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Case Laws
Showing 381 to 400 of 454 Records
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1959 (3) TMI 61 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ffirmative. Being a 'proprietary right', it vests in the State under Sections 3 and 4 of the Act. The decision in Chhotabhai's case 1953 4SCR476 treated these rights as bare licenses, and it was apparently given per incuriam, and cannot therefore be followed. 37. Even assuming that the documents in question do not amount to grant of any proprietary right by the proprietors to the petitioners, the latter can have only the benefit of their respective contracts or licenses. In either case, the State has not, by the Act, acquired or taken possession of such contracts or licences and consequently, there has been no infringement of the petitioners' fundamental right which alone can support a petition under Art. 32 of the Constitution. 38. The result is that these petitions fail, and are dismissed, but in view of the fact that they were filed because of the decision in Chhotabhai's case 1953 4SCR476 , there shall be no order about costs. 39. Petitions dismissed.
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1959 (3) TMI 60 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... on of the order under section 25A is concerned, he being aggrieved by that order, in the sense that he is deemed to be a member of the Hindu undivided family when he is contending that he is separated member, he has a right to appeal. In the result, our answer to the first two questions is in the affirmative, namely, that the proceedings under section 33B, in so far as they relate to the orders under section 25A of the Act canceling the orders passed by the Income Tax Officer dated March 22, 1952, March 31, 1952, June 12, 1953 and March 31, 1952, are bad in law. Our answer to the fourth question is that T. G. Sulakhe has a right to file an appeal and it is not necessary that he should file it in the capacity as a Kartha of the family. In the view we have taken the four miscellaneous reference applications do not arise and are, therefore, dismissed. Let the reference be answered accordingly with costs to the assessee. Advocates fee ₹ 250. Reference answered accordingly.
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1959 (3) TMI 59 - ORISSA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ttack Municipality, or as the Chairman or Vice-Chairman of the said Municipality, as the case may be, on the strength of the Ordinance. Opposite Party No. 1 is also permanently restrained by Mandamus from enforcing the aforesaid two provisions of the Ordinance. The petitioner will be entitled to the costs of this application. Hearing fee is assessed at ₹ 200/- (Rupees two hundred) to be apportioned equally between the State of Orissa on the one hand and the contesting Municipal Councillors on the other. 32. Before concluding this judgment I wish to mention that though under the Orissa High Court Rules a Division Bench has jurisdiction to hear this case, a Special Bench consisting of the Chief Justice Hon. Rao, J. and Hon. Das, J. heard the case in the earlier stages, but for the reasons mentioned in our order dated the 16th March, 1959, the hearing of the petition was continued by a Division Bench and judgment is being pronounced by the same Bench. Das, J. 33. I agree.
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1959 (3) TMI 58 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... llant in the High Court stated that his client intended to raise one question only, namely, whether the partnership formed for the purpose of carrying on a business in differences was illegal within the meaning of s. 23 of the Contract Act. Further this plea was not specifically disclosed in the statement of case filed by the appellant in this Court. If this contention had been raised at the earliest point of time, it would have been open to the respondents to ask for a suitable amendment of the plaint to sustain their claim. In the circumstances, we do not think that we could with justification allow the appellant to raise this new plea for the first time before us, as it would cause irreparable prejudice to the respondents. We express no opinion on this point. For the foregoing reasons we must hold that the suit partnership was not unlawful within the meaning of s. 23 of the Indian Contract Act. In the result, the appeal fails and is dismissed with costs. Appeal dismissed.
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1959 (3) TMI 57 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... sistant Commissioner of Income-tax or the income-tax Appellate Tribunal or from this court. It appears to us that, in such a case, it is appropriate for us to exercise our powers under article 266 of the constitution so as to relieve him of unnecessary hardship and harassment, so that we consider that, on the view taken by us above, the petitioner should be granted the relief which he has prayed for. As a result, we allow this petition and quash the notice dated 4th January, 1956, issued against the petitioner under section 34(1)(a) of the Income-tax Act. Since we are quashing the notice which automatically has the result that the Income-tax Officer cannot now exercise the jurisdiction which we have found he did not possess, we do think that there is any need for issuing a writ of prohibition. The petitioner will be entitled to his cost from the opposite party which we fix at ₹ 400. The same amount is assessed as the amount of fee for learned counsel. Petition allowed.
