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Case Laws
Showing 141 to 160 of 455 Records
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1959 (9) TMI 66 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... that the duty of the publisher is merely to give his name and place of publication for being, printed cannot prevail. It is also his duty to see that the book or paper complies with Section 3 and to refrain from publishing it if the requirements are not satisfied. 10. In the result, the appeal is allowed as regards the 1st respondent and dismissed as regards respondents 2 and 3. The 1st respondent is found guilty and convicted under Section 12 of the Act. With regard to punishment, it is conceded that the offence is a technical one. It is not as if the 1st respondent wanted to make a secret of his connection with Ex. P-1 and of his responsibility for publishing it. Sri V. V. Siva Rao states, without contradiction, that the 1st respondent is a political worker with no means. In the circumstances, I sentence him to pay a fine of ₹ 10/- (Rupees ten only) and in default to undergo simple imprisonment for two weeks. Three weeks' time is granted for payment of the fine.
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1959 (9) TMI 65 - PUNJAB HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... d but was not pursued. It has been held repeatedly that a question which has not been raised before the Tribunal cannot be raised before this Court. In Mash Trading Co. v. Commissioner of Income-tax 1956 30 I.T.R. 388., a Full Bench of this court held that if a question of law has not been raised or considered by the Appellate Tribunal, that question cannot be held to arise out of the order of the Tribunal within the meaning of section 66(1) of the Indian Income-tax Act and the question cannot therefore be referred to the High Court under section 66 of the Act. There can be little doubt that the debts which were due to the assessee were debts of the trade the profits of which are not being computed. For these reasons I am of the opinion that no question of law arise in this case or even if on arises it was not raised before the Appellate Tribunal and cannot now be agitated before us. The petition must be dismissed with costs which I assess at ₹ 150. Petition dismissed.
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1959 (9) TMI 64 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... fts made by a person in the course of a year for the purpose of assessment and more they are bound to do it, as otherwise they would be violating the mandatory provisions of the Act. This point also fails and is negatived. In W.P. No. 458 of 1959, it is argued that neither of the two gifts is subject to gift tax for the reason that one is not a transfer but only a partition of the family properties and the other does not exceed the limited imposed by section 5(2), being a gift in favour of the wife of the petitioner. If so, it is open to the petitioner to raise this point before the authorities concerned. In W.P. No. 459 of 1959, the complaint is that the authorities concerned have arbitrarily fixed the value of the gift. This is also a matter to be considered by the Department. Any question, which is foreign to this enquiry, can be gone into by the Revenue. In the result, all the petitions are dismissed with costs. Advocate's fee ₹ 75 in each. Petitions dismissed.
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1959 (9) TMI 63 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ional case, to which we have referred, applied. We are accordingly of the view that the appellants having proved their case of benami acquisition of these properties - a case which is not now questioned - the fact that the signatures of Prahlad Rai and others on some relative documents were not their own, cannot disentitle the plaintiffs-appellants to a decree. The exceptions to the rule contained in the maxim were not considered by the High Court, which proceeded entirely upon the supposition that every illegality or fraud disentitled a plaintiff to a judgment. That, however, is not the law. We accordingly hold that the appellants were entitled to a decree in their favour, and with respect, it was wrongly disallowed by the High Court. 26. We set aside the judgment and decree of the High Court of Patna, and restore those of the Subordinate Judge, Motihari. In the circumstances of this case, we think that we should make no order about costs of this appeal. 27. Appeal allowed.
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1959 (9) TMI 62 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... her lenient. Subsequently, the legislature thought that the possession of a wireless transmitter was a graver offence; sometimes involving the security of the State, and so an amendment was introduced in 1949 constituting the possession of such apparatus a graver offence and imposing a more severe punishment. Therefore, it cannot be said that s. 6(1-A), inserted in the Act XVII of 1933 by the amending Act of 1949, is either covered by the provisions of the Indian Telegraph Act, 1885, or a surplusage not serving any definite purpose. Even from the history of the legislation we find it not possible to say that it disclosed an intention different from that envisaged in s. 6-A of the General Clauses Act. For the aforesaid reasons, we hold that s. 6 (1 -A) of the Act continued to be on the statute book even after the amending Act of 1949 was repealed by Act XLVIII of 1952, and that it was in force when the offence was committed by the appellant. The appeal fails and is dismissed.
