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Case Laws
Showing 61 to 80 of 454 Records
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1959 (11) TMI 69 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... in mind, if we examine the facts of this case, the Indian Companies Act deliberately makes no provision for exercise of jurisdiction in regard to resignation of directors. This is on the well recognised principle that courts should not generally interfere in the internal affairs of the company unless where the act complained of is ultra vires of the company or a fraud on the minority or where there is absolute necessity to waive a rule in order that there may not be a denial of justice. 12. Therefore, when this application is made to this company court invoking powers not provided for by the Companies Act or the rules made thereunder and which absence cannot be made good by judicial legislation it has got to be dismissed, leaving it open to the Registrar of the Companies to recognise the resignation of the applicant and give effect thereto in his further dealings with the company. 13. This application is dismissed subject to the above observations. 14. Application dismissed.
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1959 (11) TMI 68 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ted would have operation only from that date with respect to the State so adopting. 29. There is nothing in the Act to make the operation of the Act retrospective either by express words or necessary implication to a date earlier than the date of the publication of the notification under S. 5(2); it must follow that the duty will be leviable in regard to the agricultural lands of a deceased only in case of his death after the publication of the notification by the Central Government under S. 5(2), that is, 11-6-1955. 30. In the present case, the deceased died in April 1955, sometime prior to the coming into force of the Estate Duty Act in respect of the agricultural lands in the Madras State; the applicant would be entitled to a rebate of duty with respect to the value of the agricultural lands situate in the Madras State. The question referred to us is answered in the negative. The applicant will be entitled to his costs. Counsel's fee ₹ 250/-. Answer accordingly.
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1959 (11) TMI 67 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... nting and violating the order already passed on 16-10-1958. I am, however, not satisfied that any such violation of the order of that date has been made by the opposite parties as calls for any action. The orders now being questioned are independent orders-passed after the earlier application had been decided. In the earlier application some portions of the order questioned had been quashed but no directions had been issued which could be disobeyed. Therefore, there can be no question of violating or disobeying those orders. This prayer cannot, therefore, be granted. 19. In the result the applicant succeeds passed on 24-10-1958, a copy of which is annexure 'C' of the application, is quashed. The order passed by the District Magistrate opposite party No. 2 on 31-10-1958 is quashed to this extent that it cannot apply to letters or parcels received after the date of the order and will also not apply to anything other than letters and parcels. It is. ordered accordingly.
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1959 (11) TMI 66 - PRIVY COUNCIL
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... ... ..... sections cannot be read as part of a co-ordinated scheme in which the provisions of one reflect upon and adopt the provisions of the other. They do not in fact harmonise as they stand ; if they are to be harmonised, it must be by new enactment of the legislature in which the various complications of their inter-relation can be foreseen and specifically provided for. 8. For these reasons their Lordships will humbly advise Her Majesty that the appeal should be allowed ; that the order of the Court of Appeal for Eastern Africa dated April 2, 1958, and the order of the High Court of Tanganyika dated November 12, 1956, be set aside and that the respondent be ordered to pay the appellant's costs of those two hearings ; and that the assessments T, 1234 and 3718 which are under appeal should be remitted to the respondent with directions to amend them in accordance with their Lordships' opinion here expressed. The respondent must pay the costs of the appellant of this appeal.
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1959 (11) TMI 65 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... s conceded that he had knowledge of the litigation between Rukhmabai and Chandanlal claiming the property under the trust deed; but, for that suit he was not a party and the decision in that litigation did not in any way bind him or affect his possession of the house. But in execution of the decree, the Commissioner appointed by the Court came to the premises on February 13, 1937, to take measurements of the house for effecting partition of the property, when the plaintiff raised objection, and thereafter in 1940, filed the suit. From the aforesaid facts, it is manifest that the plaintiff's right to the property was not effectively threatened by the appellant till the Commissioner came to divide the property. It was only then there was an effectual threat to his right to the suit property and the suit was filed within six years thereafter. We, therefore, hold that the suit was within time. In the result, the appeal fails and is dismissed with costs. 35. Appeal dismissed.
