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Case Laws
Showing 281 to 300 of 300 Records
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1989 (9) TMI 20 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
Company, Surtax ... ... ... ... ..... dend will be paid out of the general reserve. Further, dividend is to be distributed out of the general reserve. The amount standing to the credit of the general reserve at the close of the year is Rs. 50,65,750. This amount is made up of general reserve of Rs. 42,81,971 brought forward from the earlier years plus a sum of Rs. 13, 23,779 being an amount appropriated out of the profits of that year, reduced by the amount of Rs. 5,40,000 representing the amount of proposed dividend. This is how the amount to the credit of the general reserve at the end of the year is Rs. 50,65,750. From the above discussion, it is clear that the dividend was distributed from out of the general reserve and not from out of the general reserve of the earlier years. The case is, therefore, squarely covered by the Supreme Court decision in Vazir Sultan Tobacco Co. Ltd. v. CIT 1981 132 ITR 559. The question is, accordingly, answered in the negative and in favour of the Revenue. No order as to costs.
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1989 (9) TMI 19 - GAUHATI HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... and repairs work associated with the garage including washing and overhauling of motor vehicles. Such a business required the attention of the firm round the clock and, therefore, the two partners occupied the first floor to attend to the work of the assessee-firm. Whether two partners should attend to the work or one is enough to attend to such a work and whether the first floor is to be occupied by them for attending to the work, it is for the proprietor of the firm to decide. As a matter of fact, it is not denied that the two partners were attending to the work indicated earlier. As we have indicated in the prefatory part of the order, the issue raised is founded on fact and law and, in our consideration on the facts, it is more probable to infer that the house property was occupied by the partners for business purposes. In that view, the question referred is answered in the negative, in favour of the assessee and against the Revenue. No costs. SMT. M. SARMA J. -I agree.
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1989 (9) TMI 18 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
Intercorporate Dividends, Special Deduction ... ... ... ... ..... dividends to a specified percentage thereof and that, in the case of intercorporate dividends received from a domestic company, it is limited to 25 per cent. We agree with the submission of Mr. Jetley, learned counsel for the Revenue, that no part of paragraph 32 can be read as being an order, instruction or direction, which it has categorically to be if it is to bind the officials of the Revenue. Furthermore, the paragraph states that the Finance Act, 1966, which it explains, has not made any change in section 85A. Implicitly, therefore, it refers to the earlier circular explaining the Finance Act, 1965, paragraph 19 whereof we have already analysed. We are, in the circumstances, unable to accept the submission that income-tax on inter-corporate dividends can be levied by the officials of the Revenue only at the rate of 25 per cent. thereof. In the result, the question posed to us is answered in the negative and in favour of the Revenue. There shall be no order as to costs.
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1989 (9) TMI 17 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
Information That Income Has Escaped Assessment, Intercorporate Dividends, Reassessment, Relief From Income Tax
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1989 (9) TMI 16 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
Capital Asset, Capital Gains, Transfer ... ... ... ... ..... uired a capital asset by reason of the said agreement for sale, that there was a transfer of that capital asset when the assessee entered into consent terms and relinquished it, and that the capital asset had been acquired for the cost of Rs. 17,500 paid as and by way of earnest money under the said agreement for sale. The question that is posed asks whether the amount of Rs. 1,00,000 can be treated as a capital gain in the hands of the assessee. We find that the Income-tax Officer had deducted from out of the total sum of Rs. 1,17,500 received by the assessee under the consent terms the amount of Rs. 17,500 as being the cost of acquisition of the asset and the sum of Rs. 17,904 on account of expenses and legal charges. The assessment was made by him rightly on the basis that the capital gain was of Rs. 82,086. Accordingly, we answer the question thus the amount of Rs. 82,086 shall be treated as a capital gain in the hands of the assessee. There shall be no order as to costs.
