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Case Laws
Showing 401 to 420 of 455 Records
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1959 (3) TMI 9 - SUPREME COURT
Whether on the interpretation of the sale deed it can be said that any good-will was purchased by the assessee ?
Whether in view of the said proviso to section 10(5)(a) the Income-tax Officer on the facts and circumstances arising out of this case was competent to go behind the conveyance and fix a valuation of his own in the way he has done ?"
Held that:- Question No. 1 was not allowed by us to be argued because the matter was not taken in the statement of case on behalf of the appellant and the only question which survives for consideration is the second one, i.e., No. 7, and this question, as it is or with modifications, should have been referred to the High Court.
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We therefore direct that the question with the necessary modifications, if any, be referred and the case stated in accordance with section 66(1) of the Income-tax Act.
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1959 (3) TMI 8 - SUPREME COURT
Whether the computation of the loss by the assessee company at ₹ 35,801 is in accordance with law or whether the loss computed by the Income-tax Officer/Tribunal is in accordance with law ?
Held that:- The loss as calculated by the Tribunal is correct and according to law
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1959 (3) TMI 7 - SUPREME COURT
Whether the respondent's admitted income under certain heads is chargeable to income-tax under the provisions of section 10(6) of the Indian Income-tax Act (XI of 1922)?
Held that:- As to the nature of the service which the association performed in respect of the assistants, the payment of the fee was definitely related to that service. It is, therefore, plain that the case fell within section 10(6) of the Act. It must, therefore, be held that the question referred to the High Court should have been answered in the affirmative, and that the High Court was in error in giving its opinion to the contrary. Appeal allowed.
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1959 (3) TMI 5 - SUPREME COURT
Whether the sum of ₹ 2,19,343 received by the assessee in the year of account relevant for the assessment year 1951-52 was a revenue receipt or a capital receipt?
Held that:- The Appellate Assistant Commissioner as well as the High Court were thus justified in the conclusion to which they came, viz., that the sum of ₹ 2,19,343 received by the assessee from the company, was a capital receipt. Appeal dismissed.
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1959 (3) TMI 4 - SUPREME COURT
Whether on the above facts and circumstances of this case the Tribunal was right in holding that the sum of ₹ 2,31,009 was income of the assessee during the assessment year under consideration and was liable to be assessed under the Indian Income-tax Act ?
Held that:- The amount received as repayment of excess profits tax must be deemed to be " income " for the purposes of the Indian Income-tax Act and for assessment it must be treated as income of the previous year. The answer to question given by the Calcutta High Court was thus correct. Appeal dismissed.
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1959 (3) TMI 3 - SUPREME COURT
Whether the Income-tax Officer, Calcutta, could make the assessment in the appellant's case?
Held that:- In the view of the matter the question as to the place of assessment does not arise out of the order of the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal and, therefore, no question of law could be referred nor could the High Court make such order under section 66(2). In our opinion, the High Court rightly dismissed the appellant's application for directing the case to be stated under section 66(2) of the Act. Appeal dismissed.
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1959 (3) TMI 2 - SUPREME COURT
Whether the circumstances reasonably supported the Income-tax Officer's presumption that the appellant had converted his secret profits into jewellery, gold and sovereigns, with a view to camouflage his transactions and brought such profits in his accounts by re-sale of such jewellery etc., and remittances through bank drafts?
Whether in the circumstances of the case, Yamnabai could have in her possession jewellery, etc., to the tune of ₹ 1,60,000.
Held that:- The whole of the inference drawn by the Appellate Tribunal in this behalf was allegedly based on no material whatever and was submitted to be at best a suspicion or a conjecture which warped the reasoning of the Appellate Tribunal.
The Income-tax Appellate Tribunal is a fact finding Tribunal and if it arrives at its own conclusions of fact after due consideration of the evidence before it this court will not interfere. The conclusions reached by the Tribunal should not be coloured by any irrelevant considerations or matters of prejudice and if there are any circumstances which required to be explained by the assessee, the assessee should be given an opportunity of doing so. On no account whatever should the Tribunal base its findings on suspicions, conjectures or surmises nor should it act on no evidence at all or on improper rejection of material and relevant evidence or partly on evidence and partly on suspicions, conjectures or surmises and if it does anything of the sort, its findings, even though on questions of fact, will be liable to be set aside by this court.
Set aside the order of the Appellate Tribunal and remand the matter back to the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal, Madras "A" Bench, to reconsider the same in accordance with law, in the light of the observations made above. Appeal allowed. Case remanded.
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1959 (3) TMI 1 - HIGH COURT AT CALCUTTA
Inspection of seized documents - Natural Justice ... ... ... ... ..... the parties by the Authorities concerned, fixing the date for hearing, and the matter will be decided after hearing them. The Rules are made absolute to this extent. 5.Mr. Ginwalla on behalf of the petitioners had gone into the merits of the application that is to say, he was trying to establish that there are errors apparent on the face of the orders. In view of the fact that the respondents are willing to have the orders set aside on the ground of violation of the rules of natural justice, I do not think it is necessary, for me to go into such questions. A certain amount has been deposited as security. This security that has been furnished in any of these applications which I have disposed of to-day, will continue, until two weeks after making the orders on the proceedings. After that, the security will stand discharged unless the Authorities have taken steps to enforce the same. So far as the petitioners are concerned, this order will be an order of Court, and not consent.
