we hold that while connecting factor with Kaira jurisdiction was ensured by fixing the situs of the contract within Kaira, other jurisdictions having connecting factors were not clearly, unambiguously and explicitly excluded. That being the position it could not be said that the jurisdiction of the Court at Salem which Court otherwise had jurisdiction under law through connecting factor of delivery of goods there at was expressly excluded. We accordingly find no error or infirmity in the impugned judgment of the High Court. Appeal dismissed.
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1989 (3) TMI 369 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ance with law. For the fitness of things, the prayer of the petitioners for eligibility certificate has to be considered by the respondents-authorities by giving an opportunity of hearing to the petitioners and by passing a speaking and reasoned order. Considering all these aspects of the matter, this Court finds that the petitioners cannot escape from the payment of sales and turnover tax in the manner as canvassed in the writ petition, but at the same time, it is found that in the fitness of things, the appropriate respondent-authorities should be directed to consider the representation of the petitioners for granting the eligibility certificate within two months from the date of the communication of this order, and they should dispose of the matter, after giving an opportunity of personal hearing to the petitioners and by passing a reasoned and speaking order. The writ petition is thus disposed of without costs, with the observations as made and directions as given above.
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1989 (3) TMI 368 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... . As we said above only tin of oil is sold. There is no intention for sale or purchase of tin. The intention is to purchase of oil which of course is in tin. Therefore, whatever is the price paid, it must be taken to be the price of the oil. May be if more oil is sold and delivered in a container brought by the purchaser the price may be lesser than the oil sold in tin container, but nevertheless, when oil is sold in tin, the price that is paid is the price of the oil. Therefore, total turnover of the price has to be taxed and there is no question of taxing separately for the price of oil and price of tin at different rates. 7.. Accordingly with these findings on the question of law arising in the matter, we set aside the order of the Appellate Tribunal and restore the order passed by the Appellate Assistant Commissioner. The references are thus disposed of. There will be no order as to costs. Petition allowed. See Premier Breweries Ltd. v. State of Karnataka 1984 56 STC 14.
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1989 (3) TMI 367 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... e had ultimately sent the goods manufactured by it on consignment basis to places outside Uttar Pradesh. In this view of the matter, realization of difference of tax under the provisions of sub-clause (6) of section 4-B of the aforesaid Act, as it was applicable during the assessment year in dispute, was upheld by the Sales Tax Tribunal by the impugned order. Having gone through the order passed by the Sales Tax Tribunal and having heard the learned Standing Counsel, I find that the Tribunal has not committed any error of law in doing so. It may be pointed out that under the provisions of sub-clause (2) of section 4-B of the Act the raw materials which are intended to be covered by the said provisions are those which are not to be sold on consignment basis. In the result, the revision fails and is dismissed with costs which are assessed at Rs. 200 (rupees two hundred). Stay order dated 18th August, 1987, passed in the case by this Court is hereby vacated. Petition dismissed.
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1989 (3) TMI 366 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... middleman commission at the rate of Re. 1 per ton. The bills are duly paid. On these facts the Supreme Court came to the conclusion that the assessee was commission agent of the colliery and the property never passed on to the assessee. On the strength of the said decision of the Supreme Court learned counsel for the assessee contended that the Tribunal committed an error in imposing the tax under section 3(b) of the Central Sales Tax Act. After hearing counsel for the parties and carefully perusing the order passed by the Tribunal I am of opinion that since no tax could be imposed under section 3(b) of the Central Sales Tax Act on the facts of the case, the order passed by the Tribunal cannot be sustained. In the result the revisions succeed and are allowed. The order passed by the Tribunal is quashed. However, the parties shall bear their own costs. Let a copy of this order be sent to the Tribunal concerned as contemplated under section 11(8) of the Act. Petitions allowed.
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1989 (3) TMI 365 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... When rule 31 of the Tamil Nadu General Sales Tax Rules permits an assessee to provide personal or property security, I do not see how the 2nd respondent can refuse even to look into the security bond given by the assessee pending the appeal before him. At any rate, since the appeal is pending before the 2nd respondent and the appeal relates to the assessment year 1987-88, I think it is just and proper in the interests of justice to direct the 2nd respondent to dispose of the main appeal itself within six weeks from today. Till then, there will be stay of collection of demand. The writ petition is ordered accordingly. No costs. Writ petition allowed.
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