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1959 (9) TMI 61 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... have now fixed, from the date of the plaint the interest would be six per cent. 9. We may mention that though we have been taken through the evidence bearing on the subject we have purposely refrained from making any reference to an alleged agreement between Dr. Gopala Menon and the plaintiff relating to the discharge of the four mortgages because that agreement was not acted upon, nor was it pressed on us by either side. Such an agreement cannot assist us in any manner to decide whether the rate of interest provided in the mortgages was excessive at the time when the mortgages were executed. 10. Though the point appears to have been raised before Ramaswami J. that the provisions of the Usurious Loans Act cannot be availed of by a transferee of the equity of redemption, before us this point, was not pressed and rightly by the learned counsel for the plaintiff-respondent. In the appeal there will be no order as to costs. Time for redemption six months. 11. Order accordingly.
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1959 (9) TMI 60 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... by one of the plaintiffs, which is quite sufficient in view of the decision of their Lordships ot the Privy Council in ILR 17 Cal 580. In regard to presentation Of the plaint, as already observed, the plaint need not be presented by plaintiff or sny person authorized by him. Presentation of the plaint by the pleader of one of the plaintiffs is quite proper. As regards verification ot the plaint, unfortunatrly, even today the plaint is not properly verified by one of the plaintiffs or by any person acquainted with the facts of the case. But this however is a matter of mere irregularity in regard to procedure and does r.ob make the suit filed on 18-2-49 detective. The lower Court was therefore wrong in holding that the suit must be deemed to have been instituted only on 24-4-51 and that it was therefore barred by limitation. I thereiore agree with my learned Brother's view that the suit is within time notwithstanding the irregularities in the plaint. 32. Appeal dismissed.
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1959 (9) TMI 59 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... payment to any shareholder of any paid up capital. The reasons which prompted the legislature to provide this was thus explained by Jessel M. R. In. re Ebbw Vale Street, Iron and Coal Co. (1877) 4 Ch. D. 827.at p. 832, Now what is the meaning of that? It means; that the company is give notice to the world that it is a company which previously offered to the public the security of a larger amount of nominal capital, that is, of a larger capital, that is. of a larger amount of liability on the part of the shareholders, than it offers now. The use of the words ''and reduced" is really intended to serve as a warning to the public that the capital of the company has been reduced. In re Pinkney and Sons Steamship Co., 1892-3 Ch. 125. But instead of one month, I direct that the words "and reduced" be added for a period of six months from this date. 18. This petition is allowed and the petitioner company will take the costs of this application from its funds.
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1959 (9) TMI 58 - HIGH COURT OF MADRAS
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... ... ..... the body was placed, the seizure of blood -stained earth from another spot pointed out by the accused, the medical evidence itself, all amply and materially corroborate his retracted confession. His guilt was established overwhelmingly, and beyond any reasonable doubt. ( 12. ) We would therefore confirm the convictions, both upon the charge of murder and the charge of causing disappearance of evidence of the crime. The sentence of death imposed with reference to the charge of murder is the only one that could be fitly imposed, in the circumstances of the case. The accused seems to have planned the offence, and there is absolutely nothing to suggest that he acted suddenly, in the heat of passion or anger, or even that some kind of altercation preceded the murder, The accused had no rights over the woman, and there is, again, nothing to Indicate that any particular conduct on her part was an immediate provocation. We therefore confirm the sentence also, and dismiss the appeal.
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1959 (9) TMI 57 - HIGH COURT OF KERALA
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... ... ..... with wages but there is no provision either in Section 79 or any other section of the Factories Act which operates as a bar to the grant of leave with wages for workers in seasonal industries which from their nature cannot be carried on for 240 days in an year. It cannot therefore be held that the Tribunal had no jurisdiction to grant leave with wages irrespective of the total number of working days in a calendar year. The finding on issue (4) does not therefore require modification. 14. It follows from the conclusions reached above that the award requires modification in respect of the following matters. (1) The workers will get one holiday with wages for Onam and not two; (2) The finding on issue (3) regarding compensation for period during which the factories remain closed is quashed; and I order accordingly. The original petitions are allowed to the extent indicated above and are dismissed in other respects. In the circumstances, I direct the parties to bear their costs.
