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Showing 201 to 220 of 249 Records
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1984 (1) TMI 50 - MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... laced on a decision of this court in CIT v. Ratanlal Mishrilal 1983 143 ITR 929 (MP), wherein it was held that in the instant case the assessee had discharged the burden cast on him by the Explanation to s.271(1)(c). He had explained that the amount was a loan from his father and unless the I.T. authorities had something more than a mere estimate of the father s ability to save the amount in question, the guilt of concealment could not be held to have been established and no penalty could be levied in the circumstances of the case. It was also observed that the proof necessary under this Explanation is not one as required in a criminal case. If the assessee has tendered proof of such explanation and the Department was not convinced with it, merely on the possibility of its being unlikely, the conclusion that concealment was established would not be warranted. Accordingly, we dismiss the application by saying that no question of law arises. The parties to bear their own costs.
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1984 (1) TMI 49 - RAJASTHAN HIGH COURT
Firm Assessment ... ... ... ... ..... ious that the other family members would be grief stricken and attending to the ceremonies and rituals which continue for about 13 days. Hence, the delay in executing the new partnership deed is quite natural, and no adverse inference can be drawn. As regards the legal aspect, we have held in D.B. Income-tax Reference No. 25 of 1973, decided on January 30, 1984 Addl. CIT v. M. K. M. Moosa Bhoy Amin 1984 148 ITR 89 (Raj) that the view of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in Nandlal Sohanlal s case 1977 110 ITR 170 (P and H) FB , has been dissented from by the other High Courts and we have also not followed the view taken by the Punjab and Haryana High Court, but have agreed with the view expressed by other High Courts, including Allahabad, Calcutta, Andhra Pradesh, Gujarat and Madras. We may only refer to the latest authority of the Delhi High Court in CIT v. Sant Lal Arvind Kumar 1982 136 ITR 379. In view of the above discussion, the reference is answered in the affirmative.
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1984 (1) TMI 48 - RAJASTHAN HIGH COURT
Firm Assessment ... ... ... ... ..... by the Delhi, Allahabad, Madras, Orissa, Madhya Pradesh, Andhra Pradesh and Gujarat High Courts and dissent from the view taken by the Punjab and Haryana High Court. Since the matter has already been discussed at length in various judgments of the High Courts noted above, especially in CIT v. Sant Lal Arvind Kumar 1982 136 ITR 379 (Delhi), we do not think it necessary to discuss the matter in detail. The assessee-firm dissolved automatically on the death of one of its partners, Shri Shamsuddin, on June 11, 1968, in terms of s. 42 of the Partnership Act and a new partnership came into existence with effect from June 12, 1968, and was governed by the new partnership deed executed on June 13, 1968, and, therefore was a separate entity altogether. Therefore, s. 187(2) of the Act was not applicable in the present case and there should have been two separate assessments of the two different firms in the assessment year 1969-70. Therefore, we answer the question in the affirmative.
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1984 (1) TMI 47 - MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT
Advance Tax, Appeals, Failure To File Estimate U/S 212(3a) ... ... ... ... ..... bility to tax under the provisions of the Act if the option given to the appropriate officer under the provisions of the Act is judicially exercised. The Full Bench distinguished the two cases to the contrary in National Products v. CIT 1977 108 ITR 935 (Kar) and Bhikhoobhai N. Shah v. CIT 1978 114 ITR 197 (Guj). In the Karnataka case, it was held that the levy of penal interest under s. 139 or under s. 215 of the Act is made in the regular assessment order and under these two sections a discretion is vested in the ITO to waive or reduce penal interest. This is not the case so far as levy of penal interest under s. 217(1A) of the Act is concerned. Here no discretion is given for levying of interest which is given at a particular rate. There is no power given to waive or reduce the rate of interest. Therefore, the reference is answered in the negative, in favour of the Department and against the assessee. In the circumstances of the case , there shall be no order as to costs.
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1984 (1) TMI 46 - MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT
Appeal To AAC ... ... ... ... ..... of s. 141. The reason for prohibiting such an appeal obviously was that such provisional assessment did not bind either the assessee or the Revenue and an appeal is provided against the regular assessment at the end of the assessment proceeding. The prohibition contained in s. 141(7) did not apply to the present case, because the appeal preferred was not against the provisional assessment but against the order of the ITO at the end of the assessment proceeding, refusing to refund the amount in deposit in excess of the tax liability determined in the assessment proceeding. As a result of the aforesaid discussion, it follows that both these references must be answered in the affirmative, in favour of the assessee and against the Revenue as under In the facts and circumstances of the case, the appeal filed by the applicant before the Appellate Assistant Commissioner of Income-tax was maintainable under section 246 of the Income-tax Act, 1961. Parties will bear their own costs.
