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Case Laws
Showing 41 to 60 of 408 Records
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1996 (8) TMI 528 - SC ORDER
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... ... ..... sel appearing for the Union of India, says that he cannot urge anything in these appeals. Accordingly, the appeals are dismissed in the light of the afore decision. No costs.
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1996 (8) TMI 527 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ustice of the Madras High Court to constitute a special Bench "Green bench" to deal with this case and other environmental matters. We make it clear that it would be open to the Bench to pass any appropriate order/orders keeping in view the directions issued by us. We may mention that "Green Benches" are already functioning in Calcutta, Madhya Pradesh and some other High Courts. We Direct the Registry of this Court to send the records to the registry of the Madras High matter as a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India and deal with it in accordance with law and also in terms of the directions issued by us. We give liberty to the parties to approach the High Court as and when necessary. Mr. M.C. Mehta has been assisting this Court to our utmost satisfaction. We place on record our appreciation for Mr. Mehta. We direct the State of Tamil Nadu to pay ₹ 50,000/- towards legal fees and other out of pocket expenses incurred by Mr. Mehta.
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1996 (8) TMI 526 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... be paid. Then the respondent filed an OA claiming interest at 18 p.a. The Administrative Tribunal in the impugned order directed the payment of interest. Thus, this appeal by special leave. The Tribunal has committed a gross error of law in directing the payment. The claim is barred by constructive res judicata under Section 11, Explanation TV, CPC which envisages that any matter which might and ought to have been made ground of defence or attack in a former suit, shall be deemed to have been a matter directly and substantially in issue in a subsequent suit. Hence when the claim was made on earlier occasion, he should have or might have sought and secured decree for interest. He did not set and, therefore, it operates as res judicata. Even otherwise, when he filed a suit and specifically did not claim the same, Order 2, Rule 2, CPC prohibits the petitioner to seek the remedy separately. In either event, the OA is not sustainable. The appeal is accordingly allowed. No costs.
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1996 (8) TMI 525 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... right of the citizens. It is not in dispute that the entire expenditure for the acquisition is being met from the public funds, as accepted by the High Court. Under those circumstances, it is clearly a case of public purpose. It could be seen that when the order of eviction was sought to be enforced, this Court while upholding the decree of eviction had imposed a condition that the undertaking shall not be enforced when the land is sought to be acquired. This Court had recognised the need for the continuance of the educational institution in the said place and that the State had taken action to acquire the land at the expense of the State to provide the education to the middle school going children. Under those circumstances, the High Court was wholly wrong in its conclusion that public purpose is not served in acquiring the land but benefits the private individuals. The appeal is accordingly allowed but in the circumstances without costs. The writ petition stands dismissed.
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1996 (8) TMI 524 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... in liming does not constitute res judicata; that too in a dispute which was not even between the parties in this case. The above decision may not stand in the way of this Court s exercising the power under Article 136 of the Constitution. The learned counsel has contended that the Court has power to grant or to refuse to grant the relief and it having gone into the question and decided the same on merit, it can be said that the High court committed no error of law. So the order is valid in condone the delay and entertain the appeal filed against the original order dated March 22,1985 and also the review petition. The appeals are accordingly allowed. The award of, the solatium 30 under Section 23 (2) of the Acct and interest 9 for one year from the date of taking possession and 15 thereafter till the date of deposit under proviso to Section 28 stands set aside and the original order of the High Court dated July 24, 1984 stands restored. But in the circumstances without costs.
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1996 (8) TMI 523 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... of electricity consumed by it for the supply of drinking water to its residents from a bore-well, we are not inclined to interfere with the order passed by the State Commission upholding the right of the panchayat to the benefit of the said subsidy." We find this very difficult to appreciate. If a court does not have jurisdiction, it does not have jurisdiction, regardless of the fact that one of the parties involved is a Gram Panchayat or the period involved is very short or the amount involved is very small. If a court does not have jurisdiction, it is the obligation of the appellate court so to hold and to set aside the order under appeal. Having regard to the fact that the dispute did not "legitimately fall within the purview of adjudication by the Consumer Disputes Redressal Forums", the appeal is allowed, the order under appeal is set aside and the claim made by the respondents before the State Commission is dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs.
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1996 (8) TMI 522 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... this Court. Under these circumstances, the entire time taken from the date of the filing of the writ petitions till the date of the receipt of the order of this Court stands excluded and the limitation of one year would start thereafter only. Accordingly, we hold that the notification under Section 4(1) has not been lapsed. It is now on record that the appellants have already filed their objections; enquiry under Section 5-A was conducted and report obviously must have been furnished to the Government for taking further steps in the matter. It would, therefore, be necessary for the Government to consider the objections and have the declaration under Section 6 published, if the Government is of the opinion that the public purpose still subsists. The appeals are accordingly dismissed with the above observations. The State Government is directed to publish the declaration, if the objections are overruled, within four months from the date of the receipt of this order. No costs.
