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Case Laws
Showing 21 to 40 of 285 Records
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1992 (3) TMI 348 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ming to the case on hand, the detention order was passed after 5 months and 8 days from the date of the registration of the last case and more than 4 months from submission of the proposal. What disturbs our mind is that the statements from the witnesses A to E were obtained only after the detenu became successful in getting bail in all the prohibition cases registered against him, that too in the later part of March, 1991. These statements are very much referred to in the grounds of detention and relied upon by the detaining authority along with the registration of the cases under the Act. 14. Under the above circumstances, taking into consideration of the unexplained delay whether short or long especially when the appellant has taken a specific plea of delay, we are constrained to quash the detention order. Accordingly we allow the appeal, set aside the judgment of the High Court and quash the impugned detention order. The detenu is directed to be set at liberty forthwith.
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1992 (3) TMI 347 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... t required to be filed in the High Court under section 10 of the Companies Act. Section 10 of the Companies Act has no application to the suits which are before us. We therefore agree with the view taken by the learned Chamber Judge, that the two suits have to be tried by a Civil Court. It is not in dispute that looking to the valuation of the prayers in the suits, it is the Bombay City Civil Court which will have jurisdiction to entertain and try the suits. The plaints are accordingly returned under Order VII, Rule 10 read with Rule 283 of the High Court Rules on the Original Side, for presentation to the proper Court. 26. We have no doubt that in the event of it becoming at all necessary for the plaintiffs to approach the learned Single Judge of this Court who passed the orders in A.O. Nos. 111 of 1992 and 112 of 1992 for a review of his orders, the applications will be considered by the learned Judge in the light of our observations above. Prothonotary to act accordingly.
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1992 (3) TMI 346 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... only just, fair and proper that the claim of the company is entertained and the Cess Authority is directed to recompute the cess payable for the years in question holding the demand already made as illegal. In view of the above discussion while dismissing Civil Appeal No.3249 of 1983 arising from the suit and disposing of Civil Appeal No.3250 of 1983, we allow the Writ Petition No.1266 of 1980 and make the following directions - "The appellant company is liable to pay for the years 1953-1954 to 1966-1967 the cess as recomputed in the light of the decision in writ petition No.1372 of 1974. If the amount paid by the company for these years is in excess of the amount thus assessed, the District Board shall not be liable to a make any refund of the excess. If the cess recomputed exceeds the amount already paid, the liability to pay such excess shall be on the appellant company." In the circumstances of the case, the parties are directed to bear their respective costs.
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1992 (3) TMI 345 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... and the second points, the very interesting and learned discussion on the third point need not detain us and we express no opinion about it. We allow transferred writ petition of Kumar Padma Prasad and declare that K.N. Srivastava, on the date of issue of warrant by the president of India, was not qualified to be appointed as a Judge of the High Court. As a consequence, we quash his appointment as a judge of the Gauhati High Court. We direct the Union of India and other respondents present before us not to administer oath or affirmation under Article 219 of the Constitution of India to K.N. Srivastava. We further restrain K.N. Srivastava from making and subscribing an oath or affirmation in terms of Article 219 of the Constitution of India and assuming office of the Judge of the High Court. We direct the Registry to send a copy of this judgment to the President of India for his consideration and necessary action in terms of our judgment. There shall be no order as to costs.
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1992 (3) TMI 344 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ons already received. The claims of squatters/hawkers who have already responded can be scrutinised from the viewpoint of the eligibility criteria laid down under the scheme so that their priorities can be determined. So also the claims of those who have petitioned this Court and whose petitions are pending can also be finalised to save time. Henceforth if any new petitions is filed in regard to MCD area, the Registry of this Court will direct copy of the petition to be delivered to standing counsel of MCD and the matter will be listed not earlier than 10 days before the service of the copy unless otherwise directed by the Court. No such mention will be made in Court unless the Registrar has been intimated in advance who on such intimation will indicate if there is such urgency that the matter cannot wait usual listing time. The above order will guide all concerned including the Registry of this Court so far as cases of squatters/hawkers are concerned. Petitions disposed of.
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1992 (3) TMI 343 - SUPREME COURT
Whether Tribunal correct to restrain appellant from proceeding further with the disciplinary proceedings against the respondent in terms of the charge-sheet filed by the appellant and directed that in case the commuted value of the pension payable to the respondent was refunded, the respondent should be paid the full value of the pension from the due date including the arrears pending the proceedings?