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1959 (9) TMI 56 - KARNATAKA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... e petitioners, was that the learned Sessions Judge was not justified in ton-firming the composite sentence awarded by the learned trial judge in spite of the fact that he acquitted the petitioners of the offence under Section 167(81) of the Sea Customs Act. According to the learned counsel for the petitioners the sentences awarded to the petitioners should have been proportionately reduced. There is no substance in this contention. It cannot reasonably be urged that the sentences awarded to the petitioners are in any way severe. I am of the opinion that the sentences awarded to any of the petitioners do not call for any interference. 11. In the result, therefore, this revision petition fails and the same is dismissed. The first petitioner is on bail and should surrender to his bail and undergo the imprisonment and also pay the fine. The sentences of fine awarded to the other petitioners shall be enforced if they have not already paid the fine amounts. 12. Revision dismissed.
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1959 (9) TMI 55 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... We understand that the defendant No. 1 has now resigned from the managing committee. and, therefore, no further question as to his right to continue to manage the trust remains to be considered. We set aside the decree in so far as it determines the amount due to the temple and confirm the rest of the decree. The matter is referred to he triawl Court for reassessment of the amount due to the temple having due regard to the observations made by us in our judgment. (16) In view of the fact tha we are remitting the case to the trial Court we direct that so far as the order for costs made by the learned Trial Judge is concerned it will be confirmed but so far as the costs of this court are concerned the respondent will bear his own costs. The costs of the appellants and the Charity Commissioner will come out of the estate. (17) Cross-obections are dismissed with costs. The costs of cross-objections will be credited to the trust for the purpose of the appeal. (18) Case remanded.
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1959 (9) TMI 54 - PATNA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... the matter, and no question of law arises. Indeed, the question as framed shows that the assessee's contention is that there is no foundation for the action taken. The appropriate authorities have found the stock books to be defective, and we cannot say that that matter was not within their special and exclusive powers, in view of the provisions of the Act." Applying the principle of these authorities to the present case we hold that the question of application of the proviso to section 13 of the Income-tax Act has not passed from the region of fact to the region of law because there was sufficient material upon which the income-tax authorities could reject the account books of the assessee and apply the proviso to section 13 of the Income-tax Act. We accordingly answer the question of law referred to the High Court by the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal in favour of the Income-tax Department and against the assessee. The assessee must pay the costs of this reference.
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1959 (9) TMI 53 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... o further litigation, which is not in the interests of the deity. Respondents 6 and 7 raised before us the question of costs. They stated that the trial Judge had given two sets of costs, which was changed to one set by the High Court. These respondents should have cross-objected on this point against the judgment of the High Court, and in the absence of any such cross-objection, no relief can be granted to them. For the same reason, no relief can be given to respondent 7, in respect of whom the finding that he bad no right of performing the seva and getting emoluments attached to that right, as respondents 1 to 4, has not been vacated, as was done in the case of respondent 6. In view of our observations that these matters were alien to the suit which had been filed, we do not propose to deal with them. In the result, the appeal is dismissed. The appellant will personally pay the costs of Respondent 1. The other set of respondents will bear their own costs. Appeal dismissed.
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1959 (9) TMI 52 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... if it can be established, it has to be established by lengthy and complicated arguments. We do not think such an error can be cured by a writ of certiorari according to the rule governing the powers of the superior court to issue such a writ. In our opinion the High Court was wrong in thinking that the alleged error in the judgment of the Bombay Revenue Tribunal, viz., that an order for possession should not be made unless a previous notice had been given was an error apparent on the face of the record so as to be capable of being corrected by a writ of certiorari. 19. For the reasons stated above the judgment and order of the High Court cannot be sustained. We, therefore, allow the appeal and set aside the order of the High Court issuing a writ of certiorari, quashing the order of the Tribunal and restoring the order of the Mamlatdar, and we restore the order of the Bombay Revenue Tribunal. 20. The appellant will get his costs here and in the High Court. 21. Appeal allowed.