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1959 (11) TMI 64 - HIGH COURT OF ASSAM
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... ... ..... come for purposes of taxation." In this case there has been no remission by the bank and the advantage that the assessee derived was in the matter of transaction through these deposits. This case could not be applied even in the case of transaction with the depositors since the assessee owed them nothing; nor was any remission granted by them in the matter of liability. What took place was clear transactions of purchase of the full payment certificates from the depositors with a view to cash them for higher values for satisfying the assessee's liability to the bank. These cases, therefore, have no bearing on the point at issue. We accordingly decide the point under reference in favour of the Department and hold that the surplus of ₹ 16,995 received from the transactions amounted to profit under section 10 of the Income-tax Act. The point under reference is answered in the affirmative and the assessee is liable to pay ₹ 200 as costs. Mehrotra, J.-I agree.
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1959 (11) TMI 63 - HIGH COURT OF MADRAS
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... ... ..... are not at liberty to contend that the second decision which is the final decision in the matter, should be interfered with in appeal. ( 4. ) Apart from all this, Section 3 -A (4)(b) of Madras Act XXIX of 1956 is very clear that the decision of the Tribunal upon such matters on appeal " shall be final and shall not be liable to be questioned in any Court of law ". We find that a precisely similar provision has been enacted in Section 7(3) of Madras Act XXX of 1956. Whatever might be the powers of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution, so long as this Court is exercising its powers in civil appeal, its jurisdiction to interfere will certainly by affected by these valid provisions of law. Hence we hold upon all the grounds set forth above, that the dismissal of the suit by the learned Principal Subordinate Judge was proper, and that no interference is merited in appeal. The appeal accordingly fails, and is dismissed. The parties will bear their own costs.
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1959 (11) TMI 62 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... r the circumstances, reason to believe that part of the income had escaped assessment. It will be recollected, and in this respect I cannot go beyond the assessment order, that the assessee did not take advantage of the proceedings and did not adduce any evidence in respect of its case, or at least the evidence adduced is not sufficient. Mr. Mitter argued that evidence had been adduced and should have been found satisfactory. However, I am not a court of appeal upon such points, and I cannot go behind the finding of the Income-tax Officer in respect thereof. If the case of the assessee is that such findings are incorrect, he should appeal in the usual manner. The result is that I find no ground for interference in this case and this application must fail. The rule is discharged. Interim order is vacated. No order as to costs. The operation of this order will be stayed for six weeks from date. But any further stay must be taken from the court of appeal if appeal is preferred.
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1959 (11) TMI 61 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... oods subsequent to the arrival thereof without his being concerned in illegal importation thereof into India. It appears to me that tile words "person concerned" relate to all those who may have an interest already accrued in the illegal importation prior to the period of time of such importation. That however I have no reason to decide in this case and does not arise before me. So far OS the petitioners are concerned I cannot hold that they were persons concerned in the importation of these two slabs of gold into India. That they have been helping Shankarlal in destroying the evidence of gold of Foreign origin smuggled into India does not in any manner make them persons concerned in the offence as mentioned in Section 167(8). 13. The petitioners are accordingly entitled to have the penalty imposed upon them quashed. The impugned order as against the petitioners will therefore stand quashed. The respondents will pay costs if 'of the petition to the petitioners.
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1959 (11) TMI 60 - HOUSE OF LORDS
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... ... ..... arent company and controlling shareholder of the subsidiary companies, but that does not avoid the fact that it was a different person from the African subsidiaries. I should have thought, therefore, that there might be a question whether the African subsidiaries could be said to be in any sense resident in the United Kingdom in respect that no actings of theirs could be said to show that the central management and control actually abided there. On the other hand, it is a matter of concession that the African subsidiaries have a residence in Africa, and if there is nothing to show that they have also a residence in the United Kingdom the appeal would be bound to fail. This question was not, however, raised on the appeal and did not, as I understand, enter into the decision of the Court of Appeal, and as your Lordships think that on the issues raised in this appeal the appeal should be allowed, I, with some hesitation, am prepared to agree with your Lordships. Appeal allowed.