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1959 (3) TMI 56 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ights so that in those cases the petitions were clearly their civil rights. It is true that the question of enforcement of civil rights arose during the proceedings for recovery of taxes, the liability to which had been imposed by the assessment proceedings, but it is also clear that the petitions were confined to the enforcement of civil rights relating to the properties and were not taken for the purpose of questioning the assessment proceedings or orders so that no occasion arose for deciding whether proceedings for assessment were civil proceedings. The point arose directly only before the Patna High Court in the case cited above and that court gave a decision, as we have said earlier, which is in line with the view we are taking in the present case. In these circumstances this application for a certificate is not maintainable under article 133 of the Constitution also. The application is, therefore, dismissed with costs which is fixed at ₹ 200. Petition dismissed.
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1959 (3) TMI 55 - KERALA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ot a question of suspicion or conjecture. He can only act on the evidence which is tendered before him, and where the evidence tendered is worthless or not tendered he would be justified in taking the evidence of the books showing the cash deposits as conclusive of the fact that some income was made and related to an undisclosed source. In this case the Income-tax Officer was willing to find in respect the credits and bank deposits, that "it was clear that the assessee had money dealings over and above what is reflected in his books of accounts" and he proposed to treat them as secret profits for purpose of income-tax. This finding has been confirmed by the Appellate Tribunal. If so no question of double taxation can arise. We hold accordingly that the assessee fails in the reference. We, therefore, answer the question referred in the affirmative. The assessee will pay the costs of the Department. Counsel's fee ₹ 150. Question answered in the affirmative.
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1959 (3) TMI 54 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... t; A similar view was taken by a Special Bench of the Madras High Court in Arunachalam v. Commissioner of Income-tax 1931 6 I.T.C. 58. Of course, both these cases deal with revised returns filed under section 22(3). But they are authority for the proposition that when the assessee files a subsequent return (and in our view it makes no difference whether it is a revised return or a return filed in compliance with a notice under section 34) he cannot be said to have discovered his mistake on the day on which he files a correct return, because at the time when he made his previous return he knew it was incorrect and he could not at any subsequent time have discovered something which he knew at an earlier time. In our view, therefore, the notice for the levy of penalty and the imposition thereof by the Income-tax Officer were justified. The reference is answered in the affirmative with costs to the Department. Advocate's fee ₹ 250. Question answered in the affirmative.
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1959 (3) TMI 53 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... 1939 I.L.R. 19 Pat. 208 as well as that of the Full Bench of the Punjab High Court in Khair Mohammad Khan v. Mst. Jannat support the respondents' contention that where the s, impugned act amounts to ouster there is no scope for the application of s. 23 of the Limitation Act. We are, therefore, satisfied that there is no substance in the appellants' contention that s. 23 helps to save limitation for their suits. The result no doubt is unfortunate. The appellants have succeeded in both the courts below in proving their rights as hereditary worshippers; but their claim must be rejected on the ground that they have filed their suits beyond time. In this court an attempt was made by the parties to see if this long drawn out litigation could be brought to an end on reasonable terms agreed to by them, but it did not succeed. In the result the appeals fail and are dismissed. We would, however, direct that the parties should bear their own costs throughout. Appeals dismissed.
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1959 (3) TMI 52 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... 1958 9 S.T.C. 654 1958 N.L.J. 658. The point that arises in the two appeals before us has been authoritatively decided by the Full Bench in the case above-mentioned. The Full Bench took the view that assessment under sub-section (1) of section 11 of the Sales Tax Act could be made more than three years after the expiry of such period but notice could not be issued under section 11(2) more than three years after the expiry of the period for which it was proposed to make the assessment. In view of this decision, it is fairly conceded by the Assistant Special Government Pleader that the two appeals must fail. Accordingly, following the above-mentioned decision of the Full Bench, we dismiss both the appeals with costs. Appeals dismissed.