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1989 (9) TMI 15 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
Bonus Shares, Capital Gains, Short-term Capital Gains ... ... ... ... ..... passu with the other shares. Therefore, on the issue of bonus shares what happens is, that though the extent of participation of the holder is not increased the number of shares is, all holders of original shares being entitled to the bonus. The observation was made in the context of the issue before the court, namely, the cost of acquisition of the original and not the bonus shares. We have been taken through the decision of the Gujarat High Court aforementioned and we are, respectfully, in full agreement therewith. It is difficult to see how a bonus share can be said to have been acquired or held by an assessee before the date of the issue. In the result, the first question is answered thus The 120 bonus shares issued by the Century Mills Ltd. were held by the assessee on and from the date on which they were issued. Consequently, the second question is answered thus The capital gain of Rs. 84,492 arising on the sale whereof is short-term capital gain. No order as to costs.
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1989 (9) TMI 14 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... not apply to the assessee s case and consequently directing the Income-tax Officer not to reduce the capital by the proportionate sums of Rs. 3,22,858 and Rs. 2,52,282 for the purpose of surtax assessment for 1971-72 and 1972-73 assessment years respectively ? Both the questions are, it is agreed, covered, the first by the decision of the Supreme Court in Vazir Sultan Tobacco Co. Ltd. v. CIT 1981 132 ITR 559, and the second by this court s judgment in CIT v. Century Spg. and Mfg. Co. Ltd. 1978 111 ITR 6. Following the aforesaid judgments, the first question is answered in the negative and in favour of the Revenue and the second question is answered in the affirmative and in favour of the assessee. No order as to costs.
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1989 (9) TMI 13 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
Casual And Non-recurring Receipt, Company ... ... ... ... ..... 395 of the Reports, this court held as under This payment was expressly provided for in the lease and, therefore, it was foreseen, known, anticipated and provided for as it was put by Dr. Gupta. It has its source in the agreement itself where it is clothed with the nature of royalty. In these circumstances, it cannot be held to be casual receipt. Similar view has been taken by the Madras High Court in CIT v. V. P. Rao 1950 18 ITR 825, the Patna High Court in Bisheshwar Singh v. CIT 1955 27 ITR 376 and the Kerala High Court in Helen Rubber Industries Ltd. v. CIT 1959 36 ITR 544. It is not necessary to discuss any of the cases cited either on behalf of the assessee or on behalf of the Revenue as, in our opinion, none of these cases are relevant in deciding the controversy in issue in this case. For the foregoing reasons, we must answer the question referred to this court in the affirmative and in favour of the Revenue. There will be no order as to costs. K.M. YUSUF J.-I agree.
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1989 (9) TMI 12 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
Association Of Persons, Wealth Tax ... ... ... ... ..... no doubt issued under section 167A of the 1961 Act, clarifying that members of such clubs do not have any share in the income or assets of such association. Since there is no definition of association of persons under the 1957 Act, we must understand the said expression in the same sense in which it is used in the 1961 Act. If so, the principle of the Board s circular applies with equal force in the case of an association of persons under this Act. We may also say that sub-section (4) of section 21AA appears to lend support to our conclusion. It says that, upon discontinuation or dissolution of an association of persons, every person who was a member of such association on such date shall be jointly and severally liable for the amount of tax, penalty, or other sum payable by the association. We do not think that such an action is contemplated in the case of a club whose members do not have a share in its income or in its assets. The wealth-tax case is, accordingly, dismissed.
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1989 (9) TMI 11 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
Business Expenditure ... ... ... ... ..... interest, maintenance charges and depreciation accrued in the earlier years and it was known and ascertained liability though it could not be quantified accurately. Therefore, it held that the order of the Commissioner (Appeals) allowing the claim was not justified but, at the same time, it held that the liability which related to a part of the accounting year relevant for the assessment year 1976-77 should be allowed as a deduction. There is no doubt that the claim of the railways was in respect of siding charges, interest and maintenance for the period November 1, 1963 to December 11, 1973. This, however, is not a statutory liability. The railways sent a bill in the relevant accounting period. Having received this bill, the assessee was entitled to debit the amount against the current year s profits. In that view of the matter, the question is answered in the negative and in favour of the assessee. There will be no order as to costs. BHAGABATI PRASAD BANERJEE J. -I agree.
