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Case Laws
Showing 21 to 40 of 408 Records
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1996 (8) TMI 548 - MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... on 263 to make fishy inquiries and to disturb the concluded proceedings without any valid material. 12. The aforesaid findings of the Tribunal are the findings of facts based on proper appreciation of the facts and evidence on record. 13. In CIT v. Ashoka Marketing Ltd. 1976 103 ITR 543 (SC) and in CIT v. Kotrika Venkataswamy & Sons 1971 79 ITR 499 (SC), it is held that conclusion based on appreciation of facts does not give rise to any question of law. 14. We find that the orders of the Tribunal are based on proper appreciation of facts and correct application of law. We, thus, hold that there is no referable question of law has presented in these cases. 15. Accordingly, we reject these applications but without any orders as to costs. Counsel fee for each side in each case is, however, fixed at ₹ 750 if, certified. 16. Retain this order in the record of Misc. Civil Case No. 30 of 1992 and place its copy each in the records of the aforesaid three Misc. Civil Cases.
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1996 (8) TMI 547 - DELHI HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... light of Dr. Balbir Singh's case, it would appear that the-assessing authority have failed to follow these judgments. It may be mentioned that they are binding on all of us under Article 141 of the Constitution. If any quasi-judicial authority like assessing authority in the present case fails to follow the ratio of disrendi of the judgments delivered by the Supreme Court and if this court continued to keep the matter pending after issuing rule in these petitions for over a decade, we feel that it would be improper to refuse the relief on this ground. In view of the above, we allow these writ petitions, set aside the impugned assessment orders and the demands raised thereon. We direct the assessing authority to hear the petitioners and proceed to decide the matter afresh in accordance with the direction's of the Supreme Court in the cases of Dewan Daulat Rai Kapoor (supra). Dr. Balbir Singh (supra) and in accordance with law. Parties are left to bear their own costs.
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1996 (8) TMI 546 - SC ORDER
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... ... ..... DER Delay condoned. No merits. Appeals are dismissed.
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1996 (8) TMI 545 - ITAT MUMBAI
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... ... ..... uot; The only difference that we can note is that in the 1960 Agreement it is taking of assembly project' and in the 1985 Agreement it is terming it as "installation project". The facts as they are, the assessee had rendered supervisory services to the Indian concern and the erection and installation were carried on by the Indian concern. Identical facts were examined by the AP High Court (supra). Their Lordships of the AP High Court have categorically held "It is not, therefore, permissible to equate the situation with one where the German Engineer has instead of merely supervising the above operations, was himself incharge of those operations on behalf of the German company". Since the assessee was not concerned with the actual installation, but mere supervision, which is not the same thing as installation project, the assessee cannot be said to be having a permanent establishment in India. Therefore, this point is decided in favour of the assessee.
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1996 (8) TMI 544 - AUTHORITY FOR ADVANCE RULINGS
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... ... ..... e, the interest income received by the applicant will be liable to tax 12.5 . 15. Art. 13 deals with the capital gains earned by the applicant. Under this Article, capital gains on sale of movable assets like shares, debentures, units and other securities will be liable to tax only in the UAE and not in India. 16. On the basis of the above discussion, the Authority pronounces the following ruling on the present application Ruling Question No. 1 Yes; the applicant can claim the benefits of the DTAA from asst. yr. 1995-96 onwards. Question No. 2(a) The dividend income from companies,, Unit Trust of India and mutual funds specified in s. 10(23D) of the Act will be liable to tax 15 . Question No. 2(b) The interest income derived from India will be liable to tax 12.5 . Question No. 2(c) The capital gains arising from the sale of movable assets will be exempt from income-tax in India. Question No. 3 In view of the affirmative answer to Question No. 1, this question does not arise.
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1996 (8) TMI 543 - ITAT MUMBAI
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... ... ..... r dyeing on the grey cloth admittedly manufactured by others carried on the business of manufacture or production within the meaning of section 32(1)(vi) of the Act." With due respect to the Hon’ble Bombay High Court, after considering the facts and circumstances of the case and the issue which was before the Hon’ble High Court for its opinion, we are of the view that the decision in this case is not applicable to the facts and circumstances of the case under appeal before us and is distinguishable on facts. Consequently, we do not agree with the ld. D.R. that the processes carried on by the assessee did not amount to production of articles or thing. In the result, we hold that the assessee is entitled to investment allowance and we direct the Assessing Officer to grant the assessee investment allowance in accordance with provisions of law after verifying the admissible quantum. Assessee's ground No. 4 is allowed. 8. In the result, appeal stands allowed.
