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Showing 21 to 40 of 492 Records
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1998 (2) TMI 599 - COMPANY LAW BOARD
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... ... ..... hares by the Bank as per section 108(1C)(B). Again this can be determined based on the facts. 9. In view of the submissions made by the petitioner, it would be necessary to determine as to how Bank claims that shares were under pledge or lien with them, authority under which they have sold the shares and how the bank was entitled to appropriate the proceeds. In the absence of the Bank who have not been made party in these proceedings these issues cannot be adjudicated upon. It is a settled view of the Board that where in a petition under section 111 complicated question of facts arose, which could not be adjudicated upon and the controversy could be tested by a Civil Court alone, the Board would be reluctant to go into the matter but can relegate the parties in Civil Court. In our opinion this is a fit case for relegating the matter to the Civil Court and no relief can be granted in the matter. The petition stands disposed of accordingly. There would be no orders as to cost.
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1998 (2) TMI 598 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... lands attached to village offices after abolitions of the said offices under the Village Offices (Abolition) Act. 1961. This contention of the appellant therefore fails. Even if the amendment is prospective, the application under section 45 is to be filed on or before 30.6.1979 and that was not done. Learned senior counsel for Kittamma (4th respondent) Sri Krishnamoorthi contended that till the occupancy-price is paid by the erstwhile office holder under Section 5(1) of the Village offices Abolition Act read with Rule 4 of the Rules made under the Village Offices Abolition Act, the rights as to re-grant do not get crystallised and hence it is not possible to fill up Form 7 for filing an application under Section 45 of the Land Reforms Act, 1961. It is argued that till re-grant, the land is ‘government land’. We have already considered this contention and rejected the same. For all the above reasons, the appeals are dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs.
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1998 (2) TMI 597 - SC ORDER
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... ... ..... impugned judgment of the Tribunal as well as the record. We do not find any merit in the appeal and the same is accordingly dismissed. No order as to costs.
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1998 (2) TMI 596 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... quently discovered to be void. We may point out that there are many facets of this question, as for example (and there are many more examples), the agreement being void for any of the reasons set out in Section 23 and 24, in which case even the refund of the amount already paid under that agreement may not be ordered. But, as pointed out above, we are dealing only with a matter in which one party had received an advantage under an agreement which was "discovered to be void" on account of Section 20 of the Act. It is to this limited extent that we say that, on the principle contained in Section 65 of the Act, the petitioner having received ₹ 77,000/- as earnest money from the respondent in pursuance of that agreement, is bound to refund the said amount to the respondent. A decree for refund of this amount was, therefore, rightly passed by the Lower Appellate Court. For the reasons stated above, we see no force in this Special Leave Petition which is dismissed.
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1998 (2) TMI 595 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ld that the view of the evidence taken by the High Court is erroneous and that it misled itself in coming to the conclusion that the guilt of A-2 and A-6 was not established; we are of the view that prosecution has proved the guilt of the accused beyond any reasonable doubt. The trial court was, therefore, right in convicting them and that the High Court was not justified in interfering with the conviction and sentence of Shishupal Singh (A-2) and Ram Gopal (A-6) on grounds which are hardly sustainable in law. Accordingly, judgment of the High Court dated 3-10-1985 in Criminal Appeal No. 1830 of 1994 is set aside, judgment of the trial court dated 3-7-1984, insofar as it relates to A-2 and A-6, is restored and Shishupal Singh (A-2) and Ram Gopal (A-6) are directed to be taken into custody to serve their sentences. The appeals filed by the State against the said respondents (Respondents 2 and 3) are allowed, as indicated above, and they are dismissed against other respondents
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1998 (2) TMI 594 - ITAT JAIPUR
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... ... ..... itor and the father has also filed affidavit in support of his claim, there is no reason to deny the genuineness of this credit. This addition is also deleted. 8. Ground No. 8 and ground No.10 of the grounds of appeal were not pressed by the learned A/R. Both these grounds are, therefore, treated as withdrawn and hence treated as dismissed. 9. Ground No.9 of the grounds of appeal is in regard to the addition u/s. 40A(3) of the I.T. Act. The learned A/R of the assessee argues that when 10 net profit is applied on the gross receipt from the contract business, it is not reasonable or justified to further make disallowances out of the expenses claimed either in trading a/c or profit and loss account. 10. We agree on this account, as the results from the books of a/c have been rejected, and net profit rate is applied, there is no reason to make further addition on the basis of books of a/c. The ground, therefore, stands allowed. 11. Subject to the above, appeal is partly allowed.