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1989 (9) TMI 10 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
Business Expenditure, Company ... ... ... ... ..... stances of the case, the Tribunal was right in holding that reimbursement of medical expenses to employees of Rs. 11,028 was to be considered as perquisites for the purpose of computing the disallowance under section 40A(5) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 ? Counsel are agreed that the issue involved herein is covered by this court s decision in the case of CIT v. Mercantile Bank Limited 1988 169 ITR 44. In view thereof, we answer the questions in the negative and in favour of the assessee. No order as to costs.
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1989 (9) TMI 9 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
Actual Cost, Depreciation ... ... ... ... ..... elevant assessment years, the assessee claimed that the said amount of Rs. 89,900 should be taken as forming part of the assessee s assets and depreciation should be allowed thereon. The Income-tax Officer and the Appellate Assistant Commissioner rejected the assessee s contention. The Tribunal allowed the second appeal by the assessee before it. It held that the amount of Rs. 89,900 had to be taken as part of the cost ofthe fixed assets of the assessee and should be taken into account for the purpose of capital computation. Counsel have fairly stated that the question must be answered in the affirmative and in favour of the assessee, having regard to the judgments of the Supreme Court and this court in Challapalli Sugars Ltd. v. CIT 1975 98 ITR 167, CIT v. Alcock Ashdown and Co. Ltd. 1979 119 ITR 164 (Bom) and in CIT v. Hindustan Polymers Ltd. 1985 156 ITR 860 (Bom). The question is answered accordingly in the affirmative and in favour of the assessee. No order as to costs.
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1989 (9) TMI 8 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
Penalty, Quantum Of Penalty For Delayed Filing Of Return ... ... ... ... ..... e Explanation introduced in section 271 with retrospective effect applies to the case. By reason of that Explanation, assessed tax for the purpose means tax as reduced by that deducted at source or paid in advance. Having regard to this Explanation, the question is answered thus. The quantum of penalty is liable to be computed with reference to the total tax payable by the assessee as reduced by the advance tax paid by him. No order as to costs.
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1989 (9) TMI 7 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
Appeals, Salary, TDS On Salary ... ... ... ... ..... aken a correct view of the matter. A point has been made by the assessee that as a result of this deduction, the Department is realising the tax twice on the same income. It does not appear that this point was agitated before the Tribunal. We, however, make it clear that if the amount of tax has already been realised from the employees concerned directly, there cannot be any question of further realisation of tax as the same income cannot be taxed twice. If the tax has been realised once, it cannot be realised once again, but that does not mean that the assessee will not be liable for payment of interest or any legal consequence for their failure to deduct or to pay in accordance with law to the Revenue. Under these circumstances, the third question is answered in the affirmative and in favour of the Revenue. Fourth and fifth questions are also answered in the affirmative and in favour of the Revenue. There will be no order as to costs. BHAGABATI PRASAD BANERJEE J. -I agree.
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1989 (9) TMI 6 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
Interest, Limitation, Salary ... ... ... ... ..... he usual course on the full amount of salary. The interest that is payable under section 201 (1A) is only up to the date on which such tax is actually paid. The interest will stop running when the amount of tax which should have been deducted at source is actually paid by the employer or by the employee. Section 202 makes it clear that deduction of tax at source is only one mode of recovery of tax and is without prejudice to any other mode of recovery. The amount which the employer has failed to deduct and pay to the treasury may be recovered from the employer by treating him as an assessee in default or from the employee himself. It has not been shown how the recovery of the amount of tax which was deductible at source by the company and thereafter, payable to the treasury has become barred by limitation. In the premises, both the questions are answered in the affirmative and in favour of the Revenue. There will be no order as to costs. BHAGABATI PRASAD BANERJEE J. -I agree.