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1984 (1) TMI 45 - ORISSA HIGH COURT
Income, Works Contract ... ... ... ... ..... o supplied. Therefore, since no element of profit was involved in the turnover represented by the cost of stores/material supplied by the M. E. S. to the assessee-firms, the income or profits derived by the assessee-firms from such contracts will have to be determined on the basis of the value of the contracts represented by the cash payments received by the assessee-firms from the M.E.S. Department exclusive of the cost of the material/stores received for being used, fixed or incorporated in the works undertaken by them. Admittedly, in this case certain materials were supplied by the contractee to the petitioner and the cost of the same has been deducted from the bill. In view of the decision cited above, we are of the opinion that the petitioner is entitled to deduction of the cost of the materials supplied to him by the contractee from the gross receipt. The reference is answered accordingly in favour of the assessee. There shall be no order as to costs. MISRA J.-I agree.
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1984 (1) TMI 44 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
HUF, Hindu Law ... ... ... ... ..... 01 ITR 776. In that case, the HUF consisted of a sole member who was the appellant before the Supreme Court, his wife and his married daughter. The Supreme Court held, as far as the wife and minor daughter were concerned, they not being coparceners of the appellant, had neither a right by birth in the property nor the right to demand its partition nor indeed the right to restrain the appellant from alienating the property for any purpose whatsoever. It is true that, in that case, it so happened that the property in question had been thrown by the sole surviving coparcener into the family hotchpot which had no other property, but the principle laid down which we have pointed out above, was not limited to those facts but was of general application. The questions aforesaid admit of only one answer and that is in favour of the assessee and against the Department. There would be no purpose in referring such questions to the High Court. In the result, rule is discharged with costs.
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1984 (1) TMI 43 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
Audit Objection, Estate Duty, Information, Reassessment ... ... ... ... ..... tment, fairly stated that mistakes had been pointed out to the Asst. Controller upon a revenue audit. It is clear now in law that audit objections do not furnish information to the tax authorities which enable them to reopen assessments under the W.T. Act, 1957, I.T. Act, 1961, E.D. Act, 1953, etc. Mr. Joshi submitted that what was pointed out by the revenue audit to the Asst. Controller in the present case was information upon which he was entitled under s. 59 of the E.D. Act to reopen the assessment to estate duty of Kasturbai s estate. I cannot agree. What it comes to is this upon the communication by the revenue audit, the Asst. Controller changed his opinion as to the details of the valuation of the shares of the private limited company, and such change of opinion does not constitute information within the meaning of the section. The notice, accordingly, must be set aside. The petition is made absolute in terms of prayer (a) of the petition, with costs. Rule accordingly.
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1984 (1) TMI 42 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
Depreciation, Firm ... ... ... ... ..... is, therefore, unnecessary to go into the question as to whether under the general law, a reconstituted partnership firm should be taken to be separate and independent entity as contended by the learned counsel for the assessee. As a result of the above discussion, we have to hold that there was no dissolution of the firm consisting of Ramanathan Chettiar and Meyammai Achi constituted under the deed dated February 26, 1962, and that as the same assessable entity has continued even after September 30, 1964, the assessee can claim depreciation allowance only on the written down value of Rs. 14,61,721.95 and not on the notional value of Rs. 33,50,000 at which the mill and the mill assets were valued at the time of the partition of the family of Ramanathan Chettiar which owned 10 annas share in the partnership. We have to, therefore, answer both the questions in the negative and against the assessee. The assessee will pay the costs of the Revenue. Counsel s fee Rs. 500 (one set).
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1984 (1) TMI 41 - RAJASTHAN HIGH COURT
Firm, Registration ... ... ... ... ..... Tribunal. The statement of the case shows that the application for continuation of registration that was filed on June 28, 1968, bears the signature of the partners including the deceased partner, Shri Janak Raj, indicating that the said application was signed by the partners before the death of Shri Janak Raj on October 13, 1966, and due to oversight the said application could not be filed along with the return on September 29, 1966. In the circumstances, the Tribunal was justified in holding that the failure on the part of the assessee to file the declaration prior to June 28, 1968, was under the bona fide belief of the partners of the assessee that the application had already been filed by Janak Raj. In the facts and circumstances of the case, the Tribunal cannot be said to have committed any error in condoning the delay in filing a declaration under s. 184(7) of the I.T. Act, 1961, for the assessment year 1966-67. The reference is, therefore, answered in the affirmative.