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1959 (11) TMI 59 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... uestion to be decided has not been decided, (2) it is not clear whether the Tribunal intended to dismiss the appeal or set aside the order of the Appellate Assistant Commissioner and remand it, and that we should direct it to rehear the same. We cannot see how we can give any such direction, as the matter has not been brought to us on a proper reference. As we indicated, it is difficult to accept the extreme contention urged on behalf of the assessee that the appeal had been dismissed. Question 1 cannot, therefore, arise. As regards the second question, we are of opinion that, as the question as to who received the foreign profits during the year of account was not properly the subject of appeal the Tribunal was not competent to decide that question by giving a finding that the joint family received the foreign remittance and remand the proceedings for fresh assessment. The assessee will be entitled to his costs. Counsel's fee ₹ 250. Reference answered accordingly.
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1959 (11) TMI 58 - ASSAM HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... assessee by his son-in-law. Reliance was placed on the case of Mangalchand Gobardhan Das v. Commissioner of Income-tax 1954 26 I.T.R. 706 (Ass.). In that case the question as framed assumed that if it was established as a fact that the money did not belong to the third party, it was an income of the assessee from an undisclosed source. In that case also however it was laid down that there must be some material, before the taxing authorities could treat the amount as an income of the assessee. On the materials before them it was found in that case that the money belonged to the assessee. Here, as I have already pointed out, except the circumstance that Nisi Kanta Saha had no means to get that amount, there is no other material before the assessing authorities from which it could be inferred that the money belonged to the assessee and thus it was a taxable income from some other source. I would, therefore, answer question No. 3 in the negative. Questions answered accordingly.
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1959 (11) TMI 57 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... r the knives and lasts constituted machinery or plant It was apparently taken for granted that if they could be brought within the scope of the statutory expression machinery or plant , the fact that they were integrated with other machinery did not bar the grant of the allowances to which new machinery was entitled Of course, that decision is not authority as such for the conclusion we have reached, that the diesel engines of the assessee came within the scope of the statutory expression new machinery , and the fact that they were made parts of vehicles was not relevant in deciding whether the assessee was entitled to the further allowance for depreciation for which paragraph 2 of section 10(2)(vi) and section 10(2)(via) provided o p /o p We answer the second question as amended by us in the affirmative and in favour of the assessee o p /o p As neither side has wholly succeeded in this reference each party will bear its costs o p /o p Reference answered accordingly o p /o p
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1959 (11) TMI 56 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... which pardon was tendered. These three cases really turn on the question whether the accused had complied with the conditions upon which the pardon was tendered to him and it was held that be had so complied. In those circumstances, the trial under s. 339 was held to be bad. We are not concerned in the present case with s. 339. What we have to decide is whether a pardon under S. 337(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure can be granted in the case of an offence under s. 5 of the Official Secrets Act read with s. 120-B of the Indian Penal Code. To that there can be only one answer on the terms of s. 337(1), namely, that no pardon can be granted for an offence of this nature. Therefore, as the present proceedings before the magistrate are only for an offence under s. 5 of the Official Secrets Act read with s. 120-B of the Indian Penal Code, Mehra cannot be examined as an approver in that court. There is no force in these appeals and they are hereby dismissed. Appeals dismissed.
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1959 (11) TMI 55 - HOUSE OF LORDS
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... ... ..... o close scrutiny, it was found to be studded with ambiguities and defaced by exceptions. It would, if accepted, put a greater burden on the taxpayer than ever the statute warrants, and it would introduce more confusion into a subject where enough already exists. I would ask your Lordships, therefore, to put on one side the proposition submitted by the Crown and to go back to the words of the statute. I do not find much help in any of the previous decisions; and the speeches in them cannot rule the day. They show the way in which judges look at cases, and in that sense are useful and suggestive, but in the last resort each case must be brought back to the test of the statutory words. So tested the question simply is Was this ? 350 received by Mr. Mayes a "profit" from his employment? I think not, for the simple reason that it was not a remuneration or reward or return for his services in any sense of the word. I would therefore dismiss this appeal. Appeal dismissed.
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1959 (11) TMI 54 - SUPREME COURT
Validity of the award made by the arbitrators to whom the matters in dispute between the parties were referred pending the present- litigation questioned
Held that:- High Court was right in answering the question against the appellants. Therefore the award is not open to the attack that it deals with immoveable properties out of the jurisdiction of the court.