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1959 (9) TMI 51 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... by the authority that the appellants have failed to establish sufficient cause for their inaction between May 2, 1952, and the respective dates on which they filed their present applications is fatal to their claim. That is why we think it unnecessary to consider the larger question of law which Mr. Phadke sought to raise before us. 20. We would like to add that the learned Attorney-General had raised a preliminary objection against the validity of the certificate granted by the High Court in the present appeals. He wanted to urge that the High Court was in error in considering the total value of the consolidated appeals for the purpose of granting certificate under Art. 133. We have, however, not thought it necessary to consider this argument. 21. The result is the appeals fail and are dismissed. The respondent has fairly not pressed for his costs, and so we direct that the parties should bear their own costs in this Court. No order as to Court fees. 22. Appeals dismissed.
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1959 (9) TMI 50 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... behind the decree & give the relief to the appellant which was expressly denied to him in the suit. The question so posed can only have one answer. It is a well-settled principle that a Court executing a decree cannot go behind the decree it must take the decree as it stands, for the decree is binding and conclusive between the parties to the suit. If the contention of the appellant were to be accepted, it would contravene the said principle; for, while the decree as construed by us, has directed that it should not be executed against the personal properties of the partners, the executing Court would be directing execution against the said partners. While the decree excluded persona liability, the executing Court would be imposing the same. This cannot obviously be done. 6. The conclusion arrived at by the learned Judges of the High Court is correct. The appeal fails and is dismissed with costs. The appellant is directed to pay the court, fee payable by him to the State.
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1959 (9) TMI 49 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... mplete the ingredients of the offence, with which the appellant was charged. 14. We differ, therefore, from the appraisal of this evidence by the High Court, and we think that the documents were wrongly regarded by the High Court as confessions, pure and simple, and that it was in error in holding that the guilt of the appellant was brought home to him. No doubt, the sufficiency of evidence is a matter ordinarily for the High Court. Where, however, the High Court, as on the facts of this case, has construed the two documents as amounting to confessions of guilt, which they cannot reasonably be construed to be and there is no other evidence, this Court is entitled to interfere, even though this is an appeal from concurrent judgments of the two Courts below. We are, therefore, of opinion that the conviction in the present case on its facts, cannot be sustained. 15. We accordingly allow the appeal. The conviction and sentence of the appellant are set aside, and he is acquitted.
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1959 (9) TMI 48 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... 28 of the Patna High Court Rules. Under the said Rules the application should have been filed immediately after the judgment was delivered. In the affidavit filed in support of that application the only reason given for not doing so was that the appellant did not give the necessary instructions. The learned Judge of the High Court rightly did not accept that reason as a sufficient ground for permitting the application to be filed at a later stage. In the application for special leave filed in this Court, though it was stated that the application filed in the High Court for certificate was rejected, the reason for the rejection was not disclosed. Further, the State, presumably, filed this appeal to get the legal position clarified. We also believe that public interest does not require that the stale matter should be resuscitated. In the circumstances, we would be justified not to exercise our discretionary jurisdiction, and we accordingly dismiss the appeal. Appeal dismissed.
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1959 (9) TMI 47 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... at the University was not a State or local or other authority. In the course of the judgment a distinction was drawn between 'state maintained' institutions, to which the provisions of Part III of the Constitution would apply, and to 'state aided' institutions, to which the said articles would not apply. I do not think that this decision has any direct bearing on the facts of this case for two reasons r firstly, the respondent-company is not a state-maintained institution, and secondly, no question of infringement of fundamental rights arises in this case. 13. In the view I have taken that a writ of certiorari cannot be directed against the respondent-company, it is not necessary for me to consider whether, the order that is sought to be quashed to this petition, is in violation of Sub-rule 1 of Rule 24 of the Officers' Service Rules, or whether such a violation could give the petitioner any cause of action at law. 14. The petition fails and is dismissed.
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