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1959 (10) TMI 25 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
... ... ... ... ..... tax or taxes leviable under this Act in respect of the transaction. Without prejudice to his other rights to recover from his principal the tax or taxes paid by him on behalf of the principal such agent may retain out of any moneys payable to the principal by the agent a sum equal to the amount of the tax or taxes assessed on or paid by the agent. The principal on whose behalf the agent has paid the tax or taxes as aforesaid shall not again be taxed in respect of the same transaction but the burden of proving that the tax in respect of the transaction has been paid to the agent shall be on such principal. It is plain that under this proviso, it is the principal who is exempt and not the agent he is bound to pay the tax although he is at liberty to recover it from his principal. The petitioner is not entitled to the exemption claimed. The levy is perfectly valid. The writ petitions are dismissed with costs in W.P. No. 1278 of 1957. Advocate s fee Rs. 100. Petitions dismissed.
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1959 (10) TMI 24 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
... ... ... ... ..... ase before them from the case of State of Travancore-Cochin and Others v. Shanmugha Vilas Cashew-nut Factory and Others 1954 S.C.R. 53 4 S.T.C. 205., wherein it was held that where cashew-nuts were purchased, conditioned and processed for export abroad, the exported article is not the same as the one purchased and therefore the exemption under Article 286 would not apply. Their Lordships then stated that there was a vast difference between prepared cashew-nuts and printed cloth. In my opinion, this case is near the case in State of Travancore-Cochin and Others v. Shanmugha Vilas Cashew-nut Factory 1954 S.C.R. 53 4 S.T.C. 205. than the case in Kailash Nath v. State of U.P. 1957 8 S.T.C. 358. When a cloth is made into a shirt or a pyjama it would no longer be proper to describe it as mere cloth. It has assumed a new character. Such finished garments are clothes and no longer cloth. In the result, the petition is dismissed with costs. Advocate s fee Rs. 100. Petition dismissed.
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1959 (10) TMI 23 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
... ... ... ... ..... eferred to India Coffee and Tea Distributing Co., Ltd., Madras v. State of Madras 1958 9 S.T.C. 769. But that referred only to the ultimate and economic incidence of the tax on the non-resident principal. That should be made clear by sub-section (3) of section 14-A, which gives the agent of the non-resident principal a statutory right to recover from that principal whatever that has been collected under the provisions of the Act from the resident agent. Neither the terms of section 14-A nor the principle laid down in the India Coffee Board s case(1) supports the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner, that since in this case the non-resident principal could not have been taxed on the turnover, the agent could not be taxed at all. These were the only two contentions on which the taxed liability ultimately sustained by the Tribunal was resisted. Both these contentions fail. The petition fails and is dismissed with costs. Counsel s fee Rs. 100. Petition dismissed.
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1959 (10) TMI 22 - PATNA HIGH COURT
... ... ... ... ..... , not possible to accept the argument of learned counsel for the assessee that there is any inconsistency between rule 36(2) and the provisions of the new Act within the meaning of the proviso to section 32 of the new Act and therefore rule 36(2) of the old Act ceased to exist after the enactment of rule 18 of the new Act, namely, Bihar Act XIX of 1947. It follows, therefore, that the Sales Tax Authorities did not commit any error of law in applying rule 36(2) of the Rules made under the old Act to the case of the assessee for the relevant period. It follows, therefore, that in the circumstances of this case the petitioner s claim for deduction on account of sales to registered dealers has been rightly rejected and the second question of law referred by the Board of Revenue for the year 1947-48 must be answered also in favour of the State of Bihar and against the assessee. The assessee must pay the costs of this reference. Hearing fee Rs. 250. Reference answered accordingly.
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1959 (10) TMI 21 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
... ... ... ... ..... re again I am unable to agree with the submission of the learned AdvocateGeneral. The question is not one of logic but rather of interpretation of the words used. It was certainly open to the State Legislature to have effected a confirmation of a more extensive nature. But the Legislature did not do so, but expressly confined the validation of the rule so as to permit assessment being made for one particular year. It would not be interpretation but an act of legislation for the court to say that notwithstanding that section 9 in terms restricts the scope of the validity of the rule to the assessment year 1955-56 and regularises the assessment for that year it has validated the rule for the subsequent years also. The language of section 9 precludes the argument advanced by the learned Advocate-General. The result is that these writ petitions succeed and the rule nisi issued will be made absolute. There will be no order as to costs in any of these petitions. Petitions allowed.