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1959 (3) TMI 51 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ave been really another notification the number of which was 213/XXXIX-B(d) 2-17-49 dated 2nd April, 1949, by which in effect the mills were entitled to make certain profits of the depots also. That notification was issued specially in order to help the uneconomic mills. While fixing the ex-mill sale price the profits derived from the depots under this notification were not taken into consideration, but since it was not possible for the company to sell at the fixed ex-mill prices, therefore, they were given certain special benefits. We do not think that that notification in any way affects the case. Thus we think that the tax should have been charged only on Rs. 45,16,161-15-3 and not on Rs. 46,54,333-12-6. We accordingly allow this reference and direct the Sales Tax Officer to assess accordingly. The applicant is entitled to its costs of this reference which we assess at Rs. 100. The excess tax, if any, paid by the assessee shall be refunded. Reference answered accordingly.
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1959 (3) TMI 50 - ORISSA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... raw materials and paid the labour charges. The petitioners are the first owners of the goods. 8.. I would, therefore, take the view that the expression manufacturer occurring in the aforesaid exemption clause means the first owner of the finished product for whom it is made, either by his paid employees or even by independent artisans on receipt of raw materials and labour charges from him. On the findings of the Sales Tax Officer the petitioners must be held to be entitled to exemption from sales tax because it is admitted that while selling the finished goods to the consumers they used to charge separately for the value of the gold and for the cost of manufacture. 9.. The petitions are, therefore, allowed and the opposite party is directed to revise the assessment of sales tax on the basis of the aforesaid observations. The petitioners are entitled to their costs. There will be a consolidated hearing fee of Rs. 200 (Rupees two hundred). DAS, J.-I agree. Petitions allowed.
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1959 (3) TMI 49 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... order of the Commissioner there lay a further revision to the Board of Revenue. This remedy also was left alone. The petitioner must therefore be taken to have neglected to pursue his alternative legal remedies. For these reasons I find no ground for interfering in this case and this application must fail. Mr. Mukherjee has pointed out that under the Act even when a dealer has been convicted or has paid composition money under section 23 the Commissioner is bound to register a dealer and give him a certificate of registration. That may be so and if the petitioner again carries on business in fact at any address, he can apply again to be registered provided he is entitled to do so under section 7(1) of the Act read with section 4. The order of cancellation will not operate as a bar. That however has nothing to do with the subject-matter of this application. The rule is discharged. Interim orders, if any, are vacated. There will be no orders as to costs. Application dismissed.
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1959 (3) TMI 48 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... review should not be granted and by requiring the High Court to pass a particular order and no other indirectly curtails the power conferred by the Constitution and the State Legislature had no authority to do so. In the latter case the provisions of compulsory review on a ground not mentioned in section 104 or Order XLVII, Rule 1, of the Civil Procedure Code come into conflict with those provisions of law enacted by the Centre and must on that account be held to be void in view of Article 254 of the Constitution. From whatever angle the matter is looked at therefore we are of opinion that section 4 of the U. P. Sales Tax (Validation) Act, 1958, is, in its application to the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution, invalid. That being the only provision under which the present application for review has been filed the application cannot succeed. It is accordingly dismissed with costs which we assess at Rs. 200. Application dismissed.
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1959 (3) TMI 47 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... May, 1956, though on the 4th April, 1956, discussion did take place as regards the propriety of the rates of tax imposed by the notification on some of the commodities. The copies of the notifications were, in fact, placed on the table on 2nd April, 1956. Every Member had been supplied with. the copies on that date. Even if the notification be taken to have been placed on the table, when the formal motion was made on 9th May, 1956, the requirement of placing it on the table was fully complied with. We consequently hold that proper proceedings under sub-section (3) of section 3A of the Act were duly taken, and the objection of the petitioner on this score must be rejected. In view of the above decision, it is not necessary to consider whether such an objection could be raised on behalf of the petitioner, because of the provisions of Article 212 of the Constitution. The petition is dismissed with costs. We assess the counsel s fee for the State at Rs. 400. Petition dismissed.