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1998 (2) TMI 593 - ITAT MUMBAI
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... ... ..... ordingly deleted the disallowance of ₹ 1,03,512. 18. These facts have neither been controverted nor rebutted by any evidence. In these circumstances, we find no justification to interfere. 19. In the result, the appeals of the Revenue, for asst. yrs. 1987-88 and 1988-89 are dismissed. 20. We now take up the cross-objections of the assessee for asst. yrs. 1987-88 and 1988-89. 21. The first common ground is relating to the disallowance of telephone expenses installed at the residence of the partners. The disallowance of 50 per cent is stated to be excessive. We restrict the disallowance to 1/3rd. 22. The only other common ground in the cross-objections is relating to the disallowance of 1/4th of car expenses on account of personal use by the partners. In our view, the disallowance to the extent of 1/5th out of car expenses would be reasonable. We direct accordingly. 23. In the result, cross-objections of the assessee for asst. yrs. 1987-88 and 1988-89 are partly allowed.
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1998 (2) TMI 592 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ines stated above, it may be noticed that in the present case it was not pointed out bey the prosecution that it was a cold blooded murder. There is nothing on record to show how the murder has taken place. In the absence of such evidence, we do not find that the case before us falls within the category of rarest of rare cases, deserving extreme penalty of death. Keeping in view the afforested facts, we are of the view that the ends of justice would be met if we substitute t he death sentence with that of life imprisonment under Sections 302/34 IPC, while upholding the appellants’ conviction, as recorded by the High Court. This appeal is, accordingly, allowed in part, only to the extent that the death sentence passed against the appellants under Sections 302/34 IPC is set aside, and, instead, the appellants are sentenced to undergo imprisonment for life. since we upheld the conviction of the appellants under Sections 302/34 IPC., appeal to that extent stands dismissed.
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1998 (2) TMI 591 - SC ORDER
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... ... ..... inst the said decision and the matters stood concluded as far as the assessee was concerned. This being so, no useful purpose would be served in proceeding with the appeals on the other questions when the respondent cannot be taxed because of the principle of mutuality. 2. The appeals were accordingly dismissed. No order as to costs.
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1998 (2) TMI 590 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... elevant only if the reassessment proceedings were taken under section 17(1)(b) of the Act. Since the proceedings were initiated under section 17(1)(a) of the Act, it is unnecessary for us to express any opinion on the correctness of the view of the Appellate Tribunal as to whether the powers under section 16A of the Act were properly invoked by the Assessing Officer. Questions Nos. 1 and 2 They are answered in the affirmative against the Department and in favour of the assessee. Third question We are of the opinion, it is not necessary for us to render any answer to this question as the reopening of the assessment was made under section 17(1)(a) and since the powers under section 17(1)(b) were not invoked, it is not necessary to render any answer to the question whether the report under section 16A can be the basis for reopening the assessment under section 17(1)(a) of the Act. Hence, we are not answer ing the third question. The assessee is entitled to costs of ₹ 750.
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1998 (2) TMI 589 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... e no mention of gunny bags but it contained only some entries of cash amounts. Further against the cash entries only date was mentioned without any year. A perusal of the information further revealed that it related to some other dealer. The Tribunal ultimately held that the information which was the basis for reassessment was not specific and was vague and in any case, it could not be co-related with the Assessment Year 1985-86 and at best the information may arose suspicion but no assessment can be made on the basis of surmises and conjectures alone. On these findings, the Tribunal set aside the reassessment and allowed the appeal. 4. It would be seen from the above that the order of the Tribunal is concluded by findings of fact and does not give rise to any question of law. It could not be shown by the Standing Counsel as to in which respect the order of the Tribunal suffered from any infirmity, whether legal or factual. 5. The revision is devoid of merit and is rejected.
