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Case Laws
Showing 421 to 440 of 455 Records
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1959 (2) TMI 29 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... agreement which is for the benefit of one of the parties and which he may waive. This is a provision in an Act of Parliament, which, though to some extent it may be for the benefit of the parties to the difference, must be regarded as inserted in the interest of the public also In that case there was a provision made by the Legislature that disputes mentioned in the section of the Act were to be determined by an Expert nominated by the Board of Trade and it was contended that though not in the strict technical sense estoppel, it was a waiver of the provisions introduced into the Statute for the benefit of private rights. No doubt that was a case which proceeded on a question of jurisdiction but the judgment proceeded on the principle of waiver of a statutory provision inserted in public interest. Thus the plea of waiver is unsustainable. In our opinion, therefore, the judgment of the High Court is sound and the appeal must therefore be dismissed with costs. Appeal dismissed.
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1959 (2) TMI 28 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... son and recovered the marked notes and other articles from him ; he searched the person of the informant and recovered the other notes marked but not given to the accused ; he took possession of the twenty wooden boxes intended to be booked and the forwarding note together with the record copy of the R/R; he got prepared relevant memoranda for the aforesaid recoveries and got them duly attested by witnesses; and thereafter on the basis of his investigation he sent a report to the Special Police Establishment Office, Indore. We do not know on the material placed before us what further things he did in the matter of investigation between the 14th and 21st when be obtained the permission of the District Magistrate. In the circumstances, we must hold, agreeing with the High Court that the investigation in this case was started by the Sub-Inspector on the 11th, i.e., ten days prior to his obtaining permission of the Magistrate. The appeal fails and is dismissed. Appeal dismissed.
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1959 (2) TMI 27 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... done so, merely confirmed the additions of the income-tax authorities, probably under the impression that the two items of yield of oil and cake from unaccounted kernel and the value of deficit yield of oil and cake from kernel disclosed in the books would amount to ₹ 1,37,189. We cannot, having regard to the categorical observations of the Tribunal that the additions should be unitary where the proviso to section 13 of the Act is applied by making an estimate, assume that the Tribunal intended to negative the statement by also adding cash credits in computing the gross profits. In the circumstances we have no hesitation in holding that the addition on the flat rate of 9.5% adopted by the Tribunal in estimating the gross profit is proper and that the amount of ₹ 1,37,189, was wrongly computed. Our answer to the reference is in the negative. The assessee will receive costs from the Department. Advocate's fee ₹ 250. Question answered in the negative.
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1959 (2) TMI 26 - ASSAM HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... pellate authority prescribed under the Assam Sales Tax Act, by implication repealed the provision in rule 74 of the relevant Rules to that extent. The question is not so much whether there was due legislative competence for the amendment of the Court-fees Act aforesaid, or for enactment of rule 74 of the Rules, as about the obvious conflict between the two provisions which admittedly relate to the self-same subject, namely, payment of fees for the above purpose. The two provisions, in my opinion, could not stand together and the later legislation under the Court-fees Act, which is an act of the Legislature itself and not merely that of a delegate, should prevail. But, I find that the Court-fees Act has since been again amended and the above provision has been deleted. It is, therefore, unnecessary to pursue the matter any further and, for purposes of this case, I would be content to give my assent to the answers proposed by my learned brother. Reference answered accordingly.
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1959 (2) TMI 25 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... the purpose of the Act and be detrimental to its object, namely, the collection of revenue. In such a case it is not for the Courts to lay down as to what procedure should be adopted for the better collection of the revenue, nor is it for the Courts to add to the Rules and Regulations, or to the wordings of a Statute or the Rules made under it, and in the particular case I find myself unable to do so. It cannot be an unreasonable restriction upon a fundamental right to provide that it should be exercised without negligence. The result is that although in this particular case it is quite possible that there may ensue a case of hardship, I am unable to direct the respondents to allow exemption under section 5 (2) (a) (ii) of the Act upon secondary evidence of the issue of declaration forms, which is in reality the relief claimed. The application, therefore, fails and must be dismissed. The rule is discharged, interim orders vacated no order as to costs. Application dismissed.