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1959 (2) TMI 41 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... these principles in mind if we examine the facts of this case we find that the requirements of Section 201 as laid down by the Supreme Court in Palivinder Kaur v. State of Punjab 1953CriLJ154 have been, made out. The evidence set out above clearly shows that this accused knew or had reason to believe that an offence had been committed and with that requisite knowledge and with intent to screen the offender from legal punishment, has given false information to P.W. 7, who was interested in bringing the offender to public justice and that this information did mislead P, W. 71 and laid a false trail for him and which false information stood out in its true colours only when P.W. 8 investigated the information given by the accused at the instance of P.W. 7. 28. Therefore, altering the conviction of the accused from Section 302 to Section 201 IPC we convict him accordingly and sentence him to rigorous imprisonment for seven years. HC/K.S.B. Conviction altered and sentence reduced.
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1959 (2) TMI 40 - KARNATAKA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ir and just that the accuracy or otherwise of such information will have to be ascertained and the only way of doing so is to give an opportunity to the assessee who can urge his plea as to whether the Income Tax Officer is misinformed. At any rate, giving this opportunity the Income Tax Officer will always be in a better position to know as to what extent that information is right and whether he should act upon it or not." 22. The Full Bench decision of the Madras High Court in Gunda Subbayya v. Commissioner of Income Tax, has been relied upon by his Lordship. 23. Taking into consideration all the facts and circumstances of this case I find that the question that has been referred to us for decision should be answered in the negative. The petition is allowed with costs. Advocate's fee ₹ 100 (one set of costs). 24. (C.P. 30 of 1956) This order will govern the connected petition No. 31 of 1956 a copy of which should be kept in the file of the connected petition.
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1959 (2) TMI 39 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... lthough there is provision for prosecution and daily fines, a leisurely correspondence goes on, and of course nobody has need to be aware until told on solemn affirmation that in a congested living space, numerous mills are going on merrily, contributing their quota to the already unbearable smoke nuisance of the city and its suburbs, without erecting chimneys, and using whatever fuel comes handy. The inevitable conclusion must be that the restrictions imposed by the Act are by no means too wide or unconscionably strict or constitutionally unreasonable. The fact is that they are not wide enough, and not administered with that sense of urgency which is imperative, and without which, this statute will like its predecessor, be very soon relegated to the limbo of oblivion, like so many other statutes relating to public health and sanitation, so bravely promulgated and so utterly wasted. 11. The rule is discharged, interim orders if any, vacated. There will be no order for costs.
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1959 (2) TMI 38 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... d only be decided by the appropriate Income Tax authority. It was a matter of discretion with the Income Tax Officer as the proviso only contains an enabling provision giving powers to the Income Tax Officer to reduce or waive the interest payable by the assessee. There is no mandatory direction that he must always do so. In this particular case, no question can arise for interference by this Court in respect of the exercise of the discretion by the Income Tax Officer when it is not even asserted that the Income Tax Officer paid no heed to this provision of law and that he ignored it when he passed the order. In all these circumstances, this ground also has no force. 3. The petition fails and is dismissed with costs, 4. This order will also govern the Civil Miscellaneous Writ No. 748 of 1956 in which also the same principles of law are involved and the facts are similar though the figures or relevant years may be slightly different. That petition is also dismissed with costs.
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1959 (2) TMI 37 - PUNJAB AND HARYANA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ome up on the next date fixed is not proper compliance of Section 344 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, and if there is, as is apparent, no legal order remanding the accused to police custody, the detention obviously would be questionable. 11. The learned Assistant Advocate-General for the State had no real answer to the contentions raised but suggested that in any event today (at the time of the hearing of the petition) the detenu was in proper legal custody, for the challan for those offences had meanwhile been put in Court. The submission is wholly untenable. In point of time, the question has to be settled whether at the time of arrest of the detenu, the detention was legal or not. 12. For all these reasons and considerations, I have no manner of doubt that the detention of the petitioner on the day he was taken into custody, e.g., 7th January, 1959, was wholly illegal. In this view, this petition must succeed and the petitioner detenu must regain his liberty forthwith.
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1959 (2) TMI 36 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... manifest error apparent on the face of the record in taking proceedings in the manner in which he has done. Consequently, we allow this petition to the extent that a writ of mandamus shall issue to the opposite party directing him not to take any proceeding for recovery of the tax in pursuance of the notice dated the 4th November, 1955. We make it clear that this order will not stand in the way of the Income-tax Officer taking any other proceeding for the recovery of the tax against the petitioners, if permitted by law. In this case, though we are allowing the petition, the main grounds which were raised by the petitioners have not succeeded and consequently we direct that parties shall bear their own costs of this petition. Considering that this case raised complicated questions and had to be argued before us for about 5 days, we fix the fee for counsel on each side at ₹ 500 even though it is not necessary to fix it just at present for the purpose of taxation of fees.
