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Showing 21 to 40 of 276 Records
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1992 (7) TMI 335 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... . The High Court was not inclined to give this margin of 10 observing. If that doubt is entertained that some more money has not been accounted for the accused is not entitled for the benefit of 10 rebate. As we have now found that a sum of ₹ 97,968/- has to be deducted from the total value of the alleged disproportionate assets of ₹ 93,937.24 as found by the High Court even without giving 10 margin, the accused would be entitled for an acquittal on the ground that the prosecution has not satisfactorily established that the appellant was holding assets disproportionate to his known sources of income. On the other hand, there will be a surplus of ₹ 4030.76. 13. In the result, we set aside the conviction of the appellant under Section 5(1)(e) read with Section 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 and the sentence of imprisonment and fine imposed therefor. The fine amount if already paid is directed to be refunded. Accordingly, the appeal is allowed.
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1992 (7) TMI 334 - SC ORDER
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... ... ..... R Appeal dismissed.
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1992 (7) TMI 333 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ation has testified to the fact that the appellant had demolished many unauthorised and multistoried buildings and that the Government did not feel it necessary to suspend him even after the raid in his house was conducted. 24. On the face of the totality of the above circumstances and the cumulative effect thereof according to Mr. P.P. Rao, the prosecution cannot be said to have successfully fixed the criminality under Section 5(1)(e) of the on the appellant who had completed an unblemished service well for over a period of 25 learned Counsel, we feel that the conviction recorded by the High Court affirming the judgment of the Trial Court sentencing the appellant under Section 5(1)(e) read with 5(2) of the Act and the sentence imposed there for cannot be sustained and are liable to be set aside. 25. In the result, the appeal is allowed and the sentence of imprisonment and the fine are set aside and the fine amount if already paid is directed to be refunded to the appellant.
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1992 (7) TMI 332 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... cy due to his drinking habit. Thus it would constitute gravest misconduct warranting dismissal from service. The authorities, therefore, were justified in imposing the penalty of dismissal. The courts below failed to properly appreciate the legal incidence and the affect of the rules. The ratio relied on by learned counsel for the respondent in Gurdev Singh v. State of Haryana & Ors., (1976) 2 S.L.R. 443; Rattan Lal Ex-Constable v. State of Haryana & Ors., (1983) 2 SLR 159 and Sukhdev Singh v. State of Punjab & Ors., (1983) 2 SLR 645 turned on their peculiar facts and would render little assistance to the respondent. We approve the ratio in Bhagwat Parshad v. Inspector General of Police, Punjab & Ors., AIR 1970 (Punj. & Har.) 81 as correct law. The appeal is accordingly allowed. The decree of the courts below is set aside and the dismissal order is restored. But in the circumstances, parties are directed to bear their own costs throughout. Appeal allowed.
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1992 (7) TMI 331 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... rs, depreciation in respect of those assets cannot be taken into account. 3. The respondents have drawn our attention to a Circular dt. 26th Nov., 1968 issued by the CBDT under which it has clarified that in the case of a business undertaking held under trust its income will be income as shown in the accounts of the undertaking and that where the trust derives income from house property, interest on securities, capital gains or other sources, the income should be understood in its commercial sense. 4. We are also informed that in the earlier years when a similar question arose in respect of an assessee known as Laxmi Charitable Trust, an application under s. 256(2) was rejected by this High Court. In our view, therefore, the answer to the question is obvious. 5. We may also point out that the question as framed is somewhat misleading and is based on misconception, in so far as it reproduces the language used by the ITO which we have explained earlier. The rule is discharged.
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1992 (7) TMI 330 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ent shall be applicable to the case of foreign students and students who are non-resident Indians. We further hold that this judgment shall be operative prospectively. All those students who have already been admitted to the private medical colleges in the State of Karnataka in terms of the Karnataka State Notification dated June 5, 1989 shall not be entitled to the advantage of this judgment and they shall continue their studies on the same terms and conditions on which they were admitted to the consolidated MBBS course. Although we have struck down the capitation fee and allowed the writ petition to that extent, we are not inclined to grant any relief regarding admission to the petitioner. She was not admitted to the college on merit and secondly the course commenced in March-April, 1991 and we see no justification to direct respondent 3 the medical college to admit the petitioner. The writ petition is allowed in the above terms with no order as to costs. Petition allowed.
