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Showing 21 to 40 of 228 Records
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1994 (8) TMI 301 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... icer to ensure that if any student is sent to a college, other than the respondent-college, then his studies are not hampered and she is permitted to complete the course. (v) If the time is short then the respondent institution shall hold extra classes for all the students, complete their course so as to enable them to appear in their examination for the first year at the appropriate time. 10. In view of the facts we were inclined to issue notice to Deputy Education Officer, Zilla Parishad, Ahmednagar, to show cause for concealing the truth from this Court that on the date the impugned interim order had been passed Writ Petition No. 1703 of 1990 had already been decided. But the learned State counsel succeeded in persuading us that he shall ensure that the authorities are more careful in future. For the same reason and on persuasion by the learned State counsel we are not imposing any exemplary costs on the State of Maharashtra and direct the parties to bear their own costs.
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1994 (8) TMI 300 - SC ORDER
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... ... ..... assessable value or on the question of penalty, which were the only two questions decided against the appellant by the Tribunal in the impugned judgment. The appeal is dismissed accordingly.
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1994 (8) TMI 299 - SC ORDER
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... ... ..... ls Ltd. and four others. It is stated by the learned Counsel that all the relevant facts are identical in both the cases. In other words, the grounds upon which Bajaj Electricals Ltd. and other customer-companies were sought to be treated as related persons’ are the very grounds on which Unipro Lamp Components company is sought to be treated as the related person’ herein. For the reasons given in the said decision namely, Union of India v. Hind Lamps Ltd. 1989 (43) E.L.T. 161 (S.C.) 1989 (2) SCR 873 , the appeal is dismissed. No costs.”
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1994 (8) TMI 298 - MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ing upon the decisions cited by him, contended that as the ITO, Guna, had the jurisdiction and the assessment proceedings were under the Act, the assessment orders were not nullity, it was a procedural irregularity, the question would not have been agitated in appeal in view of the bar created under section 124(5), order directing to proceed afresh would be merely an empty formality as the voluntary returns were filed, the same assessment would follow; therefore, in the absence of prejudice or occasion in failure of justice, the cases ought not to have been remitted to ITO, Bhopal. We are not inclined to deal with this submission because the revenue has not applied for reference on it, and the Tribunal, has considered it to be a case of denial of the liability to be assessed by the ITO, Guna, under the provisions of the Act. 11. In view of the above discussion, the questions referred to us are answered in the negative, i.e., in favour of the revenue and against the assessee.
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1994 (8) TMI 297 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... k. Response, should be filed in each of the suits. 2 (1985) 1 SCC 260 1985 SCC (Tax) 75 (1985) 2 SCR 190 3 (1993) 1 SCC 22 JT (1992) 5 SC 335 Till the next date of hearing there shall be no recovery proceedings. The admitted amount however be paid. A copy of the plaint, application, annexures and the documents relied upon be given to Mr Jain today itself. Case for 18-11-1993." No ground was indicated for passing the interim order staying recovery of tax. The order was passed even without deciding the question of maintainability of the civil suit. This interim order has been extended from time to time. 13. Having regard to the law, which is now well-settled, we fail to say how an interim order of stay of realisation of tax could be passed in a case like this. Under these circumstances, we set aside the interim orders under challenge. The Delhi Municipal Corporation will be at liberty to recover the taxes due. 14. The appeal is allowed. There will be no order as to costs.
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1994 (8) TMI 296 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... the respondent submitted to us on 3-8-1994 that the possession of the factory should be handed over back to his client and out of the profit to be earned it would clear the dues. As to cash to be paid, about which also we had asked to get instructions, we were informed that a sum of ₹ 50,000 alone could be paid because of the present bad financial position of the respondent. We do not regard this stand as reasonable, as there, is no knowing if the unit would at all become profitable in the hands of the respondent in view of how it had functioned earlier when it was, being operated by it. The offer to pay ₹ 50,000 as against more than ₹ 5 lakhs which had become due by January 1992 cannot also be regarded as reasonable. 8. In view of the aforesaid, this appeal is allowed by setting aside the impugned judgment, leaving the parties to bear their own costs. It would be open to the appellant to take such further action(s) in the matter as permitted by Section 29.