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1959 (10) TMI 20 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
... ... ... ... ..... cations pending at that time. The language of this section clearly brings out the intention of the Legislature that he cannot be deemed to be appellate authority to deal in any manner with the closed cases. The necessary consequence of this is that he had no power to reopen closed matters or revive those proceedings which were finally settled. Having regard to the scheme of the amending Act, it is obvious that the extent to which the Act was intended to be retroactive in its operation has been fully brought out in its various provisions. But section 13 has not gone back to the extent now desired. Thus against the clear language and intendment of the enactment, the powers of the Deputy Commissioner could not reach back to acts done by the Commercial Tax Officer. In this view of the law, we have no hesitation in holding that the Tribunal was right in allowing the appeal. This revision case fails and it is hereby dismissed with costs. Advocate s fee Rs. 100. Petition dismissed.
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1959 (10) TMI 19 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
... ... ... ... ..... tween transactions which are immune from tax and which are not. Where no assistance is rendered to them to determine the necessary questions of fact, the authorities have no option but to resort to those provisions of the Act which enable them to take action where the parties abstain altogether from co-operation. The petitioners can only succeed now on the view that all transactions of whatever nature carried on by them within the territory of Andhra Pradesh should be exempt-a contention which is obviously unsustainable. The question with respect to every transaction is a question of fact which must be established in the usual course to the satisfaction of the assessing authorities. The general contention therefore urged on their behalf that irrespective of the nature of the transactions all their transactions should be declared immune from tax cannot be upheld. In the result, I dismiss all these petitions with costs. In each case, Advocate s fee Rs. 50. Petitions dismissed.
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1959 (10) TMI 18 - PATNA HIGH COURT
... ... ... ... ..... ion No. 2, therefore, has to be answered in favour of the State of Bihar and against the assessee. So far as the merit of the case is concerned, which is involved in question No. 1, counsel for the assessee has contended that in this case the assessment has been made twice over for the same taxable turnover, first in the Rural Circle and then in the Urban Circle. Since, however, the second question has to be answered against the assessee, the decision of the first question becomes only academic, and it is not therefore, necessary to answer that question. I, therefore, do not propose to answer the first question. The result, therefore, is that the second question is answered in favour of the State of Bihar and against the assessee, and I do not propose to answer the first question, as, in view of the answer of the second question, it becomes academic. In the circumstances of the case, there will be no order as to costs. RAMASWAMI, C.J.-I agree. Reference answered accordingly.
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1959 (10) TMI 17 - HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB
Winding up – Application of insolvency rules ... ... ... ... ..... or a covenant entered into by the debtor, or a judgment which he has obtained, the principle, I apprehend, is exactly the same, and is this mdash that the trustee is not the person who has stated the account, is not the covenantor, is not the judgment debtor, but is entitled to say, it is my business to see that those who seek to rank against this estate are persons who are really creditors of that estate. If there be a judgment it is not necessary to shew fraud or collusion. It is sufficient, in the language of Lord Esher, to shew miscarriage of justice that is to say, that for some good reason there ought not to have been a judgment. Exactly the same, I think, is true of an account stated or of a covenant. Having regard to the facts of this case and in view of the principles of law enunciated above, I am satisfied that the official liquidator was eminently justified in rejecting the claim of the petitioner Shri Brij Lal Palta. I, therefore, dismiss the petition with costs.
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1959 (10) TMI 16 - HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH
Winding up - Powers of liquidator ... ... ... ... ..... equent offer of a higher bid should not be a ground for refusing confirmation of the sale provided the price is adequate. In this case, it is not suggested by the applicant mdash and in fact Mr. Narasimha Aiyangar has fairly conceded that he is not suggesting mdash that there has been any irregularity or fraud or that the price is inadequate. All that is stated now is that as the applicant is prepared to make an offer of a higher sum, the matter should be reopened and his offer should be accepted. Mr. Narasimha Aiyangar has not been able to place before me any decision which has taken a view contrary to the one taken by the Madras High Court in the two Bench decisions referred to above (which are binding on me) and by the Allahabad High Court in Brindaban Agarwala v. Official Liquidator of the Saraswati Soap and Oil Mills Ltd.4 For all the above reasons, the applicant is not entitled to have his offer considered or accepted. This application is therefore dismissed with costs.