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1992 (7) TMI 329 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... the appellant. When the assessing officer himself has given sufficient reasons to apply different rates of tax for different periods, having regard to the position of entries at the relevant time, the Joint Commissioner was not justified either in law or on facts to have interfered with the order of the assessing officer also so as to deprive the appellant of payment of lesser rate of tax in respect of turnover for the period prior to September 13, 1977 during the assessment year in question. The order of the Joint Commissioner in so far as it levied 15 per cent tax as against 4 per cent really due on a turnover of Rs. 2,83,665 shall stand set aside, and the said turnover shall be liable to tax only at 4 per cent. The assessing officer shall take further steps to implement the order in the light of the directions contained above. 7.. In the result, the T.C.(A) is partly allowed as indicated above and in other respects the same is dismissed. No costs. Petition partly allowed.
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1992 (7) TMI 328 - PATNA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ttled that best judgment assessment can be made but for that there must be materials. From the orders of the Tribunal and the assessing officer it appears that the order of assessment has been passed upon the information collected by the assessing officer under three different reports and the officers who have submitted the reports have made due enquiry and examined various persons. Therefore, it cannot be said that the best judgment assessment has been made without any material on the record. In my view, the Tribunal has not committed any error in deciding this question as well. 8.. For the foregoing reasons question No. 1 is answered in the negative and question No. 2 in the affirmative, i.e., both the questions are answered in favour of the Revenue and against the assessees. Let a copy of this judgment be communicated to the Commercial Taxes Tribunal, Bihar, Patna. AFTAB ALAM, J.-I agree. Question No. 1 answered in the negative. Question No. 2 answered in the affirmative.
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1992 (7) TMI 327 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... hoc addition of Rs. 3,000 would be sufficient. It has been held by a Division Bench of this Court in Avon Plastics v. State of Tamil Nadu 1982 49 STC 268 that unless the discretion by the appellate authority has been wrongly exercised, it would not be proper for the Board of Revenue to interfere with the order of the Appellate Assistant Commissioner under section 34 of the Act. In Kuppuswamy and Sons v. State of Tamil Nadu 1982 51 STC 143 a Division Bench of this Court has held that the Board of Revenue in arriving at a turnover should not act mechanically but should act judicially while exercising its power of revision. So the function of the Board of Revenue is to find out whether the order of the Appellate Assistant Commissioner is reasonable and not to interfere with the order arbitrarily. In this view of the matter, the order under appeal is set aside and the order of the Appellate Assistant Commissioner is restored. The appeal stands allowed. No costs. Appeal allowed.
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1992 (7) TMI 326 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT]
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... ... ..... ny relief from this Court. However, learned counsel for the petitioner contended that the offer that was sent by the petitioner to pay the tax in lump sum was not binding on him because the same was not accepted in time. We cannot accept the submission for more than one reason. The contention raised is essentially one of fact and it was never raised earlier at any stage before the appropriate authority. Again the question whether an enforceable contract between the parties had come into existence or not, cannot be appropriately decided in these proceedings. The petitioner, if so advised, may seek redress before the Commissioner of Sales Tax, U.P., Lucknow or before such other forum as he may deem fit. However, if the petitioner makes any such representation before the Commissioner of Sales Tax, U.P., Lucknow, the same shall be decided in accordance with law. 7. Subject to the above, the writ petition is dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs. Writ petition dismissed.