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1996 (8) TMI 542 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ences under Sections 201 and 498-A IPC are restored and are directed to run concurrently. The acquittal of the second respondent in respect of all charges is upheld. 14. We request the learned Chief Justice of the Allahabad High Court to bring this judgment to the notice of the learned Judges, B.N. Katju and Bajpai, JJ. if they have not already retired with a view to see that the learned Judges would be more careful in future in deciding criminal matter assigned to them so that miscarriage of justice would not result15. The appeal as against the first respondent is allowed and is dismissed as against the second respondent. The bail bonds of the first respondent stand cancelled. He should surrender forthwith to serve out the sentence. In case he does not surrender himself, the Superintendent of Police, Banda District is directed to take him into custody forthwith and report the compliance to the Registry of this Court. The bail bonds of the second respondent stand discharged.
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1996 (8) TMI 541 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... made out by the plaintiffs/appellants in accordance with the provisions of clause (2) of Order XXIII rule 1 of the Code. 9. As regards the exclusion of time under Section 14 of the Limitation Act it was essential for its application to show that the proceedings related to the same matter in issue and the plaintiff prosecuted the suit in good faith in a court which, from dafact of jurisdiction or other cause of like nature is unable to entertain it. As discussed above the plaintiffs appellants have miserably failed to show as to what was the defect of jurisdiction or any other cause of like nature by reason of which the earlier suit was not entertainable or competent. That being so, the benefit of the provisions of 14 cannot be legitimately extended to the plaintiffs, In these facts and circmatanpes the plaintiffs suit has rightly been dismissed as barred by limitation. 10. For the reasons stated above the appeal fails and is hereby dismissed. We make no order no as to costs.
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1996 (8) TMI 540 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... requires to be quashed. If it is quashed, necessarily an enquiry under Section 5-A has to be conducted. The limitation, therefore, of conducting the enquiry and publication of the declaration within three years would start running from the date of the receipt of the order of the High Court and not from the date on which the original publication of the declaration within three years would start running from the date of the receipt of the order of the High Court and not from the date on which the original publication under Section 4(1) came to be made. This view was laid by this Court in Narasimiah’s case (supra). For the same ratio, the appeals are to be allowed and the declaration has to be quashed. Accordingly, the declaration is quashed. The appellant is permitted to conduct an enquiry within a period of four months from the date of the receipt of this order and have the declaration published within one month thereafter. The appeals are accordingly allowed. No costs.
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1996 (8) TMI 539 - SC ORDER
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... ... ..... rnan, JJ. ORDER Appeal dismissed.
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1996 (8) TMI 538 - ADVANCE RULING AUTHORITY
Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, exemption under section 10(5B) of the Income-tax Act, 1961, would be available to the applicant ?
Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the applicant would be considered as a “technician” for the purpose of section 10(5B) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 ?
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1996 (8) TMI 537 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... liance was placed on a judgment of Justice S.B. Majmudar (as he then was in the High Court of Gujarat) in State of Gujarat v. Jethmal Bhagwandas Shah Spe. WA No. 2770 of 1979 disposed of on 1-3-1990, where in connection with Section 84-C itself it was said that the power under the aforesaid section should be exercised within a reasonable time. This Court in connection with other statutory provisions, in the case of State of Gujarat v. Patil Raghav Natha and in the case of Ram Chand v. Union of India 1994 (1) SCC 4 has impressed that where no time-limit is prescribed for exercise of a power under a statute it does not mean that it can be exercised at any time; such power has to be exercised within a reasonable time. We are satisfied that in the facts and circumstances of the present case, the suo motu power under Section 84-C of the Act was not exercised by the Mamlatdar within a reasonable time. Accordingly, the appeal is allowed. The impugned orders are set aside. No costs.
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1996 (8) TMI 536 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... etenu was released from detention but had proceeded to observe that the proceedings taken against the detenu had no effect on him and after his release he had continued his activities. What is worse in the case before us is that there is not even a whisper of the judgment of the High Court delivered as far back as on 25th August, 1992 setting aside the order of detention dated 20th January, 1992 and in recording the satisfaction that the detenu was habitually indulging in keeping as well as dealing in smuggled goods. The detaining authority has relied upon the earlier detention order dated 20th January, 1992. 13. In view of the ratio of the decision of the Supreme Court referred to above, we are of the view that the order of detention is liable to be set aside. Accordingly, we set aside the order of detention and direct that the detenu be released forthwith unless he is required to be detained under some other order. 14. Rule is made absolute as above. 15. Order accordingly.