Held that:- In a case like this the tribunal, we feel, should have been very careful before granting stay in a disciplinary proceeding at an interlocutory stage. The imputations made against the respondent were extremely serious and the facts alleged, if proved, would have established misconduct and misbehaviour. It is surprising that without even a counter being filed, at an interim stage, the tribunal without giving any reasons and without apparently considering whether the memorandum of charges deserved to be enquired into or not, granted a stay of disciplinary proceedings as it has done.
Considering all the facts and circumstances of the case, we direct that a copy of this order should be forwarded to the Chairman of the Central Administrative Tribunal so that he may consider whether further hearing of the application made by the respondent should be proceeded with by a bench presided over by him or a Bench other than the one which has passed the impugned order. We do not intend to cast any aspersions on the members of the tribunal who have passed the order, in the absence of more concrete material. But we certainly feel that in the facts and circumstances it is desirable that the same Bench of the tribunal should not proceed with further hearing of the application. Appeal allowed.
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1992 (3) TMI 342 - KERALA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ability to pay penalty may, however, be different from that of liability to pay penal interest. 10.. In the light of the above decision of the Supreme Court, it must be held that the appellant is liable to pay penal interest from May 1, 1978 and not merely from July 25, 1979, when the revised return was filed. The words in Rule 21(11) which provides for filing of the return in form 8 must be construed as a return ought to be filed under that provision, and the default has to be construed in terms of section 23(3) of the K.G.S.T. Act as a default occurring for non-payment of the tax payable in terms of the return which ought to have been filed. 11.. For the aforesaid reasons, we are of the view that the Board of Revenue was right in holding that the appellant was liable for the payment of interest in regard to tax payable on the excess turnover with effect from May 1, 1978. We answer the reference in favour of the Revenue. The Appeal fails, and is dismissed. Appeal dismissed.
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1992 (3) TMI 341 - RAJASTHAN HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... be issued. Thus, in such cases application of section 12 has been made obligatory. In this case too no best judgment assessment has been made so far under section 10(1)(b) of Act prior to April 7, 1979 and therefore, the limitation of eight years prescribed by section 12 of the Act will be applicable in such cases and therefore, following this dictum of the learned Judges of the Division Bench, I am firmly of the view that the proposed assessment of the years 1966-67 to 1970-71 have become time-barred as per section 12(2) of the Act and, therefore, to that extent the petitioner s writ petition must succeed and the notice annexure 1 given in respect of these years is quashed. However, the assessing authority will be free to assess the petitioners for escaped assessment of tax pertaining to the years 1971-72 to 1975-76 under section 10(1)(b) of the Act. The writ petition stands disposed of accordingly on merits with no orders as to costs. Writ petition disposed of accordingly.
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1992 (3) TMI 340 - RAJASTHAN HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... nly when there is no reasonable cause. Section 7A of the Rajasthan Sales Tax Act provides for provisional assessment in a case where return has not been submitted. It is expected from the assessing authority in a case where the returns are not submitted as required under section 7 to take action within reasonable time. Issue of notice under section 7A is not only in the interest of revenue but in the interest of the assessee as well because if the notice is issued timely then beside the revenue getting the due tax, the assessee may not be liable for late submission of return to its maximum extent as has been done in the present case. The Tribunal in the present case was satisfied that there is a reasonable cause on account of the reasons mentioned above and this being a finding of fact, I am not inclined to interfere and the order setting aside penalty under section 7AA is maintained. 8.. In the result, the revision is dismissed. 9.. No order as to costs. Petition dismissed.
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1992 (3) TMI 339 - RAJASTHAN HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... me allowed and would incur liability under section 16(1)(b). The provisions of section 16(1)(b) before its amendment by Act No. 13 of 1964 were has without reasonable cause failed to pay tax due within the time allowed . After amendment the language was changed, i.e., has without reasonable cause failed to pay within the time allowed any tax, fee or penalty . From this change in the provisions of section 16(1)(b), it would be evident that liability to pay the penalty has arisen in respect of failure to pay tax and it is not necessary that the tax should be due. The decision of the honourable Supreme Court reported in 1965 16 STC 318 (State of Rajasthan v. Ghasilal) pertains to the period prior to the amendment of 1964. In these circumstances, I am of the view that the view taken by the Board of Revenue is not in accordance with law. Consequently, the revision is accepted. The order levying penalty under section 16(1)(b) by the assessing authority is upheld. Petition allowed.