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1994 (8) TMI 295 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... as the case may be, then he has to be released on bail forthwith. The accused, so released on bail may be arrested and committed to custody according to-the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The right of the accused to be released on bail after filing on the challan, notwithstanding the default in filing it within the time allowed, as governed from the time of filing of the challan only by the provisions relating to the grant of bail applicable at the stage. (3) In view of the decision of the Constitution Bench in Kartar Singh on the meaning and scope of sub-section (8) of Section 20 of the TADA Act as extracted earlier, this question does not require any further elucidation by us. The question referred are answered in the above manner. This case, for decision of the petitioner’s claim for grant of bail on merits, like any other bail matter, has now to be considered and decided by the appropriate Divisions Bench. We direct, accordingly. Petitions dismissed.
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1994 (8) TMI 294 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ion from vesting under Section 3(3) of the Act and the only question which he will enter upon will be as regards to the area allocable keeping in mind the ceiling area and Section 82 of the Kerala Land Reforms Act, 1963. It is needless to clarify that the total area allocable will in no case exceed 1680 acres but on account of the applicants having any other land or opting for any other land there may be shrinkage in the total area claimed. The benefit of the shrinkage, if any, will go to the State Government. We may also clarify that the area to be allocated will be on the right bank of Shaliyar River in one single block," We make it clear that the applicants in this case are bound by the aforesaid directions of this Hon’ble Court and in giving effect to the Judgment under appeal, it is open to the authorities concerned to pass appropriate or consequential order or take steps in this regard. The appeal is disposed of as above. There shall be no order as to costs.
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1994 (8) TMI 293 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ixing stamps on the hundis form part of the turnover? This point is found against the assessee by a judgment of division beach of this Court in Tax Revision Case Nos. 238, 240 and 242 of 1985, dated February 7, 1989. Following that judgment, the tax revision cases are dismissed. No costs. Petitions dismissed.
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1994 (8) TMI 292 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... pportunity. There is no other option for the respondent-authority and the stand should not have been taken by the respondent that the petitioner is not entitled for any opportunity. 4.. In view of the aforesaid, the impugned order dated June 16, 1993 is not sustainable and is hereby quashed. The matter is sent back to the respondent No. 2 to give a personal hearing and opportunity to the petitioner in terms of order dated March 12, 1993, passed in the earlier writ petition and then pass a fresh order within three months from the date the certified copy of this order is filed before it. The petitioner will file certified copy of this order within three weeks from today. 5.. Until disposal of the said review application of the petitioner the recovery proceedings for the assessment years 1987-88 to 1992-93 both under the U.P. and Central Sales Tax Acts shall remain stayed. 6.. With the aforesaid directions, this writ petition is allowed. Costs on parties. Writ petition allowed.
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1994 (8) TMI 291 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... vel Committee is directed to reconsider the matter as to grant of eligibility certificate for the purpose of exemption under section 4-A in accordance with law and in the light of the observations made above. Since the matter is being remitted to the Divisional Level Committee, it would be but proper to observe that the question regarding closure of the unit, since April 1988 may also be examined in the light of the clarificatory circular dated February 1, 1988 as interpreted by this Court in Writ Petition No. 277 of 1989, Ramraj Rice Mills, Meerut v. State of Uttar Pradesh decided on July 18, 1994 (printed at page 570 supra), a copy of which shall be made available by the petitioner to the Divisional Level Committee along with certified copy of this order. As observed above, the Divisional Level Committee shall reconsider the application and dispose of the same within two months from the date of production of a certified copy of this order. Petition disposed of accordingly.