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1959 (3) TMI 38 - HIGH COURT OF MADRAS
Registration of charges on properties acquired subject to charge ... ... ... ... ..... documents, there has been a transfer of the entirety of the assets and liabilities of Sayanas Ltd. to Kutty and Rao (Engineers) Ltd. The learned judge, therefore, held that the official liquidator would be entitled to collect all the moneys due and payable to Sayanas Ltd. It follows that on and from after the date of such transfer the appellant must be deemed to be a creditor of Kutty and Rao Ltd., and Kutty and Rao Ltd. is in liquidation. The appellant cannot, therefore, rely on his unregistered charge as against the other creditors of Kutty and Rao Ltd., who would include also the other creditors of Sayanas Ltd. This flows from the provisions of section 125(1) read without giving any extended definition to the word created . It follows that the claim of the appellant to be recognised as a secured creditor was rightly rejected by the official liquidator and by the learned judge. The appeal fails and is dismissed but, in the circumstances, there will be no order as to costs.
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1959 (3) TMI 31 - SUPREME COURT
Whether in the facts and circumstances of this case, the applicant (the assessee) was entitled to have this dividend income grossed up under section 16(2) and claim credit for tax deducted at source under section 18(5) of the Income-tax Act ?
Held that:- The words of section 18(5) must accordingly be read in the light in which the word "shareholder" has been used in the subsequent sections, and read in that manner, the present assessee, notwithstanding the equitable right to the dividend, was not entitled to be regarded as a "shareholder" for the purpose of section 18(5) of the Act. That benefit can only go to the person who, both in law and in equity, is to be regarded as the owner of the shares and between whom and the company exists the bond of membership and ownership of a share in the share capital of the company.
In view of this, we are satisfied that the answer given by the Calcutta High Court on the question posed by the Tribunal was correct.Appeal dismissed.
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1959 (3) TMI 30 - HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB
Shares – Power, to discount, Directors vacation of office by, Winding up - Liability as contributories of present and post members, Winding up – Fraudulent preference
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1959 (3) TMI 29 - HIGH COURT OF CALCUTTA
Charges – Rectification of register of ... ... ... ... ..... n who had acquired rights in respect of the property which form the subject-matter of the mortgage or charge and as the first respondent is not such a party the order passed by S.B. Sinha J. could not be revoked or recalled at his instance. I would accordingly allow this appeal and set aside the order passed by G.K. Mitter J. and direct that the application filed by the first respondent Abhoy Singh Sahela be dismissed with costs in this court as well as in the trial court. The liquidator of the appellant bank will be entitled to retain his own costs in the first instance out of the assets of the bank in his hands. The liquidator of the second respondent will also be entitled to retain his costs as between attorney and client out of the assets of the company in his hands but as between party and party both the respondents will be jointly and severally liable for costs of the appellant in this court as well as in the trial court. Certified for two counsel. Ray J. mdash I agree.
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1959 (3) TMI 9 - SUPREME COURT
Whether on the interpretation of the sale deed it can be said that any good-will was purchased by the assessee ?
Whether in view of the said proviso to section 10(5)(a) the Income-tax Officer on the facts and circumstances arising out of this case was competent to go behind the conveyance and fix a valuation of his own in the way he has done ?"
Held that:- Question No. 1 was not allowed by us to be argued because the matter was not taken in the statement of case on behalf of the appellant and the only question which survives for consideration is the second one, i.e., No. 7, and this question, as it is or with modifications, should have been referred to the High Court.
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We therefore direct that the question with the necessary modifications, if any, be referred and the case stated in accordance with section 66(1) of the Income-tax Act.
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