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1998 (2) TMI 588 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... discrepancy was so negligible, I am of the opinion, that instead of remitting the case back to the Trade Tax Tribunal, the order of the first appellate authority should be confirmed in this revision. In adopting this course, to which the controversy pertains and no useful purpose would be served by directing the Trade Tax Tribunal to decide the appeal afresh. Accordingly the order passed by the appellate authority is confirmed. 11. In the result the orders under revision passed by the Trade Tax Tribunal, Muzaffar Nagar in Second Appeal No. 688 of 1991 (Year 1988-89) (Central) and Second Appeal No. 667 of 1991 (1988-89) (U P.) are set aside. The aforesaid appeals filed by the Revenue before the Tribunal shall stand dismissed. The revisionist-assessee will be assessed to tax both under the U.P. Trade Tax Act and Central Sales Tax Act in terms of the orders passed by the first appellate authority. Both the revisions succeed and are allowed. There shall be no order as to costs.
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1998 (2) TMI 587 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... depending upon the number of vacancies and the posts available for such promotes, and their year of allotment would be re-determined accordingly. We would further make it clear that if any of these State Civil Service Officers who were much junior to the officers who had approached the tribunal on earlier occasion and who had been appointed on promotion to the Indian Administrative Service on the basis of the original Select List of the year 1987 their year of allotment has to be re-determined in view of their position having been pushed down in the review select List of the year 1987 which contains the names of all the 40 officers. We decline to interfere with the order of the Central Administrative Tribunal but we issue the aforesaid directions for the purpose of re-determination of the seniority and year of allotment of these officers which we think is necessary in the interest of justice. All these appeals are disposed of accordingly. There will be not order as to costs.
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1998 (2) TMI 586 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... the expiry of the period of contract. If such contract, on the expiry of its original period, is not renewed and the services are terminated as a consequence of that period, it would not amount to "Retrenchment". Similarly, if the services are terminated even before the expiry of the period of contract but in pursuance of a stipulation contained in that contract that the services could be so terminated, then in that case also, the termination would not amount to "retrenchment". This view finds support from a decision of this Court in Escorts Ltd. vs. Presiding Officer, (1997) 11 scc 521. 33. This case does not fall in either of the two situations contemplated by Clause (bb). The Rule of exception', therefore, is not applicable in the instant case and consequently the finding recorded by the Tribunal on "retrenchment" cannot be disturbed. 34. For the reasons stated above, we find no merit in this petition which is dismissed at the SLP stage.
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1998 (2) TMI 585 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... is paid and what is admissible rate at Escort. Looking to the facts and circumstances of this Case we hold that the respondent in SLP (C) No. 11968/97 is entitled to be paid the difference amount of what is paid and what is the rate admissible in Escorts then. The same should be paid within one month from today. We make it clear reimbursement to the respondents as approved by us be not treated as precedent but has been given on the facts and circumstances of these cases. For the reasons and findings recorded herein before, the new policy dated 13th February, 1995 is upheld. The impugned High Court orders to that extent are set aside, Appeals arising out of SLP(C) Nos. 13167 and 12418 of 1997 are allowed to the extent indicated above and are disposed of accordingly. Appeals arising out of SLP (C) Nos. 12143, 12144 and 11968 of 1997 are dismissed, subject to the further direction given in the appeal arising out of SLP (C) No. 11968 of 1997. There will be no order as to costs.