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1959 (2) TMI 35 - KERALA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... stration. We do not see anything wrong in the said clauses of the deed warranting the rejection of the application of the assessee for registration, if we are to take into consideration the deed as a whole. These are only conditions prescribing the manner in which the business has to be conducted. Hence following, the aforesaid decision of the Tribunal, we hold that there is no justifiable reason to reject the application of the assessee for registration. We, therefore, direct the Income-tax Officer to grant registration to the assessee." The conclusion reached by the Tribunal appears to be correct and in the light of what we have stated above the question referred has to be answered in the affirmative. We do so, though in the circumstances of the case without any order as to costs. A copy of this judgment under the seal of the court and the signature of the Registrar will be sent to the Appellate Tribunal as provided in section 66(5) of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922.
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1959 (2) TMI 34 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... een infringed, it is not an error of law at all; and so an application for the issue of a writ of certiorari based on the alleged infringement of the rule must fail. 19. We would like to add that, if we had felt inclined to take a contrary view about the character of the rules, we would have considered the question as to whether it would not be more appropriate to place this matter before the learned judges who decided the case of R. Rama Reddiar, Civil Appeal No. 783 of 1957, D/- 6-2-1958 (supra), to deal with the question as to whether their decision has been properly interpreted in the present proceedings or not. However, on the view we take about the character of the relevant order, no other question really survives. 20. The result is both the appeals fail and must be dismissed with costs, one set in each. Sarkar J. 21. In view of the judgment of this Court in Civil Appeal No. 37 of 1958 (AIR 1959 SC 694), I agree with the judgment of my learned Brother Gajendragadkar J.
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1959 (2) TMI 33 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ether the inferior tribunal has exceeded its jurisdiction or has not proceeded in accordance with the essential requirements of law which it was meant to administer." The words "law which it was meant to administer" are very significant. The Transport Authorities in the present case were certainly meant to administer the orders issued under s. 43-A. 37. There is one thing more that I wish to observe in this connection. It may be that an order which it is the bounden duty of the Transport Authority to obey may give it a certain amount of discretion, but that in my view would not make the order any the less a law. If the discretion has been duly exercised, there would be no error of law for the law itself gives the discretion. It would be the bounden duty of the tribunal to observe that law and so if necessary to exercise the discretion given by it. 38. For the reasons earlier mentioned, however, I agree that the appeal should be dismissed. 39. Appeal dismissed.
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1959 (2) TMI 32 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... hat in case we found for the plaintiffs on the question of infringement of copyright the damages to which the plaintiffs would be entitled should be ₹ 500; accordingly, we hold the plaintiffs are entitled to recover damages ₹ 500 from the defendants. It is not permissible for the plaintiffs-appellants to ask for an account of the profits made by the respondents, in addition to damages for infringement of copyright. In the result, the appeal is allowed the decree and judgment of Ramaswami, J. are set aside and the appellants are given a decree, for injunction in terms of Clause (a) of paragraph 15 of the plaint, and also a decree for damages in the sum of ₹ 500 with interest at 6 per cent per annum payable from this date till recovery. All other claims made in the plaint are refused, 12. The appellants will be entitled to get their costs incurred during the trial before Ramaswami, J, from the respondents. But there will be no order as to costs in the appeal.
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1959 (2) TMI 31 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... also to quash the order of the Commissioner of Income-tax passed in revision by which that order was confirmed. The question of issuing a writ of mandamus to direct the Income-tax Officer; to withdraw the notice of demand issued by him on the basis of the order under section 35 of the Income-tax Act does not arise because, once that order of rectification under section 35 of the Act is quashed, the notice of demand automatically become ineffective. For these reasons, we allow this petition and quash the order of the Income-tax Officer dated 13th December, 1954, passed under section 35 of the Income-tax Act and the order of the Commissioner of Income-tax dated 18th September, 1955, passed in revision confirming that order of the Income-tax Officer. The petitioner will be entitled to costs of this petition form the Department which we fix at ₹ 400. For purposes of taxation, the fee of learned counsel for the Department will be taken at the same amount. Petition allowed.
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1959 (2) TMI 30 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... a party. We are unable to read s. 57 as making cl. XVI in the Sixth Schedule a statutory provision by which certain disputes between any and every person have to be referred to arbitration. It was said on behalf of the appellant that the licence is a statutory document’ That, in our view, is a loose way of putting the thing. By that the utmost that can be meant is that it is issued under the terms of a statutory provision and must comply with the provisions thereof. But that cannot convert it into a statutory provision for reference to arbitration of disputes irrespective of the parties between whom the disputes may exist. In our view, therefore, cl. XVI of the Sixth Schedule of the Act of 1948 contains no provision for arbitration, statutory or otherwise, for reference of the dispute of the nature we have before us, between a licensed supplier of electricity and a consumer of it from him. In the result, this appeal fails and is dismissed with costs. Appeal dismissed.
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