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1994 (8) TMI 290 - PUNJAB AND HARYANA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... his provision cannot be read into the provisions relating to appeal. We, therefore, dispose of this writ petition with the following directions (i) The appeal filed by the petitioner against the order of assessment raising demand of Rs. 5,51,822 shall be re-entered against its original number by the Deputy Excise and Taxation Commissioner (Appeals), respondent No. 4, as the petitioner has since deposited the amount of Rs. 25,000, which was directed by the Sales Tax Tribunal, even though after the expiry of the period prescribed in this behalf. (ii) Respondent No. 4 is further directed to entertain petitioner s appeal with regard to the additional demand of Rs. 2,86,988 created vide order of the Assessing Authority dated April 15, 1991, against its original number without insisting on prior deposit of the said amount. (iii) Both the appeals shall, however, be disposed of according to law. The writ petition is disposed in the above terms. Writ petition disposed of accordingly.
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1994 (8) TMI 289 - PUNJAB HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... t open for the Sales Tax Tribunal to ignore the order of the Supreme Court directly or indirectly. Once the apex Court granted further time of four weeks to the petitioner to deposit the amount, it will be presumed that the apex Court extended the time-limit fixed by the appellate authority and the Tribunal. Use of the word further in the order of the Supreme Court is conclusive of the intention of the apex Court, namely, to extend the time-limit specified in the order passed by the appellate authority and the Tribunal. In view of the above, we hold that the dismissal of the appeals filed by the petitioner before the Tribunal is arbitrary, unreasonable and unjust and the order of the Tribunal suffers from an error of law apparent on the face of it. For the reasons aforesaid, the writ petition is allowed. Order dated May 6, 1994, passed by the Sales Tax Tribunal is set aside. The case is remanded to the Tribunal for fresh hearing in accordance with law. Writ petition allowed.
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1994 (8) TMI 288 - MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... 1) of the Act is unsustainable in law. 26.. In the ultimate analysis, I find that contentions of petitioners should be permitted to prevail. In the result, annexures 1 to 5 in this petition annexures 2 and 3 in M.P. No. 924 of 1984 and M.P. No. 932 of 1984 annexures 3 and 4 in M.P. No. 959 of 1984 and M.P. No. 960 of 1984 annexures 7 and 12 in M.P. No. 961 of 1984 annexures 5 to 8 in M.P. No. 962 of 1984 annexures 4 to 6 in M.P. No. 963 of 1984 annexures 9 to 16 in M.P. No. 964 of 1984, deserve to be and are hereby quashed as being arbitrary and without jurisdiction. If occasion arises, recourse to section 19-A of the Act may be considered if justified on facts and permissible under the law. 27.. Ex consequenti, all these nine petitions are allowed but in view of legal debate, parties are left to bear their own costs as incurred. Counsel fee on each side shall be Rs. 5,000 (one set). 28.. A copy of this order shall be placed in the record of each petition. Petitions allowed.
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1994 (8) TMI 287 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... st the appellate order dated February 17, 1994. 5.. For the reasons aforesaid, we do not feel it necessary to consider other arguments made on behalf of the respondents, while opposing the petition. However, as there was no order for payment of additional amount of Rs. 11,635 towards the alleged cost and damages from any competent authority or a court, no direction for payment of this amount to the petitioner can be made in these proceedings under article 226 of the Constitution. 6.. In the result, this petition partly succeeds and it is hereby partly allowed. The respondents are directed to refund the amount of Rs. 34,152 to the petitioner pursuant to the order dated February 17, 1994, made in appeal by the Appellate Deputy Commissioner (CT), Panjagutta Division, within fifteen days from the date of receipt of this order. We also direct the respondents to pay costs of this petition to the petitioner. Counsel s fee Rs. 250, if already certified. Writ petition partly allowed.