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1996 (8) TMI 521 - SC ORDER
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... ... ..... , JJ. ORDER Appeal dismissed.
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1996 (8) TMI 520 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... the provisions of Sections 191, 192 or 193 IPC. The filling of the present application appears to us to be an effort to get 'reopened' the case even after this Court decided criminal appeal No. 275-277 of 1993 on 16.3.1993 and dismissed the review petition also more than three years ago. Finality must attach to some stage of judicial proceedings. The course adopted by the applicant is impermissible and his application is based on misconception of law and facts. No litigant has a right to unlimited drought on the court time and public money in order to get his affairs settled in the manner as he wishes. Easy access to justice should not be misused as a licence to file misconceived or frivolous petitions. After giving our careful consideration to the submissions made at the bar as well as those contained in the memorandum of the application, we are of the opinion that this application is misconceived, untenable and has no merits whatsoever. It is accordingly dismissed.
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1996 (8) TMI 519 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... h May, 1995 and it was urged that after the said amendment no right of pre-emption can be enforced. Section 15 which has been substituted is as follows "15. Right of pre-emption to vest in tenant - The right of Pre-emption in respect of sale of agricultural land and village immovable property shall vest in the tenant who holds under tenancy of the vendors the land or property sold or a part thereof." On a plain reading the aforesaid section has been introduced prospectively and there is no question of the said section affecting in any manner the judgment and decree passed in the suit for pre-emption as early as in the year 1983 affirmed by the High Court in the second appeal in the year 1984. According to us the impugned order passed by the High Court is in terms of the direction given by this Court in the judgment of the Constitution Bench in Atam Prakash case (supra) and we find no reason to take a contrary view. These appeals are accordingly dismissed. No costs.
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1996 (8) TMI 518 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... the copy of the disputed letter bears and endorsement of "Receipt and Rubber Stamp" allegedly of the appellant but the copy of the admitted letter No. 2775 does not bear any endorsement of receipt which the respondent had acted. 43. In view of the above, and if the letter No. 2776 (forged by the respondent) is excluded from the evidence, there remains only the letter No. 2775 of 26.8.1991 in which is was not indicated by the respondent to the appellant to write to the French Bank to deliver the documents only on co-acceptance by it. The appellant, in the circumstances, was justified in not mentioning co-acceptance by the French Bank. The case of the respondent being false and based on fabricated evidence has to be dismissed. The appeals are consequently allowed, and both the judgments of the Commission, namely judgments dated 16.11.1993 and 13.12.1994 are set aside and the Original Complaint of the respondent is dismissed with costs quantified at ₹ 25,000/-.
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1996 (8) TMI 517 - MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... position of the law that undisputed amounts cannot be added and should be deleted so far as taxation is concerned. No dispute is raised before us. In our view, the Tribunal was justified in law in holding that the action of the Assessing Officer in making various adjustments under section 143(1)( a) is patently erroneous and as such deletion of such amounts does not suffer from any infirmity or illegality. 8. In the circumstances, we answer question No. 1 in favour of the assessee and against the revenue. In view of this answer, as submitted by the applicant and undisputed by the non-applicant, answer to question No. 2 is not necessary. 9. We, accordingly, dispose of this application without recording our answer on question No. 2 on request and answer question No. 1 in favour of the assessee and against the revenue, but with no orders as to costs. 10. Counsel fee for each side is, however, fixed at ₹ 750, if certified. 11. Transmit a copy of this order to the Tribunal.
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1996 (8) TMI 515 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ir’s case does not deal with the problem involved in the present case and is not in conflict with the view that we propose to take. The other decision, Swantraj and Others (supra), which finds mention in the impugned judgment, merely rules that temporary storing of drugs was also covered by the term "stocking for sale" within the meaning of Drugs and Cosmetics Act. This judgment has no application to the present facts. Both the appellants before us were merely found moving in trucks with paddy in excess of the quantity permitted to be ’stored’. Nothing more was proved. That by itself cannot amount to ’storing’ of goods and hence they cannot be said to have contravened any of the provisions of the Order. Therefore, they are not liable to be convicted or sentenced under Section 7 of the Act. The appeals are allowed. The convictions of the appellants are therefore set aside, and they are acquitted. Their bail bonds shall stand discharged.
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1996 (8) TMI 514 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ₹ 1,69,890/- towards the value of the tank and the well. Since the award of the Collector is of November 16, 1977, the grant of the additional amount under Section 23(1-A) is clearly illegal. Accordingly, the additional amount under Section 23(1-A) for a sum of ₹ 1,16,000/- also stands set aside. The claimants are entitled to the interest from 1.1.1966, the date on which the possession was taken for a period of one year @ 9% and thereafter @ 15% till date of deposit on the enhanced compensation. The claimants are also entitled to the solatium at 30% on the enhanced compensation till date of deposit. The claimants are also entitled to the additional amount @ ₹ 12% on the market value from the date of publication of notification under Section 4(1) to the date of award of the Collector or from the date of taking possession of the land, whichever is earlier. The appeals are accordingly allowed, but in the circumstances without costs.