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1989 (9) TMI 5 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
Provisions For Compulsory Audit, S. 269-SS ... ... ... ... ..... o punish him under section 276DD. In other words, the assessee will have to show that there was a reasonable cause for such failure. Only then the question of prosecution will arise. This is undoubtedly a sufficient safeguard. Yet another safeguard, as we are able to see from section 279, which we have already extracted, is that the prosecution is to be at the instance of the Chief Commissioner or the Commissioner. Where, therefore, the highest functionary in the Incometax Department is entrusted with the power, that itself takes away the sting of arbitrariness. Besides section 269SS, the petitioners have also challenged the validity of section 44AB. It may be pointed out that we have already upheld the validity of section 44AB in Writ Petition No. 3205 of 1985 by order dated August 29, 1989. As a corollary, for the reasons stated above, we hold that section 269SS is also valid and, accordingly, we dismiss all these writ petitions. However, there will be no order as to costs.
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1989 (9) TMI 4 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... assessee on that piece of land. The upkeep and maintenance of the road were the responsibility of the assessee. Some other persons occasionally may use the road but that will not prevent the assessee from being the owner of the road. The assessee has himself put the matter beyond doubt by claiming depreciation allowance on this road. This was negatived by the Appellate Assistant Commissioner but was allowed by the Tribunal. The claim for depreciation could be made by the assessee only on the basis that the road was owned by the assessee and was used for the purpose of its business. Therefore, in my judgment, on the facts of this case, the Tribunal has correctly come to the conclusion that the expenditure of Rs. 20,00,598 incurred by the assessee on the construction of the road was not allowable as business expenditure. Therefore, the question is answered in the affirmative and in favour of the revenue. There will be no order as to costs. BHAGABATI PRASAD BANERJEE J. -I agree.
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1989 (9) TMI 3 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... sessee is able to establish that it is liable to pay income-tax on the interest income as statutory agent of the non-resident depositors, its obligation to deduct income-tax on the interest income remains. It has not been shown how the assessee is itself liable to pay any income-tax on the interest income on the deposited amount. Under the above circumstances, question No. 1 is answered in the affirmative and in favour of the Revenue. Questions Nos. 2 and 4 are concluded by the judgment delivered by this court on September 5, 1989, in the assessee s own case, in Incometax Reference No. 154 of 1983 ( Grindlays Bank Ltd. v. CIT since reported in 1992 193 ITR 457). In view of the principles laid down in that judgment, questions Nos. 2 and 4 are also answered in the affirmative and in favour of the Revenue. It has been stated on behalf of the assessee that it does not want to press question No. 3. Therefore, no answer is given to this question. There will be no order as to costs.
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1989 (9) TMI 2 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
Business, Business Income ... ... ... ... ..... hatsoever, any amount in respect of such loss or expenditure or some benefit in respect of such trading liability by way of remission or cessation thereof, the amount obtained by him or the value of benefit accruing to him, shall be deemed to be profits and gains of business or profession and accordingly chargeable to income-tax as the income of that previous year, whether the business or profession in respect of which the allowance or deduction has been made is in existence in that year or not. The assessee in this case has been allowed deduction in respect of the expenditure and the amount of expenditure has been recovered from the insurance company. Therefore, the entire allowance has to be written back in this particular year of account when he received the amount from the insurance company. In view of the aforesaid, the question referred is answered in the affirmative and in favour of the Revenue. There will be no order as to costs. BHAGABATI PRASAD BANERJEE J. -I agree.
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1989 (9) TMI 1 - SUPREME COURT
Lliability of the appellant, the Life Insurance Corporation, to pay interest for the period after date of maturity of insurance policy, in case of delay in payment - mere intimation to ITO and assignee did not amount to discharge of statutory obligation u/s 226(3)(vi). The award of interest to the assignee was justified on the delay arose on account of the failure of the LIC to perform its statutory obligation u/s 226(3)(vi) - contention of the appellant is rejected
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