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1996 (8) TMI 535 - RAJASTHAN HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... st against the petitioners which can be assumed is that the answering respondents are, entitled to charge 60 maximum within the meaning of mandatory provisions contained under Section 113 of the Income Tax Act, therefore, they are not entitled to withhold the entire amount of the petitioners subject to and without prejudice to their rights to show cause and explain before the appropriate Income Tax authority that no part of ₹ 9,80,000/- is their undisclosed income the balance of 40 amounting to ₹ 3,92,000/- deserves to be released to the petitioners forthwith. 20. As a result of the aforementioned discussion the instant writ petition is partly allowed with a direction to the respondents to refund ₹ 3,92,000/- to the petitioners out of total amount of ₹ 9,80,000/-forthwith subject to and without prejudice to their rights to show cause and explain before the Income Tax authorities that no part of ₹ 9,80,000/- is their undisclosed income. No costs.
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1996 (8) TMI 534 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... preme Court has stated that the request was made in writing and was made in the representation which was presented to the Advisory Board. The detenu had specifically stated that he wanted to examine the witnesses who were brought by him. In these circumstances, the Supreme Court came to the conclusion that the right of the detenu as recognised by the Constitution Bench in A. K. Roy's case was violated. 13. In this view of the matter, we are of the view that on account of failure to afford the petitioner the opportunity of examining the witnesses who were kept ready by him on 15th September, 1995 when he was interviewed by the Advisory Board his continued detention cannot be sustained. 14. In the result the petition succeeds. The continued detention of the petitioner is not permissible in law and hence we direct that the petitioner be set at liberty forthwith unless he is required to be detained under some other order. Rule made absolute accordingly. 15. Petition allowed.
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1996 (8) TMI 533 - SC ORDER
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... ... ..... rnan, JJ. ORDER Appeal dismissed.
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1996 (8) TMI 532 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... Court of Session and thereafter his bail application was considered. In view of this, it is clear that the case of Niranjan Singh is not an authority for the proposition that an accused can be enlarged on bail by a Court in whose custody he is not at that time. On the other hand, as mentioned above, case of Niranjan Singh is an authority for the proposition that only that Court. can consider bail application in whose custody the accused is for the time being. 15. In view of the above discussion, it is held that only that court can consider and dispose of the bail application either u/S. 437 or u/S. 439, Cr. P.C. in whose custody the accused is for the time being and mere issuance of production warrant u/S. 267, Cr. P.C. is not sufficient to deem the custody of mat Court which issued such warrant unless the accused is actually produced in that Court in pursuance of each production warrants. It follows that this petition u/S. 482, Cr. P.C. has no force and is hereby dismissed.
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1996 (8) TMI 531 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... appellant-Samitis do render a number of services to persons transacting their business and deals in the market-yards as elsewhere, and it is not necessary that what they are charging, would be shown to have been spent penny by penny for the benefit of the fee payers and others concerned with them. The High Court should have, if doubting, gone into the question itself, whether the claim of the Samitis in rendering services was authentic or not, or else to have gone by the word of the Samitis that they were rendering such services. There was no occasion for the High Court to have remitted the matter to the, Mandi Samitis and thereby open flood-gates of never ending disputes; counter-productive to the good objects sought to be achieved by the concerned enactment. 5. For the foregoing reasons, we allow these appeals, set aside the impugned orders of the High Court and dismiss the writ petition preferred by the respondents before the High Court, but without any order as to costs.
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1996 (8) TMI 530 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... r the amount demanded at the rate of ₹ 500/- per sq.mtr. i n the impugned demand which works out to ₹ 17,33,245/-. We are informed that he has already given the bank guarantee at the rate of ₹ 180/- per sq.mtr. After deduction of the amount of that bank guarantee, for the balance amount also he should give the bank guarantee, for the balance amount also he should give the bank guarantee. On his giving the guarantee for the balance amount, the Agra Development Authority would release the sanction of the pain for execution. The bank guarantee will remain in force and should be kept alive till the development of the area and satisfactory completion certificate is issued by the competent authority in accordance with the rules. In the event of his completing the development and providing all the amenities according to the sanctioned plan, the bank guarantee given would get discharged. The appeals are accordingly allowed, but, in the circumstances, without costs.
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1996 (8) TMI 529 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... t be stated that where a word or an expression is defined by the legislature, courts have to look to that definition; the general understanding of it can not be determinative. So, what has been stated in Strouds' Judicial Dictionary regarding a "produce" can not be decisive. Therefore, where a product from bamboo is commercially different from it and in common parlance taken as a distinct product, the same would not be encompassed within the expression "forest-produce" as defined in section 2 (4) of the Act, despite it being inclusive in nature. that bamboo mat is taken as a product distinct from bamboo in the commercial world, has not been disputed before us and rightly. 9. In view of all the above, we hold that bamboo mat is not a forest-produce in the eye of the Act, and so, allow the appeal, set aside the impugned judgment of the High Court and state that the order of confiscation passed by the Conservator of Forest was not in accordance with law.
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