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1998 (2) TMI 584 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... iture cannot conceal the deceptive innocence as it is obvious, on a judicial scrutiny, that paramount purpose was to re-write the over-ruled judgment. 36. In view of these facts, we are constrained to observe that it was not competent for Mr. Justice Ajit Kumar Sengupta to have presided over the Bench in which the impugned judgment was passed as he had already expressed his opinion in the earlier writ petition which was over-ruled. He should have disassociated himself from that Bench in keeping with the high traditions of the institution so as to give effect to the rule that "justice should not only be done, it should manifestly be seen to have been done" apart from sitting in appeal, though collaterally, over his own judgment. 37. The appeals are consequently allowed. The judgment and order dated 21.7.1992 passed by the division Bench of the Calcutta High Court is set aside and the Writ Petition (Matter No. 1449 of 1987) is dismissed without any order as to costs.
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1998 (2) TMI 583 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ably point to the legislative object in doing so. The same issue came up before a Full Bench of the Punjab and Haryana High Court, particularly in the light of change made in Section 195(1)(b)(ii) of the Code vis-a-vis the corresponding provision in the old Code. In Harbans Singh and others vs. State of Punjab - AIR 1987 Punjab & Haryana 19 , the Full Bench observed that deletion of those words would not help to take a wider view as the restrictive view is more in consonance with the scheme of the Code. We have notice that Karnataka High Court in Govindaraju vs. State of Karnataka 1995 Crl.L.J.1491 and the Bombay High Court in Alka Bhagwant Jadhav vs. State of Maharashtra ILR 1986 (Bombay) 64 have also adopted the same view. The sequitur of the above discussion is that the bar contained in Section 195(1)(b)(ii) of the Code is not applicable to case where forgery of the document was committed before the document was produced in a Court. Accordingly we dismiss this appeal.
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1998 (2) TMI 582 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... in the High Court; and Article 236 defines the expression "District Judge" extensively as covering judges of a city civil court etc, as earlier set out, and the expression "judicial service" as meaning a service consisting exclusively of persons intended to fill the post of the District Judge and other civil judicial posts inferior to the post of District judge. Therefore, bearing in mind the principle of separation of powers and independence of the judiciary, judicial service contemplates a service exclusively of judicial posts in which their will be a hierarchy headed by a District Judge. The High Court has rightly come to the conclusion that the persons presiding over Industrial and Labour Courts would constitute a judicial service so defined. Therefore, the recruitment of Labour Court judges is required to be made in accordance with Article 235 of the Constitution. In the premises, the appeal is dismissed. There will, however, be no order as to costs.
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1998 (2) TMI 581 - CEGAT MADRAS
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... ... ..... y the learned Consultant, is mentioned in the show cause notice itself. Therefore, it is clear that in common parlance, both the goods cannot be said to be the same. 21. It is further seen from the Circular of the Board in F. No. 213/41/88, the Board itself has clarified that it is permissible to have the same trade mark for different clauses of goods owned by different persons. This circular of the Board is in consonance with our view. Moreover, the department cannot argue against these circulars of the Board also. 22. The learned SDR pointed out that the Assistant Commissioner has distinguished these circulars. 23. In our view, the reasons given by lower authorities in distinguishing the circular is not logically not correct. However, we are only saying that our view is supported by the circular of the Board. We have taken a different route to come to the same conclusion. 24. In this view of the matter, the appeals are allowed with consequential relief.
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1998 (2) TMI 580 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... er was based upon perverse appreciation of the materials and the same deserves to be set aside. The very finding itself is sufficient to set aside the order of the Tribunal in cancelling the penalty of Rs. 12,671, as sustained by the first appellate authority and therefore, the order of the Tribunal, as respects the cancellation of the penalty also deserves to be set aside. 20.. In fine, the Tax Case (Revision) is allowed and the assessment order making a further addition of Rs. 2,53,414 exigible to tax at ten per cent for the assessment year 1989-90 by the assessing officer and laterly confirmed by AAC is ordered to be restored, by setting aside the order of the Tribunal in that regard. Further, the penalty of Rs. 12,671, as sustained by AAC-the first appellate authority is also ordered to be restored, by setting aside the order of the Tribunal in that regard. There shall, however, be no order as to costs, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case. Petition allowed.
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