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1996 (8) TMI 513 - SUPREME COURT
Termination of service from Central Public Works Department - whether the appeal has been competently laid? - whether the delay has been properly explained in filing the special leave petition? - Held that:- It is not disputed and cannot be disputed that the Union of India can lay the suit and be sued under Article 300 of the Constitution in relation to its affairs. The appeal came to be filed by the Secretary, though wrongly described. The nomenclature given in the cause title as Secretary instead of Union of India, is not conclusive. The meat of the matter is that the Secretary representing the Government of India had filed the appeal obviously on behalf of Union of India. Accordingly, we reject the first contention.
Proper explanation for 217 days has accordingly been given in the affidavit filed in support of the SLP. We find that the explanation offered by the appellant is well acceptable and is accepted. Accordingly, the delay is not in our view a bar to consider the matter on merits.
Dismissal order was the foundation for cause of action. After dismissal of the Departmental’s appeal he laid the suit Accordingly, the suit came to be filed within limitation.
The employer is entitled to terminate the services of its employee in terms of the order of appointment which confers power to take action in terms thereof. As seen, Rule 5 of Rules clearly gives power to terminate the services of the temporary servant in terms of the order of appointment. Until the temporary service matures into a permanent, he has no right to the post. At any point of time before that right accrues, it is open to the employer to terminate the service in terms of the order of appointment. The High Court wrongly applied the principle of dismissal followed by conviction for misconduct and acquittal thereof. Appeal allowed.
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1996 (8) TMI 512 - AUTHORITY FOR ADVANCE RULINGS
Application of investor company (IC) -
(a) Whether in view of the provisions of India-Mauritius double tax avoidance agreement, can it be construed that the applicant does not have a permanent establishment (PE) in India ?
(b) Whether the applicant be liable to tax in respect of the management fees received from the CT ?
(c) Whether the applicant be liable to tax in respect of the carried interest received from the CT ?
(d) Whether there be a withholding tax liability on the CT, in respect of the payment of management fees and carried interest to the applicant ?
Application of investment manager (IM)
Whether the applicant would be assessed in respect of its proportionate share of income earned by the contributory trust as per the provision of section 161 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 (the Act) ?
Whether the contributory trust would be regarded as a ‘see through’ or‘transparent entity’ vis-a-vis the applicant; i.e., to say, the applicant willbe taxed in respect of its proportionate share of income under section 161 of the Act ?
Whether it is held that the provisions of section 161 do not apply to the incomeof the applicant from the contributory trust because of the power vestedin the trustees to add to the list of the beneficiaries on the terms laiddown in the indenture of trust and the contribution agreement, then ifsuch power is deleted, would the assessment of the applicant in respectof its proportionate share of income of the trust be made in accordancewith section 161 ?
Whether if it is held that the shares of the additional beneficiaries are indeter-minate whether the capital gains arising to the applicant will be chargedto tax at the rate of 20 per cent. as prescribed in section 112 of the Act ?
Whether will there be any tax withholding by the investee companies at the time of distribution of income to the CT ?
Whether, on the facts and circumstances of the case,the character of the applicant’s proportionate share in the income of thecontributory trust will be same as in the hands of the contributory trust?
Whether the applicant’s share in the dividend earned by the contributorytrust will be chargeable to tax and if so at what rate?
Whether the applicant’s share in the interest earned by the contributory trustbe chargeable to tax at the rate of 20 per cent. ?
Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances ofthe case, the applicant’s share in the capital gains earned by the contribu-tory trust will be chargeable to tax ?
Whether there would be any withholding tax liability on the CT in respectof the distributions made to the applicant ?
Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances ofthe case, the applicant’s proportionate share in the surplus arising on therealisation of the investments made by the contributory trust would constitute capital gains ?
Whether, in case the answer to question No. 11 is in the negative, the proportionate share of the applicant in such surplus will be chargeable to income-tax in India in the applicant’s hands ?
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1996 (8) TMI 511 - SUPREME COURT
Whether, relying upon clause (5) pf Section 35, an Income tax Officer could rectify the assessment of a person a who was a partner in a firm when the assessment of the firm was completed before 1st April, 1952?