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1992 (7) TMI 325 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... . We do not find any materials to come to the conclusion whether G.S. powder forms part of the commodities found in entry 59 of the First Schedule. The Joint Commissioner, in our view, has approached the matter in a wrong way. He has proceeded on the footing that G.S. powder is more or less used for the same purpose for which wattle bark is used and the quantity is also the same. We do not see how the Joint Commissioner can come to such a conclusion, when no sufficient materials were placed before him. In view of that, we are constrained to set aside the order of the Joint Commissioner and accordingly the matter is remanded back to the appellate authority to go into the question whether G.S. powder specifically falls under entry 59 of the First Schedule to the Tamil Nadu General Sales Tax Act, 1959, or not and decide the issue. It is not necessary to remind the revisional authority that the appellant-assessee has to be given an opportunity before deciding the issue. No costs.
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1992 (7) TMI 324 - ORISSA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... n the ownership, if any, and (vii) the declaration in form I-A is to be furnished by the purchasing dealer or his authorised agent. 6.. The assessing officer as well as the ACST proceeded on the basis that the purchasing dealer should be authorised to purchase the article in terms of the certificate of registration to get the benefit. In view of the analysis made by us above, we do not find that such a condition was required to be fulfilled. The Tribunal in our view was, therefore, justified in its conclusion that the approach of the assessing officer as well as the ACST was not correct. We find that the matter was remanded to the assessing officer for verification of the forms submitted by the assessee in support of his claim. That, according to us, is also the correct approach. The answer to the question referred to is in the affirmative in favour of the assessee and against the Revenue. No costs. D.M. PATNAIK, J.-I agree. Question reframed and answered in the affirmative.
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1992 (7) TMI 323 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... by the competent appellate authority could not arrogate powers to interfere with the same merely on a change of view on the very same facts and assume powers of an appellate authority. The revisional powers of the Joint Commissioner though couched in wide terms, it has been held to be at any rate not of the same extent as that of the appellate powers. Consequently, unless for just and sufficient reasons, the Joint Commissioner could not acting in routine disturb the findings of fact rendered on proper appreciation of relevant materials. On the facts of the present case, we are satisfied that there was absolutely no basis or justification for the Joint Commissioner to interfere with the wellconsidered findings of the appellate authority in coming to the conclusion that the slips in question do not reflect any suppression of sales turnover. Consequently, we set aside the order of the Joint Commissioner and restore the order of the appellate authority. No costs. Appeal allowed.
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1992 (7) TMI 322 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... detailed enquiry, the certificate issued by him did not have binding effect. If the Government, after giving cash subsidy, found that the cash subsidy was wrongly given, inasmuch as the industry, to which it was given, was not entitled to it, it was certainly open to the Government to recover the said amount. So also, it was open to the Sales Tax Commissioner to refuse to issue certificate for sales tax deferment if he found that the industry, in whose favour the eligibility certificate was given, was really not entitled to that benefit under the scheme. A certificate issued by an Industries Commissioner in his administrative capacity cannot have the effect of depriving the sales tax authorities of their powers or absolving them from performing their duties under the Gujarat Sales Tax Act. Therefore, this contention also cannot be accepted. In the result, this petition fails. Rule is discharged with no order as to costs. Ad interim relief stands vacated. Petition dismissed.
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1992 (7) TMI 321 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... the apex Court itself. In view of the well-settled principle whether the respondent-assessee is entitled to exemption or not, in such circumstances, we have to set aside the order of the Tribunal on this aspect. We are not able to understand when the Tribunal says that if the wording is different, the intention of the Government can be read in the other way, especially the following finding of the Tribunal, namely If the intention of the Government was that it should qualify the word use the phrase should have been in the Union Territory of Pondicherry instead of in the whole Union Territory of Pondicherry . cannot be sustained in the view we take. So also the conclusion arrived at by the Tribunal on the construction of explanation to section 8(2A) of the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956, is against the law laid down by the apex Court in the land. In view of that, Tax Case No. 977 of 1983 shall stand allowed. No costs. T.C. No. 977 of 1983 allowed. T.C. No. 978 of 1983 dismissed.