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1994 (8) TMI 286 - PUNJAB AND HARYANA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ose provisions were being complied with, there was no reason why the goods booked at the out-agency needed a special check by the authorities at the sales tax barrier. Putting of such restrictions according to Mr. Sawhney, were not only totally uncalled for but they would ruin the petitioner s business. After hearing learned counsel we are of the view that this is a matter which relates to legislative policy. The court is not called upon to enter into the wisdom of the legislative policy. The impugned provisions have been upheld by the apex Court and that settles the matter finally. For the foregoing reasons, we partly allow these writ petitions and hold that the petitioners shall not be required to comply with section 38 of the Act. Notices issued requiring compliance are hereby quashed. The action of the State Government in establishing sales tax check barrier under section 37 is, however, upheld. The petitions are disposed of in these terms. Writ petitions partly allowed.
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1994 (8) TMI 285 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... terim order to the effect that subject to further orders of this Court proceedings under section 10-B of the U.P. Sales Tax Act for the assessment year 1981-82 may continue, but no final orders would be served on the petitioners. Learned Standing Counsel has drawn the attention of this Court that on May 5, 1988, the Deputy Commissioner (Executive), Sales Tax, passed order under section 10 of the U.P. Sales Tax Act. In view of the order of this Court the order might not have been served on the petitioner. The order passed was subject to the final orders, which we would be passing in this writ petition. Hence that order has no relevance for purposes of deciding this case. In view of what we have indicated hereinabove, the writ petition succeeds. A writ in the nature of certiorari quashing the notices dated July 11, 1988, contained in annexures 7 and 8 to the writ petition under section 10-B of the U.P. Sales Tax Act and the proceedings thereon is issued. Writ petition allowed.
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1994 (8) TMI 284 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... nd out whether the dealer had paid excise duty or not. The excise duty paid was an expenditure and it could not be included in the turnover. What could be included in the turnover was only the real sale price realised by the revisionist. Since the department has never doubted that the price paid by the canteen stores department has been included by the dealer in its turnover, its line of enquiry was entirely misconceived and misdirected. The Tribunal in remanding the matter again to the assessing officer has only perpetrated that misdirection instead of setting the department to the right path. For the above reasons, the Tribunal s order is unsustainable and setting aside the same, it is ordered that the department s second appeal No. 144 of 1979 for the assessment year 1970-71 in so far as it related to the sum of Rs. 15,35,357 shall stand dismissed. The revisionist will get his costs of this revision from the respondents. Revision petition stands allowed. Petition allowed.
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1994 (8) TMI 283 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... pressed by the Andhra Pradesh High Court that the subsidy is not related to a particular transaction of sale and that being the position, the subsidy amount cannot be included in the turnover . The question of reopening of the assessment does not arise. The impugned notices are liable to be quashed. On the facts stated above, it cannot be said that the assessing authority had reason to believe that whole or any part of the turnover of the petitioner for the relevant assessment years had escaped the assessment to tax, or had been under-assessed to tax at a rate lower than that at which it was assessable under the Act. The condition precedent for assessing under section 21 of the Act, being non-existent, the impugned notices and further proceedings pursuant thereto, are liable to be quashed. The impugned notices for reassessment for the years 1985-86 to 1988-89 both under the U.P. Sales Tax and Central Sales Tax Acts, are quashed, and the petition is allowed. Petition allowed.
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1994 (8) TMI 282 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... through the order of the learned single Judge, we notice that the other contentions are not considered. Learned single Judge has only considered the question as to whether proper and full opportunity was afforded to the appellant/petitioner before passing the order of assessment. That being so, the dismissal of the writ petition on the ground that the order of assessment has been passed after affording full and proper opportunity, does not amount to rejecting the other contentions which are to be decided by the appellate authority. Hence, while affirming the order of the learned single Judge, we make it clear that the contentions raised in the appeal, except the one relating to lack of opportunity, are to be decided by the appellate authority and the dismissal of the appeal and the writ petition in question shall not be construed as affirming the order of assessment the validity of which has to be adjudged on the basis of the contentions urged before the appellate authority.
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