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1984 (1) TMI 40 - MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT
Capital Gains, Deduction ... ... ... ... ..... of a land constituted part of actual cost of assessee for the purpose of determining the capital gain derived from the sale of the land, but this ruling has no relevance to the facts of the present case. We agree with the Tribunal that only those expenses which have been actually incurred by the assessee in making additions and improvements in the property ought to be taken into consideration while computing capital gains under s. 55(1)(b) of the Act. The expenses incurred by the firm which came to the share of the assessee has been allowed while those which came to the share of the other partners have been rightly disallowed. Since it was a self-acquired property of the assessee, s. 49 of the I.T. Act has no application as the property was not acquired in any of the modes mentioned in that section. Accordingly, the question referred is answered in the negative, in favour of the Department and against the assessee. Under the circumstances, the parties to bear their own costs.
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1984 (1) TMI 39 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
Delay In Filing Return ... ... ... ... ..... n made by him. We respectfully differ from this view. Section 139(4) does not make the entire proviso applicable but it makes only the provisions of sub-clause (iii) of the proviso applicable, i.e., that part of the proviso, which provides for payment of interest for late furnishing of the return. It does not lay down that all the provisions of the entire proviso must be applied. If a person applies for extension of time, he comes within the ambit of s. 139(1) and the proviso to it. But if a person does not make such an application, the Legislature has given him a right to file a return of income even in such a case under s. 139(4) but has saddled him with an obligation to pay interest as it would have been payable if he had made an application for extension of time. In the premises, the question is answered in the negative and in favour of the Revenue. In the facts and circumstances of this case, each party will pay and bear its own costs. UMESH CHANDRA BANERJEE J.-I agree.
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1984 (1) TMI 38 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
Estate Duty, Gift By Deceased ... ... ... ... ..... after the donee was adopted by the donor. It has not been found as a fact that after the adoption the donee brought back the amount into the hotchpot of the joint family. The control which the donee initially had over the amount remained unaltered even after the adoption. The Supreme Court held in CED v. Kamlavali 1979 120 ITR 456, that where the amounts of the gift were invested in a firm, where the donor was a partner, there was no relinquishment of the enjoyment and possession of the donee over the subject-matter of the gift as a result of such investment. The same principles may be applied in the facts and circumstances of the case. The possession, enjoyment or benefits of the donor in the subject-matter of the property in the instant case remained consistent with the factum of the gift. In the facts and circumstances the question referred is answered in the affirmative and in favour of the accountable person. There will be no order as to costs. C. K. BANERJI J.-I agree.
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1984 (1) TMI 37 - DELHI HIGH COURT
Capital Gains, Tenancy Rights ... ... ... ... ..... sition of the asset. A subsidiary point may also be noticed in which the Tribunal had directed the determination of the value of tenancy right as on January 1, 1954, and to deduct the amount from Rs. 30,000 which the assessee received. It opined that the balance would represent capital gains subject to statutory exemption. The authorities under the Act have no jurisdiction or power to direct the ascertainment of the cost of acquisition in relation to a capital asset. The option is given to the assessee whether to adopt the cost of acquisition of the asset to the assessee or the fair market value of asset on the 1st day of January, 1954. The assessee has not exercised the option, nay, he has not even been called upon to do so. There is, therefore, no basis for directing the determination of the value of the tenancy rights as on January 1, 1954. The question is, therefore, answered in the favour of the assessee and against the Revenue with no order as to costs. GOEL J.-I agree.
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1984 (1) TMI 36 - PUNJAB AND HARYANA HIGH COURT
Burden Of Proof, Income Tax Proceedings, Penalty ... ... ... ... ..... ividend income belonged to the partners. The Tribunal further held the view that there was no positive evidence to draw an inference that the assessee is guilty of any concealment regarding the income from the dividends. Conversely put, the conduct of the assessee and the entertainment of his bona fide belief, as explained by him was sufficient evidence for the Tribunal to take the view that on preponderance of probabilities, the assessee had discharged the burden that lay on him. Thus, we are of the considered view that there was evidence before the Tribunal on all the aforesaid three particulars from which it could be said that the assessee had discharged the burden that lay on him under the Explanation to s. 271(1)(c) of the I.T. Act, 1961. For the foregoing reasons, the question framed is answered in the affirmative, in favour of the assessee and against the Revenue. In the circumstances of the case, there would, however, be no order as to costs. R. N. MITTAL J.-I agree.