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1992 (7) TMI 320 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... cial Tax Officer 1985 60 STC 301 that the question really is whether the movement of the goods from the registered office is occasioned by the order placed by the buyer or is an incident of the contract and if it is so, its movement from the very beginning from the registered office all the way until delivery is received by the buyer is an inter-State movement. 7.. In view of the categorical decisions of the apex Court of the land in English Electric Company of India Ltd. v. Deputy Commercial Tax Officer 1976 38 STC 475, South India Viscose Ltd. v. State of Tamil Nadu 1981 48 STC 232 and Sahney Steel and Press Works Ltd. v. Commercial Tax Officer 1985 60 STC 301, we have no hesitation to hold that the transaction which is the subject-matter in these appeals cannot be held to be as stock transfer , but only as inter-State sale under section 3(a) of the Central Sales Tax Act. Accordingly the appeals fail and are dismissed. There will be no order as to costs. Appeals dismissed.
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1992 (7) TMI 319 - ORISSA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... tand of the department. As observed in Santosh Kumar s case 1983 54 STC 322 (Orissa), it is inconceivable that a non-existent person can be granted a certificate of registration. It is accepted that the certificate of registration was granted to the purchaser. Merely because he may or may not have functioned in a particular year cannot deprive the seller of the claim of deduction. It is not the concern of the seller to see how the purchaser deals with the goods purchased. Production of the purchaser is not a requirement in law for getting the deduction. In the aforesaid premises, we are of the view that the conclusion of the Tribunal that the dealer was entitled to deduction and the direction given to the assessing officer to accept the declaration forms and allow the claim of deduction is in order. The answer to the question referred to is in the affirmative. The reference is accordingly disposed of. No costs. D.M. PATNAIK, J.-I agree. Reference answered in the affirmative.
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1992 (7) TMI 318 - ORISSA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... t appellate authority to make such further enquiry as it thinks fit or cause further enquiry to be made by the Assistant Sales Tax Officer or the Sales Tax Officer, as the case may be, before disposing of any appeal. From the order of the Tribunal, we find that exception has been taken to the dealer not producing its books of accounts before the Sales Tax Officer. It did not deal with the question specifically whether the books of accounts were produced before the first appellate authority or not. Therefore, there was nonapplication of mind by the Tribunal while dealing with the motion of the dealer for accepting the additional evidence. Accordingly, we answer the question in the negative in favour of the assessee and against the Revenue. The Tribunal shall rehear the matter and reconsider the application under rule 61 in the light of the observations made above. The reference is accordingly disposed of. No costs. D.M. PATNAIK, J.-I agree. Reference answered in the negative.
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1992 (7) TMI 317 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... e did not consider whether sub-rule (4) of rule 18 will cover cases of returns being submitted without proof of payment of tax. If the returns are otherwise complete and the only default on the part of the dealer is non-payment of tax or failure to attach proof of payment of tax, sub-rule (4) will not apply. That position has not been considered by the learned Judge. We are of the view that the decision of the learned single Judge does not in any way help the appellant in the present case. 10.. In view of the clear language of rule 18 and section 24(3), we have no doubt that the remedy of the appellant to claim refund is independent of its liability to pay interest under section 24(3) of the Act. Hence, it cannot claim any adjustment as against the tax to be paid by it. Consequently, the view taken by the Revenue in this case is right. There is no merit in the writ petition or in this appeal. The writ appeal is dismissed. There will be no order as to costs. Appeal dismissed.
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1992 (7) TMI 316 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ng authority had done was proper and also that the Appellate Assistant Commissioner had, in giving any reduction, not acted properly. We are of the opinion that the reasonableness would depend upon the facts of each case. Having regard to the features pointed out by us, we consider that the Appellate Assistant Commissioner s order could not have been properly interfered with on the facts of the case and therefore we hold that the Joint Commissioner had no material to restore the assessment as made by the assessing authority. In our view, the order of the Appellate Assistant Commissioner should have been left at that. On the facts and circumstances of the case, no material is placed before us to show that the first appellate authority has committed an error in refixing the turnover. The view we take, the order of the Joint Commissioner is set aside, the order of the Appellate Assistant Commissioner shall stand restored. The tax case appeal is allowed. No costs. Appeal allowed.
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