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1959 (10) TMI 2 - HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
Smuggled goods - Evidence - Natural justice ... ... ... ... ..... ent on the record of this case as regards the finding made by the 1st respondent. That finding must be held as vitiated by reason of what is well-known as legal misconduct and is liable to be set aside. 23.Mr. Joshi has informed me that as regards the contention that the provisions of Section 178A are ultra vires the constitution and invalid, he has not been able to press that contention before me as division Bench of this Court has in the case of Pokhraj v. D. R. Kohli held that the contention is not well founded. That contention will be open to be urged by the petitioners in further proceedings if any in this case. 24.The result of my above findings must be that the petitioners are entitled to the relief as claimed in prayers (a) and (b) of the petition. The petitioners will be entitled to costs. Rule absolute in terms of prayers (a) and (b) with cost. 25.The respondents are given time of ten days within which they may obtain such order as they desire from the appeal Court.
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1959 (10) TMI 1 - SUPREME COURT
Whether a person contravened the provisions of the Act or the Rules which is an offence ?
Held that:- We think that the legislature, by stating in Section 18 of the Act that the searches under the Act and the Rules shall be carried out in accordance with the provisions of the Code relating to searches, clearly indicated that the appropriate provisions of the Code shall govern searches authorised under the Act and the Rules. We therefore hold that the provisions of Section 165 of the Code must be followed in the matter of searches under Rule 201 of the Rules
The search made by the Deputy Superintendent in the present case in contravention of the provisions of Section 165 of the Code was illegal. Appeal dismissed.
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1959 (9) TMI 75 - SUPREME COURT
... ... ... ... ..... nferred such a power on the State Government is also supported by the provisions of s. 27 of the Act. Under s. 27(1), the bye-laws made by the Market Committee for the regulation of business and conditions of trading in the market area are subject to the rules made by the State Government under s. 26. This indicates that under s. 26 of the Act, the State Government has also power to make rules for the regulation of business and conditions of trading in the market area, and that power can be spelled out from the provisions of s. 26(1) of the Act, Therefore, s. 26(1) confers ample power on the State Government to make r. 65. In this view, it is not necessary to invoke the provisions of s. 26(2)(e) to sustain the power of the State Government to make r. 65. 14. The third contention though raised was not pursued in view of the word "business" in r. 65(1) which is comprehensive enough to take in even forward contracts. 15. In the result the appeal fails and is dismissed.
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1959 (9) TMI 74 - SUPREME COURT
... ... ... ... ..... Chairman of the Industrial Tribunal wrongly held that the limestone quarry at Rajanka and the factory at Jhinkpani were separate establishments. In our view, they constituted one establishment within the meaning of clause (iii) of s. 25E of the Act. It was conceded on behalf the respondent workmen that the lay-off in the factory was due to the non-supply of limestone by reason of the strike in the limestone quarry and the strike was decided on by the same Union which consisted of the workmen at the factory and the quarry. That being the position, the disqualification in clause (iii) aforesaid clearly applied and the workmen at the factory were not entitled to claim lay-off compensation. 28. The result, therefore, is that the appeal succeeds and is allowed and the award of the Industrial Tribunal is set aside. In the circumstances of the case in which a difficult question of interpretation arose for decision for the first time, we pass no order as to costs. 29. Appeal allowed.
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1959 (9) TMI 72 - SUPREME COURT
... ... ... ... ..... llow the appeal of Munna Lal, set aside the order passed by the appellate tribunal and direct his reinstatement on the same terms and conditions on which reinstatement of the other 136 employees has been directed by the appellate tribunal. Subject to this modification the appeal preferred by the employees fails and is dismissed. Since the appeal has succeeded in respect of Munna Lal, we direct that parties should bear their own costs of this appeal. K. Subba Rao, J. 71. I have had the advantage of perusing the judgment prepared by my learned brother, Gajendragadkar, J. I agree with his conclusion. I would prefer not to express my opinion on the construction of s. 33-A of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, for the reason that the argument which called for a consideration of the said section had not been raised at any of the earlier stages of the dispute, but was raised for the first time in this Court. 72. Appeals Nos. 519 and 520 dismissed. 73. Appeal No. 521 allowed in part.