The award is not and does not purport to be a final decree in the proceedings and the proceedings before the arbitrators substantially correspond to the proceedings of the enquiry which the Commissioner would have held even under the order of the High Court. Therefore this, contention must also fail.
The fact that a preliminary decree had been drawn up in the present case and it was based upon a judgment delivered by the court cannot exclude the application of s. 21. The judgment which had been delivered by the court not a final judgment contemplated by s. 21. The trial court would, therefore, have jurisdiction to make the order of reference. In the present case proceedings subsequent to the preliminary decree were pending before the trial court and so we must hold that the trial court was competent to act under s. 21. On that view the objection against the validity of the reference based on the provisions of s. 21 cannot succeed Appeal dismissed.
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1959 (11) TMI 53 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... and the movement of the goods thereafter would largely depend upon certain circumstances and conditions which in no way form part of the sale transaction and with which the seller is in no way connected. In these circumstances the plea taken under Article 286(2) which fetters the legislative powers of the State to tax the sale in the course of interState trade and commerce is wholly devoid of force. That apart, even if it be assumed that the sale was in the course of inter-State trade, the transactions for the questioned period were protected by the President s Sales Tax Laws Validation Act (VII of 1956) which Act was brought into question in Sundararamier and Co. v. State of Andhra Pradesh 1958 9 S.T.C. 298 1958 S.C.J. 459. and was found to be quite valid and intra vires the powers of the Parliament. No further question now remains to be determined. Both the petitions would fail. They are, therefore, dismissed with costs. Advocate s fee Rs. 250 in each. Petitions dismissed.
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1959 (11) TMI 52 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ate of the final assessment. We therefore agree with the court below that the suits were filed in time and that they were not barred by limitation. The last question that remains for decision is whether the suits were barred under section 18-A of the Act. We are clearly of the opinion that section 18-A does not apply inasmuch as the suits are not to set aside or modify the assessment as contemplated by the section. What the plaintiff in each of the suits contends is that the Deputy Commercial Tax Officer had no jurisdiction to collect the assessment having regard to the clear terms of Article 286(1)(a) of the Constitution. That such suits are cognizable by civil courts is clearly laid down by the Privy Council in Secretary of State for India v. Mask and Co. 1940 2 M.L.J. 140 I.L.R. 1940 Mad. 599 L.R. 67 I.A. 222 (P.C.). We, therefore, overrule the contention that the suits were not maintainable. In the result, the appeals fail and are dismissed with costs. Appeals dismissed.
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1959 (11) TMI 51 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... not in any way concerned with the export of goods though the purpose of purchasing so far as the assessee was concerned may be for export. The export of goods was not occasioned under the contract of sale. It is subsequent to the sale and the assessee on his own account sent the goods. The seller had nothing to do with the export nor was he interested in seeing that the movement of goods took place. The movement is regulated as per the terms agreed upon between the assessee and his principal with which the seller is not at all concerned. Thus having regard to the fact that the transactions were in substance intra-State sales and the movement of goods was not a direct result of the sale transaction, the sale is not a sale in the course of inter-State trade within the meaning of Article 286(2). On this basis the plea of the petitioner is without substance. The result is that this petition fails and it is hereby dismissed with costs. Advocate s fee Rs. 200. Petition dismissed.
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1959 (11) TMI 50 - MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... s ability to recover the tax from the customer or his willingness to do so. 7.. In this view of the matter, it is not necessary to consider whether the time taken by the opponent in registering the petitioner as a dealer under the Act was due to the petitioner s own default or was due to the inaction of the opponent. It must be noted that the cement which the petitioner sold was a controlled commodity subject to price control. Under the law of price control governing it, the amount of the sales tax could not be recovered by the petitioner from the purchaser. The question, therefore, of the petitioner sustaining any loss on account of the delay in his registration under the Act and his consequential disability to recover the amount of the sales tax from the purchaser does not arise. 8.. In consequence, this petition is dismissed with costs. Counsel s fee is fixed at Rs. 75. The outstanding amount of the security deposit shall be refunded to the petitioner. Petition dismissed.
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