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1992 (3) TMI 338 - RAJASTHAN HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... e a very limited scope with regard to the infirmity in the form of notice. It has no application when there is no service of the notice at all or where no notice under section 12 has been issued or the notice issued is unsigned and cannot be considered to be a valid notice in the eyes of law. The issue of notice in the prescribed form under section 12 is a condition precedent to the validity of the order of reassessment as has been held by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Narayana Chetty v. Incometax Officer 1959 35 ITR 388 and if there is no exercise of power under section 12 and notice has been issued under some other section, then it cannot be said that the proceedings have validly been initiated. Since notice under section 12 in the present case, has been issued after expiry of timelimit prescribed under section 12, the Sales Tax Tribunal was justified in quashing the reassessment proceedings. The revisions are dismissed. No order as to costs. Petitions dismissed.
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1992 (3) TMI 337 - WEST BENGAL TAXATION TRIBUNAL
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... ... ..... the 1987 amendments of section 6B of the 1941 Act are not confiscatory. 20.. Mr. Somen Bose, learned counsel for the applicant-company further argued that if the amended provisions are not applied to it, the applicant will have no cause for grievance. In this connection, he relied on the case of Ahmedabad St. Xaviers College Society v. State of Gujarat AIR 1974 SC 1389. That was a case involving the minority rights embodied in articles 29 and 30. The ratio of that decision hardly applies to this case. But, here, there is not a single reason to make the impugned provisions of the Bengal Finance (Sales Tax) Act, 1941, inconsistent with any provision in the Constitution. Therefore, there is no conceivable reason why these provisions should not be applied to the applicant-company. Accordingly, the application is dismissed. Interim orders stand vacated. No order is made for cost. S.P. DAS GHOSH (Chairman).-I agree. P.C. BANERJI (Technical Member).-I agree. Application dismissed.
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1992 (3) TMI 336 - KARNATAKA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... stered under the Central Act when he purchased the goods. The provision contemplates the levy of tax upon goods which have been purchased in the course of inter-State trade and in respect of which the concessional rate of tax under the Central Act has been levied. This necessarily implies that the dealer should have been registered under the Central Act when he purchased the goods. The words a dealer registered under the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956 must, therefore, refer to the point of time when he sold the goods. Having regard to this interpretation of the provisions of section 5(2) of the Karnataka Act, we must set aside the order of the Tribunal and hold that the petitioner was not liable to pay any tax under the provisions of section 5(2) of the Karnataka Act for the assessment year 1981-82 in respect of the goods purchased by him during the assessment year 1980-81 at a concessional rate under the Central Act. Ordered accordingly. No order as to costs. Petition allowed.
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1992 (3) TMI 335 - RAJASTHAN HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... nt passed by the Income-tax Officer. From the perusal of various authorities mentioned above, I am of the view that the Sales Tax Tribunal has ample power to allow a new ground for the first time, which is raised before it. That discretion has to be exercised looking to the facts and circumstances of each case as to whether such ground should be allowed to be raised or not. For the reasons given hereinabove, I am of the view that the Sales Tax Tribunal has jurisdiction to entertain the question, which has been raised for the first time before it and no illegality has been committed by the Tribunal. With regard to the matter of interpretation of the provisions of section 10(1)(b) of the Act, since it is held that the order of the Tribunal is not in accordance with law, it would be open to the Tribunal to hear the appeal on merit and then decide the same in accordance with law, after hearing both the parties. The revision is partly allowed accordingly. Petition partly allowed.
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1992 (3) TMI 334 - RAJASTHAN HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... , I deem it proper to remand the matter to the Tribunal to decide afresh as to whether purchase tax under section 5A would be still leviable or not. Section 11B relating to charge of interest came into existence on 2nd May, 1969 and it was later on substituted by section 8 of the Rajasthan Act No. 4 of 1979 with effect from April 7, 1979. In the explanation to sub-section (1) of section 11B, section 12 was added for the first time by section 10 of the Rajasthan Sales Tax (Amendment) Act, 1987, with effect from April 1, 1987. Admittedly, the cases pertain to prior to the coming into force of this section and, therefore, apparently interest cannot be levied as it is not applicable. Thus, the learned Tribunal was right in setting aside the interest. Further this point is squarely covered by the decision of this Court rendered in Commercial Tax Officer v. Nalwaya Minerals and Motor Parts 1989 30 STL 151 (Raj). Accordingly, all these revisions stand disposed of as observed above.