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1959 (9) TMI 71 - SUPREME COURT
... ... ... ... ..... ed the distinction may be an indication that in its view there is relevant difference between a lambardar and village accountants. We would therefore, hold that a village headman cannot be brought within the words “the like” in the said clause. In this view, it is not necessary to express our opinion on the question whether a lambardar is a person in the service of the Government within the meaning of s. 123(7) of the Act. Before parting with this case, we must express our feeling that the final disposal of the election petition should not have been delayed so long. The elections were held on February 24, 1957, the respondent was declared elected on February 25, 1957, and the election petition was filed on April 11, 1957. Though 2 1/2 years have elapsed, the petition has not yet been finally disposed of. We hope that the election petition would be disposed of on other issues as expeditiously as possible. In the result, the appeal fails and is dismissed with costs.
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1959 (9) TMI 70 - SUPREME COURT
... ... ... ... ..... Company's account books. On this clear evidence it is manifest that the fourth charge, namely, the attempt to cheat the Government of India by submitting bills on the basis of the inflated costs of the machinery purchased from Ramdas and Sons, has not been established. If this charge fails, the third charge also must fail. That charge relates to the offence of forgery of Ex. D and user of the said forged document. The charge refers by incorporation to the first charge indicating thereby that the intention to fabricate the document was only to cheat the Government in the manner stated in the first charge. As we have held that the accused did not make any claim in the bills on the basis of Ex. D or the accounts written on the foot of Ex. D, the necessary ingredient of the third charge was also not established. 16. In the result, we agree with the conclusion arrived at by the learned Judges of the High Court, though for different reasons. The appeal fails and is dismissed.
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1959 (9) TMI 69 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
... ... ... ... ..... e to get back the land in the event of a partition. Further complications would arise if such a permanent settlement was granted by only one of the co-sharers but was acquiesced in by the others. In such an event it would have to be seen whether the acquiescence was of such a nature as to operate as an estoppel against the other co-sharers, who were no parties to the permanent settlement. This is the view of the matter which has not been considered by any of the Courts below. In our opinion the case has not been properly tried and must be remanded to the trial court for a rehearing in the light of the observations contained in this judgment. 25. The evidence already on the record shall be treated as evidence at the rehearing but parties shall have liberty to adduce further evidence if they like. 26. This appeal is accordingly allowed and the case is remanded to the trial court for rehearing. Costs of this appeal shall abide the final result. Braja Kanta Guha, J. 27. I agree.
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1959 (9) TMI 68 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
... ... ... ... ..... question referred to by the learned judge, but the limited question "whether receipts of the cheques at Bhavnagar amounted to receipts of sale proceeds in Bhavnagar" which could not cover the question "whether the posting of the cheques in British India at the request, express or implied, of the appellant amounted to receipt of sale proceeds in British India". Mr. Kolah frankly stated that this is an obvious inaccuracy which has crept in, in the judgment of the learned judge. 105. In my view, the question of law that has been raised by the Tribunal in the present case is sufficiently wide to cover the aspect of the case sought to be raised by the learned counsel for the Revenue. He seeks to confine himself to the facts as set out in the statement of the case and I do not see any reason why that argument cannot be entertained and given effect to. 106. In the result, my answer to the question is in the affirmative. 107. Question answered in the affirmative.
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1959 (9) TMI 67 - MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT
... ... ... ... ..... set off loss of profits or gains under one head against income, profits or gains under any other head." In the proviso which is before us the words used clearly modify the method of computation under section 10 of the Act. The question arose for interpretation in the Bombay High Court in Keshavlal v. Commissioner of Income-tax 1957 31 ITR 7 . While appreciating the rule that a proviso operates within the main enactment, the learned Judges found that the express words in the proviso in dispute implied that it governed section 10 of the Act. We are in respectful agreement with this decision. Our conclusion is that in computing the profits and gains chargeable under the head "profits and gains of business, profession or vocation" the losses sustained in speculative business cannot be adjusted against the profits under other items within that head. Accordingly, we answer the question in the negative. As the assessee has not appeared, we make no order as to costs.
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