Held that:- By reason of the said Notification issued on 30th March, 1974, with effect from 1st November, 1971, Rule 18(5)(ii) has to be read as barring the commissioner (or other authority to whom power in this behalf has been delegated by the commissioner) from revising of his own motion any assessment made or order passed under the Act or the rules if the assessment has been made or the order has been passed more than six years previous to 1st November, 1971, Put conversely, with effect from 1st November, 1971, Rule 18(5)(ii) permits the Commissioner (or other authority) to revise of his own motion any assessment made or order passed under the Act or the rules provided the assessment has not been made or the order passed more than six years previously. This being the plain meaning, the said Notification must be given full effect. Full effect can be given only if the said Notification is read as being applicable not only to assessments which were incomplete but also to assessments which reached finality by reason of the earlier prescribed period of four years having elapsed. Where language as unambiguous as this is employed, it must be assumed that the legislature intended the amended provision to apply even to assessments that had so become final: if the intention was otherwise, the Legislature would have so stated.
In the result, the appeal is allowed. The judgment and order under appeal is set aside. The respondents shall be entitled to proceed upon the notices dated 7th November, 1974, issued to the 1st respondent reopening its assessments for Assessment years Chaitra Sudi 2023 and 2024.
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1996 (8) TMI 510 - SUPREME COURT
Whether there is an arbitration agreement between the parties?
Whether the proceedings of the forums created under the Act are legal proceedings and the authorities have the trappings of judicial authorities of a court within the meaning of Section 34 of the Arbitration Act?
Whether the case shall be stayed by operation of Section 34 of the Arbitration Act?
Held that:- As the State Commission expressly has gone into the question and held that by operation of Clause (12) of the quotation there is an arbitration agreement brought into vogue between the parties. Thereby, Clause (12) of the agreement became as integral part of the contract. Thus, there is an arbitration agreement between the parties.
The word "court" must be read in the context in which it is used in the statute. In the context in which the word "court" is used in Section 9A of the Special Courts Act, it is intended to encompass all curial or judicial bodies which have the jurisdiction to decide matters or claims, inter alia, arising out of transactions in securities entered into between the stated dates in which a person notified was involved. Therein, the Company Law Board has been held to be a court exercising the functions of the court; therefore, it is possessed of the trappings of a Court. Thus, we have no hesitation to hold that the proceedings before the District Forum, State Commission and the National Commission are legal proceedings. The District Forum, National Commission and the State Commission are judicial authorities falling under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act.
As seen, Section 34 of the Act does not confer and automatic right nor create an automatic embargo on the exercise of the power by the judicial authority under the Act. It is a matter of discretion. Considered from this perspective, we hold that though the District Forum, State Commission and National Commission are judicial authorities, for the purpose of Section 34 of the Arbitration Act, in view of the object of the Act and by operation of Section 3 thereof, we are of the considered view that it would be appropriate that these forums created under the Act are at liberty to proceed with the matters in accordance with the provisions of the Act rather than relegating the parties to an arbitration proceedings pursuant to a contract entered into between the parties.
Thus this dispute need not be referred to arbitration under Clause (12) of the agreement and the matter could be decided on merits by the State Commission itself. Appeal allowed.
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1996 (8) TMI 509 - KERALA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... in the case of the assessee evidenced by annexure D. That assessment order sufficiently reveals that the petitioner was dealing in second sales of scheduled goods. The case of the enquiry officer is that there was an attempt to help the consignee from payment of turnover tax. Inasmuch as it is sufficiently proved that the goods under transport are taxable on the first point of sale and it has thus already suffered tax it is difficult for this Court to say that there is an attempt to evade payment of tax much less conscious or definite. Therefore, we are not satisfied that this is a fit case where levy of penalty under section 29A(4) is attracted. That being the position, we set aside the orders of the authorities below and allow this tax revision case. The penalty collected from the petitioner shall be refunded within a period of one month from the date of receipt of a copy of this judgment. Order on C.M.P. No. 2539 of 1996 in T.R.C. No. 69 of 1996 allowed. Petition allowed.
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1996 (8) TMI 508 - SUPREME COURT
Whether there is any cogent ground to interfere in this appeal with the exercise of discretion by the trial court?
Held that:- It is unnecessary to refer to the several decisions cited at the bar to indicate the settled principles of law regulating grant or refusal of interlocutory injunctions and the scope for grant of such an injunction in a passing-off action even against the proprietor of a registered trade mark. None of those decisions lays down that in a passing-off action based on the right in common law distinct from the statutory right based on a registered mark, an injunction cannot be granted even against an owner of the trade mark in an appropriate case. It is for this reason, Shri Kapil Sibal fairly conceded this position at the outset and relied on the fact of registration in favour of the defendants only for the limited purpose indicated earlier. The surviving controversy at this stage was confined only to the legality and propriety of an interlocutory injunction granted on the facts of this case.
It cannot be seriously disputed that on the findings recorded by the trial court and affirmed on appeal by the Division Bench which appear to us as reasonable conclusion on the relevant material, grant of an interlocutory injunction is the appropriate order to make and the proper exercise of discretion by the trial court. This appeal must, therefore, fail.
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