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1959 (2) TMI 24 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... e of the question, were sold by the assessee from their depot at Calcutta in the year 1948-49. These goods thus are of the class mentioned by the Supreme Court in their judgment cited above. They were manufactured by the assessee in U.P. and the question of taxing them has arisen on the basis that they were eventually sold by the assessee in the assessment year in question from their depot at Calcutta outside the State of U.P. In such a case the State of U.P. had power to tax the sale of goods to the extent of the nexus between the sale and the taxing State of U.P. in accordance with the principles laid down by the Supreme Court. Consequently, the second question must be answered in the affirmative. As a result, we answer the first question in the negative and the second question in the affirmative. The Department will be entitled to its costs from the assessee for this reference. We fix the fee of learned counsel for the Department at Rs. 200. Reference answered accordingly.
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1959 (2) TMI 23 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... an absence of jurisdiction the situation is materially altered. And, it would not make any difference whether the absence of jurisdiction arises out of an attempt to usurp jurisdiction, or because the officer has through ignorance or otherwise strayed beyond the limits of his jurisdiction. In relation to a tax, where an assessing officer acts outside the boundaries of his jurisdiction, his acts would to that extent be null and void. No one would have any power to call upon a citizen to make payment of a tax so imposed, and, if any authority seeks to collect a tax so imposed the citizen can call in aid Article 265, and seek the assistance of this Court. There was some argument as to the exact nature of the writ that may issue in a case of this kind. We are of opinion that a writ of mandamus should issue directing the respondents to forbear from collecting the amounts which form the subject-matter of these petitions. There will be no order as regards costs. Petitions allowed.
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1959 (2) TMI 22 - KERALA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ndia Act, 1935, and this again excluding the entries in List I relating to any tax or duty. Before us however learned counsel rested on the coming into force of the TravancoreCochin Sales Tax Act, 1125, on 30th May, 1950, after the date of the Constitution to argue that Article 54 of List II of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution applied and that brought in the principle of ultra vires. But this is nothing original for the argument was already addressed in Gannon Dunkerley and Co. Madras (Private) Ltd. v. Sales Tax Officer, Mattancheri 1957 8 S.T.C. 347 1957 Ker. L.T. 380., and then not by reference to the definition of law in force in Article 372 of the Constitution which gave importance to the passing or making of the Act rather than its operativeness either at all or in particular areas. There is therefore no substance in this point either. 6.. The result is that there is no merit in this appeal and it is dismissed with costs. Counsel s fee Rs. 200. Appeal dismissed.
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1959 (2) TMI 21 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... mounts collected were lawfully payable by way of tax to the State before they could be called upon to account for the collections. On the same reasoning, the sales tax collected by the respondent not being a lawful collection does not preclude the appellant from recovering the sales tax collected from him. In the result, the appeal is allowed in respect of the sales tax recovered on the turnover during the period 26th January, 1950, to 31st March, 1950, in regard to the transactions referred to supra. The amount will be determined by the Court below. The appeal is allowed as aforesaid and the suit is remanded to the Court below for fixing the amount of the sales tax which the appellant is entitled to refund. The appellant will also be entitled to interest at 6 per cent per annum from the date of the notice of demand, i.e., 28th September, 1952. As the appellant has, partly failed, the parties will receive and pay proportionate costs in both the Courts. Appeal partly allowed.
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1959 (2) TMI 20 - PATNA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... h a contrivance. It is obvious that in examining the question of liability of the petitioner to sales tax we must look at the substance of the transaction and not at the mere form in which the petitioner granted receipts or in which he kept his accounts. For the reasons already given, I hold that the amount of Rs. 41,736 which was paid as excise duty by the customers was part of the valuable consideration for the sale of the tobacco and so constituted part of the sale price within the meaning of section 2(h) of the Bihar Sales Tax Act. It follows, therefore, that the amount of Rs. 41,736 was rightly included in the taxable turnover of the petitioner and assessed to sales tax by the authorities constituted under the Bihar Sales Tax Act. In my opinion, the petitioner has not made out a case for grant of a writ under Article 226 of the Constitution. The application fails and is accordingly dismissed with costs. Hearing fee Rs. 200. CHOUDHARY, J.-I agree. Applications dismissed.