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1992 (3) TMI 333 - RAJASTHAN HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... earned Members of the Sales Tax Tribunal is not correct as it has been alleged for transportation of material and in any case once a certificate was issued in order to give a finding that the same is not reliable, it was incumbent on the part of the Sales Tax Tribunal either to have sent the matter back to the assessing authority for enquiry or it could have conducted enquiry at its level and then could have come to the conclusion with regard to any finding of fact. Thus, the order passed by the Tribunal is contrary to the principles of natural justice and is therefore, set aside. The matter is remanded to the Sales Tax Tribunal for conducting enquiry with regard to the correctness of the certificate and only thereafter come to the conclusion whether the said certificate is reliable or not. Due opportunity shall be given to both the parties before a final conclusion is arrived at. Accordingly, the revision is allowed in part with no order as to costs. Petition partly allowed.
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1992 (3) TMI 332 - KARNATAKA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ification, to cancel or vary a notification issued under sub-section (1). The words of subsection (3) empower the State Government to cancel or vary notification issued under section 8-A(1) but they cannot be read to mean that a notification issued under section 8-A(1) continues to be operative although the relevant portion of the Act itself is amended. The delegate, the State Government, has to issue a notification to supersede an earlier notification. The delegate s notification is impliedly superseded when the parent Legislature amends the concerned parts of the Act. 15.. Therefore, we answer the question referred to us in the affirmative we are of the opinion that a notification issued under section 8-A of the Act will be impliedly repealed or rendered ineffective when the Legislature amends the Act and introduces an entry in the Schedule to the Act which relates to the class of goods to which exemption is given by the notification. Reference answered in the affirmative.
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1992 (3) TMI 331 - RAJASTHAN HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... bmitted the cheque in advance then the position may change, inasmuch as the respondents have by their own practice accepted the cheques in advance. If such cheques have been given in advance and of the due dates and have not been dishonoured, then no penalty could be levied. If the cheques have been given of a date, which is later than due date or if they have been dishonoured, then the petitioner cannot claim the benefit of giving cheque in advance. In the result, the writ petitions are partly allowed. The petitioner is held liable for penalty in respect of the delay in making payment for each of the week, but if the cheques have been given in advance of the due date as alleged and have been encashed from the bank, then for the delay of encashment of such cheques no penalty can be levied. If the cheques have been given of the date, which is later than the due date or dishonoured then the petitioner would be liable for penalty. No order as to costs. Petitions partly allowed.
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1992 (3) TMI 330 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... stion or under the provisions of the Act, being the Tamil Nadu General Sales Tax Act, 1959, as well as the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956 and till the factual basis is proved to exist, the claim of the petitioner cannot be sustained. It is well open to the petitioner to face the assessment proceedings as and when they are initiated, make his objections to such proposals for assessment and substantiate the claim for exemption by sufficient records and then pursue his remedies, otherwise available in law. In the absence of such procedure or exercise being initially gone through before the competent assessing authorities it will be not only inappropriate but will lead to serious anomalies to grant any declaration as prayed for in the writ petition, in general terms de hors the eligibility of the individual transaction for such exemption. 11.. For all the reasons stated above, the writ petition, therefore, fails and shall stand dismissed with costs of Rs. 1,000. Petition dismissed.
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1992 (3) TMI 329 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... pretation of section 15A-I of the Act and the department is bound to determine the liability of additional duty accordingly. 8.. The petitioners have sought relief of quashing of the trade circular and direction to the department to desist from giving effect to the amendment to section 15A-I of the Act. Both the reliefs cannot be granted and are not required to be granted in view of our interpretation of provisions of section 15A-I of the Act as amended in the year 1984. The only relief the petitioners are entitled to is that the returns filed by the company shall be finalised by computing additional tax on net amount of tax payable after adjustment of set-off under the Act and the Rules. We make it clear that this computation should be undertaken only in cases where the returns are not finalised either by the original assessing authority or the appellate authority. The petition is accordingly disposed of. There will be no order as to costs. Petition disposed of accordingly.
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