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1984 (1) TMI 35 - PUNJAB AND HARYANA HIGH COURT
Appeal To Tribunal, Limitation ... ... ... ... ..... ctions of competent authority under the Act. It seems that for this, reason Shri, H. K. Ahuja was under a mistaken notion that the limitation for filing an appeal against the order of the competent authority was also 60 days. It is now well recognised that no litigant should ordinarily suffer for a mistake of his counsel. If any authority for this proposition is needed, reference may be made to a Division Bench judgment of this court in Smt. Nirmal Khosla v. Union of India, AIR 1976 P and H 22. In that case, because of the wrong calculation made by a counsel, the appeal had been filed beyond limitation. The Bench condoned the delay in filing the Letters Patent Appeal. As a result, we allow the appeal and set aside the order dated March 24, 1975, of the Appellate Tribunal, and allow the application for condonation of delay and remit the appeal to the Appellate Tribunal, for fresh decision on merits. The respondents shall pay the appellants costs which are assessed at Rs. 500.
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1984 (1) TMI 33 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... s of the association. It was also not argued before the Tribunal that the main activity of the Association was, and the income of the Association was being actually spent for the purpose of, promoting good relationship between workmen and workmen or good relationship between workmen and employers. On an overall view of the rules and regulations framed and bearing in mind the type and the nature of the membership of the association, it cannot be said that the association was formed primarily for the purpose of promoting good relationship between employees and employees or between employers and workmen. In that view of the matter, question No. 2 is answered in the affirmative and in favour of the Revenue. The question No. 1 is concluded by the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of CIT v. Indian Sugar Mills Association 1974 97 ITR 486 and is also answered in the negative and in favour of the Revenue. Each party will pay and bear its own costs. SATISH CHANDRA C.J.-I agree.
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1984 (1) TMI 32 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
Reference, Wealth Tax ... ... ... ... ..... manner as expressive of our agreement or disagreement with the said decision. That would not be correct to do so. However, it does seem to us that in the said decision, the controversy which is at hand here was treated to be a question of law and was dealt with as such. In these circumstances, we have felt that a question of law does arise in the instant case and accordingly, we allow these applications and direct the Appellate Tribunal to state the case and refer the following question of law. We shall frame the question in such a manner that both the sides may be able to make their submissions Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Appellate Tribunal was in error in holding that the assessee was not liable to wealth-tax on the value of his interest in the association of persons ? In our view, the two questions whose reference the Department is seeking will be covered by the question that we have framed. The Department will be entitled to its costs.
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1984 (1) TMI 31 - RAJASTHAN HIGH COURT
Impartible Estate, Mitakshara School, Succession By Promogeniture, Wealth Tax ... ... ... ... ..... nother case reported in Gopal Singh v. State of Rajasthan 1983 WLN 375, a learned Single judge (who is a party to the present order also) had, relying on Thakur Gopal Singh s case 1975 99 ITR 354, held that if the impartible character of the property was lost on account of the resumption of the jagir, then the property would still bear the character of a joint family property. It will not be out of place to mention that the learned counsel for the Department has not challenged the view taken by these authorities and has not pointed out any distinguishing features in the present case. In these circumstances, we are clearly of the opinion that questions Nos. 1 to 3 should be answered in the negative. It may be added that when the assets themselves were of the joint Hindu family and not of the assessee in his individual capacity, the income derived from the investments made in the names of the minor sons of the assessee could also not be covered under s. 64(iv) of the I.T. Act.
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1984 (1) TMI 30 - KARNATAKA HIGH COURT
Deduction, Other Sources ... ... ... ... ..... sit by premature termination of the deposit. There is, therefore, no reason why he should not be given the benefit of s. 57(iii) of the Act. The Tribunal has correctly concluded in the matter. Mr. H. Raghavendra Rao, learned counsel for the Revenue, however, relied upon the decision of this court in H. H. Maharajakumari Meenakshideviavaru v. CIT (I.T.R.C. No. 183 of 1981, disposed of on November 17, 1983 1984 150 ITR 247 (Kar) ). That case, in our opinion, has no application to the facts of the present case, since the premature termination of the fixed deposit therein was not for the purpose of earning income by way of purchasing any asset. That was a plain case of withdrawal upon premature termination of fixed deposit and, consequently, repaying the excess interest to the bank. It was not shown in that case that the fixed deposit was prematurely withdrawn for the purpose of earning any income. In the result, we answer the question in the affirmative and against the Revenue.
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