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1959 (2) TMI 19 - HIGH COURT OF CALCUTTA
Winding up – Liability as contributories of present and past members ... ... ... ... ..... spondence on the subject. It is necessary to emphasise that the transfer in this case was ante litam notam, long before liquidation and through accredited stock-brokers and must, therefore, be held as bona fide and genuine. Therefore, the laches were entirely on the part of the bank alone and not on the part of the transferor in this case. Applying the principles I have laid down these disputants must be relieved. For these reasons, I set aside the order settling the list of contributories made on the 7th September, 1955, and the order of the 5th June, 1956, making a call but only in respect of these disputants. I hold further that Mr. Chowdhury s clients are not liable as contributories and were not shareholders at the time when the bank went into liquidation, and due entirely to the banking company s default the share register was not rectified. Each party will bear his own costs and the liquidator will retain his costs out of the assets in his hands. Certified for counsel.
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1959 (2) TMI 12 - HIGH COURT OF CALCUTTA
Amalgamation ... ... ... ... ..... ricted interpretation of these words so as to exclude certain kinds of contractual rights and liabilities? In the general purpose of the section, nothing. On the contrary, if the power of the court did not extend to contractual rights and liabilities of all kinds, its order would be only partial in its operation and the necessary arrangements for transfer in such cases would have to be carried through by assignment, novation or other appropriate means. How in such a case the beneficent power of ordering dissolution of a transferor company without liquidation could conveniently be exercised it is difficult to see. It is unnecessary to consider the matter further, as, for the reasons, already mentioned, I do not think the decision of the House of Lords itself is an authority for the extreme proposition that unless the ordinary law makes a particular property transferable, the vesting order would not have the effect of transferring it. I agree with the order proposed by my Lord.
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1959 (2) TMI 1 - SUPREME COURT
Whether on the facts and in the circumstances of the case the loss of ₹ 27,709 arising in Cochin State could be set off against the profit of ₹ 38,998 arising in Travancore State ?
Held that:- The question referred to the High Court which is common to the two appeals was rightly answered in favour of the assessee. Appeal dismissed.
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1959 (1) TMI 38 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... here is in these, circumstances nothing to give special importance to the defence founded on time. 50. The appellant, we have found, is entitled to a decree directing the defendant to execute either a deed of release or a deed of conveyance. The appellant's learned Counsel requested during arguments that a decree directing the defendant to execute a deed of conveyance might be passed. We hold that a deed of conveyance is necessary in order to secure title to the plaintiff. 51. We allow the appeal and set aside the judgment and decree of the learned Subordinate Judge. There will be a decree directing the defendant to execute a proper deed of conveyance to the plaintiff of the defendant's undivided 1/6th share in the estate in accordance with the terms of Exhibit A-1. Time for execution, two months from this date. In default, a document will be executed by the Court on behalf of the defendant and will be duly registered. The appellant will have his costs in both Courts.
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1959 (1) TMI 37 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ation in effect by the fixation of prices in these three regions. The argument that there is discrimination is purely theoretical, in view of the economic factors which control the price of sugar in this country. Thus in fact there is no discrimination after the control of sugar prices in these three regions and the contention that the factories in the other areas are left free to sell at any price is specious and does not merit a moment's consideration. We are therefore of opinion that in effect the impugned notification brought about no discrimination between different regions or between producers and middleman in view of what we have said already in Re. 1(b), and consequently, it is not necessary to consider the last part of the submission under this head. There is in fact no discrimination by the impugned notification and this contention fails on that ground. 9. There is no force therefore in this petition and it is hereby dismissed with costs. 10. Petition dismissed.
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1959 (1) TMI 36 - HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH
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... ... ..... s income of both the Eluru and Narsapur branches could be computed at ₹ 1,20,000. As we have already stated, the average rate of ₹ 5,000 for each bus on the fleets operating from Narsapur and Eluru, when particularly the results from the books of Eluru have been admitted to be without defect, would amount to a capricious fixation without any basis. 5. In our view, the order of the Tribunal is not sustainable in law and our answer to the question is, therefore, in the negative. While thus answering the reference, we would like to point out that in disposing of the appeals, the order on the face of it should indicate the basis on which the taxable income of the assessee was computed, so that it is possible for the High Court in such reference to ascertain with certainty the correctness and soundness of the basis adopted by the Tribunal. 6. Let the reference be answered accordingly with costs of the assessee. Advocates fee ₹ 250. Reference answered accordingly.
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1959 (1) TMI 35 - PUNJAB AND HARYANA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... y further, 11. For the reasons given above, the appeal must be allowed and the case remanded back to the learned Senior Subordinate Judge for disposal according to law. In so far as the revision is Concerned, now that the case has been finally disposed of by Mr. K. Section Gambhir I do not think any useful purpose will be served by setting aside the order of the learned District Judge dated 26th of May 1952. 12. It appears to me that the plaintiff-appellant is not completely free from blame; even the revision filed by him against the order dated 26th of May 1952 was filed in this Court in October 1954; in fairness, therefore, he must be put to terms and he must pay to the respondent a sum of Rs, 100/- by way of costs before he can claim hearing of the appeal in the Court of the learned Senior Subordinate Judge. The cost should be deposited on or before the 9th of February 1959. Case, to come up on 9th of February 1959. (The rest of the judgment is not material for reporting),
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1959 (1) TMI 34 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... r purposes of levy of penalty the assessee had concealed his income or deliberately furnished inaccurate particulars of such income, is a question of fact to be determined in the circumstances of the case. There is sufficient material on record to show that the assessee has furnished inaccurate and false statements of accounts. The very fact that he has manipulated his accounts, so as to arrive at an income of ₹ 51,774 for both the branches, while in fact he had in his possession a balance-sheet of only one branch showing income of nearly ₹ 64,000, is itself sufficient to justify the income-tax authorities in levying the penalty. The Tribunal further took into account the excessive nature of the amount of penalty and reduced it to half. It is not open for us to interfere in the quantum of the levy. In the result, both the questions are answered in the affirmative. The assessee to pay the costs. Advocates' fee ₹ 250. Questions answered in the affirmative.
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1959 (1) TMI 33 - ORISSA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... g effect "The next point to be considered in the Income-tax Act is that the proceedings are of a most secret character . . . Now it does not follow that because an agent is duly authorised to conduct the business of the appeal before the Assistant Commissioner he is ipso facto authorised to obtain copies of the Assistant Commissioner's judgment or indeed to perform any act preparatory or incident to the conduct of an appeal." I am, therefore, of opinion that in the case before us there is no express authorisation to Mr. B.N. Mohanty to receive the order. Therefore, the date of receipt of the order by Mr. B.N. Mohanty cannot be taken as the starting point for limitation. In my opinion, therefore, the application filed by the assessee under section 66(1) of the Indian Income-tax Act should be treated as an application made within the time allowed under sub-section (1) and I direct the Tribunal accordingly. The application is allowed with costs. Barman, J.-I agree.
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1959 (1) TMI 32 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ettlor intended to convey all her estate to the settlee as persona designata and not by reason of his answering a particular description. 29. We may also point out that in fact this contention was not advanced in the Courts below- What was urged there was that the legatee i.e., Ramayamma, under the will of Sreeramulu, as his wife had obtained only a limited estate and that the adoption of the respondent had resulted in the divesting of the estate taken by her. In other words, the plea related to the character and the amplitude of the estate taken by the legatee under the will of Sreeramulu. That point was not raised before us and rightly, in our opinion, having regard to decided cases, namely, AIR 1937 PC 139 ILR 50 Mad 508, and Lakshmjnarasimham v. Rajeswari, . For these reasons, we negative this contention also. No other question was argued before us. 30. It follows that the decrees and judgments of the Courts below should be confirmed and the appeals dismissed with costs.
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